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By the mid-1970s, Tanzania had the biggest co-operative movement in Africa and 
the oldest in East Africa. Despite such achievement, for decades, the literature on 
Tanzania’s small-scale coffee and cotton cultivation and marketing co-operatives has 
suffered from a dearth of substantive historical accounts. The available literature is 
fragmented along various academic disciplines, mostly political science and 
sociology. In addition, there is no single substantive secondary historical study 
specifically dedicated to the co-operative movement since the inception in 1932. The 
neglect is more critical given the current renaissance in Africa and increasing 
international interest in the co-operative movement at either national or local levels. 
This thesis seeks to fill this gap by utilising primary sources from the Co-operative 
College archive in Manchester and Tanzania National Archive (TNA) to examine and 
evaluate the coffee and cotton marketing co-operatives during the 1932 to 1982 
period. The study further explores the interlocking forces and policies that led to its 
growth and development. The development is also examined against the changing 
political and ideological influences during the interwar, and post-war to 
independence periods.  
 
This thesis is structured under three cases, two of which are coffee marketing co-
operatives, the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) and Bukoba Co-
operative Union (BCU) in Kagera; and the cotton apex marketing co-operative in the 
WCGA, the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions (VFCUS) which was formed 
in 1955. Study findings show that the time gap in the formation of the mentioned co-
operatives were due to the colonial authority neglecting its own co-operative 
development policy. The evidence shows that, the KNCU which was formed in 1933 
and BCU in 1950 were both established at the behest of the British colonial 
government in a move to control the coffee industry. Importantly, the study examines 
the power relations involved and the government interventions in the process and 
the extent to which the co-operatives were promoted and controlled by the 
government through the co-operative and agricultural marketing policies and 
legislations. This was particularly provided under Section 36 of the 1932 co-operative 
legislation and was further reinforced by three policies, the 1934 Chagga Rule, the 
iv 
 
1937 Native (control and marketing) Ordinance and the Defence Ordinance, Orders 
of 1939 and 1940; and the African Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) 
Ordinance, 1949.  
 
The post-colonial authority perpetuated the colonial policies in promoting co-
operatives and the control of agricultural export revenues provided under the 1962 
by the National Agricultural Products Board (Control and Marketing) Act by 
intensifying the intervention, effectively strangling and restructuring them to provide 
for effective control. Again, there was an increased politisation of the movement’s 
function as they became an integral part of the propagation of the socialist/ujamaa 
ideology and the national development plan as the 1976 villagisation policy. 
 
This study is of the view that the colonial and post-colonial authorities intervened in 
the formation of co-operatives given the fact that they were economic strategically 
vital. During the phases covered in this thesis, the established legislations reinforced 
the government’s control over the co-operative movement and the producers; and 
granted themselves a monopoly over the handling and export of small-scale 
produced coffee and cotton through the control of marketing boards by appointing 
co-operatives as crop handling agents. Thus, the co-operative movement never 
attained autonomous status as it became part of the government machinery in 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT 
1.0: INTRODUCTION  
This thesis examines the development of the co-operative movement during the 
colonial and post-colonial eras in Tanzania, that is, from 1932 – 1982 period. The 
rise of the co-operative movement in Tanzania commenced following the 
promulgation of the legislation in 1932 to support cash crop marketing. Agricultural 
production was encouraged by the British colonial authority to foster the colony’s 
economic and financial self-sufficiency whilst meeting British industry and consumer 
demands.1 The co-operative movement was the vehicle employed in the colonial and 
post-colonial era for handling the collection of produce from growers, quality control, 
processing, and delivery to marketing boards for export.  
 
Iliffe work is a comprehensive and fully-documented history of Tanzania from 1800 to 
1961 about the social, political and economic history of some ethnic groups’ pre-
colonial as well as the German and British colonial history in the country.2 He made 
attempts to analyse the intensification of the inter-war agricultural exploitation of, for 
example, the cotton small-scale growers in the WCGA. Similarly, the post-war 
colonial agricultural development covering such schemes as Kongwa, Nachingwea 
and Urambo groundnuts schemes as well as the Sukuma Development Scheme 
geared to increase cotton productivity that were all envisaged to salvage the 
collapsing British post-war economy. He, also examines the rural agricultural change 
and development of co-operative movement was not the natives’ initiative, but he 
viewed them to have taken place in response to the capitalist economic demands. 
He briefly, examined the reorganisation of the KNPA into KNCU; but, pays little 
                                                          
1 Extract from minutes of meeting of the Directors of Agriculture for East African 
countries (Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, held in Nairobi in June 12th 1946, TNA 
26054; Billy Frank, Billy Frank, The Formation of British Colonial Development Policy 
in the Trans World Wars Two Period, 1942-1953: With special reference to central 
and southern Africa, unpublished PhD thesis, (Edge Hill Lancaster university, 2002), 
p.16; Melville J. Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa, (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1952), p. 219; Michael Havinden and David Meredith, Colonialism and 
Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960,(London: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 299 -301; B. King, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development: Survey of British Colonial Development Policy, (IBRD- Economic 
Department, November 9th 1949), p. iv. 
2 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, (Cambridge: University Press, 1979). 
2 
 
attention on the factors that prompted the reorganisation and mechanism as well as 
processes employed.3  
 
In examining agriculture crop marketing this study employs the functional and 
institutional approaches.4 The functional approach comprised of a number of 
functions such as growers selling their crops and buyers buying/assembling of crops, 
processing, and financing. The institutional approach functions that involve 
individuals (merchants, middlemen, retailers) and agents, mainly facilitative 
organisations such as co-operatives and marketing boards and enterprises) all being 
key in the marketing function. The existing literature for example, by Iliffe has tended 
neglect the relationship provided by the two mentioned approaches.5 Iliffe pays little 
attention and has generalised the agriculture marketing. He also treats cash crop 
production and co-operatives separately. Consequently, so little is known about 
agricultural marketing that this study investigates. Additionally, they are 
predominantly based on secondary sources, so there is a lack of historical rigour of 
studies that have considered agricultural marketing co-operatives and this thesis 
attempts to address this void.  
 
Andrew Coulson work in Tanzania covers political and economic development during 
three epochs which are pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial.6 Some of the 
aspects that are covered include colonisation politics by the Germans and British 
and discusses political struggle for independence. Interestingly, Coulson in his work, 
he covers aspects which are the focus of this thesis such as cash crop production 
and marketing policies, the agricultural marketing co-operative movement during 
colonial and post-colonial eras. However, Coulson work lacks evidence. Where he 
managed to support his arguments he relies on secondary sources. In most cases 
as shall be shown in this thesis, Coulson has produced misleading evidences on one 
                                                          
3 John  Iliffe, (1979), p. 279. 
4 R.L. Kohl and J.N. Uhl, Marketing of Agricultural Products, (New York: MacMillan, 
1972). 
5 John Iliffe, (1979).   




hand and has muddled details on the other which proved in this thesis that are 
wrong. 
 
The co-operative movement in the British colonies is well documented by some 
historians as Rita Rhodes7 and co-operators as Margaret Digby8 and Strickland9 all 
these, have a lot in common regarding the co-operative movement worldwide. 
Rhodes and Strickland have presented the co-operative movement in Britain and 
how Robert Owen, William King and the Rochdale influenced its growth and 
development which had an impact to the colonies such as India, where its legislation 
was borrowed in many other countries which were under British colonial rule such as 
Malaya (Malaysia), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Cyprus and some African countries such as 
Kenya. 
 
But, development in Tanzania not only ignored, but also not mentioned despite a 
progress shown by the passage of the legislation. But also, the impact of the 1932 
co-operative legislation that led to the registration of the KNCU and its affiliated 
societies with effect from January 1933. She, also traces how, and why Britain 
promoted the co-operative model as part of its development strategy in British 
colonies after the Second World War when the co-operative movement was 
employed as an economic transformation tool in the British colonies as well as in the 
post-colonial era. Such development was evident in Tanzania where it was 
employed for the realisation of development strategies. Rhodes has published on the 
history of the co-operative movement and in the British Empire in which she focused 
on Kenya, particularly the European communities.10 In this regard, there is practically 
nothing was in place for the natives. So to say, her publication is practically nothing 
that explains why the Kenya natives were not considered. Strickland has established 
that the co-operative legislation in Kenya was designed to serve Europeans, but not 
                                                          
7 Rita Rhodes, Empire and co-operation: How the British Empire used co-operatives 
in its development strategies 1900–1970, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2012). 
8 Margaret Digby, The World Co-operative Movement, (London: Hutchinson and 
Company Limited, 1960). 
9 C.F. Strickland, Co-operation in the Colonies, (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Co. Ltd., 1945). 
10 C.F. Strickland, (1945), p.38. 
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for Africans and it does not give controlling power to the Registrar.11 He further 
emphasized by justifying the policy that, ‘it would be unwise to form co-operatives 
societies of Africans under this Ordinance’.12  
 
In her work, Rhodes has ignored the contribution of the Tanzania’s colonial authority 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s in providing the Colonial Office (CO) impetus for 
promoting the co-operative movement in the colonies (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.2 
and 3.3). She also fails to acknowledge that, Tanzania was the first East African 
country to promulgate the co-operative legislation in 1932. Under the legislation the 
native had their agricultural marketing co-operative registered and it was not so for 
the natives in the two East African countries of Kenya and Uganda who had such 
opportunity for the first time in 1945; thus, Tanzanian co-operative movement was 
the oldest in East Africa. In this regard, there is a significant research gap to fill in the 
role played by the Colonial Office (CO), colonial authority and growers in the growth 
and development of the co-operative movement in Tanzania during colonial rule. 
 
Whereas some authors like Rhodes do not recognise the Tanzania’s co-operative 
movement. Other authors like Spaull13 does, by emphasising that, by 1961 Tanzania 
is perhaps among all East and Central Africa countries (Kenya, Uganda and Zambia) 
the most co-operative minded country. According to Spaull, this can be judged by the 
fact that one-third of the National Assembly members were active co-operators, of 
which four of them became cabinet ministers soon after independence (see Chapter 
3, Section 3.5). Spaull points out that, the co-operative movement is responsible for 
one-third of county’s export handled by 750 co-operative societies and produced by 
340,000 individuals who are the members of out 10 million of the Tanzania 
populations. Spaull concludes his evaluation that, out of the identified figures, the 
people of Tanzania proudly claim that the co-operative movement is the biggest in 
Africa. Whereas Spaull acknowledges achievement that was attained by Tanzania’s 
co-operative movement a lot of questions need to be addressed. Voluntary 
                                                          
11 C.F. Strickland, (1933), pp.55. 
12 C.F. Strickland, (1933), pp.55-56. 
13 Hebe Spaull,  The Co-operative Movement in the World Today, (London: Barrie 
Rockliff, 1965), pp.93-95. 
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membership is one of the co-operative principles. But, the Tanzania’s 1932 co-
operative legislation made membership compulsory. Nevertheless, membership 
remained small as compared to the total population. This was also reflected in a 
number of societies that was confined within some cash crop producing areas (see 
Chapter 3, Sections 3.2 and 3.3). It also illustrates that, such small number was 
easily reached and the majority were either underserved or unreached for over 30 
years, which suggests the colonial authority had done little to reach them. 
 
Additionally, Spaull has presented some general figures, evaluation and conclusions 
that failed to reveal development based on regions and cash producing areas. She 
has neglected the historical development of the co-operative movement in Tanzania 
that, this thesis takes such interest. Where attempt has been made, Spaull proved to 
struggle as some evidences that she has generated distortions, are misleading and 
contradicting, this is the case with the development in Kagera region. For example, 
she indicates that, in 1949 co-operative societies formed and registered in the region 
to market coffee;14 and the Union, which she has not mentioned, apparently the BCU 
by arguing that, its formation and registration followed, a year or two later that by 
appointment of two companies to handle coffee from growers on its behalf because 
the Union had no means in doing so.15   
 
Digby traces the origin of British consumer and producer co-operative movement, its 
growth and development in the 19th century. As Rhodes, she also examines the 
consumer co-operative the Canada, New Zealand and France by examining their 
business links with those in Britain. The producer co-operative movement in French, 
German under the Nazi and communist regime of China are examined in detail. She 
traces origin of credit co-operatives in Germany are also examined in the same 
volume and the replication of the model in some European countries such as 
Belgium, Scandinavian countries, and North America. However, she pays a limited 
attention to the growth and development of the co-operative movement in other 
developing countries, despite a significant achievement in the 1950s, particularly, in 
                                                          
14 Hebe Spaull,  (1965), p.96. 
15 Hebe Spaull,  (1965), p.96. 
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Tanzania which has mentioned, but there is a lack of historical development in her 
work.   
 
In another work, Digby16 she discusses the growth and development of agricultural 
co-operative movement in the Commonwealth. Again, such development is covered 
in a nutshell and fails to illuminate the colonial authority’s policy and political 
intervention aspect. Her discussion of Tanzania is predominantly about the KNCU, 
Ngoni and Matengo Co-operative Union (NGOMAT). The BCU which was 
established in 1950 is not mentioned and the VFCUs affiliated societies are not 
covered largely because they were formed and registered in the same year when her 
work was published. Thus, this study attempts to fill her gaps by providing in-depth 
development that took place in Kagera and in the WCGA. 
 
Gorst illuminates a brief but a comprehensive history of the co-operative movement 
in the British colonies.17 An attempt is made in her work to show the development not 
only in Asian countries but also in African in which she covers some aspects of each 
country. As a result, the coverage falls short of in depth analysis on the historical 
development. For example, the background to the development and progress that 
took place in Tanzania is briefly presented that this study expands by examining the 
colonial policies, political decision, and the role of various stakeholders in promoting, 
formation and registration of co-operative societies. 
  
Sadleir, who was the officer in the Co-operative Department has published a brief 
work about the history of the co-operative movement in Tanzania from 1925 to 1960. 
Given his position in the Department, obviously he had access to primary evidence 
to the co-operative development in the country. In this book the author presents a 
brief attention given to the KNCU, NGOMAT, Bugufi Coffee Co-operative Society 
                                                          
16 Margaret Digby, Agricultural Co-operation in the Commonwealth, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), pp. 147-150. 
17 Sheila Gorst, Co-operative Organisation in Tropical Countries: A Study of Co-
Operative Development in Non-Self Governing Territories under the United Kingdom 
Administration, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959), pp.165-182. 
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(BCCS), BCU, Rungwe Co-operative Union as well as, the VFCUS.18 In his book, 
Sadleir highlights development of crops among small scale growers, mainly; coffee, 
cotton and tobacco that were marketed by mentioned co-operative societies are also 
briefly examined. This book has several misleading and distorting details regarding 
the general development of the co-operative movement; the same is evident for the 
co-operative unions that this study examines.  For example, he distorts the 
background of the first and second Registrar of co-operative societies in which he 
indicates that Ronald Cecil Northcote was the Director of Lands and Mines, whereas, 
Mr R.S.W. Malcom was District officer. The evidence from primary sources has 
established it was vice versa, but they both served as Registrar of co-operative 
societies in which Northcote was the first when he retired in 1945, Malcom took over.  
 
The policy and political aspects that prompted the promulgation of co-operative 
legislation has completely neglected by Sadleir. The neglect and similar mistake has 
been repeated by the Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT).19 Furthermore, 
Sadleir and the CUT have not provided an account as to why the promotion of the 
co-operative movement in Tanzania was uneven growth. Sadleir, has not 
enlightened how the KNCU, BCU as well as, the VFCUS emerged. The CUT’s 
publication shares the same, but has neglected the VFCUS despite being a 
prominent co-operative organisation in East Africa. Thus, such neglect generates an 
incomplete history of the co-operative movement in Tanzania. Additionally, both 
have neglected the policy aspect and the role played by various stakeholders in 
promoting the co-operative movement that this thesis attempt to address.   
 
Kimario’s work on the co-operative movement in Tanzania that he divided the 
historical narration in two sections, the colonial and post-colonial. 20 The post-colonial 
                                                          
18 .R. Sadleir, The Co-operative Movement in Tanganyika, (Dar Es Salaam: 
Tanganyika Standard Printing Ltd., 1963). 
19 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika, Ushirika Wetu. (Dar Es Salaam: CUT Press, 
1977). 
20 Ally M. Kimario, Marketing Cooperatives in Tanzania: Problems and Prospects, 




section is further subdivided into four sections covering years before and post-ArD 
that span from 1961 to 1967 and 1968 to 1975 respectively. Then the other two sub-
sections are about the villagisation from 1976 to 1982 and the post-co-operative 
reinstatement era from 1982.  
 
Generally, Kimario’s work provides a comprehensive narration of the Tanzania’s co-
operative movement. He has made attempts to narrate a historical development in 
the co-operative movement of various sectors as the agricultural marketing, transport 
co-operative and consumer societies is provided, nonetheless in a nutshell. For 
example, it lacks a historical analysis about the general policies on the cash crop 
marketing and those that led to the growth and development of the co-operative 
movement in Tanzania during the colonial era. He has treated the rise of, for 
example, unions like the KNCU, NGOMAT, BCCS, BCU, and VFCUS with limited 
specific historical background details for each just in not more than four paragraphs. 
Thus, the mentioned union’s specific historical background details fails to reveal how 
and why various stakeholders as the colonial territorial authority, the colonial 
provincial and district officials, the marketing boards and growers played a part in the 
process of formation of the mentioned unions. 
 
Kimario’s narration has limited details and analysis regarding the processes, policy 
linkages and development that led to the reorganisation of the KNPA into KNCU and 
why was it so. He has not been able to establish a link between the 1932 co-
operative legislation and the formation and registration of the KNCU. There is also a 
lack of clear revelation on uneven development of the co-operative movement in the 
country for example, the formation and registration of the NGOMAT, BCCS in 1930s 
and those like the BCU and VFCUS which were formed and registered in the post-
war years in which the policy aspects and the involvement of the CO is neither 
mentioned nor discussed.  
 
The post-colonial phases are well illustrated by Kimario but, there is a lack of policy 
and political analysis regarding to various decisions that led to the changing political 
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and ideological influences of the emerging Tanzanian state shape the co-operative 
movement during the era. There is also some difficulties in Kimario’s work to 
establish a clear continuity and change in the marketing policy and their partnership 
with agricultural marketing co-operatives in the colonial and post-colonial periods. 
For example, the legislation that provided for the formation of the marketing boards 
and powers that they had to appoint the co-operatives as its agencies in handling 
crops from growers. There is also a lack of clarity on the formation of crop authorities 
in the 1970s and the engagement of villages in crop marketing in place of the co-
operative societies. 
 
Lyimo, who is a sociologist examines the Tanzania’s co-operative movement.21 In his 
study, Lyimo used case study in which tobacco and coffee marketing co-operatives 
are examined. In his study the KNCU is one of his cases. However, his focus is 
mainly on governance with more attention given to the participation of the members 
in management of co-operative society. Therefore, the cash crop production, 
marketing history is not part of his study. He neither examines cotton marketing nor 
the historical development of the VFCUS and BCU; this is so because, his coverage 
revolves around 1980s when both were not in existence. This was either due to the 
demolition of the VFCU in 1968 or the BCU forced amalgamation by the government 
to form a new co-operative organisation, the West Region Co-operative Union 
(WERECU) in 1974 or Kagera Region Co-operative Union when the co-operative 
movement in Tanzania was reinstated in 1982. Against the backdrop, Lyimo has 
marginalised the history of cash crop marketing, mainly the coffee marketing co-
operative unions such as the BCU, KNCU. Treatment was the same for cotton 
marketing co-operative, the VFCU and its affiliated unions. 
 
                                                          
21 Francis Lyimo, Peasants Production and Cooperative Experiences in Tanzania: 
Case Studies of Villages in Moshi Rural and Urambo Districts, PhD Thesis, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, (1984).  
10 
 
The co-operative movement is widely discussed in the political science discipline. 
For example, Baldus22 supports and argues that the co-operative movement was 
part and parcel of political struggles with the marginalisation of initiatives by growers 
to have control over marketing of what they produce. He further stresses that, the co-
operative movement from 1967 was part and parcel of implementation of Arusha 
Declaration socialist policy; but, no details are given for the failure to incorporate the 
co-operative movement in building a socialist state that forced the post-colonial 
authority to embark upon the socialist villagisation policy that prompted the abolition 
of the co-operative societies which were replaced by villages as a co-operative 
society entity.  
 
Baldus article clearly provides insignificant position in the economic aspect of the co-
operative movement as an independent organisation and also fails to realise its 
linkages with marketing boards as provided under specific crop marketing legislation 
and policies. He views the whole co-operative movement to a political point of view, 
particularly its support to TANU; in this he failed to distinguish the role of some 
individuals’ engagement in politics and the co-operative society as a member based 
organisation with economic interests. This is a sheer distortion of the history of the 
movement. Importantly, this thesis elaborates when the KNCU, NGOMAT, Bugufi 
Co-operative Society, and BCU were formed which was in 1930s, 1940s and early 
1950s. Historically, the formation of mentioned societies was before the formation of 
any political party in the country as the earliest political organisation was Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) which was formed in Dar Es Salaam in July 1954. 
Thus, TANU was an urban based organisation, whereas agricultural marketing co-
operatives were rural based.   
 
Andreas Eckert23 generalises that, the co-operative movement in Tanzania was 
mainly the result of initiatives from the local rural population. Eckert emphasises that, 
                                                          
22 Rolf D. Baldus, The Tanzanian Cooperative Movement at the Beginning of the 
Eighties: A Comment, Internationales Afrikaforum, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 1980, pp. 63-64. 
23 cited Donald Barton, Some Problems in Local Government, Manuscript, January 
1962 (Rhode House MSS/Afr./S.1230. 
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such a move is ‘from below’, even though the idea was imported from Europe. She 
also maintains and refutes a contention that the co-operative movement generally 
was imposed upon Africans by the British.24 Such generalisation and distortion is 
likely to have been attributed by too much reliance on the unreliable secondary 
sources and it is an obvious ignoring of the primary evidences which shows that the 
KNCU and BCU was imposed from above to growers by the colonial authority and it 
was only the VFCU that emerged from the grassroots. No matter how the co-
operative society emerged, they all fell under control of the government through the 
Registrar as per the co-operative legislation.    
 
A work by Hydén’s, a political scientist focuses on the co-operative organisation’s 
governance of the co-operative movement in Africa at various structure levels, which 
is the co-operation unions;25 and primary society. The governments’ intervention 
through co-operative education, capacity building by Nordic countries as well as the 
regulatory frameworks in the control and management of the co-operative movement 
with more attention given to post-colonial era and development during the colonial 
period is significantly ignored. He also but briefly, examines the historical 
background of the co-operative movement based on the political and sociological 
theoretical perspectives. The title of this work is however, not reflected as the focus 
is mainly about the co-operative movement in Kenya. In some instances, Tanzania 
features, particularly, development of the co-operative movement in Kilimanjaro. He, 
in a nutshell, mentions about the slow growth and development of the co-operative 
movement in Tanzania during the interwar years which was due to a shortage of 
staff,26 an aspect that is well and further documented in this study in which it has 
been explained that the political and policy decisions led to such slow progress. Also, 
the co-operative model in Francophone countries and Uganda is mentioned. It has to 
                                                          
24Andreas Eckert, Useful Instruments of Participation? Local Government and 
Cooperatives in Tanzania, 1940s to1970s, The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, Continuities in Governance in Late Colonial and 
Early Postcolonial East Africa (2007), pp. 97-118, URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40034792 Accessed in July 15th 2013. 
25 Göran Hydén, Efficiency versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives: A Study 
in organizational Conflicts, (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, (Nairobi: East 
African Literature Bureau, 1973). 
26 Göran Hydén, (1973), p.7. 
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be realised that, this work was published in 1971. In that case, the political and policy 
development regarding the reorganisation of the co-operative movement that took 
place after 1971 in Tanzania is not captured that provides a point of departure for 
this study. 
 
One of the contemporary publications is by Oda van Cranenburgh27 which a political 
science discipline thesis on Tanzania’s post-colonial political development from the 
early 1960s to 1980s. She has discussed about the state and constitution reforms 
that led to the mono-political party system. Cranenburgh has also dedicated a 
discussion regarding agricultural marketing. It is against the development of such 
political circumstance in which the post-colonial movement is discussed primarily by 
exploring the evolution of the general trends in the post-colonial co-operative policy 
as well as the relationship between the co-operative societies and marketing boards. 
The boards are explained as effective organisation for handling and export of 
crops.28 This study discusses the changing motivation behind state intervention in 
crop marketing; but Cranenburgh’s pays more attention to the political linkages to the 
marketing structure in the early the 1960s and in the 1970s.29 Cranenburgh account 
is too general and she does not discuss about cash crop production. Yet, her 
discussion lacks primary evidences on the circumstances that prompted the 
government to reinstate the co-operative in 1982.30  
 
Furthermore, Holmén research report on the agriculture marketing co-operative 
movement in African. He traces its roots links to the colonial rule. His examination 
focus is on its role in the development and under which condition the co-operative 
movement can facilitate development and can be employed as 
                                                          
27 Oda van Cranenburgh, The Widening Gyre: The Tanzanian One-Party State and 
Policy Towards Rural Cooperatives, (Eburon: Delft, 1990), pp.144-151. 
28 Rita Rhodes, British Co-operative History, A Paper Presented in the Co-operative 
Movement Workshop, Stockholm, (November 20th  2009), p.18. 
29 Oda Van Cranenburgh, (1990). 
30 Oda Van Cranenburgh, (1990), pp.152-159 
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instruments of development.31  He also points out that, tools to execute certain 
economic on the behalf of the government, and political or ideological functions. In 
this regard, the co-operative movement ceased to act as autonomous, member-
based organisations. It has to be noted here that, Holmén’s argument are based  on  
a  secondary sources review  related to  development,  co-operative movement; 
also  the various  sources  involved  in  rural  development. However, given that, 
Holmén interest is whole of Africa, the development in Tanzania is marginalised 
regardless of significant development that has so far been achieved since 1932, the 
case that, this study attempt to address. 
 
It has to be understood that, the government intervention in promoting co-operative 
movement is not only a post-colonial phenomena, but also was a practice during the 
colonial era whereby Develtere is in a critical proposition against colonial authority 
initiatives and intervention policy in promotion of co-operatives.32 For him this was 
primarily a prejudice policy which viewed the colonised as incapable to initiate. The 
primary evidence has also shown that, the colonial authorities viewed as the only 
stimulating source that could trigger promotion of the co-operative movement 
because the colonised were conceived backward, illiterate, apathy and inexperience 
has prevented them not only from forming co-operatives but also managing them.33 
 
This thesis attempts to shift away from domination by the political scientists and do 
away with numerous and repeated distortions, misinterpretation and marginalisation 
by pursuing a historical inclination in examining the history of the Tanzania’s co-
operative movement. It aims to evaluate to what extent the co-operatives were 
established at the behest of the British colonial government in the years before 
independence; and examines how the movement was promoted and controlled 
through marketing policies and legislation. Since the thesis is on history discipline it 
                                                          
31 Hans Holmén, State, Cooperatives and Development in Africa, (Uppsala: The 
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1990), p.23. 
32 Patrick Develtere, Cooperative Movements in the Developing Countries: Old and 
New Orientations, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 64, Issue 2, pp. 
179-208, April 1993. 
33 CS to Plunkett Foundation, November 21st 1930, TNA 13698. 
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extensively utilises official primary sources from archives on agriculture production 
and marketing, also the co-operative movement policies; and oral testimonies 
investigate, cross-check and contextualise a range of aspects not considered, 
marginalised and distorted in existing literature. Significantly, this thesis utilises 
considerable new evidence that offers an original contribution to fill this knowledge 
gap and provide additional evidences in the existing literature. The thesis critically 
examines the policy and political decisions that led to the promotion of agricultural 
marketing co-operatives in Tanzania.  
 
This thesis examines the transformation of the selected co-operatives in the post-
independence era. These objectives are illustrated by focusing on the three cases 
which comprised of small-scale coffee and cotton growers. This will be achieved 
through the detailed study of three case studies. Such cases are, the KNCU and 
BCU which are coffee marketing societies formed in 1933 and 1950 respectively; 
and the VFCUS which was formed in 1955 to market cotton in the WCGA. The rise 
of these co-operative societies was prompted by two major policies; cash production 
and crop marketing. Both policies provided for the encouragement of small-scale 
growers to cultivate coffee and cotton that integrated them into the cash crop 
economy in which they became key players in the marketing of their crops through 
co-operative societies. However, entry of small-scale growers in marketing of their 
produce through the co-operative movement differed from one location to the other. 
The reasons for the time difference in the formation and registration of these 
societies will also be examined. 
 
This chapter, this section in particular, provides essential historical and theoretical 
background to the co-operative movement in the developed world and its 
transplantation to developing countries. This chapter will shed light on the 
socioeconomic factors, also policies and their motivation behind the formation of the 
co-operative movement not only in the developed world but also in developing 
countries like India and Tanzania. Such historical and theoretical context is explored 
in the following section.  
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1.1: THE CO-OPERATIVE’S HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXTS  
Co-operative movement exists all across the world in both rural and urban settings 
and comprise of six main categories or types. These are the consumer, 
marketing/producer, housing, credit, workers and service co-operatives. The focus of 
this section is of two types; the consumer and credit co-operative societies which 
were dominant in Britain and German in the 19th century. The emphasis is 
specifically on their historical development and the impact on the development of the 
co-operative movement in various countries.  
 
One of the key founders of the modern co-operative movement was the Rochdale 
Equitable Pioneers Society which emerged in 1844. This consumer co-operative was 
based on six principles (see Table 1 below).34 The Society successfully managed to 
offer an alternative supply of goods and services at reasonable prices that for years 
they had difficulties to access because costs were high. The Pioneers agreed on a 
set of objectives and procedures which they later became known as the co-operative 
principles.35 The success of Rochdale led to the establishment of other types of co-
operatives which were tailored to the member’s needs. The Rochdale Principles (see 
(Table 1 below) were adopted in other towns and cities in Britain where similar 
societies sprang up. The Rochdale model is regarded as the ‘Mecca and Medina of 
the system’.36 
 
In Germany, the credit co-operatives were formed in the same period as in Britain 
with activities revolving around financial services such as the provision of loans and 
savings to members. Some of the societies were promoted in Germany from 1849 by 
two individuals, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch and Friederich Wilhelm Raiffeisen.37 
Both were formed in response to the failure of formal financial institutions to provide 
loans to agriculturists and urban craftsmen. Also, it was a response to exploitation by 
                                                          
34 Carlo Borzaga and Giulia Galera, ‘The Concept and Practice of Social Enterprise. 
Lessons from the Italian Experience’, In International Review of Social Research, 
Volume 2, Issue 2, June 2012, pp. 85-102. 
35 G. D. H. Cole, A century of Co-operation, (Oxford: Allan and Unwin Ltd., 1944), pp. 
64-68, 70, 72, 74. 
36 George Jacob Holyoake, The History of the Rochdale Pioneers, (London: Swan 
Sonnenschein and Co. Ltd., 1900), p.147. 
37 Lambert Paul, Studies in Social Philosophy of Co-operation, (Manchester: Co-
operative Union Ltd., 1963), pp.95-100. 
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moneylenders and traders, as credit societies were better placed to fill the financial 
service provision gap to underprivileged groups.  
 
The Schulze-Delitzsch’s credit structure had provincial and national outlets. Under 
such structure, financial services were made available to craftsmen and retailers who 
through the Schulze-Delitzsch’s national outlets could access loans across the 
country including rural areas.38  The Raiffeisen model became the most popular 
among small-scale agriculturalist and labourers in rural areas who could have 
access to financial services as savings and loans at reasonable interest rate.39 
Consequently, it attracted attention from pragmatic credit society co-operatives 
enthusiasts all over the world for its role in stimulating agriculture economy. One of 
such enthusiast is Alphonse Desjardins immediately saw how the credit union 
concept could help his family and his neighbours in Quebec, Canada. In 1900 he 
formed a credit society followed in 1909 by a credit union, which provided loans to 
poor farmers. The Desjardins’s initiatives became the forerunner of the credit co-
operatives that provided loan and other financial services in North America that 
signified the spread of the Raiffeisen model and its development had significant 
impact in other parts of the world such as India and other British colonies in India 
from 1904 eventually a credit union as provided under the 1912 Indian and 1932 
Tanzania’s co-operative legislation.  
 
The Rochdale and Raiffesein co-operative movement was a free and spontaneous. It 
owed nothing to government and managed to avoid any form of a state control. The 
Rochdale Society when it began it was not legally recognised.40 Two years after its 
formation the British Parliament granted its request for legal recognition under the 
provisions of the Industrial and Provident Act.41 The motivation behind the legislation 
was to address the difficulties experienced by the co-operative movement in the 
1840s regarding the legal right to invest members’ savings and prosecuting those 
                                                          
38 Richard C. Williams, (2007), pp.24-25; Lambert Paul, 1959), pp. 95-97. 
39 Brett Fairbairn, ‘History from the Ecological Perspective: Gaia Theory and the 
Problems of Co-operatives in Turn of the Century Germany’, in the American 
Historical Review, Vol. 99, No. 4 (October 1994), pp.1217, 1220. 
40 George Jacob Holyoake, (1900), pp.87. 
41 George Jacob Holyoake, (1900), pp.87-88. 
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office bearers who committed fraud.42 Co-operatives gained formal legal recognition 
under the 1852 Act.43 The British co-operative legislation addressed practical 
problems facing the co-operative movement and did not infringe upon the autonomy 
of the co-operative movement and its members, for example by the Registrar as 
provided under Sections 3 (i) and 4 (i).44  
 
The legislation for the German credit co-operatives had similar experiences to the 
consumer co-operatives in Britain. The co-operative legislation in Germany was 
promulgated in 1889 and was originally designed and influenced by Schulze-
Delitzsch to provide safeguards for co-operators. This suggests that, development 
experienced limited, if any, government interference. Generally, the development of 
co-operatives in the countries discussed above followed a bottom-up approach. The 
co-operatives emerged to enhance the economic situation of its members, based on 
mutual help, reciprocity, self-management, equality and democratic control. 
Formation of credit co-operatives were a reaction against capitalism and its cost in 
social deprivation. Thus, the co-operative movement was a collective action for the 
improvement of the economic situation of the participants, according to the principles 
of democracy and equality.   
 
The co-operative movements in Britain and Germany were ideologically committed 
to building the co-operative movement embracing all fields and permeating all 
activities of life until it becomes an all-inclusive system. It places no limits on the 
possibilities of co-operatives and assumes the possibility of a totally co-operative 
social order.45 It holds that, a new economic and social order can be constructed 
through utilisation of co-operative structures and in partnership with other 
associations, such as, professional farmers associations and trade unions.  
                                                          
42 Ian Snaith, Co-operative Principles and Co-operative Law in the United Kingdom, 
http://www.iansnaith.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/8/files/2013/02/This-1996-article.pdf 
Accessed in March 20th, 2015 
43 G. D. H. Cole, (1944), p.78; George Jacob Holyoake, (1900), p.88. 
44 Industrial and Provident Societies Acts, 1893 to1952 
45 Alex F. Laidlaw, Cooperatives and the Poor: A Review from within the Cooperative 
Movement, In Co-operatives and the Poor, (London: ICA, 1978), pp. 51-90; Paul H. 
Casselman, The Cooperative Movement and Some of Its Problems, (New York, NY: 




Over the years the Rochdale and credit co-operative models helped to solve the 
economic problems of their members. In particular, the Rochdale Principles found 
widespread appeal and had impact at various levels, local (within a specific country) 
as well as internationally. For example, in August 1895 the International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA), as the co-operative movement umbrella organisation was 
established by drawing membership worldwide. It was established so as to act as the 
representative, promote and safeguard the co-operative movement activities all over 
the world;46 also it became adopted and modified the Rochdale Principles that it had 
a duty and obligation to propagate them. Therefore, in the discussion, this study will 
generally be guided by both Rochdale’s and ICA’s Principles (see Table 1 below) 
under which the first principle maintains that membership has to be voluntary and 
open with no gender, religion discrimination to all who are interested. This clearly 
illustrates that the 1932 Tanzania’s co-operative legislation violated the first co-
operative principle by having individuals compelled to join the co-operative society. 
The same legislation compelled all growers to sell their produce through co-
operatives. The crop marketing legislations and policies under the colonial and post-
colonial authorities were further reinforced to ensure that co-operatives sold the 
collected commodities to the marketing boards which also determined the price; 
hence inhibited the bargaining power of the co-operatives. 
 
Importantly, a co-operative society is a democratic organisation that must be 
managed or administered and controlled democratically by office bearers appointed 
by the members. The members must have a democratic say and participate in 
decisions affecting their societies; also must have a right on the policies of his/her 
organisation and have the right to elect leaders or to be elected as a leader as 
provided in the second principle. However, the co-operative movement in Tanzania 
was placed under close supervision of the Registrar who was, according to the 1932 
Tanzania’s co-operative legislation was empowered to interfere the internal affairs of 
a society; and in some instances, the colonial and post-colonial authorities interfered 
in the appointment of the managers as illustrated in the KNCU in 1932, BCU in 1950 
                                                          




and the VFCU in 1968. The 1963 amendment of the co-operative legislation stripped 
the Registrar of his function only to be handled to the Minister responsible for Co-
operatives. Under such amendments, the powers and functions of the Registrar’s 
were vested to politicians.   
 
Additionally, the co-operative society should be set up to serve the interest of its 
members; but this study has established that co-operatives were set up to fit in the 
national development plans and were required to be the key implementing agencies 
of the national policy as portrayed in the colonial development and welfare plans; 
similarly, rural development policies and implementing of Ujamaa policies provided 
under the ArD.  
 
 
Table 1: The Rochdale Co-operative Principles as Revised by the ICA in 1937, 
1966 and 1995  
1844 Rochdale 
Principles 
1937 – ICA 
Principles, 
Vienna 
1967 - ICA 
Principles, 
Paris 
1995 - ICA 
Principles, 
Manchester 
Voluntary and open 
membership 






Democratic control by 
‘one member, one 
vote’ 





Division of the surplus 









Limited interest on 
capital 
Limited % of 
capital (if any) 
Limited % of 
capital   
Autonomy and 
independence 























Source: Compiled from Reports of Proceedings of the International Co-operative 
Alliance held in 1937, 1966 and 1995  
 
This section highlighted the emergence of the co-operative movement in Britain and 
Germany and the theories underpinning their development. The following section 
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attempts to examine transplantation of the co-operative movement in the European 
powers’ colonies. An attempt is made specifically to highlight the policy contrasts 
between Britain and Germany. 
 
1.2: THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
This section examines the emergence and development of the co-operative 
movement in developing countries. The colonial powers such as Britain were 
motivated to establish co-operatives in their colonies for various reasons. Credit co-
operative societies were established in India in 1904 by the British colonial 
government to solve the problem of rural poverty.47 The 1904 legislation was 
expanded and amended in 1912 to provide for the formation of other types of co-
operative societies and adequate enforcement of the co-operative practice and strict 
supervision and intervention by the Registrar.48 Unlike the bottom-up growth of co-
operatives in Britain and Germany, the movement in India was promoted, controlled 
and placed under strict supervision by the colonial government through the 
Registrar49 that aimed at addressing the predicament of agriculturalists.50   
 
The credit societies were created to address the vicious circle of rural indebtedness 
among the growers due to their dependency on the moneylenders who charged 
exorbitant interest rates. Growers had no other alternative to access finance before 
the establishment of co-operative credit societies, based on the Germany’s Raffeisen 
model which were envisaged by the government as crucial in resolving the 
indebtedness faced by the rural growers.51  
 
Having briefly seen the history, policy and motivation behind the formation of co-
operatives in India, this section also intends to provide a theoretical background to 
                                                          
47 Dharma Kumar, The Cambridge Economic History of India: Volume II; c. 1750 – c. 
1970, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.802.  
48 C. F.  Strickland, (1945), p.183; Linda Shaw, Working with Co-operatives: the 
Legal and Policy Environment, Co- for Development, Briefing Paper No. 5, 
http://coop-web-assets.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/uploads/2010/07/Briefing-
Paper-No-5-Working-with-Co-operatives-the-legal-and-policy-environment.pdf 
Accessed in May 10th 2015. 
49 C. F.  Strickland, (1945), p.183. 
50 Rita Rhodes, (2012), p.129. 
51 Margaret Digby, (1960), p.81; Rita Rhodes, (2012), p.129. 
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the policy on agriculture marketing co-operatives in Tanzania. In an attempt to 
provide a legal footing for the co-operative movement in Tanzania, the colonial 
authority reviewed a number of legislations. In so doing, consideration was given to 
the relevancy of agriculture marketing co-operatives. Priority was clauses from the 
Indian Co-operative Act No 2 of 1912 and Sri Lanka’s Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance no 34 of 1921 also the 1927 Act of Myanmar (Burma) that provided the 
colonial authority legal grounds for regulating functions and activities of the co-
operatives.  
 
The mentioned co-operative legislations provided the colonial authority a justification 
and enabled it to become a key player in promoting the co-operatives. Under the 
legislations it became a sole authority in formation and registration co-operatives 
societies, providing them with guidance. Additionally, the legislation provided power 
to the colonial authority to control the movement through the Registrar of co-
operative societies.  
 
The Tanzanian legislation allowed for the creation of various types of co-operatives 
such as credit, transport and consumer in a similar way to the 1912 Indian Co-
operative Act under which the influence and powers of the Registrar were prominent. 
Importantly, the legislation was primarily intended to provide the means and 
mechanism for the extraction of native produced resources provided under Section 
36 of Tanzania’s 1932 co-operative legislation. The extracted food crops were 
destined for the European consumers and raw materials for the British industries;52 
whereas no encouragement for local consumption was a priority. Thus, the co-
operative movement provided a mechanism for encouragement in production of 
export crops by native growers so that they could handle coffee export and raw 
materials from small-scale growers.  
 
In this regard, agricultural marketing co-operatives in Tanzania were the dominant 
feature in export crop production of coffee in Kilimanjaro and Kagera regions, 
tobacco in Ruvuma region, and cotton in the WCGA, whereas food crops were 
neglected. A bias on export crops meant agricultural marketing co–operatives had 
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prevailed and become the dominant organisations throughout the colonial and post-
colonial era. The agricultural marketing co–operatives in Tanzania were encouraged 
and promoted by the colonial authority to enable economies of scale owing to the 
volume of production by small-scale producers who were scattered in rural areas.  
 
 
The co-operative legislation in the British colonies was in four categories.53 The 
specific co-operative ordinance as the 1904 Indian credit co-operative legislation that 
applied to one type; the Friendly Societies Acts, industrial and Provident Acts and 
the British Model were widely in use because it provided for registration of more than 
one type of co-operative societies. Unlike Friendly Societies Acts and the industrial 
and Provident Acts, the British Model was most preferred in the colonies largely 
because provided for adequate enforcement of strict supervision by the 
government.54 This was so for the 1912 Indian co-operative legislation which was 
adopted in most of the British colonies such as the 1932 co-operative legislation in 
Tanzania. Under this legislation model, the powers were vested with the Registrar of 
Co-operative Societies to provide supervision, audit, mutual control and overall 
encouragement and development of the co-operative movement unlike in Britain. 
Under the legislation, it was made compulsory for the co-operatives to be promoted 
by the government a task which was performed by the colonial authority through the 
Department of Co-operatives headed by the Registrar.55 The registered co-operative 
societies were then placed under the supervision, control and guidance of the 
Registrar.56 
 
The British Model laid a foundation for the creation of the unified co-operative model 
in the British colonies in which federations or secondary societies were placed at the 
apex and primary societies at the base underpinned by a common co-operative 
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legislation.57 The unified model structure is vertical. In the British colonies the model 
was characterised by a disintegrated and the disjointed relationship as the co-
operatives were distinguished by type. This enhanced a divide, for example, 
between agricultural marketing co-operatives and credit societies. The agricultural 
marketing co-operatives in Tanzania were established by native growers to develop 
their interests; similarly, this was the case of credit societies only five were set-up 
and registered in various regions in the country (see Appendix 3c) by Indians of 
Ismailia sect with the support of Aga Khan Foundation, comprising chiefly of traders 
who received financial services as loans specifically to members.58  
 
In an attempt to reinforce the vertical relationship as far as crop marketing was 
concerned, the marketing boards which were statutory bodies with comprehensive 
control over marketing price control and control over export coffee trade as provided 
under the native coffee control through the Moshi Native Coffee Board and Bukoba 
Native Coffee Board (BNCB) as provided under the native coffee control and 
marketing legislation No. 26 of 1937 and cotton as provided through the 1952 Lint 
and Seed Marketing Board (LSMB).  The marketing boards were granted monopoly 
powers over control of a specific crop and to appoint co-operatives as handling 
agencies. Against the backdrop, there was no horizontal connectivity or integration 
as provided under the ICA’s sixth co-operative principle (see Table 1 below) that 
emphasise co-operation among the co-operatives by strengthening the movement by 
collaborating with each other.59 Such collaboration can be at various levels, such as 
local, national, regional and internationally. Under such structure the co-operatives 
affiliated to the same apex and secondary society; for example, the BCU, KNCU 
affiliated primary societies as well as the VFCU’s secondary and primary societies. 
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Additionally, there had also been no collaboration among the co-operatives 
regardless of business similarities. For example, co-operatives which were engaging 
in the marketing of the same produce such as coffee by the BCU and KNCU and 
were not horizontally integrated. At international level, the horizontal structure was 
not adopted by the CWS incorporated to play part in the marketing of coffee 
produced by small-scale growers who were the members of co-operatives. The 
horizontal integration was not a priority of the colonial authority which sought to 
enhance disunity among the co-operatives and weaken their bargaining power.  
 
Vertical integration was established in Tanzania under Section 36 of the 1932 co-
operative legislation. These Sections were borrowed from South Africa’s 1922 co-
operative legislation which provided for the compulsion of growers to sell their 
produce to co-operatives. In Tanzania it was designed in a manner that provided the 
government with powers to intervene and place crop marketing under its control. 
Under such intervention and control the co-operatives handled crop marketing on 
behalf of government institutions, the native marketing boards following the passage 
of marketing legislation that led to formation boards the Moshi Native Coffee Board 
(MNCB) and the Bukoba Native Coffee Board (BNCB) in 1937 with exclusive 
responsibility for export of the native produced coffee. The Boards became a 
permanent feature in Tanzania in which the Unions were appointed as agents in 
which growers were compelled to sell their produce through. In order to ensure 
effective extraction of crops from growers and their handling at local level and export 
such structures were put in place. The primary co-operative societies were formed 
and registered to operate at village level as it was viewed as a less costly and more 
effective means of assisting bulk collection of crops from growers within a specific 
village. The collected crops were then forwarded to secondary societies for export. 
The crop marketing structure was in principal vertically oriented to provide 
connectivity from growers to export market. Nyaluke argues that, the co-operative’s 
area of operation was essentially local and sometimes provincial;60 but he has not 
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explained why it was so. This study has established that, the 1932 and 1968 co-
operatives legislations, also the 1937 and 1949 marketing legislations confined the 
co-operative unions or societies within a specific locality/district. These boards were 
granted immense powers to appoint a local agent either private enterprise or the co-
operative societies to handle crops. The basis of such legislation is section 36 of the 
1932 co-operative legislation that provided for such geographical confinement. 
  
Co-operative development in Tanzania varied from one crop to the other and from 
one location to the other. It has been established in this study that the colonial 
government intervened to promote co-operatives; for example, it influenced and 
intervened in establishing co-operatives in Kilimanjaro by restructuring the KNPA into 
KNCU. This was implemented through the co-operative legislation in 1932 which 
provided a politically expedient solution in restructuring that brought the KNPA 
activities to an end due to its engagement in political affairs which was viewed as a 
threat to the colonial establishment (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3 for further details). 
This resolved the challenges posed by the KNPA one the one hand and increased 
control over coffee marketing under the KNCU on the other.    
 
The development in Kilimanjaro from 1933 was followed by lack of enthusiasm from 
the colonial authority and policy inconsistency in the promotion of co-operatives in 
the rest of the country. However, in his work, Dubell suggests that, the KNCU was a 
nester of the co-operative movement in Tanzania;61 this indicates that the growth of 
the KNCU was a stepping stone to the spread of the co-operative societies across 
the country that denies the colonial officials’ attitude in slowing down the process that 
led to a stunted growth of the co-operative movement because they thought posed a 
threat to the establishment. The obtained evidence for this study refutes Dubell 
findings by showing in the WCGA it was not so where a year earlier, in May 1932 
Chief Mgemela of Bakwimba in Kwimba District presented a formal request for 
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establishing a co-operative society in the WCGA.62 He envisaged that, the co-
operatives would end cheating by Indian traders and would increase cotton prices; 
hence, stimulating cotton farming. The Kwimba’s DC convinced him to abandon the 
idea because the Native Treasury could play the same role.63  
 
Generally, the policy towards promoting co-operatives outside Kilimanjaro was 
erratic which indicates that, there was a lack of a universal support for the 
establishment of co-operatives among colonial officials.64 This demonstrates is that, 
there was no cross-country universal support for the establishment of co-operatives 
among the colonial officials. During the same period some District Officers (DOS) 
promoted and registered societies such as the BCCS in 1936; in the same year 
NGOMAT and its affiliated societies and many other types of co-operative societies 
were registered (see appendix 3a – 3b).65 Such DOS are described by Rita Rhodes 
as liberal minded.66 In other areas excuses were given by the colonial authority 
regarding their disfavour of co-operatives. This was not only double standards, but 
also, a deliberate move by the colonial authority to arrest growers’ initiatives. For 
instance, in the same year the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mr Northcote67 
recommended promotion of co-operatives in Kagera. But his recommendation was 
rejected because the colonial authority feared opposition from Arabs and Asians who 
had vested interest in coffee marketing68 as any attempt in such direction could 
generate political unrest.69 The cases demonstrate a lack of policy consistency and 
political commitment in promoting co-operative societies; a policy in favour of private 
traders was evident. 
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The evidence shows that, during the interwar period the colonial authority was in 
favour of the spontaneous growth of co-operatives instead of government 
intervention and support. However, the idea did not make a significant headway. 
Historically, the spontaneous growth belongs to the 19thc during the laissez faire 
epoch in Europe where and when the Rochdale, and Raiffesein pioneers 
commandeered high levels of exposure to previous attempts and experiences in 
Britain by Robert Owen, William King and Christian and Utopian Socialist also Saint 
Simon in France; and the Schlesische Landschaft in Germany.70 Additionally, the 
growth of co-operative movement in Britain and Germany has been spontaneous 
and free from government control and authority and it was a product of the 19th 
economic and social conditions prompted by industrial revolution. The government 
intervention was repugnant and could be considered as contrary to the voluntary co-
operative element.  
 
Such conditions did not exist in colonies like Tanzania where most societies 
operated a subsistence economy (ujima) and the co-operative movement and its 
principles were unheard of among the illiterate rural growers who were expected by 
the colonial authority to organise themselves into co-operative societies. For 
example, Strickland pointed out in 1933 that, co-operation was almost unknown in 
tropical Africa.71 Thus, it was virtually impossible for the co-operative movement to 
grow and develop without the government intervention. Without it would take too 
long before it is realised.72 However, the colonial authority policy on the promotion of 
the co-operative movement in Tanzania was characterised by uncertainties, 
particularly outside Kilimanjaro with exception of some areas such as Songea in 
Ruvuma region and Bugufi in Ngara district.   
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The lack of consistent colonial government support for co-operative development 
effectively stunted co-operative growth in Tanzania as in 1934 there were 23 
societies, in 1937 they were 37, in 1943 they were 45;73 The slow growth persisted  
until after the Second World War as by 1947 there were 55 primary co-operative 
marketing societies, 3 more were formed and only 2 unions were in existence in 
1948 with 58,012 members;74 by 1949 there were 61 primary co-operative marketing 
societies, 3 unions and 60,445 members.75 The colonial authority was however, not 
impressed by these development as pointed out in its report that, ‘progress 
continued to be slow and education of indigenous membership of the primary co-
operative marketing societies was disappointing and demands for instruction that 
exceeds capacity of the staff’. 76 It was obvious that, the Co-operative Department 
was so much frustrated and admitted a decade of the policy mistakes. The colonial 
authority was of the view that, the slow progress was being held back by lack of 
trained personnel.77 This was made clear by the Department that, ‘there is no co-
operative progress and none will be made until the effects of many years of neglect 
have been obliterated’.78  This marked the end of an era of neglect and policy shift 
towards encouragement of the co-operative movement in Tanzania. 
 
However, post-war development was prompted a policy shift towards 
encouragement of the co-operative movement in various colonies. The policy shift 
was prompted by pressure from various agencies that triggered the co-operative 
‘renaissance’ era in which, there was an expansion of the co-operative movement 
footprint in Tanzania and many other British colonies such as Uganda and Kenya 
where they were set up for the first time from 194579 following publication of W.K.H. 
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Campbell80 report regarding promotion of co-operatives in East in 1944.81 This 
prompted the passage of the co-operative legislation that led to the registration of 5 
African societies.82 In Tanzania the Department of Co-operatives was set up and 
furnished with resources (human and funds) to promote the creation of co-
operatives. This culminated in an expansion which saw 172 co-operative societies 
established by 1952.83 
 
1.3: POST-WAR COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES  
The post-war British colonial  development  throughout her colonies  had  three 
main  aims;  firstly,  to  increase  the  production  of  raw  materials and food crops in 
the colonies, so that could earn foreign exchange, USA dollars in particular; secondly 
to ensure agriculture produce exported contributes to the  reconstruction of her war 
ravaged economy; and finally, to  improve  the  standard  of living  among  colonial  
populations.  
 
The highlighted developments during the post Second World War were prompted by 
a number of factors. First, Britain was financially impoverished84 and looked to its 
colonies, especially in Africa, as a source of raw materials and crops to alleviate 
shortages at home and reduce dependence on imports. The co-operative movement 
was much favoured by the left and especially Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies from 1945 – 1950 as once envisioned that the co-operative 
movement is one of the most important element is raising standard of life and in 
invigorating economic development in the colonies.85 It was by then considered that 
the co-operatives they were only part of the policy that was envisaged could play a 
leading role in reversing the tide of the dislocated British economy.  
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The post-war era witnessed two major changes in Britain that had a direct impact on 
the approach to economic development in the colonies; first, was the creation of the 
Colonial Development Corporation. Is this regard, it was viewed as necessary by the 
colonial power that it had to directly engage in agricultural production of export crops 
resulting in engaging in colonial development as provided under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts (CDWA) of 194086 and 194587 that the leading 
objective was to increase agricultural production. The 1945 Act culminated in the 
creation in 1947 of the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) and the Overseas 
Food Corporation (OFC) which was responsible to the Minister of Food as provided 
under the Overseas Resources Act.88  
 
In 1949 the OFC took over from the United Africa Company, a subsidiary of the 
Unilever which was appointed as an agent to manage the Groundnut Scheme at 
Kongwa in Tanzania from December 1946 because the British government has no 
means to implement the scheme. Other Groundnut Schemes were opened up in 
other parts of the country in Urambo in the Central West part of the country and 
Nachingwea in the then Southern Province.89 The mentioned Schemes were an 
integral part of the entire Colonial Development and Welfare Programme that and 
were envisioned to relieve the whole world of oil and fats shortage;90 increase 
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national income and revenue from taxation and social benefits to the colonised by 
raising the standard of life of the employees and their families91   
 
The second development was an increased emphasis on co-operative practices by a 
number of agencies which were on the view that, the co-operative movement was an 
essential element for the realisation of social and economic development of the 
colonised and poor/backwardness. 92 The most important long-term advantage of the 
co-operative movement envisioned by the CO and colonial authority is to bring a 
revolution in agricultural technique among small scale growers that would have a 
profound effect in raising their standard of living and enhance productivity eventually 
in the economy of the country through stable supply of food crops and raw materials 
for export.93 This was evident in declarations by the United Nations Organisation 
(UNO) at its conference in Hot Springs in 1943. The 1944 International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) during its 26th Session conference issued the Recommendation 
No.70 affirming that, the government intervention in promoting the co-operative 
movement was vital.94 Importantly, the ILO maintained that the use of co-operatives 
as a tool for socio-economic development during the post war era.95  
 
This came at a time when there was an intellectual and policy consensus by the 
UNO and Fabian Colonial Bureau96 that political and economic progress in the 
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colonies could best be fostered through the co-operative methods. It was also 
stressed that, the economic development can easily be achieved if the co-operative 
movement is explored to reach the masses of growers population in rural areas in 
which the government has to play a role.97  
 
This assumption was also maintained by the modernisation theorists such as 
Rostow, who posited the stages under which all societies develop through certain 
stages to attain economic advancement and growth.98 It was envisaged that society 
moved from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘modern’; in this, the role of government in 
promoting the co-operative movement is vital. In implementing policies influenced by 
such thinking, various other approaches were employed to improve agriculture 
productivity among small-scale growers aimed at modernisation with emphasis on an 
improvement approach. It also encouraged growers to adopt modern farming 
practices by abandoning primitive and careless farming practices such as shifting 
cultivation, which was widely practiced among growers in Tanzania. Shifting 
cultivation was a practice whereby land was cultivated for a number of years, then 
the land is allowed to rest for a considerable period before growers began to plough 
it.  The purpose modernisation farming practices were envisioned to play a part in 
accumulating capital for development of the country as well as bring to end 
poverty.99 
 
Whereas Britain’s post Second World War policy ambition was to increase the 
growers’ wealth through the co-operative movement which was envisaged to play a 
key role in the realisation of modernisation of farming. This was envisaged to enable 
growers to solve the problems of poverty among the colonised by raising their 
incomes; hence, to enable them to pay taxes. The colonial authority and colonising 
powers were to effectively utilise small-scale growers as well as progressive farmers 
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to increase production of raw materials such as cotton and food crops for export so 
as to contribute in alleviating British post-war economic difficulties.   
 
By the end of the 1940s the Co-operative Department embarked upon the promotion 
of co-operatives in Kagera region. This signified consolidation of the colonial 
authority’s commitment to the post-war policies in utilising the co-operative 
movement in realisation of economic development and in the modernisation the rural 
sector, in particular coffee production in the region. The co-operative movement, 
particularly agricultural marketing co-operatives were one of 
a piecemeal programmes, strategies and a strong post-war element of the British 
colonial development policy for her colonies.100 In 1950 the BCU and its affiliated 
societies were registered in an attempt to tackle the apparent lack of interest by 
growers. This was evidence that the process was dominated by the government’s 
led top down approach;101 as the initiative and process was led by the colonial 
authority for the growers. This suggests that, it was the government which decided 
that the co-operatives as a means to this end; and colonial authority interests on the 
co-operative movement was uppermost. Such approach was necessary and justified 
owing to lack of enthusiasm from growers owing to some historical challenges from 
the outset of commercialisation of the coffee trade in Kagera where tension as those 
in Kilimanjaro where the settlers agitated against Africans growing coffee and in the 
WCGA where the Indian traders cheated the growers did not prevail (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3 and 2.4 and Chapter 6, Section 6.4). In realising the colonial interests, an 
exercise was conducted by the Co-operative Department in Kagera without 
undertaking sensitisation on the co-operatives to the potential members.102  The 
members had no democratic say and did not participate in decisions that led to the 
formation and registration their societies; also had no opportunity granted to them 
deciding on policies as well as in electing the BCU manager and leaders103 as  
provided under the second ICA’s principle.   
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The government installed the BCU’s first two managers, clearly demonstrating a ‘top-
down’ approach in transplanting societies to coffee producers. In this regard, the co-
operatives were the government hand-outs to growers whose autonomy and 
freedom was undermined contrary to practices which were prevalent in Britain and 
other western countries where democratic control of societies by members was 
obvious.  
 
The VFCUS was registered in 1955 to market cotton. Its background can be traced 
as far as in 1946 when the colonial authority intervened in the formation of co-
operatives such as consumer societies that resulted in the registration of the 
Mwanza African Traders Consumer Co-operative Society (MATCS) (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4). The MATCS’s leaders played a key role in the formation of the Lake 
Province Growers Association (LPGA) that brought various grassroots together and 
became a leading force. The LPGA became an umbrella that managed to pressurise 
the colonial authority to register cotton marketing co-operative societies from 1953. It 
has to be noted that, the pressure was the only strategy that had to be employed 
primarily due hesitation of the Co-operative Department to promote co-operative 
societies to market cotton marketing.104 The engagement of the grassroots in 
pressurising the colonial authority in registering cotton marketing co-operatives was 
a bottom-up that led not only to the emergence primary co-operative societies but 
also 20 secondary societies and the VFCU which was the apex organisation. Such 
development took place through a democratic process in which members had a say 
and participated in decisions affecting their societies such as the formation and 
appointment of the management team at all levels with limited colonial authority 
interferences.  
 
Despite the way the co-operatives emerged in the WCGA they were subjected to 
agriculture marketing policies under which they had to sell their produce through the 
Lint and Seed Marketing Board (LSMB) in compliance to the colonial and post-
colonial authorities’ interest in controlling of cotton supply and marketing. The post-
                                                          
104 Commissioner of Co-operative Development to PC, Lake Province, Ref. No. Co-
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colonial interferences on the affairs of the VFCUS was evident in 1968 when its 
management was removed by the government and it was renamed Nyanza Co-
operative Union (NCU) and restructured by removing Unions. 
 
1.4: POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT  
After independence, the control over export earnings by the government was viewed 
as necessary. This was realised through continuing and increased promotion and 
support to the co-operative movement. In this regard, clearly, the government 
created privileged co-operatives which were given a monopoly position against 
private enterprises in crop handling. In practice, however, the promotion and 
direction of the co-operative movement led to the central control by government. This 
was achieved through strengthening agriculture marketing legislation that provided 
power to the marketing boards from as early 1960s to 1980s. For example, in 1962 
the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) was established and became the 
only legal channel for agricultural marketing provided under the National Agricultural 
Products Board (Control and Marketing) Act that scrapped the MNCB and BNCB 
which were locally based boards for handling coffee and provided for the 
establishment of a nation-wide board, the Tanganyika Coffee Board in October 1st 
1962; also the Mild Coffee Board, Songea Native Tobacco Board,  Nyamirembe 
Native Tobacco Board, BNCB, Central Province Creameries Board Government 
General Notice No. 1836, November 3rd 1961were scrapped too.  
 
At the political level the ruling party (then Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) 
and later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) engineered the formation the co-operative 
movement apex body, the Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) in 1963 and 
setting up of Moshi Co-operative College, which were both part of the First Three 
Year Development Plan.105 The CUT placed regional co-operative unions under its 
umbrella and therefore facilitated incorporation into the government and ruling party 
machinery. This was finalised in 1979 when the CUT was renamed Jumuiya ya 
Washirika (Union of Co-operative Societies - UCS) and officially became an arm of 
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36 
 
the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) charged with mobilisation, providing 
guidance and supervision of growers. 
 
The co-operative development strategy during the post - colonial era in Tanzania 
was an integral part of the overall national economic development strategy aimed at 
addressing national inequality. By the late 1950s and early 1960s a similar idea was 
held by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Organisation 
Agency which had a responsibility to promote co-operatives and self-help 
organisations as they advocated for the role of government in the promotion co-
operative of various types in developing countries so that could be used to improve 
the livelihoods of the poor, control and enhancement of the economy.106 This was 
designed to realise the structural transformation of subsistence through modernising 
the agricultural economy in developing countries in which the co-operative 
movement was considered to play a significant role. The attempt towards this 
direction was envisioned and embedded under the ArD. 
 
Against the background, it is clear that, the government intervention was inspired by 
the modernisation theory which maintained that the movement could play a key role 
in rural development and national economic growth. This top-down strategy and 
intervention by the government was employed in the promotion of co-operatives 
across the country. The government contributed resources in terms of human and 
finance towards accomplishing the strategy that bears similarities with colonial 
authority strategy after 1945; but an attempt to the promotion of the mass co-
operative societies across the country was too ambitious to be realised.  
 
In an attempt to realise such ambition, 857 societies were registered in 1961 and by 
1966 there were 1616 in agricultural marketing alone.107 Certainly, this was a 
significant achievement, this increase did not see a commensurate increase in 
government staff to serve societies. Hence, officers were under enormous pressure 
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with financial resources overstretched and by 1966 the movement had plunged into 
chaos as proved by the 1966 Presidential Committee.108   
 
The encouragement of the co-operative movement during the post - colonial era was 
accompanied by an attempt to redefine and shape its needs based on the national 
and rural development plans designed to modernise rural communities. In an attempt 
to realise mentioned plans, each region was supposed to have one co-operative 
union as provided under the Co-operatives Societies (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 
1968. This empowered the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to sanction the 
amalgamation and splitting up of societies. As a result, all co-operative unions in the 
country were compelled to adopt the government recommended administrative 
structure in which a region where more than one union existed had to amalgamate; 
this, however, did not take into consideration the consent of the members.  
 
Following the Arusha Declaration of 1967 in Tanzania was restructured into a 
socialist state. Co-operatives were envisaged by the ruling party to be inclined 
towards the socialist ideology. Nyerere’s policy paper on rural development laid 
down the guiding principles based on self-help, production and self-reliance and 
signified a departure from dependence on unreliable foreign. A self-reliance policy 
provided under the ArD was emphasised in response to the termination of funds 
from Western powers particularly Britain due to the diplomatic and political row over 
the question Zimbabwe over the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965;109  and West Germany over Tanzania decision to establish a 
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diplomatic relations between Tanzania and East Germany.110 Tanzania was making 
an attempt to address the issue of neo-colonialism which was detrimental to the 
economic development of the country. This also signified the influence of 
modernisation theories coming to an end. The co-operative movement was 
employed not only as ideological instruments, but an instrument for reinforcement of 
national economy.111 As a result, the government’s motivation did not correspond to 
growers’ interests; it signified a deprivation of their autonomy and freedom provided 
under the co-operative principles. This again was in contrast to the development of 
the co-operative movement in western countries where attempts were made to 
provide a linkage between democratic control of societies by members and 
economic goals.  
 
Tanzania’s co-operative model and crop handling during the post - colonial era, as 
during the colonial period, was structured by the authorities in a manner which was 
compatible with the existing marketing policies.  Economic crisis in the 1970s saw 
the Tanzanian government replace the co-operative movement in crop marketing by 
drafting in Crop Authorities to handle crops from growers through villages which 
became their crop collecting agents. This was done to reduce handling costs, 
increase efficiency in crop production by growers and to enable the government 
accumulate surpluses which formerly were accrued by the co-operatives. All these 
were achieved through legalising a village as a co-operative and production entity 
through collectivisation and control by the government provided under the 1975 the 
Ujamaa Village (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act. Under the Act, 
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the colonial inherited co-operative model was completely abandoned only to adopt a 
cocktail of the Chinese communal farming and Israel’s kibbutz or Moshav.   
 
Under the new model, the growers were required to market their produce directly to 
villages which became crop purchasing stations. The village, which was the 
government unit at the grassroots level, had to play a major part in the practical 
operations of buying and assembling of crops at village level whereby the statutory 
boards which were converted into the Crop Authorities controlled and directly 
undertook export and sale. In this regard the government took on the function of the 
merchant in the form of Crop Authorities. Thus, the co-operatives were rendered 
redundant being bypassed by villages and Crop Authorities. In 1976 co-operatives 
were officially abolished by the government so as it could gain greater control over 
the growers and revenues. The abolition of co-operatives resulted in having the 
government taking the role of the merchant which was a move towards 
nationalisation of the agriculture sector whereby the growers were detached from his 
or her assets and make them more public. This proved ruinous as it created apathy 
and low level commitment among the growers to the new village co-operatives, 
growers uprooted coffee trees to plant other crops so that they could maintain their 
earnings from farming;112 or abandoned them because the Crop Authorities did not 
pay them. Also, there was no supply of farm inputs (fertiliser, pesticides, fungicides 
and equipment) and declined extension services that led to decline of coffee produce 
in Kilimanjaro from a minimum of 250 to 50 kilograms per season.113 All these, 
resulted in the revenue decline. As a result, the government was forced to reinstate 
co-operatives in 1982. 
 
This section shows that the co-operative movement has existed in different 
economic and political systems. It has also presented co-operative theories that 
emerged partly as a result of the economic and political systems where it operated; 
thus, formed a significant part in the historical development of co-operative 
movement in Britain and Germany as well as India and other Asian countries. In 
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order to generate in-depth understanding of the Tanzania’s co-operative agricultural 
marketing this study is guided by five key research questions:  
1. How were the agricultural and crop marketing policies linked to the promotion 
of the co-operatives during the period under investigation?  
2. In what ways did the colonial authority influence and shape the emergence of 
the co-operative movement? 
3. Why was the concerted effort for promotion and registration of the co-
operatives by the colonial authority uneven? 
4. To what extent was there continuity in policy towards co-operatives in the 
trans-colonial period?  
5. In what ways did the changing political and ideological influences of the 
emerging Tanzanian state shape the co-operative movement during the first 
two decades of independence?      
 
1.5: RESEARCH METHODS AND EVIDENCE GATHERING  
This section presents the research methodology employed in addressing the 
questions. This study employs a qualitative research methodology by selecting 
cases for the study, interviews and a documentary review. The study employs a 
qualitative research methodology for a number of reasons; first, its suitability in 
examining relevant policies and decision‐making for this study. Secondly, due to its 
effectiveness in providing detailed accounts of the context, the activities and key 
players in exploring the historical development of the co-operative movement. 
Thirdly, it allows the incorporation of multiple cases for exploration regardless of their 
locality and conditions, and thus accommodates comparability.114   
 
The study is structured around three small-scale growers’ marketing co-operatives 
case studies. These are two secondary coffee marketing co-operative societies, 
namely, the BCU which was established in 1950 and the KNCU which was 
established in 1933; and cotton marketing apex co-operative society, the VFCUS 
which was established in 1955. The establishment of these co-operatives are traced 
by exploring interlocking forces and policies that led to their growth and development 
throughout the period under study. Their development is then examined against the 
changing political and ideological influences of the emerging Tanzanian during the 
first two decades of independence. The cross-case analysis and comparability has 
                                                          




generated a new understanding of how each of the selected cases historically 
evolved.   
 
The primary sources for this study were generated by the British government, 
Tanzania’s colonial and post-colonial administration, co-operative movement officials 
and local chiefs that provide an account of both colonial and post-colonial policies 
regarding cash crop production, marketing, and co-operative movement generally. 
This was achieved through identification and evaluation of relevant policies, the 
driving forces behind them, and the effects of their implementation.  
 
The search for sources of evidence began with wide reading of preliminary materials, 
including both published and unpublished sources from libraries and the internet. 
This led to the identification and selection of sources relevant on the topic being 
studied from books and journal articles. The identified and selected secondary 
sources were accessed from the UK Co-operative College in Manchester, where the 
researcher also had access to some primary sources on the BCU, KNCU and 
VFCUS and the Plunkett annual reports on co-operative development from the 
1940s to 1960s.  
 
Most of the primary evidence for this study was collected from the Tanzania National 
Archive (TNA) in Dar Es Salaam. These include those which were documented from 
1916 to 1961. Similarly, the Colonial Office (CO) policies, memoranda and circulars 
on agricultural crop production, marketing and development; the colonial 
government’s Co-operative and Agriculture Department’s Annual Reports, Policies, 
Memoranda, Orders, meeting minutes and Circulars on agriculture, marketing and 
co-operative promotion and legislations; also, the Agricultural and Natural Resources 
Committee reports as well as policy documents. The Provincial and district reports 




Numerous sources were collected and utilised on Agricultural Production and 
produce processing. These included correspondence between the Governor, CS and 
the Provinces, as well as the Provincial annual reports, memoranda, and meeting 
minutes. The correspondences between the Provinces, districts, and Native 
Authorities was also very useful as being letters between the PCs or DCs and 
various groups regarding permission to market crops and formation and registration 
of co-operatives.  
 
The thesis has utilised the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA), Empire 
Cotton Growing Corporation (ECGC), and the marketing board’s annual reports, 
newsletters, bulletins, meeting minutes and correspondences which were obtained 
from the Ukiliguru Agriculture Research Institute near Mwanza town. This also 
includes the archived paper reports or articles related to cash crop marketing; co-
operatives and views connected to co-operative and cash crop marketing legislation. 
The evidences generated from the mentioned sources provide an insight on crop 
marketing agriculture and promotion of the movement from Colonial Office at 
national and local levels. 
 
Given that secondary sources on agriculture and co-operative movement in 
Tanzania are scarce and frequently struggle to illuminate developments at the local 
level, official records, interviews, discussion and oral testimonies were extensively 
used for gathering information crucial for this study. These explore the historical 
experiences, policies and knowledge of the movement. The respondents were 
employed as eyewitness evidence or indirect witnesses from people who were not 
present on the scene but heard of the events. The interviews and document reviews 
conducted in two phases. Interviews and group discussions were conducted during 
the first phase. These involved individuals who served the co-operative movement in 
various capacities between 1932 and 1982. The interviewees comprised of 
members, committee and former movement administrators; also the former 
marketing boards, staff and government officials such as Ministers and 




Prior to a discussion and interview of each session the researcher informed 
respondents the objectives of the study, why they are part of the study, and how the 
collected information would be used. The researcher explained to respondents the 
discussion and interview procedure. The respondents were informed about the use 
of tape recording of the interview proceedings and they were assured that collected 
information would be confidentially treated. Witten consent was obtained from 
respondents for recording. The age range of the respondents was between 70 and 
90. Some of the respondents presented their co-operatives society membership 
cards,115 which indicated that they were active participants in the co-operative 
movement during 1940’s to 1960’s. 
 
In an attempt to ensure desired information was collected, semi-structured and 
unstructured questionnaires were prepared days before sessions for use for 
interviews. These were in English, but interviews and discussions were conducted in 
Kiswahili. The modality for discussions and interviews was face-to-face and further 
follow-ups were through telephone if necessary. The approach facilitated the 
capturing in-depth understanding and exploration of the cases from respondents’ 
experiences.  
 
Interviews time average was between 2 and 2.30 hours long and were undertaken in 
Mwanza (VFCUS) where primary society members were interviewed at Magulanja 
and in Shinyanga at Guliguli. In Kagera interviews were held at Kitendagulo; also in 
Kilimanjaro (KNCU) at Lyamungo, Uru and Kibong’oto (see a list of interviewees 
Appendices 1a, b and c). The focus of discussion was mainly to gain an in-depth 
understanding of some policy aspects that the researcher came across in the course 
of literature reviews.  
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Focus group discussions and interviews were conducted in Kiswahili; and were tape 
recorded and later translated into English for use in this study. The tape recording 
was helpful to provide focus and follow up questions for interviewers. Written notes 
were taken during interviews as it simplified the identification of issues that required 
further clarification from interviewees. But tape recording was employed basically 
because relying on taking notes during interviews would have not have allowed for 
the accurate capture of all responses. 
 
Key informants (KI) were used as one source of information for discussion and 
interviews. The key informants (see Appendix 1a, 1b and 1c) were eye witnesses 
and individuals that had served as managers of societies at different levels (4), ex-
Presidents of Co-operative Unions (1) and staff (2); the ex-Minister responsible for 
co-operative development (1), ex-Bank of Tanzania Governor (1) experts, authors 
and academic (4) and the former Commissioner of Co-operatives and the co-
operative college principal (1); also 16 members of co-operative societies. These 
provided clarification on some aspects and policies. 
 
Purposive sampling method was used to identify the key informants and eye 
witnesses’ respondents. The snowball research technique was selected as it is 
particularly effective in a situation where a sample is difficult to locate. This study 
encountered difficulties in identifying co-operative members, ex-committee and 
government officials who served during the period covered in this study. Thus, it was 
through asking and visiting villages that they were reached. These respondents 
formed a significant source of information and their experiences were useful in 
establishing issues that needed further investigation when a visit was made to the 
TNA. A selection of eye witnesses’ respondents took into consideration their 
involvement in the movement in various capacities, mainly members, staff and 
leaders. Government officials who served the colonial and post-colonial governments 




1.6: FIELD WORK 
The field work was split into two phases. The first phase comprised of a general 
review of the literature on the history of the movement globally and in Tanzania 
which was conducted from October 2011 to September 2012. During this period, 
relevant secondary sources were reviewed at the University of Central Lancashire 
(UCLan), the UK Co-operative College in the United Kingdom and Moshi University 
Co-operative University (then Moshi University Co-operative College of Business 
Studies - MUCCoBS), University of Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania, where reports, 
published and unpublished theses, and dissertations regarding co-operative 
theories, practices and policies as well as agriculture production and marketing 
policies; and relevant newspaper articles that were published during and after 
colonial rule were reviewed. The review of literature was primarily aimed at shedding 
light on the topic to establish gaps or areas that required further research.   
 
The second phase of the research consisted of fieldwork in Tanzania. This was split 
into two phases. First, from October 2012 to January 2013, the second from 
November 2013 to March 2014 when the focus was reviewing primary evidences, 
mainly the official records, memoirs and government (colonial and post-colonial) 
policy documents, correspondences minutes, circulars, memorandums, legislations 
and reports on agriculture and co-operative movement were reviewed at the 
Tanzania National Archive (TNA) in Dar Es Salaam and Dodoma. The TNA is the 
main repositories of primary sources for this study.  
 
1.7: STUDY JUSTIFICATION 
The co-operative movement in Tanzania is the oldest in East Africa. From 1932 
Africans were legally allowed to form and register co-operative societies. The 
Tanzanian co-operative movement is to some degree well documented mostly in 
such disciplines as economics, sociology, and rural development studies. But, there 
is a limited secondary literature on the movement’s history in Tanzania. Those that 
are available lack a linkage with key policies such as crop production and marketing 
as well as external influences on the emergence and development of the co-




Despite the prominent role played by the co-operative movement in Tanzania it is 
largely neglected in both the historical and in the contemporary literature. This 
neglect is more critical given the current renaissance of co-operatives in Africa and 
increasing international interest in co-operative development models in the 21st 
century. This thesis makes an attempt to address the identified deficiency by 
examining of the growth and development of the co-operative movement from 1932 
to 1982 by drawing not only policies but also the historical evolution of the three 
cases, the KNCU, BCU, and VFCUS.  
 
1.8: ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into six more chapters outlined as follows; Chapter 2 examines 
the history and policies connected to the development of the coffee industry among 
small-scale growers in Kilimanjaro and Kagera regions; also cotton in the WCGA. 
The establishment of coffee and cotton went hand in hand with setting up marketing 
systems and policies. The marketing policies for both, coffee and cotton are 
examined during the inter-war and post-war years as well as during the post - 
independence era. Coffee and cotton production and marketing policies are critically 
examined to provide comprehensive linkages in the emergence of native co-
operative organisations in Tanzania.   
 
Chapter 3 examines the policy developments, implementation and impact on 
development of co-operative movement in Tanzania during the period under 
examination.  
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the historical development of the three major co-
operative movement cases drawn from coffee and cotton producing areas. These 
are the KNCU and BCU which were engaged in coffee marketing; and the VFCU 
which was cotton marketing society. Specifically, processes and policies that led to 
their emergence and growers reactions are examined. It also draws their 
developments, continuity during the post - colonial era. An account is also given on 
the effects to their development owing to policy and ideological changes.  
 




In short, this chapter has introduced the history and theory of co-operative 
movement. It sketches out the historical and the theoretical formation of the co-
operative movement in the developed world and its transplantation of co-operative 
models in developing countries with emphasis on Tanzania. It has also presented 
methodology employed in gathering evidence for this study. The following chapter 
critically examines coffee and cotton production and marketing policies during 
interwar, Second World War and post-war periods. It examines how both policies 
were linked to the growth, development the co-operative movement; also the impact 
of continuity and change of both policies to the co-operative movement during the 



































This chapter examines cash crop production and marketing policies during British 
colonial rule and post-colonial era in Tanzania. This thesis explores the two policies 
to understand how and why the small-scale growers were incorporated in coffee and 
cotton production and marketing of their produce. This chapter draws case by case 
in terms of crops, that is coffee and cotton are examined. The approach taken is 
historically covering each region in turn, that is coffee Kilimanjaro and Kagera as well 
as cotton in the WCGA showing such developments. The relevant literatures on the 
topic that have documented such policies which are examined in the following 
section. This thesis and this chapter in particular attempt to fill the gap by the 
utilisation of primary evidence to draw up a new and comprehensive relationship. It 
also shows why the colonial agriculture marketing and co-operative development 
policies interlock to each other. Again, this chapter provides a departure from 
disjointed and punctuated approach in examining the two which are dominant 
existing literature where growers and their cash crop production industry are treated 
separately or one is neglected altogether. 
 
2.2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Existing literature on the cash crop production and marketing indicates that in 
Tanzania the colonial authority encouraged small-scale growers to cultivate coffee 
and cotton. However, the existing literature has not emphasised production, 




Pim has presented an overview of development regarding the contribution made by 
native growers in the colonial agricultural production.116 However, his emphasis is 
mainly on the agricultural policy and the transition from German to British colonial 
rule and neglects the development that took place in Kilimanjaro, Kagera and in the 
WCGA that this thesis offer to expand. Coulson examined the engagement of cash 
crops among small- scale growers in Tanzania by the colonial authority.117 For him, 
the colonial administration’s motivation was to ensure supply and export of raw 
materials in demand in industrial Europe with his findings mainly based on 
secondary sources. Authors Philip Curtin,118 Owusu,119 Tosh also, Kelemen, 
Meredith and Sunderland have published their findings on cash crop production,120 
with a focus on Sub Saharan Africa but, with limited emphasis on Tanzania. They 
also tend to treat such development in isolation from changing economic and policy 
developments in Britain. They have presented the agriculture policy and 
development in general and they have not shown the mechanisms by which the 
colonial authority engaged growers in cash crop production nor the growers’ 
responses. These neglected aspects are critically examined in this chapter in order 
to generate a new understanding of the growers’ interest/stake in the marketing of 
their produce. Schuknetcht’s research on cotton marketing in the Sukumaland, that 
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is, the WCGA121 lacks historical background as his focus is on post-WWII. Fuggles-
Couchman discusses the production and marketing of cashew nut, coffee, cotton, 
and sisal marketing through private outlets and the co-operative movement as well 
as Kongwa groundnut scheme.122 But, Fuggles-Couchman has not illuminated the 
early initiatives in developing mentioned crops in Tanzania that this study makes a 
significant attempt to provide a background and development throughout the British 
colonial period and early post independent years. Yoshida documented coffee and 
cotton marketing.123 But, he is not specific about who produced them and has not 
engaged with how production was promoted. Yoshida’s study is too broad as he 
covers the three East African countries, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Thus, hardly 
provides a detailed account of development and that fails to justify its conclusion on 
Tanzania. Ruthenberg discusses agricultural development during British colonial 
rule.124 He examines various production and marketing policies in Tanzania by citing 
how they were applied among small scale cash crop producers and their impacts. 
His work offers relevant and useful ideas on such policies. However, coverage of 
most policies is too general and lacks specificities particularly where and why cash 
crop production and marketing policies were applied.     
 
In examining the coffee production and marketing in Kagera region and cotton in the 
WCGA one has to examine some interlocking factors. For example, the two areas 
are located around Lake Victoria in the North West Tanzania. When the British took 
over, this location was remote from Tanga and Dar–Es-Salaam ports. The existing 
roads were poor and railway transport was not in existence until 1928 when a line 
connecting Mwanza and Dar-Es-Salaam was built. Before the railway link to Dar Es 
Salaam, export from these two locations was by steamships to Kisumu and then by 
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train to Mombasa.125 Thus, they were remote from Tanga and Dar Es Salaam ports 
and had some challenges in administering agricultural policies. Since they had 
geographical proximity advantage with Uganda that, the Tanganyika government 
mandated the Ugandan government to formulate and implement marketing policy for 
coffee and cotton produced in Kagera and the WCGA.126  
 
The consideration of coffee and cotton marketing in the existing literature by 
Yoshida,127 and Leubuscher128 compare development in Kagera and the WCGA and 
Uganda. But, have not established why the Ugandan government was involved in 
dictating agricultural marketing policies and use of its transportation infrastructure for 
shipment of crops for export. Cotton export in Uganda was under the control of the 
Uganda Cotton Growers Association (UCGA) which was an effective lobby 
organisation with connection to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce as well as 
the colonial authority.  
 
This section provides an analysis based on the underutilised primary materials 
related to the policy by providing a detailed account of agreements between with 
Ministry of Food and Marketing Boards also traders in Tanzania from time of 
outbreak of Second World War to 1950s when the agreements came to an end. 
Leubuscher has downplayed important developments regarding coffee production 
and marketing in Kagera, similarly cotton in the WCGA in which Uganda appears to 
dominate. As a result, just as Yoshida, a debate is inconclusive and could not show 
the effects of the policy on growth of co-operatives in the two locations.  
 
This chapter uses the underutilised primary sources in its attempt to shift away from 
the generalisation common in existing literature. It discusses specific and interlocked 
dimensions and intricacies related to the coffee production marketing in Kilimanjaro, 
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Kagera and cotton in the WCGA during colonial and post-colonial era. In particular, it 
will provide crop and location comparisons within Tanzania. The chapter attempts to 
explore coffee and cotton production produced by small-scale growers and 
marketing by addressing the following questions; 
 To what extent did the colonial agricultural policies give rise to small-scale 
growers? 
 How the agriculture and crop marketing policies were linked to the promotion 
of the co-operatives during the period under investigation? 
 
 
2.2: BACKGROUND TO THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
This section presents the motivation behind the colonial agriculture development 
policy with a focus on small scale growers in Tanzania which was a German colony 
before the outbreak of First World War. From 1916 when the British defeated the 
German army and took over Kagera and Kilimanjaro regions, they immediately 
began encouraging the small-scale growers into the cash crop economy. In the 
WCGA, cotton was promoted strongly. The first challenge the new colonial power in 
Tanzania had to address was the reconstruction of the economy and renovation of 
transport infrastructure destroyed during the war. At the same time, Britain had its 
own problems. It also found itself in huge financial burden resulting from war 
expenses.  
 
Arguably, this was Britain’s opportunity to utilise colonial resources for its own 
economic benefits.129 Under Article 3 of the Mandate Agreement Britain 
responsibility was to safeguard the material well-being, native interests and social 
progress of the Tanzanian population.130 Yet, Britain administered Tanzania just like 
any other colony whereby financial self-sufficiency was emphasised to cover 
administration costs so as to avoid draining the United Kingdom Treasury.131 Self-
sufficiency was to be achieved under two important interrelated policies.132 First, the 
development and increase in agricultural production for export; and secondly, 
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encouragement of small-scale growers in cash crop cultivation to provide growers 
with opportunities for income. To realise both policies, the small-scale growers had 
to have access to or ownership of land. Land ownership was provided under the 
Mandate Agreement, Article 22133 which was used by small-scale growers to grow 
cash crops.  
 
The Great Depression heightened the need for the colonial power to assist colonies. 
This led to the setting up of the Colonial Development fund in 1929.134 The fund was 
aimed at aiding colonial economic development.135 It was made available by the 
colonial power basically to increase her foreign trade so as to create employment in 
Britain which was seriously affected by the economic depression.136 In Tanzania the 
fund was utilised in coffee research in which of £23,000 of a grant was made 
available in 1933137 for the development of facilities at Lyamungo near Moshi town.  
 
This section provides a motivation behind cash crop production policy with attention 
being given to small scale producers in an attempt to realise financial self-sufficiency 
policy. To achieve the objective the colonial authority employed various approaches 
to encourage small-scale growers to produce cash crops as discussed in the 
following section. 
 
2.3: COFFEE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING POLICIES 
This section examines coffee cultivation policies and the employment of 
modernisation theory by the colonial authority in an attempt to modernise farming 
practices among small-scale cash crop growers in Kilimanjaro and Kagera. In 
examining the two aspects, two issues are taken into account. First, it assesses 
methods employed by the colonial authority and; secondly, assesses responses from 
growers. These aspects in Kilimanjaro and Kagera are treated separately to 
demonstrate the specific power relations and the stakeholders involved.  
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In Kilimanjaro coffee growers planted Arabica (Coffea Arabica L. var bourbon) they 
obtained from Missionaries who introduced it at Kilema in 1898138 followed by the 
settlers, who employed them as labourers and trained growers in the appropriate 
cultivation techniques resulting in the spread of the crop across Moshi district. The 
development of the crop was disrupted during the First World War. In 1919 the 
British colonial government began providing support to small-scale WaChagga 
coffee growers on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in an attempt to revive the 
industry.139 
 
In Kilimanjaro a policy was implemented by Sir Charles Cecil Farquharson 
Dundas140 when he was the DC of Moshi (1919 to 1924)141 not only for export but 
also to enable growers to pay poll tax.142  His efforts were very successful that he 
was honoured as Wasahuye O WaChagga i.e. the elder or grandfather of 
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Photograph 1: Moshi’s DC, Prominent Coffee Growers and KNCU’s Manager 
 
In an effort to revive the industry, from 1921 Dundas, accompanied by Joseph 
Merinyo, an employee in the Administration Department visited and had meetings 
with growers.144 It was during their visits and meetings the growers became more 
interested in coffee cultivation, after many abandoned it due to low demand during 
the First World War. During the visits growers were asked to replace their aging 
coffee trees. Joseph Merinyo was responsible for supplying coffee seedlings and 
was permitted by the DC to start nurseries with a start-up capital at a cost of only 25 
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rupees.145 Seedlings from Merinyo’s nurseries which were in Old Moshi with the help 
of the Chief (Mangi) Abraham of the area were sold to interested growers and Chiefs 
across the district.146At this juncture, the role played by chiefs was mobilisation and 
enforcement of coffee farming practices among its subjects (see Appendix 12 on 
coffee producers, acreages and price between 1944/45 and 1953/54; Appendix 13 
on Coffee Producers, Acreages and Price between 1960/61 and 1972/73 
 
As the demand grew, Merinyo could not cope and chiefs were granted permission 
from Dundas to start nurseries in their respective areas of jurisdiction.147 The 
encouragement by Dundas from his time when he took office as the DC of Moshi, 
coupled with the chief’s enthusiasm to use their land to grow coffee led to the 
tremendous and rapid growth of acreage in production. This growth is summarised in 
table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Number of Coffee Growers and Acreage 1923 – 1961 in Kilimanjaro 
Period (June - July) Number of growers  Acreage in thousands 
1923/24 – 1927/28 5,500 2,200 
1928/29 – 1932/33 10,700 4,500 
1933/34 – 1937/38 21,300 10,100 
1938/39 – 1942/43 26,700 15,800 
1943/44 – 1947/48 29,800 17,900 
1948/49 – 1952/53 33,000 23,500 
1953/54 – 1957/58 39,000 29,200 
1958/59 – 1960/61 44,800 33,700 
Source: Compiled from KNPA and KNCU reports from 1923 - 1960 
 
The growing number of coffee growers and acreage in Kilimanjaro was partly the 
result of the DC, the colonial government policy, the leadership of the KNPA which 
was formed in 1925 and later Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU) and its 
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affiliated societies’ encouragement since 1933 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and 
Appendix 4a on the KNPA’s Wawakilishi, Members, Number of Coffee Trees and 
Acreage). By 1936 the volume of coffee produced by growers surpassed that of the 
European planters.148 It has to be clear that, such expansion did not necessarily 
imply opening up new farms or additional land because coffee was often grown on 
the same farm with banana trees under the intercropping system.    
 
The parallel existence of two competing agricultural sectors split between the 
European plantation/settlers and African small-scale growers led to tension. Settler 
farmers resented the growth of African coffee production and in response they 
exerted pressure on the colonial administration to rescind the policy because they 
believed African growers could not be entrusted with the industry due to their 
inexperience and a lack of technical know-how. In particular, settlers argued that ‘ill-
informed growers in the industry would lead to the spread of coffee diseases into 
their trees’.149 European planters attempted to displace the growers from the coffee 
industry in order to force them to become labourers in their plantations while the 
native growers struggled to maintain their economic autonomy. Yet, some of the 
settlers’ concerns were relevant should have been addressed by establishing 
extension services to growers such as the use of insecticides/pesticides to eliminate 
insects that were damaging coffee plants. The use of insecticides/pesticides would 
have eliminated without creating tension. In reality, the settlers’ main concern was 
not a fear of the spread of diseases, but the shortage or curtailment of cheap labour 
in their farms as local Africans were not available to provide labour as were attending 
their own crops; and surely settler farmer resentment was also based on the fact that 
African farmers were competing with them. It was obvious that, the settlers 
underpaid growers for laborious and long hours farm work at a point where they had 
to concentrate in their farms where they were earning a reasonable income.  
 
 
The settlers’ views were opposed not only by Dundas himself, but also by Sir Horace 
Byatt, the first British Governor of Tanzania, 1919-25, on the basis that were not 
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economically convincing.150 Horace Byatt, felt that Africans should be encouraged to 
utilise their land to grow coffee, which was in demand in European markets.151 The 
colonial policy on the protection of the growers maintained that:  
Suppression of coffee planting was out of the question. The British 
government could not suppress development initiated by the Germans and no 
rules for suppression of the Native enterprise would ever have been permitted 
by the government or countenance by the League of Nation (UNO). Moreover, 
no government could set out to root up trees which had stood for 15 years 
and were bringing in secure and ample income. It is clear therefore that 
before the British government entered in the administration of Tanganyika 
certain of the WaChagga had already seen and experience of benefits to be 
derived from the cultivation of coffee.152 
 
 
Increasingly, the colonial government support enabled for the WaChagga to expand 
coffee cultivation further primarily geared towards fiscal advantages given the fact so 
as to contribute to the colony in realisation of financial self-sufficiency.  As a result of 
settler agitations the growers banded together, forming the Kilimanjaro Native 
Planters Association (KNPA), (later KNCU) in 1925 to protect their interest in coffee 
and the development of the industry and to access colonial government support 
including management provided by the colonial civil servants (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3). The Association’s representatives (wawakilishi) were made responsible 
for providing practical educational instructions on coffee cultivation, spraying 
insecticides and pesticides to protect trees from being damaged and infected (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3).  
 
In Kilimanjaro, coffee marketing was briefly under the control of Indians, Greeks, 
Missionaries and some civil servants before the formation of the KNPA in 1925 when 
the growers began to be directly involved (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3 and 4.4).153 
The involvement of the KNPA in crop purchase was emulated by growers from 
coffee bulk marketing scheme which was being undertaken by the settler’s 
organisation, the Kilimanjaro Planters Association (KNPA). The association received 
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government technical support that included developing a co-operative marketing 
scheme to help members sell their produce.154  
 
However, during 1925 the government withdrew its support. This was due to criticism 
from settlers that the colonial authority was directly engaging in business through the 
KNPA that forced its leaders who were civil servants to resign in December 7th 
1925.155 Their positions were taken over by the end of 1925 by Joseph Merinyo156 
who became its first African President and Stefano Lema as Secretary of the 
Association.157 Consequently, coffee cultivation and marketing was placed under 
control of Africans and the support from the government was maintained for example 
in protecting the Association from completion. The protection of the Association was 
provided with effect from April 1st 1929, when the colonial authority granted the 
coffee marketing monopoly under Section 15 of the Native Authority Ordinance 
No.18 of 1926.  
 
However, the colonial authority was not in favour of KNPA (see Chapter 4, Section 
4.3). In 1932 co-operative legislation was passed leading to the restructuring and 
replacement of the KNPA by KNCU (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2). Under Section 36 
of this legislation growers were compelled to be members of a society primarily to 
deprive the KNPA membership as all growers had under mentioned Section of the 
legislation to be members of the co-operative societies. The growers also as per 
section, were compelled to sell their produce through co-operatives that deprived 
KNPA supply of coffee from African growers (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4).  
 
Whereas the legislation was designed to suffocate the KNPA access to the coffee 
produced by Africans as linked to marketing by the colonial authority to control coffee 
through co-operatives as linked to marketing by the colonial authority to control 
coffee through co-operatives. The compulsion coffee marketing to co-operatives was 
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were strongly recommended by Strickland who maintained it was universal to co-
operative societies158 as the British Agricultural Act contained a similar provision that 
came amid the collapse of the Hopgrowers Limited in Britain that strengthened a 
feeling in its favour. Pennington who indicated that would guarantee business and 
revenue to a society.159 As mentioned the compulsion produce marketing was 
incorporated under Section 36 of the co-operative legislation. However, the Section 
was a concern to the colonial authority as once pointed out that, ‘its effects may be 
obtained by forcing non-members to sell through the society’160 as the settlers who 
were categorised as minority coffee producers were trapped too. Against the 
backdrop, the colonial authority, however, was hesitant to apply the sections as the 
settlers were also supposed to abide. Thus, it was strongly maintained by the 
colonial authority that, the policy desired to be modified only to target the native 
growers.161 Consequently, in 1934 a new legislation, the Chagga Rule; described by 
Coulson simply as a compulsory marketing order;162 and Rajagopalan distorts its 
background as he described it as part of Section 36 of the co-operative legislation.163 
Both they have not established its impact on the natives produced crops and the 
agriculture marketing policy as a whole. For example, the Chagga Rule excluded 
European planters, but, compelled the native growers to sell their coffee through the 
KNCU. It has to be noted here that the Chagga Rule segregated the natives from 
non-natives, mainly European planters. Strickland seems to concur with the idea as 
he argues that, it was unreasonable to expect these different types of coffee to be 
bulked and marketed through the same agency.164 In the speech to the East African 
countries governors, Strickland pointed ‘the ordinance for Europeans should 
exclusively be for them as one for the natives does not suit them and it is necessary 
to have the same there should be clauses that separates the two.165 Therefore, in 
implementation of the Chagga Rule policy, the settlers had to form an exclusive 
                                                          
158 Minute No. 261, April 14th 1931, TNA 13060. 
159 Minute No. 223, April 14th 1931, TNA 13060. 
160 Minute No. 261, April 14th 1931, TNA 13060. 
161 Report on the Reorganisation of the KNPA, p.8, TNA 13060. 
162 Andrew Coulson, (1982), p. 62. 
163 S. Rajagopalan, Co-operation in Foreign Countries: A Brief Outline of the Working 
of Co-operative Movement of the World, (Madras: V.S.N. Chari and Company1955), 
p. 227. 
164 C.F. Strickland, (1945), p.78. 
165 Extract of C.F. Strickland’s Speech to the conference of the Governors of the 
British East Africa Territories, January 17th 1932, TNA 19005. 
61 
 
European only co-operative society so that their coffee produce could be sold 
through a non-native only society, the Tanganyika Coffee Growers Association 
(TCGA) was formed in 1935 for this purpose under Mr Ames Mauran who was its 
President until 1947.166 
 
When coffee prices fell growers rioted because under the Chagga Rule they were 
not free to sell their coffee on the open market. Coulson attempted to explain about 
these riots. However, his narration lacks the measures that were taken by the 
colonial authority.167 To quell the riots the government was prompted to pass yet 
another racially based legislation, the native coffee control Ordinance, No 26 of 1937 
which created the government’s native coffee control Boards, the Moshi Native 
Coffee Board (MNCB) in November 1937. Consequently, native coffee cultivation in 
Kilimanjaro was placed under control of the government. The MNCB’s purpose was 
to advance and improve the cultivation of coffee grown by natives through 
management of coffee nurseries by instructing growers in methods of planting, 
cultivation harvesting or preparation and marketing of native coffee.168 The MNCB 
recruited some of wawakilishi to work as extension staff to provide guidance to 
growers. The government intervention in agriculture production was defined by the 
function that the marketing board had to play. Clearly, this did not lead to direct 
government involvement in production. Crop production/cultivation responsibility 
remained in the hand of growers, but under control of the colonial authority.  
 
Immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War the British government 
embarked upon measures to keep the supply of food and raw materials supply 
stable. In Britain as farmers were encouraged to produce more food. Rationing was 
introduced to help maintain stocks; and price control was put in place to protect 
consumers from being exposed to profiteering.169 Other measures included the 
establishment of the sterling-area in 1939 designed to control transactions within the 
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member countries, mostly colonies, which had to trade in sterling so as to maintain 
foreign exchange reserves;170 this was also to ensure that, Britain maintained trade 
and economic engagement with her colonies. The sterling-area was a significant 
measure in facilitating the supply of goods and services without immediate payment. 
The result was that Britain's debts were in the form of sterling balances and when 
payments were made were credited to London accounts.171 Furthermore, in an 
attempt to maintain war effort, Britain required massive external financial support 
which was made available under the USA’s Lend-Lease programme of 1941 that 
covered military assistance, food and raw materials needed by Britain as it was short 
of hard currency to pay for them during the Second World War; also, Britain it was 
forced to sell its assets to meet its for war efforts.172 
 
The British economy became critical in 1942-3, for example, in 1942 it began losing 
her Asia colonies to Japan expansionism and occupation; the Suez Canal was 
almost captured by the enemy that jeopardised its trade route to India and its 
economic strategies were also under threat. All these posed a critical threat in a loss 
of important sources of raw materials. Hence, government control and supervision of 
the economy increased because of the necessity to organize production for war 
efforts. Tanzania and East African colonies of Kenya and Uganda were expected to 
contribute to the war effort by supplying food and raw materials. This was carried out 
by the Ministries of Food and Supply in collaboration with the CO and colonial 
authorities on behalf of the colonial power. The Ministry of Food declared coffee 
produced in the British colonies which made 50 percent of entire supply to Britain as 
essential commodity and all colonies were required to ensure steady supply of coffee 
to Britain.173 The colonial authorities appointed agents to handle food and raw 
materials supply in the colonies.174 In East Africa an inter-government Joint 
Economic Council was set up to co-ordinate purchase of crops and raw materials. 
The Council was formed following the publication of a Circular by the Colonial Office 
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(CO) in 1939 that emphasised the need for a uniform policy and collaboration 
between groups of British colonial territories based on geographical locations for 
example, East Africa and West Africa.175  
 
 
The colonial authority in Tanzania had to adjust its marketing policies and 
established the administrative machinery to provide for the supply of commodities 
under bulk purchase agreement. The native coffee industry in Tanzania was 
included in the bulk purchase provided under long term contracts and the produce 
was sold to the Ministry of Food which had exclusive control of food and raw 
materials imports in Britain. Under the legislation food and raw materials produced 
by Africans with that effect had to be compulsorily sold to the British Ministry of Food 
through the recommended outlets, mainly marketing boards. Against this 
background, the food crop and raw materials, supplies were secured from the level 
of growers in the colonies to consumers in Britain through the bulk-purchase 
contracts under the Defence Ordinance and Orders of 1939 and 1940, which 
reinforced the existing coffee and cotton control and marketing.   
 
Bulk-purchase was characterised by short, medium or long-term contracts with 
producers in the colonies through marketing boards or co-operative societies in 
which purchase was in fixed quantities; and prices, which were low were fixed and 
reviewed on a year-to-year basis176 as per Section 7 of the contract.177 Under the 
contract between 1940 and 1952, the MNCB supplied coffee to the Ministry of Food. 
The KNCU also became an agent for the Ministry of Food during this period and was 
required to supply 4,000 tons.178 The Ministry of Food was responsible for 
determining the prices for commodities bought from the native growers was fixed at 
between 80/- and 105/- shillings. The TCGA was appointed as the agent of the Mild 
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Coffee Board to handle coffee from its members which was sold to the Ministry of 
Food.179 But, they could not meet the Ministry of Food’s prescribed quantity partly 
owing to small number of growers. Thus, they were allowed to handle coffee from 
native growers where marketing boards did not exists such as from the Northern, 
Tanga and Southern provinces.180 Interestingly, the TCGA was better priced at 
between £125-150 per ton.181 
 
The Ministry of Food approached the KNCU for an extension of the contract when it 
expired in the early 1950s as provided by Section 7 of the long-term contract; but it 
was declined (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5). The KNCU declined because price 
determined by the Ministry of Food inflicted a loss on growers who were paid 80 per 
cent of the freight on board (fob) value of their coffee after deduction expenses, 
taxes, levies under which they earned only £30 annually.182 This indicates that the 
KNCU was not prepared for any further loss and were determined to ensure that 
growers enjoyed a profit for coffee cultivation. Significantly, under clause 14 of the 
long-term contract, price could be revised in the view of devaluation of sterling;183 but 
the Ministry of Food was prepared to pay only two thirds of the free market price 
during the 1951/52 season’.184 The KNCU declined owing to the depreciation of 
sterling and preferred to sell in more profitable dollar markets.185 
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In 1951 the Defence Orders were revoked as they were deemed no longer 
necessary.186 It has to be recalled that, during the time compulsion policies that 
provided for a relaxation export and price control187 and setting up of auctions in 
Moshi in 1953 where KNCU coffee was sold. All these developments took place 
when Conservative government took power in 1951.188 The Conservative policy was 
against restrictive Labour Party’s policies, including rationing.189 It championed a 
reduction in state intervention in the economy.  
 
 
Unlike in Kilimanjaro, in Kagera two varieties of coffee, Robusta and Arabica were 
grown. The earliest variety is Robusta coffee (Coffea Canephora or Bukopensis) 
which is an indigenous crop and Arabica was introduced at the same time in 
Kilimanjaro by Missionaries in 1898190 to Christian converts.191 Although Robusta 
was produced for many years, it was not for commercial purpose, as was cultivated 
by growers who were strictly not allowed to consume; but it was only consumed by 
the royal, Mukama families.192 Realising the economic possibilities of the crop a shift 
to commercial production was introduced by the German colonial government, which 
intervened in cultivation of Arabica among the growers as it was highly priced in the 
European markets on account of its aroma and regarded as better quality than 
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Robusta,193 that that led to increase of export from 214 tons in 1906 to 681 in 
1913.194 
 
It was the Germans who persuaded the Mukama to extend permission to their 
subjects to cultivate coffee. Some Chiefs, such as Kahigi of Kianja, encouraged his 
subjects to produce coffee, mainly Arabica variety for commercial purposesand other 
Mukama in the region followed suit.195 Consequently, the Kianja Chiefdom, the 
largest in terms of land size and population became the biggest producer of Arabica, 
and also contained the highest number of coffee traders and co-operative societies 
(see Chapter 5, Section 5.3 and Appendix 16).  
 
Coffee production in Kagera was also affected during the WWI because growers 
could not attend their farms due to lack of market. The colonial authority’s 
encouragement of coffee cultivation among small-scale growers in Kagera took a 
different dimension compared to Kilimanjaro. In Kagera, forced coffee planting was a 
dominant feature from the onset of British occupation in which each household was 
required to plant 100 seedlings on their farms which were made available from 
Kilimanjaro and Uganda.196 In the four years following the British occupation planting 
was given a great impetus which was initiated by Denis Lynch Baines197 the British 
Administrator when the district came under the British rule in 1916.198 Reports shows 
that many seedling from Kilimanjaro and Uganda failed to grow properly due to 
variation of climatic conditions that prevailed in Kagera. Thus, to avoid the difficulty 
new coffee nurseries were established almost in every village where the village 
headmen were charged with supervision role.199 However, this also proved 
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67 
 
disastrous.200 Instead, between 1925 and 1927 the DA had to provide supervision to 
new nurseries that were set up at Nyamihanga in Karagwe Chiefdom/district that led 
to a significant improvement as shown in Table 3 below.201 
 
The motivation for encouraging small-scale growers remained the same as in 
Kilimanjaro, which was to attain territorial financial self-sufficiency. Although 
compulsion was a key characteristic in coffee planting, the whole exercise was 
marked good progress that in 1928 a total of 1,019 of Robusta and 1,693 of Arabica 
were exported;202 and in 1929 tons of Robusta rose to 1,767 and Arabica it was 
1,118.203 A significant expansion was evident in Table 3 below which shows a 
number of coffee trees in the region by 1937. 
 
 
Table 3:  Number of Coffee Trees in Kagera Region by 1937  
Chiefdom Robusta Arabica Total 
Kianja 620,271 2,381,818 5,002,089 
Ihangiro 2,012,763 1,271,337 3,284,100 
Kiziba 1,462,927 262,176 1,725,103 
Karagwe 195,203 121,1670 1,406,873 
Kiamtwara 28,7051 143,316 430,367 
Buyobo 499,539 25,681 525,220 
Kanyangereko 167,695 92,327 260,022 
Misenyi 11,071 66,794 176,865 
Source: Coffee Cultivation in Bukoba, TNA 1196/19 
 
Although coffee cultivation in Kagera was successful, it experienced challenges due 
to a shortage of extension staff. Only two officers had to attend growers who in total 
had 64,000 acres and 25,250,000 coffee trees by 1928.204 This lack of coffee 
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husbandry education resulted in low productivity that threatened the projected 
revenue collection. The shortages of extension staff had to be filled by local chiefs 
and headmen who lacked relevant knowledge and experience. In response, the 
colonial authority introduced a series of Ordinances, Regulations and Orders in 1927 
geared towards coffee improvement and better husbandry. This led to increase of 
the degree of coercion enforced by the chiefs and headmen. However, the Native 
Authorities205 were not effectively and enthusiastically enforcing Regulations and 
Orders given the fact they too who were coffee growers charged with a responsibility 
to supervise coffee cultivation;206 but, their plots were poorly managed;207  thus, they 
failed to be a good example that the rest of growers learn from.208 Having their plots 
being poorly managed was yet another example to growers, but was unacceptable to 
colonial authority. The engagement of the Chiefs and headmen did not take into 
account that, most of them were illiterate and could not understand the guidelines. 
They were not trained in extension services to execute the colonial government’s 
prescribed crop husbandry and management practices.  
 
Evidence shows that, growers who failed to attend their coffee plots were punished 
and in most cases they had to pay fines.209  However, payment of fines mostly 
among ‘rich’ growers did not lead to the improvement. So to say, the imposition of 
fines was a failure as ‘rich’ growers cheerfully and not annoyed to pay. So far, 
‘payment of fine was regarded as a guarantee of certain period of immunity from 
attention of unwelcome village headmen.210 For example, since growers lacked 
proper guidance on prescribed crop husbandry and management practices also 
were not distracted with payment of fines they did not take a good care of banana 
trees which were transplanted with coffee but were not pruned (see Photograph No. 
2 below).   
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Photograph 2: Banana before and after the annual cleanup  
 
 
Under such poor condition coffee trees were exposed to diseases and pest risks that 
prompted the colonial authority intervention. The colonial authority, particularly the 
DA intervened to improve the situation. For example, in 1933 an Assistant District 
Officer were deployed in Kagera to assist the agricultural officer to deal with coffee 
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problems in the region, little headway was achieved.211 Thus, in 1937 the DA 
introduced comprehensive extension services such as guided methods of sowing, 
planting, cultivation and thinning overcrowded banana trees and pruning leaves. The 
measures culminated in widespread fear among growers of the outbreak of famine 
as banana was their staple food and ingredient for making beer, rubisi.212 The coffee 
improvement measures faced resistance from growers in the form of riots in 1937 at 
more or less the same time as Coffee riots in Kilimanjaro. None of existing literature 
mentioned the colonial authority reaction towards the riots in Bukoba. This study has 
established that the DO, Major O.A. Flynn, boasted that, ‘I ably handled by removing 
two Chiefs who supported the rioters from their position and ring leaders were 
punished that led to the restoration of order that persisted throughout the colonial era 
and led to the adoption and expansion of the crop’.213 The removal of disobedient 
Chiefs by the colonial authority to ensure that law and order was maintained. No 
matter how successful the colonial authority was in arresting riots there was an 
oversight on a need and necessity to have experts to assist growers to improve the 
cultivation methods. 
 
The challenge was also experienced in the way coffee was processed. Photograph 
No 3 below shows a grower in Bukoba processing coffee on the outcrops of flat rock 
with a boulder attached to rope pulled round and round to crush coffee214 referred as 
(olwazi ne ibalelyokusa in Kihaya).215 The olwazi ne ibalelyokusa demonstrates a low 
level of processing,216 that resulted into damaging or breaking into pieces coffee 
beans hence, loss of interest from foreign buyers and for those who kept on buying 
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were ready to pay poor prices.217 A low demand and poor price paid for Kagera 
coffee forced the colonial authority to intervene. This was in 1929 when the 
Agriculture Department involved itself in coffee marketing in Bukoba, mainly in a 
supervisory role.218 In the year, the Bukoba Produce Export (Coffee) Rules and the 
Export Inspection was promulgated. Also the Coffee Industry (Registration and 
Improvement) Ordinance coupled with the Grading and Inspection Regulations 
provided under Ordinance No. 7 of 1929 also the 1929 Coffee Export Rules set out 
by the DA. All these were strongly opposed by Indian traders219 and provincial 
authority220 whose pressure to the Colonial authority was forced to request the CO 
for an intervention221 that, prompted an approval to withdraw the policies.222  
 
 
Photograph 3: Traditional Coffee Hulling Method 
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The withdrawal of the policies marked a critical challenge of the industry as it 
resulted in the decline of coffee demand.223 This prompted the Provincial authorities 
to intervene by invitation in 1936 of Northcote, the Registrar of co-operatives 
basically to investigate coffee industry problems and to recommend measures to 
address them. In his investigation, Northcote pointed out that, ‘it is evident that the 
marketing of coffee in Kagera is not in accordance with modern standards and it is in 
far worse state than the produce market in the Sukumaland (WCGA) prior to the 
establishment of Native Authority markets’224 whereby barter trade was dominant225 
(see cotton marketing in the WCGA for details). He further pointed out that, coffee in 
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Kagera was illegally bought by Indian traders at night. Most of the traders were 
operating dukas (retails shops) that led to completion among traders that crop quality 
was compromised.226 Thus, Northcote recommended the establishment of the 
control marketing board charged with coffee marketing and extension provision. This 
coincided with the promulgation of the Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) 
Ordinance No. 26 of 1937 that provided for control of coffee produced by Africans in 
Kilimanjaro. The legislation was envisaged to invigorate the growers’ interests in the 
industry and bring further development of the crop.  
 
Under the Native Coffee legislation the Bukoba District Coffee Board (BDCB) was 
formed under General Notice No 329 of April 8th 1941 to oversee coffee produced by 
the Africans. In 1942 the (BDCB) was replaced by the Bukoba Coffee Control Board 
(BCCB) which was established under the General Notice No. 329 on April 8th 1941. 
The BCCB oversaw the cultivation and marketing of the native- produced coffee just 
the same as MNCB in which the industry was brought under the control of 
government; and marketing policy for native produced coffee was harmonised. On 
October 31st, 1947 the BCCB was renamed the Bukoba Native Coffee Board 
(BNCB). The BNCB was required to address declining coffee productivity as most of 
coffee trees were between 26 to 35 years old that they became unproductive.227 In 
1949 the Board distributed 300,000 seedlings to growers;228 and 500,000 seedlings 
were supplied in 1950.229 The BNCB collaborated with the BCU in the supply of 
210,000 seedlings to growers 1950 and 1951 respectively.230 In 1951 few seedlings 
were made available due to adverse weather conditions; more were supplied from 
1957 to 1961 as shown in Table 4 below. More seedling distribution was 
implemented by the co-operatives; this was partly devolution of BNCB function in 
handling and management nurseries also the distribution of seedlings.231 Also, with 
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support from the DA 100 instructors were employed to provide extension services to 
growers.232 
                                                          
232 The BNCB Report on Development of Coffee Industry of 1951,  Reorganisation of 
Bukoba Coffee Industry, TNA 25777/1 
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Table 4: Coffee Seedlings Distribution in Kagera region 1957 – 1961 
Year Nurseries Kimwani Ihangiro Kianja Bukara Kamtwara Bugabo Kiziba Misenyi Karagwe Total  
1957 31 - 125,762 98,547 5,118 5,561 8,142 41,916 16,737 97,798 399,581 
1958 32 30,092 149,636 191,881 4,764 10,970 19,712 77,577 42,594 344,603 871,829 
1959 34 15,840 152,935 206,981 6,699 10,412 31,492 67,581 71324 278,701 841,965 
1960 33 - 90,097 105,940 1,769 15,532 7,530 25,990 29,469 258,047 534,374 
1961 11 - 46,238 64,622 6,411 3,699 3,360 26,284 23,396 210,128 384,138 
Total   45,932 564,668 667,971 24,761 46,174 70,236 239,348 183,520 1,189,277 3,031,887 
Source: The BCU’s Annual Reports for 1959/60 and 1960/61, p.29.
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The exercise was further reinforced during the post - independence era and various 
campaigns to improve the husbandry of coffee were conducted which demonstrate a 
continuity of policy. A new approach such as demonstration coffee plots were 
employed by the Union and post-colonial government as an educational campaign 
(See Table 6 below). The demonstration plots were established in most of the 
affiliated societies in all divisions (formerly Chiefdoms) so that could reach many 
growers in order to spread modern coffee farming practices such as application of 
manure. The BCU cultural section’s staff and those from Department of Agriculture 
provided practical training in demonstration coffee plots where growers learnt some 
practical methods on coffee husbandry attempted in these campaigns.233  The 
demonstration coffee plots are summarised in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Coffee Demonstration Plots 1968 
Division234 A number of Demonstration plots  Districts  
Ihangiro 19 Bukoba 
Kianja 17 Bukoba 
Bukara 2 Bukoba 
Kiamtwara 5 Bukoba 
Bugabo 6 Bukoba 
Kiziba 14 Bukoba 
Missenyi 3 Bukoba 
Karagwe 7 Karagwe 
Kimwani 1 Biharamulo 
Source: BCU 1968/69 Annual Report 
 
Other activities such as spraying insecticide and tree pruning were carried out by the 
post-colonial government extension services and the BCU staff primarily to improve 
productivity as summarised in Table 6 below.    
Table 6: Coffee Husbandry (Sprayed and Pruned Trees)  
Year Trees sprayed insecticides and pesticides235 Pruned trees 
1961/62 229,819 43,304 
1962/63 318,189 107,668 
1963/64 406,257 261,668 
Source: Compiled from the BCU 1961 to 1964 reports  
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Development of coffee production in Kagera region went hand in hand with the 
commercialisation of the crop. This began at a time of encouragement during the 
German era. This was noticeable when the Mombasa - Uganda railway reached 
Kisumu in December 20th 1901. When the British occupied the district in coffee 
production revival was introduced and so on; the resumption of commercial activities 
that growers were making gainful revenue generated from their coffee sales as 
summarised in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Coffee (Arabica and Robusta) Marketing Data from 1923 – 1935 
 Arabica Robusta  
Year Tons Percent age Value (£) Tons  Percent age Value (£) 
1923 790 30.8  1773 69.2 N/A 
1924 624 17.7  2911 82.3 N/A 
1925 1572 57.9  2578 62.1 N/A 
1926 1058 22.8 80,388 3579 77.2 244,504 
1927 1374 34.9 89,089 2569 65.1 127,373 
1928 2582 33 180,122 5244 67 297,785 
1929 2073 30.5 138,321 4721 69.5 260,732 
1930 2708 36.7 89,115 4660 63.3 104,732 
1931 1738 26.4 42,540 4848 73.6 90,721 
1932 1401 19.7 58,182 5710 80.3 206,602 
1933 2868 36.2 92,170 5054 63.8 134,836 
1934 3311 32.4 124,453 6899 87.6 205,230 
1935 3409 31.3 88,956 7473 68.7 160,688 
Source: R.C Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, (Appendix A), TNA 
24545 
 
However, coffee marketing in the Kagera which was controlled by the NA was 
chaotic despite the existence of marketing reforms introduced in 1932 under the Co-
operative legislation (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for further details). This was 
because control of marketing, and quality assurance assigned by the NA was not 
fully managed due to lack of expertise. Additionally, coffee marketing in the region 
was controlled from Uganda which was mandated by Tanzania colonial authority to 
manage the industry in the region owing to geographical proximity and transport 
infrastructure. Just as in Uganda, the Indian agents, mainly from Mombasa and 
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Uganda, controlled the export of coffee.236 The coffee collection and marketing 
networks in the village were managed by the abalanguzi i.e. itinerants who were 
hired to collect coffee beans from households/growers (see Appendix 15a: Licensed 
Coffee Dealers in some Gombolola in Kianja Bukoba District; Appendix 15b: 
Licensed Coffee Dealers in some Gombolola in Ihangiro, Kiziba, Kaimatwara, 
Bugabo, Kanyengereko, Karagwe and Misenyi Chiefdoms in Kagera region). The 
abalanguzi were a vital network as they lived within a village and occupied an 
important place as were well-known to growers.  
 
An attempt of an organised form a co-operative society was made by the Native 
Growers Association (NGA) in the 1930s, but it received some support from the 
colonial authority. This was an indication that co-operative marketing was 
disregarded (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4 for details). This also contributed to the 
coffee marketing policy which was in place which was generally in favour of private 
traders. It can also be recalled that in the process of developing the co-operative 
legislation, it was made clear by the colonial authority that it targeted the KNPA 
mainly to suffocate it and an attempt to such direction in Kagera was not a priority 
because it was thought to pose a threat to the political establishment (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2).  
 
When the colonial authority invited Northcote to Kagera in 1936, they also gave him 
terms of reference to study and make recommendations on processing, marketing 
and control of adulteration of coffee. To improve coffee marketing and crop quality 
Northcote recommended establishment of the centralisation buying posts.237 This 
was envisaged to end itinerant traders from collecting coffee from farms as many 
growers would not travel long distances to deliver his/her crop. Northcote also 
recommended the introduction of bulk of marketing (see table 8 and Appendix 12 for 
a summary of licensed coffee dealers in Chiefdoms and Gombolola). 
                                                          
236 Northcote 1936 Inquiry Report on Bukoba Coffee Industry in Report on Bukoba 
Coffee Marketing, TNA 24545, pp.11- 12. 
237 R.C. Northcote, Inquiry Report on Bukoba Coffee Industry in Report on Bukoba 
Coffee Marketing, 1936, pp.14 - 15, TNA 24545. 
79 
 
Following the outbreak of the Second World War the Bukoba Coffee Control Board 
(BCCB) and later BNCB with effect from 1942 charged with supplying coffee to the 
Ministry of Food under a long-term contract under the Defence Ordinance and 
Orders of 1939 and 1940. The Bukoba Coffee Control Board (BCCB) which supplied 
4,000 tons of coffee238as provided under Section 7 of the contract.239  The evidence 
shows that such price for Robusta produced in Kagera which was pegged at a price 
not less than £60 and not exceeding £75.240 In an attempt to ensure supply of coffee 
was maintained, marketing zones were set up and agents were appointed to handle 
coffee from growers (see Table 8 below). However, Coulson in his work has 
indicated that, the agents and these zones were created in 1954241 which is 
incorrect. It has to be noted that, the agents licence expired in November 30th 1954 
when the coffee purchase contract between the Board and Ministry of Food 
expired.242  This was in compliance with the CO’s policy regarding crop marketing 
which was published in June 1937 in which it was stressed that local agencies 
should to be involved. This contributed to a fading away of interest in co-operative 
societies. For agents, co-operatives meant deprivation of the opportunity that they 
enjoyed over the years. 
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Table 8: Coffee Marketing Zones, Locations and Appointed Agents in Kagera 
S/N Zone Sub – Chiefdoms/Locations Appointed Agents 
1 Muleba Kahengere, Bukoba, Ilamera, Mubunda, and Karambo Sherrif Jiwa and Co Ltd 
2 Nshamba Kashasha, Mbatama, Kishanda, Nshamba, And Birabo Messers. M. N. Patel and Co Ltd 
3 Kamachumu Ibuga And Kamachumu Messers. Rashid Maledina and Co Ltd 
4 Muhutwe Izigo , Muhutwe, Rwagati, and Minazi J. s. Patel and Co Ltd 
5 Ikimba Kabirizi, Mikoni, Ibweru, Kishogo, and Kaibanja Messers. Rashid Maledina and Co Ltd 
6 Maruku Kanyangereko Chiefdom J.S. Patel and Co Ltd 
7 Kiziba Kiziba Chief Messers. J. S. Patel and Co Ltd 
8 Bugabo Bugabo Chiefdom Sheriff Jiwa and Co Ltd 
9 Kyaka Misenyi Chiefdom Messers Shah and Co Ltd 
10 Karagwe Karagwe Chiefdom Messers Shah and Co Ltd 
11 Bukoba Kyantwara Chiefdom Mr Kassamali Allarakhusa and Co Ltd 
12 Bumbire Ihangiro The BCU (from 1950) 








Britain presented a proposal for extension of the bulk purchase contract for a supply 
of coffee, which was about half of the British home needs up to 1954243 which was 
2,000 tons of Robusta coffee to Ministry of Food for 1952/53 and the same tonnes 
for 1953/54244 on much the same price terms as previous contracts. The remaining 
stock was sold in auctions and Robusta was sold £100 per ton contrary to £65 on the 
same weight paid by the Ministry of Food245 and led to an escalation in smuggling 
(for further details see Chapter 5, Section 5.5). 
 
In summary, coffee cultivation was encouraged by the district commissioner in both 
Kagera and Kilimanjaro immediately after Britain took over Tanzania to help realise 
financial self-sufficiency. However, it has been shown that, the approaches in 
promoting coffee cultivation to native growers differed as compulsion dominated in 
Kagera whereas persuasion was dominant in Kilimanjaro. Coffee cultivation among 
small-scale growers was generally a success despite some challenges in Kagera 
that prompted government intervention. The passage of coffee improvement 
legislation enhanced coffee improvement in both regions in which the government 
had to intervene from 1937 through the MNCB for Kilimanjaro and the BNCB in 
Kagera that led to further entrenching government control over native produced 
coffee. Cotton production and marketing in the WCGA is examined in the next 
section. It traces the background and policy related to the development by 
highlighting the role of ECGC, engagement of growers in cotton production and 
traders in the marketing of the crop.  
 
2.4: COTTON PRODUCTION AND MARKETING POLICY 
This section examines the development of the cotton crop in the WCGA. In an 
attempt to illuminate the policy development, this section is subdivided into sections 
and subsections in which the policy and legislation related to the production and 
marketing of cotton during colonial era are explored. It also shows the extent to 
which the local chiefs and small-scale growers were engaged by the colonial 
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authority in cotton production and demonstrates the support mechanisms provided 
by the colonial authority. 
 
Unlike coffee, cotton production was mainly influenced and co-ordinated from Britain, 
which depended on imports from other countries. Cotton cultivation, just the same as 
coffee policy, employed small-scale growers. The cultivation of cotton was meant to 
promote financial self-sufficiency and supply of raw materials to Lancashire textile 
industries with the additional benefit of reducing dependence on imports from the 
USA.246 To achieve this goal, the ECGC was charged with developing production in 
the WCGA247 where it injected in 1934 it committed between £6,850 and £3,740 on 
recurrent account annually for five years from 1934 to 1939 to assist cotton 
development mainly research in Ukiliguru and Lubaga.248 It also appointed 10 cotton 
experts to develop the industry aimed at strengthening the local Department of 
Agriculture.249 One of its experts was appointed as the Assistant Director of 
Agriculture who was stationed in Mwanza charged with a responsibility to promote 
and oversee cotton production in the WCGA;250 and Mr Phillip Watson Briggs was 
hired as District Agriculture Officer from the BCGA, Uganda’s office.251 
 
The reinforcement of the Department was crucial given that agriculture was not only 
potential but it was also the mainstay of the economy of the colony. The DCs were 
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also considered as important officials to facilitate cotton production.252 A team of 
agricultural instructors were recruited, of which three of them were European 
foremen and twenty-four African, specialised in cotton on temporary/part-time 
basis.253 The recruitment of staff continued throughout the colonial period. The 
extension officers received training at the Ukiliguru cotton experiment station. Their 
training was conducted regularly to update them with new developments in cotton 
growing. For example, from 1940 new courses were established for agriculture 
instructors at the Ukiliguru Cotton Research Centre. Funds for training were made 
available from wartime sales of cotton.254 
 
African instructors conversant in Kisukuma, Kizinza, Kikerewe or Kijita, which are 
some of the local languages, were deployed in the districts of Kwimba, Musoma, 
Mwanza, Ukerewe and Shinyanga, all within WCGA where they were charged with 
advising growers on suitable land, when to plant, and methods of sowing and 
weeding.255 These extension staff supervised African cotton farms.256 Such 
instructions were informed by specific guidelines that were issued by the officers to 
growers aimed at control of cotton quality.257 Such guidelines defined cotton 
cultivation policy for small-scale growers.   
 
The colonial authority also had a role to play in promoting the industry by passage of 
legislation under Government Notice No. 84 in 1931 that provided a basic guideline 
on cotton cultivation.258 The Rules were amended in 1933 under Government Notice 
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Number 78 in 1936. 259 Under the Rules it was made compulsory for growers to tend 
their crop from planting to harvest. The Chiefs were made responsible for 
compulsory cotton cultivation policy enforcement. Bonuses were given to the Chiefs 
and village headmen who were exemplary in stimulating cotton growing.260 
 
Davidson’s work illustrates the great economic crash and its consequences in Africa 
from 1929 to the early 1930s. He demonstrates it caused a substantial fall in 
government revenue.261 This section establishes that the growers were adversely 
affected due to the low price for their produce, something that demoralised 
growers.262 Measures undertaken by the colonial government to bolster the territory’s 
finances involved an ‘Increase Production Campaign’ to offset depression deficits.263 
The campaign covered food crops as well and involved forced labour. The growers 
were heavily engaged as it was compulsory to increase farm size for both cotton and 
food crops for export in order to maintain their income at the levels in previous 
seasons/years owing to shortage in other parts of the world.264 As a result, growers 
organised themselves in informal work/farming groups referred to as luganda, 
uinyabeleja, lukoba or salengekilimo in Kisukuma language to work in turn in 
members farms. 
 
To achieve this objective, new regulations were put in place,265 forcing growers to 
tend their crop from planting to harvest. Rodney in his analysis on extraction of 
resources outlined measures employed by the colonial authority to compel growers 
to cultivate cotton.266 In his work, Bowles also mentions compulsory measures 
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imposed to growers to produce cotton.267 However, both Rodney and Bowles lack 
specific details and cases/examples which this section has been able to establish. 
For example, there was compulsory planting of minimum cotton acreage for each 
household. For example, in Uzinza Chiefdom it was 25 percent in 1931 which was 
increased to ½ acre in 1933 in which the policy was enforced by the Chiefs.268 The 
compulsion powers were provided under the NA (Extension Power) (Cultivation of 
Cotton) Order, 1935 and Government Notice No. 75 of 1935. Under such legislation 
growers who failed to comply with the orders were punished.269 
 
Better farming implements were important in increasing cotton cultivation. Usually, 
growers used rudimentary tools for farming. An English hoe had to replace the native 
jembe (hand hoe) which was light and fragile that could not break up the dry/hard 
soil to any real depth, something necessary for commercial production. ‘Progressive 
growers’ were persuaded to use light ploughs drawn by their trained oxen that were 
introduced in the district in 1923 by the Director of  the Game and Preservation 
Department, Mr C.F.M Sweynnerton as part of experiments in connection with tsetse 
control work270 with funding from the 1929 Colonial Development Act.271 
 
The colonial authority was also responsible in collaboration with Uganda’s colonial 
government in arrangements, policies and legislations connected to the processing 
(ginning) marketing and transportation of the of the cotton crop. The two 
governments played a role in attracting investments in cotton processing and 
attracting buyers. A monopoly was granted to cotton merchants who had the 
financial capital to handle the entire crop produced in the WCGA on annular basis. 
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As a result, the natives were not considered because were not financially capable 
and lacked knowledge and experience. The practice was applied throughout the 
interwar years with limited government intervention by the Native Authorities which 
were assigned control and quality assurance.272 However, the system proved a 
failure in ensuring control of quality because it was compromised, traders pushed 
cotton price below the government recommended amount and cheating of growers 
was widespread.273 Also, barter trade dominated whereby cotton was exchanged 
with manufactured goods despite an attempt to discourage it by introduction of cash 
trading.274 There was concern about the spread of diseases such as black boil, 
fusarium wilt and bacterial blight and pests risks as cotton bollworm and spinney 
bollworm from one village to the other that could curtail production in the entire 
WCGA, thus leading to serious implication on the industry and the country’s 
economy.  
 
The critical problem was that, the ginning of cotton was marred by defects that led to 
the deterioration of quality. The situation prompted intervention by the colonial 
government which conducted an investigation in 1923 and subsequently 
recommended solutions.275 The intervention was put in place in marketing as this 
could no longer left to ginners alone.276 It was recommended that cotton marketing 
has to be allocated to ginneries/ginning zones277 provided under the 1931 Cotton 
Ordinance, which was amended in 1933 that provided for the control of cultivation, 
marketing, and ginning. The Ordinance reorganised cotton growing areas into zones 
to curb spread of diseases, and purchase licensing was introduced that confined 
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buyer’s operation to a specific production zone.278 The cotton rules were introduced 
to curb indiscriminate buying and to control uneconomic competition that could 
adversely affect cotton quality. They also granted permission to ginners for erecting 
ginneries in which in 1933 Ladha Meghji erected ginneries in Luguru;279 also in 
Uzinza in 1938 and Mugango in 1936.280 The Mugango ginnery was meant to serve 
cotton produced in Busegwe, Ikizu, Ushahi and Bukwaya; and the British East Africa 
Corporation which was an agent of the BCGA in East Africa erected a ginnery in 
1933 at Usogore in Shinyanga district, but, in 1940 it transferred ownership to Ladha 
Meghji.281 Baghwaji Sundweji and Company had five ginneries and also erected a 
ginnery in Uzinza that became the biggest ginner in the WCGA.282 
 
In the 1920s the NA were given responsibility for overseeing cotton marketing.283 In 
some cases quality of the produce cotton delivered for marketing was compromised 
by cotton growers.284 As a result, cotton buying posts and later zones were created 
for quality control in the 1930s in an attempt to control the spread of pests and 
diseases;285 importantly, quality control of the produce. Throughout the colonial 
period, cheating was widespread by underweight, under grading their delivery and 
underpaying them that partly demoralised grower participation in cotton 
production.286  This proved challenging due to their inability to control cheating by 
Asian traders.287 All this increased mistrust of the officers by growers and NA that 
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created to find a solution through the formation of weighing groups after the Second 
World War (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4).  
 
In her work Gorst shows that following the outbreak of WWII the government had to 
intervene in cotton marketing.288 However, she has just shows this was through the 
Defence (Control of Cotton) Regulation. But, she has not shown how the process 
and legislation was applied that this section attempts to expand her findings that 
after the outbreak of WWII, an Export Group was appointed to handle the crop on 
behalf of the colonial government and the Ministry of Food. The measure was not 
only to ensure supply of cotton to Britain but also marketing of growers’ produce. 
These developments demonstrate that growers had no stake in the marketing of 
their produce. This was marked policy shift in agriculture marketing from inter-war 
marketing strategies discussed earlier. This was geared to suit the colonial power 
interventions and control of agriculture marketing following the outbreak of WWII in 
1939 to 1950s cotton was also subjected under the Defence (Control of Cotton) 
Regulation of 1939,289 1942 and 1943290 under which the Colonial Office assured the 
Colonial government in Tanganyika291 that it was committed to purchase 45,000 
bales (see Appendix 2 for a number of cotton bales produced from 1935 to 1946) of 
cotton from WCGA292 at a fixed price of 12/- shillings (£10) per a bale for a five year 
contract.293 
 
Crucially, in the WCGA there was no control Board for cotton as there was for coffee, 
thus the DA had to assume the role of Cotton Controller. A Cotton Advisory Board, 
which was set up in 1927, which was charged with responsibility for approving and 
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issuing of the cotton marketing licenses.294 The co-ordination of marketing was 
handled by the East African Exporters Group,295 which was set up by the colonial 
government as the administrative machinery designed for the execution of the 
contract arrangements. According to the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts of 1939 
and 1940 also Sections 7 and 8 of the 1943 Regulations each group member was 
allocated by the DA the quantity or a number of bales to supply during the basic 
seven years. The Exporters Group came into long term agreement with the Ministry 
for purchase of the whole cotton crop produced in the Lake Province/WCGA296 on 
fixed price of 12 cents per lb in 1943.297 By 1950 this had risen to 34 and by 1960 to 
54 cents per lb;298 and it was increase to 1.06 shillings for AR grade and 0.51 cents 
for BR grade by 1968.299 
 
The administrative machinery to handle cotton exports during and post-war years 
was reinforced by a cotton marketing policy that did not consider promotion of the 
co-operatives. Instead, it reinforced the East African Exporters Group role in 
handling cotton. The position of the East African Exporters Group in Uganda was 
weakened following the setting up of the Lint and Seed Marketing Board (LSMB) 
which, took over the Group’s functions in 1949.300 Ugandan Cotton Board handed 
over its functions to the Tanzanian Board, the Lint and Seed Marketing Board 
(LSMB) in 1952 following its formation which was provided under the Lint and Seed 
Marketing Ordinance No. 11 of 1952 that provided for setting up of the LSMB in April 
1st 1952 with John Ballemy as its first Manager. This was a year when the supply of 
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cotton on contract basis to Britain came to an end. However, the until the Board 
1958 exported Tanzania’s cotton through the Uganda Cotton Board that is why the 
VFCUS could not be appointed as agent just the same of the KNCU until when it 
acquired the export status with effect from 1959. 
 
In summary, this section has examined coffee and cotton marketing and provided an 
analysis of the administrative machinery designed for execution bulk purchase of the 
two crops on long-term contract arrangements provided under the Defence 
Ordinance and Orders. Under these arrangements both crops were handled by the 
appointed agents on behalf of the Ministry of Food and Supplies. This provided 
assurance to growers to sell their produce during the war and post-war period, but 
the price paid was determined by the buyer. The handling of coffee by the KNCU 
further reinforced its monopoly position, whereas in Kagera appointed agents 
weakened the desire to promote co-operatives. Similarly, cotton handling and 
marketing in the WCGA under control of the appointed agents who by then were 
experienced in crop handling as the co-operatives were unlikely as the war 
circumstance pressurised for utilisation of available networks. 
 
The success of bulk purchase proved economically important to the colonial power. 
However, the policy functioned on a contract basis that had obviously to be 
discontinued at a certain point. In an attempt to ensure sustained economic 
recovery, the post-war economic policies such as intensification of state intervention 
in agriculture were put in place as examined in the following section. 
 
2.5: THE POST - WWII AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
The previous section discussed the financial crisis during the Second World War and 
the measures undertaken by Britain as the war efforts which were all characterised 
by government intervention. Such interventions affected the colonies that are 
discussed in this section with focus on Tanzania, where there were three policy 
approaches that were employed in an attempt to recover the British war-ravaged 
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economy.301 Britain’s export industries had been destroyed during the war or 
production was diverted to the war effort. The net earnings from foreign investments 
and services such as shipping were drastically reduced and it had war debts, mainly 
to countries of the sterling area; and had huge debts to pay to the government of 
United States of America (USA).302 This required new efforts for the reconstruction of 
the British economy.303 This enhanced a need to exploit colonial resources within the 
sterling bloc to pay debts and to have a stable balance of payment.304 
 
The Colonial Development and Welfare Act passed in 1945 Acts was envisaged to 
raise the standard of living of the colonial peoples. Under the Act funds were made 
available by the colonial power as assistance to colonial governments. Funding was 
augmented in 1948 by the Overseas Resources Development Act that led to the 
formation of the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) and Overseas Food 
Corporation (OFC). The OFC was responsible to the Ministry of Food and set up 
primarily to increase production of dollar-earning or dollar-saving commodities by the 
processing and marketing of agricultural products anywhere outside the United 
Kingdom. The OFC brought about the first example of direct government intervention 
in agriculture production in the colonies. However, it has to be noted that, the direct 
government intervention in agriculture production is not a core part of this study.  
 
Some of the examples of colonial government intervention were the groundnut 
scheme305 in which the first project to be undertaken was in Kongwa, Urambo and 
Nachingwea, Tanzania to supply to the international market, all these which was 
managed by the OFC until 1955 when it came under the Tanganyika Agriculture 
Corporation (TAC).306 The government groundnut production in Kongwa is well 
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documented as a failure.307 Such schemes are noted here due to their significance 
especially, the tenancy scheme in Urambo which was adopted by the post-colonial 
government in an attempt to promote tobacco production. Also, the cultivation of 
dollar earning crops such as cotton, rice and wattle.308 At the same time, state 
intervention was considered vital and the private sectors such as banks were 
encouraged to take part by making capital available for development projects.309 It 
has to be noted that important driving force behind colonial development policy was 
the reconstruction of the British economy. In this regard it was believed that the 
improvement in agricultural production would increase dollar earnings. 
 
The second approach was intensification in the utilisation of the small scale 
producers mainly cotton in the WCGA as well as coffee in Kagera region (see Table 
6 and 9). Funds were made available in the colonies as development assistance 
envisaged to strengthen the capacity of the colonial economies to be more 
productive and in realising development of colonial resources to facilitate the 
regeneration of the British economy. For example, funds were made available under 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 for the Maruku coffee research 
station in Kagera for the development of the infrastructure.310 
 
The  use of the small scale producers in the WCGA was categorised in the two 
approaches; first, the continuation of the inter-war policy whereby the small scale 
producers were forced to produce cotton under the Government circular No.28 of 
1939 which provided for intensive ‘Plant More Crops Campaign’ targeting small scale 
growers. Also the 1942 Government Notice No. 177 was that provided for the cotton 
planting compulsion policy which was provided under the Defence and Emergence 
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Orders.311 The compulsion practices were further reinforced under Ordinance No. 57 
of 1951 in response to concerns over the slow expansion of cotton cultivation in the 
WCGA.312 The compulsion measures were justified as in order to target ‘the indolent 
anti-social few who have to be dealt with’.313 
 
Secondly, £520,000 was made available between 1947 and 1956 for the Sukuma 
Development Scheme, which was one of the largest development projects in the 
WCGA.314 The scheme was the most comprehensive of all the post-war colonial 
development schemes, which aimed to increase colonial production of goods and 
raw materials through state intervention. It was also envisaged providing for 
economic use of the land and modernisation of agriculture by targeting the 
‘progressive farmers’ that formed the third policy approach.  Under the policy, co-
ordination was put in place to introduce a new system of agriculture with better 
farming methods, improved crop seed strains by and large to strengthen the flow of 
revenue and to raise the standard of living of the natives. 
 
The progressive farmers were exposed to rigorous extension services and training 
revolved around individualised technical support so as to orient them towards 
increasing productivity.315 It was also envisaged to forestall future discontent by 
broadening the middle class collaborative base to enhance political stability and 
create conducive conditions for extraction of resources. The scheme also involved 
resettling of the population in 8,000 square miles of unoccupied land in Geita and 
Maswa Districts specifically in the current Meatu district from densely populated 
areas of Kwimba district. The resettlement had an impact on increase cotton 
production in the WCGA as shown in Table 9 below.  
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Table 9: Development of Cotton Production in the WCGA (1950 – 1963) 
Year Cotton Bales produced  (1000) Price in cents per lb. 
1950 40 34 
1951 40 50 
1952 39 50 
1953 70 50 
1954 91 62 
1955 109 62 
1956 121 57 
1957 151 54 
1958 152 54 
1959 183 52 
1961 161 54 
Source: IBRD, The Economic Development of Tanganyika, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1961), pp. 12, 13 and 202. 
 
 
The progressive farmers, who were selected based on their good production 
performance as compared to the majority of small scale producers. They enjoyed 
access to agricultural credit and were supplied with high-yield cotton seed 
varieties,316 culminating in the emergence of kulaks/wealthy growers. Among these 
progressive farmers who were the beneficiaries were 22 from Kakebe, 22 from 
Mahina and 11 from Isega all in Mwanza Chiefdom; another 61 were from Kishili, 62 
from Mwananga, 63 from Bujigwa in Bunegeji Chiefdom.317 
 
In summary, the post-WWII the colonial power and colonial authority were occupied 
with intervention in agriculture production to meet the demand for agricultural 
commodities and take advantage of increasing prices in the world markets. Against 
this backdrop the government was directly engaged in production. The focus was 
also in the modernisation and improvement of agricultural production among small-
scale cotton growers in which emphasis on progressive farmers’ encouragement 
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approach. All these were geared towards increasing cotton production. When 
Tanzania attained independence in 1961 the TANU leadership initially adopted the 
colonial policy representing continuity rather than change.318 The adoption of the 
policy forms an integral part of the next section’s discussion.   
 
2.6: THE POST-INDEPENDENCE AGRICULTURE POLICY 
This section examines the continuity of the agricultural production and marketing 
policies during the post - colonial era. It begins by highlighting the general 
development of agriculture in Tanzania. It is followed by an examination of the 
inherited policies and its changes in an attempt to further modernise agricultural 
production among small-scale growers. Lastly, it examines marketing policies. 
 
When independence was achieved the industrial economy and agriculture was 
dominated by small-scale growers and large plantations were under control of the 
private sector. Such growers were practicing shifting cultivation and were 
subsistence farmers with production being geared mainly towards consumption and 
not for exchange/marketing.319 Also, what they sold was to enable them get money 
to buy basic household necessities. 
 
In an attempt to address and improve agricultural production among the subsistence 
growers the post-colonial government adopted the tenancy scheme Urambo for 
tobacco production also in WCGA for cotton production where the transformation 
approach was adopted (see Appendix 19 on cotton production targets - Lake 
Province/WCGA).320 The transformation approach signified the continuation of 
promoting progressive farmers with emphasis on the production of cash crops, an 
idea that was also encouraged by the World Bank.321 The transformation approach 
comprised of a number of the supervised and co-operative settlement schemes. The 
settlement schemes were supervised by the government and provided credit and 
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specialized extension services to growers. Under the scheme growers were grouped 
in the village settlements to grow crops such as tobacco.322 Other supervised 
schemes included irrigation in villages that surround Lake Victoria which were 
supported by Israeli government;323 also, the block cotton farming and in the 
WCGA.324 The co-operative settlement schemes that growers were encouraged to 
voluntarily come to engage in agricultural production; these comprised of youth 
volunteers most of whom were managed by TANU Youth League and Ujamaa 
settlements such as Ruvuma Development Association.325 Such development is well 
illustrated by Hodge who demonstrates the continuities between late colonial policies 
and post-colonial development strategies;326 this idea dates back to the colonial 
supervised tenancy settlements. The policy was based on the premise that that it 
would assist growers to improve agricultural production practices and output 
eventually a departure from subsistence practices.  
 
When Tanzania attained independence in 1962 it inherited clear social and 
economic disparities among its rural population. The disparity was obvious between 
cash crop and non-cash producing areas. In an attempt to address such disparities, 
Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s President proclaimed Ujamaa as the country 
development policy. Ujamaa was described by Nyerere to imply family hood by 
stressing that Tanzania’s socialism, which is rooted in our past which was envisioned 
further, beyond the tribe to the nation.327 In essence, Ujamaa as a new development 
model envisioned a process of modernisation of pre-colonial social elements among 
the Tanzania population; and this was envisioned that the country be developed 
along socialist lines within a framework of its unique social and cultural heritage.328 
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Ujamaa aimed to address the disparities with priority being those in rural areas and 
regions which had been neglected during the colonial era.329 
 
However, the policy was fused with western values so as to modernise rural society 
in Tanzania, particularly in agricultural production in which co-operatives would 
undertake the process. When independence was attained there were great 
expectations for a fast economic growth and social development.330 To achieve the 
"take-off" the aid of Western development assistance, know-how, and investment 
capital were expected to facilitate the process in the agricultural sector as well as in 
industrialisation. Disappointingly, the flow of aid from Western countries was 
unreliable. As a result various development programmes were put in jeopardy some 
of which were the improvements and transformation of agriculture sector.  
 
Yet, the approaches were generating class differentiations which did not reflect the 
ideology inherent in Ujamaa. This was evident in 1966 when evaluations for both the 
improvement and progressive approaches were conducted in which it was learnt that 
there was a burgeoning of rural inequality, the majority who were poor were 
becoming landless and a handful number of kulaks.331 Although kulaks were few of 
whom majority were Arabs and few Africans were getting richer who owned huge 
tracks of land that threatened the rural social fabrics were on threat and racial and 
class tension was emerging.  
 
Despite both approaches having economic merits, they were both considered 
socially irrelevant. This suggests that, there was an unclear strategy in employment 
and implementation of Ujamaa policy objectives. Thus, the rural development 
strategy had therefore reconsidered and redefined policy under the Ujamaa policy to 
fit into a new pattern of development.332 Hence, the Arusha Declaration (ArD) was 
                                                          
329 J.K. Nyerere, (1967), p. 170. 
330 Mai Palmberg, Introduction in Mai Palmberg (ed.), Problems of Socialist 
Orientation in Africa, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1978), p.11. 
331 Umma Ulele, (1975), p.151.  
332 TANU, The Arusha Declaration, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printers, 1967). 
98 
 
brought into effect by the TANU Government in February 1967 and marked a 
watershed for socialist development in the country. 
 
Importantly, unlike the improvement and transformation approaches the ArD was the 
locally bred strategy as it delineated clear and specific steps in the creation of a 
socialist state under which existing private sectors such as banks, plantations, 
manufacturing, and transport were all nationalised. Such sectors were handed over 
to the parastatals, mainly, the agricultural marketing boards, and also to co-
operatives to manage. Adoption of socialism was based on the contention that 
capitalism was unsuitable for Africans as it reflected a continuation of colonialism. It 
was also envisioned that socialism was relevant in providing a solution to the 
challenges facing rural communities by the introduction of communal ownership of 
the means of production with emphasis on the collective production envisaged to 
realisation of self-reliance and provided a new direction for rural development 
strategy based on the Ujamaa villages. This was envisaged to stimulate growers 
under the government control to produce a surplus to sustain the state bureaucracy 
and to help inculcate the TANU’s socialist (Ujamaa/family hood)333 ideology in rural 
areas.334 
 
The post-colonial government adopted colonial agriculture marketing policies. It 
initiated and strengthened control over crop marketing of all agricultural products 
produced in the country by amending the colonial legislation on marketing of 
agricultural products which was basically designed for natives, the African 
Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949. The legislation was 
replaced by the National Agricultural Products Board (Control and Marketing) Act in 
1962 that provided for the establishment of the National Agricultural Products Board 
(NAPB).335 The colonial Agricultural Products legislation was replaced because the 
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post-colonial authority viewed it as discriminatory as it targeted only crops produced 
by the Africans/Natives but not so to those produced by settlers and Indians.  
 
The policy, however, did not make a significant shift in employment of Section 36 of 
the co-operative legislation. This translates the facts that, the co-operative were 
important and were viewed as an integral part of the government in an attempt to 
control agriculture which was the mainstay of the country’s economy. This is viewed 
by Albaum and Rutman as the anti-free market attitude of the government.336 Both, 
policy continuity and discontinuity was brought by the government's desire not only 
to control Asian traders,337 but on the understanding that the country’s economic 
largely depended on cash crops to generating revenues. In this regard, the NAPB 
provided for the centralisation and coordination of crop marketing and pricing in 
government hands. The policy objective was to facilitate revenue generated from 
exported cash crops in order to:338 
- Increase the tax revenue of Tanganyika so that the unavoidable 
governmental and development expenditures can be more satisfactorily 
covered by the state itself; 
- Create additional possibilities for industrial processing of agricultural 
products; and 
- Increase the market possibilities for the consumer industry by 
strengthening the buying power of the production, i.e. of rural families. 
 
However, a new development emerged in the 1970s, when marketing boards were 
renamed as Crop authorities, largely to widen the government’s revenue. The rural 
development policy, Ujamaa Vijijini, provided a legal identity under the Village and 
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Ujamaa Village (Registration) Act of 1975.339 The legislation gave village powers to 
control of the growers. At this juncture, communal farming in the village Ujamaa 
farms was strongly stressed. Under the legislation the villages were recognised and 
defined as multi-purpose co-operative societies and ultimately paved the way for 
dissolving primary co-operative societies which operated on a village basis. Primary 
co-operative societies, in accordance to the legislation had to wind up businesses 
and dispose assets and liabilities to the village council. The legislation also provided 
the groundwork for the abolition of co-operatives in 1976.  
 
2.7: CONCLUSION 
Tanzania was a theatre of the First World War, which caused widespread damage. 
Cash crops, mainly coffee and cotton were brought into stand still in terms of both, 
production and marketing. The first task was the reorganisation economy in which 
the British colonial administration had to embark upon was the revival of both crops 
so as to meet British industrial and consumer demand by utilising small-scale crop 
production. The encouragement of cash crops production among small-scale 
growers by the colonial government was primarily geared towards fiscal advantages 
given the fact that had to attain financial self-sufficiency.  
 
The small-scale growers were encouraged to fulfil the objective to produce for 
market. In this regard, it was clear that the future of Tanzania’s economy was 
through developing cash crop cultivation among the small-scale growers which was 
achieved through persuasion, particularly in Kilimanjaro; whereas coffee cultivation 
in Kagera and cotton in the WCGA was achieved through coercion as the foundation 
for stimulating cash crops production for export that reinforced dependency on 
foreign markets as consumption locally was not a priority to the colonial authority.  
 
The success in the encouragement of the small-scale growers to produce cash crops 
was anchored on access to land by growers which were exploited by the colonial 
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authority to encourage them in the cash crop economy as a means to promote 
economic modernisation to the colonial subjects. Land access to small-scale 
growers was in compliance with the British government that provided for 
development of small-scale cash crop production because was the cheapest way to 
obtain raw materials for export. Promotion of small-scale growers provided entry into 
a cash economy eventually were integrated to overseas markets.  
 
In the post-war years Britain, intensified agricultural commodity production in her 
colonies including Tanzania.  This was to ensure adequate supply of cheap raw 
materials to facilitate reconstruction of a devastated economy. Consequently, 
improvement of cotton production under the progressive approach was employed. 
The policy was rooted in the belief that the progressive farmers would increase 
production by adoption of improved farming techniques that in the long run the rest 
of growers to emulate production, hence the widespread adoption in improved 
farming practices. The progressive farmers, in this case were envisioned to be the 
key players not only in production but also in the marketing of their produce, mainly 
export crops. Against this background, the policy was envisaged to promote not only 
co-operatives, but a class of native rich farmers in rural areas who would have a 
contribution to the reconstruction of war-ravaged British economy. 
 
The adoption of agricultural policy prescribed for the post-colonial government by the 
World Bank, which was convinced that tenancy schemes and improvement approach 
on the same grounds that it would assist growers to improve production practices 
and output. The policy proved to be a foundation for the post-independence Ujamaa 
villagisation (Ujamaa Vijijini) strategy which involved by settling growers in villages. 
However, the process was top-down imposed and lacked participation of the 
targeted rural population.  
 
The colonial marketing authority effectively employed the 1932 Co-operatives 
Ordinance, (section 36) to promulgate the Chagga Rule and the native coffee control 
and marketing legislation in Kilimanjaro and Kagera to compel small-scale growers 
to sell their produce through co-operatives or appointed agent mainly the native 
marketing boards. This did not only dictate what small growers should produce for 
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export but also a control over crop marketing. In principal the mentioned sections of 
the co-operative legislation were the bedrock to the cash crop marketing policy in 
Tanzania which was utilised following the outbreak of WWII when bulk purchase 
contract were brought into place.  
 
The bulk purchase of coffee and cotton during and after the Second World War was 
implemented through the administrative machinery under the contract arrangements 
provided. Under the arrangements, the native produced coffee also cotton was 
handled by appointing agents. This culminated in extensive state control over the 
marketing of growers’ produce. It was made compulsory that, coffee produced by 
natives should be sold through that board or an agency appointed by the board, 
which were the co-operatives where they existed and private traders where the 
Boards and co-operatives did not exist for example, the Cotton Exporter’s Group in 
the WCGA. Under the policy there was no room was provided for the growth of the 
co-operative movement. This might have been based on the thesis that the 
appointed agents were more experienced. Consequently, implementation of the 
policy was a further delay in promotion of co-operatives in Kagera and in the WCGA 
on one hand. On the other the KNCU position was further reinforced because it was 
granted monopoly over coffee produced by natives in Kilimanjaro.  
 
The cash crop marketing policies formulated during colonial period have in fact been 
inherited and remained unchanged at independence when were utilised to facilitate 
marketing of crops through an agency appointed by the government. At this juncture, 
the post-independence authority was unwilling to encourage Asian traders to step in. 
For example, it rapidly moved into eliminating the private merchant, particularly, 
Asian traders from the agricultural commodity marketing under the National 
Agricultural Products Board legislation. In this regard, the government created a 
monopoly over crop marketing and the co-operatives were encouraged to handle 
crops through the villages that signified the continuity of the colonial agricultural 




This chapter has explored the background to the coffee and cotton production and 
marketing policies and incorporation of small-scale growers in the cash economy 
before and after the Second World War. The chapter has examined how the policies 
contributed to the emergence of the co-operative movement. It has also examined 
the continuity and change of the post-independence and their contribution to the 
encouragement of the co-operative movement. The following chapter critically 
examines policy and political decisions that led to the promulgation of the co-
operative legislation in 1932 eventually, the promotion of co-operatives were 
incorporated into the agriculture and crop marketing policies in the trans-colonial 
period. It also shows the extent to which marketing policies, as well as political 
decisions formed bedrock to the emergence and expansion of the movement 


















CHAPTER THREE: THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CO-OPERATIVE 
MOVEMENT IN TANZANIA 
 
3.1: INTRODUCTION 
This is a core chapter of this thesis. It focuses on some fundamental policy aspects 
that lay a foundation for an understanding of the development of the co-operative 
movement from 1932 to 1982. Despite the prominent role the co-operative 
movement in development policy, it is largely neglected in both the historical and 
contemporary literature on African development. This neglect is becoming more 
critical given the current renaissance of co-operatives in Africa and increasing 
international interest in co-operative development models. 
 
3.2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section analyses the promotion of the co-operative movement within the 
agriculture and crop marketing policies. It also examines the colonial government’s 
motivation and methods in promoting the co-operatives. By examining these policies 
the chapter will fill the gap the literature, particularly in the historical background of 
Tanzania’s agriculture marketing co-operatives. Although existing sources contain 
some historical coverage; they are fragmented into a number of disciplines. For 
example, Rhodes340 and co-operators as Digby341 and Strickland342 all these, have a 
lot in common regarding the co-operative movement in the British colonies. But, 
Rhodes not only ignored, but also not mentioned the growth and development of the 
co-operative movement in Tanzania despite its impressive progress. Digby has 
covered the development in a nutshell and fails to illuminate the colonial authority’s 
policy and political intervention aspect. Her discussion of Tanzania is predominantly 
about the KNCU, NGOMAT. The BCU which was established in 1950 is not 
mentioned and the VFCUs affiliated societies are not covered largely because they 
were formed and registered in the same year when her work was published.  Gorst 
illuminates the background to the development and progress that took place in 
Tanzania but, her presentation lacks an analysis of the historical development.343 
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Similarly, Kimario344 is a historical narrative that covers the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. However, it lacks a historical analysis about the general policies on the cash 
crop marketing and those that led to the growth and development of the co-operative 
movement in Tanzania during the colonial era.  
 
Baldus345 supports and argues that the co-operative movement was part and parcel 
of political struggles with the marginalisation of initiatives by growers to have control 
over marketing of what they produce. He further stresses that, the co-operative 
movement from 1967 was part and parcel of implementation of Arusha Declaration 
socialist policy; but, no details are given for the failure to incorporate the co-operative 
movement in building a socialist state that forced the post-colonial authority to 
embark upon the socialist villagisation policy that prompted the abolition of the co-
operative societies which were replaced by villages as a co-operative society entity.  
 
Andreas Eckert346 generalises that, the co-operative movement in Tanzania was 
mainly the result of initiatives from the local rural population. She emphasises that, 
such a move is ‘from below’. She also maintains and refutes a contention that, the 
co-operative movement was generally imposed upon the colonised by the British.347 
Such arguments, generalises and distortions a history of the co-operative movement 
in Tanzania.  
Develtere is in a critical of the proposition against the colonial authority initiatives and 
intervention policy in promotion of co-operatives.348 For him, this was primarily a 
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prejudice policy which viewed the colonised as incapable to initiate. The primary 
evidence has also shown that, the colonial authorities viewed as the only stimulating 
source that could trigger promotion of the co-operative movement because the 
colonised were conceived backward, illiterate, apathy and inexperience has 
prevented them not only from forming co-operatives but also managing them.349 
 
Nevertheless, a critical gap remains in the overall background regarding political and 
policy decisions that led to the promulgation of the co-operative legislation, the 
promotion of the co-operative, and restructuring them during colonial and post-
colonial era. This study utilised primary evidence to generate new ideas regarding 
the development of co-operatives during the period in question. Additionally, none of 
the existing literature has examined or assessed the factors that led to myriad 
geographical differentiations in the development of the movement in the country and 
timing of the emergence of co-operatives. This study and specifically this chapter 
provides a new historical encounter that addresses mentioned gaps through three 
selected cases.  
 
In order to have in-depth understanding of the development of co-operative 
movement in Tanzania, this chapter is sub-divided into four main sections. The first 
and second sections examine co-operative development prior and after the 
promulgation of co-operative legislation covering a period from 1925 to 1945. 
Section three examines co-operative development in the post-war years; and section 
four evaluates post-colonial policies on the co-operative movement. Within the 
mentioned sections it critically addresses them through following key questions;  
 In what ways did the colonial political decisions influenced and shaped the 
emergence of co-operatives? 
 Why the concerted effort for promotion and registration of the co-operatives 
by the colonial authority was uneven? 
 In what ways did the changing political and ideological influences of the 
emerging Tanzanian state shape the co-operative movement during the first 
two decades of independence?      
 
                                                          




3.2 THE CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS 
This section provides a historical analysis of how the colonial authority promoted co-
operatives in Tanzania. The analysis revolves around two major aspects; first, the 
background to co-operative promotion the policy. Again, the political decisions are 
taken into account in which focus is on the restricting of the KNPA and promulgation 
of the co-operative legislation and to the extent to which this formed bedrock for 
overall agricultural marketing and the eventual control of growers and co-operatives 
by the colonial and post-colonial authority.  
 
The promotion of the co-operative movement in Tanzania took centre stage in 
October 1929 when the colonial authority convened a conference in Dar Es Salaam 
which was attended by District Officers (DOS) and District Administrators (DAS) with 
co-operative development as key agenda.350 In his speech presentation the 
Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) stressed a need for promotion of the co-operative 
in the territory by citing of successful cases of the KNPA and similar arrangement for 
rice crop in Mahenge district.351 The SNA strongly stressed the significance of the 
co-operative movement in the modernisation of colonial subjects. The SNA further 
stressed on the priority to training of civil servants, particularly the DOs in Sri Lanka 
on the co-operative methods and management so that to provide proper guidance to 
members in managing their societies.352  
 
The conference identified some aspects necessary for the promotion of the co-
operative movement. The co-operative legislation was envisaged to provide both, 
legal and policy ground towards implementation of the agenda. The legislation was 
necessary to provide for the control of the co-operatives. There was also a need for 
preparing colonial officials in promoting the co-operatives that could be effectively 
                                                          
350 Extracts from Minutes of conference of Senior Administration Officers, October 
21st to 24 1929, TNA 13698. 
351 Memorandum of the SNA on the Agricultural and Credit co-operative Societies, 
TNA 13698. 




implemented by the trained staff. It was decided at the conference that the DOS and 
DAS would encourage the formation of co-operative societies in their areas of 
jurisdiction so as to facilitate the agriculture development.353 This confirms Develtere 
idea that, ‘different actors were involved in this process, all of whom were part of the 
colonizing force, the administrators and business interests in the colony as well as 
the politicians in the metropolitan and administrators’.354 
 
In a drive towards implementing the commitment to the policy the colonial authority 
dispatched a memorandum to the Provincial Commissioners (PCS) aimed at 
preparing them to implement the policy. The memorandum was also sent to the 
Colonial Office (CO) for policy approval. Generally, the CO was impressed by the 
steps taken by the Tanzanian colonial authority and indicated commitment to provide 
support. Subsequently, the CO circulated a memorandum to all British colonies in 
which it was pointed out that ‘time was thought to be ripe for development of co-
operative methods of agriculture’.355 The CO emphasised the importance for each 
colony to consider providing staff qualified for the purpose: ‘staff should be of first 
class to provide supervisory function and must have a specialised training in co-
operation and inspection;356 in which such countries as Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Malaya 
(Malaysia), and Gold Coast (Ghana)’ were cited as an example from which other 
colonies need to learn from.357  
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Furthermore, the evaluation has indicated that in some colonies where the co-
operative movement was in existence, but it was poorly performing.358 It was, 
therefore, recommended in the CO’s memo that more training of co-operative 
officers and societies’ staff,359 primarily to invigorate the performance. It was further 
stressed that, the Horace Plunkett Foundation should open its door to train colonial 
staff in cooperation as well as research in the field.360 The CO’s memorandum was a 
significant step in outlining a roadmap to the promotion and development of co-
operatives in the colonies. 
 
The Tanzania’s initiatives had an impetus not only to the CO but also to the British 
Labour Party regarding the co-operative movement policy in her Africa colonies. This 
was a time when the Labour Party in power and Sidney Webb (Lord Passifield) was 
the Secretary State for the Colonies. In 1930 Webb chaired the Conference of 
Colonial Governors, which affirmed that:  
Development of co-operation within the colonial empire is a subject to which 
the Secretary of State wishes to direct the special attention of colonial 
government it was emphasized that co-operation relieves the indebtedness 
burden on small producers and provide for training on the responsibilities of a 
simple form of self-government.361 
 
It was insisted by the CO that since small-scale growers could not compete against 
large units, the co-operatives would facilitate such capabilities. It was emphasised 
that co-operation should not be disruptive to the local customs and conditions; also 
the members should be trained and assigned the duty and responsibility for proper 
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execution of their functions.362 At this juncture, the CO clearly saw that co-operatives 
were important, but they were cautious about transplanting them to growers in the 
colonies because by doing so would have been against voluntary participation as 
provided under the co-operative principle.   
 
The 1930 colonial Governors’ conference provided confidence and approval for 
policy implementation of the co-operative development to Tanzania’s colonial 
authority363 that embarked upon two major processes.364 To start with, a committee 
was appointed charged to consider the marketing organisation of native and non-
native produce (see terms of reference Appendix 5). This committee’s report was 
racially biased as demonstrated in its recommendation that, ‘we consider that the 
actual line of advance for Africans is through the channel of co-operative societies.365  
It was insisted by the Committee that, the co-operative movement should be in the 
‘continual guidance and supervision of a trained officer’;366 thus, it was strongly 
recommended that the co-operative legislation to provide for a control of the native 
co-operatives by the Registrar or Director of Co-operative Societies. It was further 
argued that, legislation must be granted in the same way as in various European and 
Asiatic countries.367 Clearly, the Committee provided a sketch as to how the co-
operative movement should be and indicated its disfavour of how the co-operatives 
are fairly treated in Britain to be replicated in Tanzania. The committee was on the 
opinion that, ‘the Ordinance will no doubt make these powers applicable to 
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European368  (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4 about compulsion crop marketing as 
provided by the 1932 co-operative legislation). The policy did not segregate the 
African societies as it was stressed that, consideration for promotion of co-operative 
societies would be to ‘wherever groups of Africans capable of understanding the 
simple principles of such bodies’.369  
 
The support was also sought by the colonial authority from the CO which, liaised with 
Claude Francis Strickland (popularly, C.F. Strickland) the former Registrar of Co-
operative Societies in Punjab370 to help in the reconstruction of the KNPA (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3 for further details) and overhaul coffee marketing in 
Kilimanjaro371 and to draft the co-operative legislation bill and Rules, and involved in 
the formation of a co-operative Department and advise the government where to 
locate the Co-operative Department or Registrar's office.372 
 
All mentioned policy aspects were discussed by Strickland and Phillip E. Mitchell,373 
who was the CS, and the Attorney General (AG), Joseph Alfred Sheridan in Dar Es 
Salaam374 that Coulson does not mention in his work though he made an attempt to 
show the role played by Strickland in advising over the co-operative legislation to the 
Tanzania’s colonial authority.375  The Attorney General (AG) was involved due to the 
fact that, the legislation was the responsibility of his office. In the discussion, the 
Tanzania’s authority indicated their favour for agriculture marketing co-operative 
                                                          
368 Extract from a report of a committee appointed to consider the marketing 
organisation of native and non-native produce, TNA 19005.   
369 Extract from a report of a committee appointed to consider the marketing 
organisation of native and non-native produce, TNA 19005.   
370 Secretary of State (Passfield) for the Colonies to Governor, Dispatch No 867 
(Confidentila), November 8th 1930 and further confirmation provided in January 29th  
1931, TNA 19595. 
371 Telegram No. 252 from the Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
December 1930, TNA 13698. 
372 Extract from Conversation between the SNA and C.F Strickland, TNA 19005. 
373 Phillip E. Mitchell also served as the Secretary for Native Affairs for eight years 
374 Extracts from the conversation between the Secretary of Native Affairs and C.F. 
Strickland, TNA 19005. 
375 Andrew Coulson, (1982), p. 62. 
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rather than credit societies which were dominant in Asia. This was so because, the 
credit service among the natives was restricted to engage in commerce under the 
Credit to Natives Ordinance of 1931; 376 and the cash crop economy was developing 
that required a legislation for agriculture marketing co-operatives to provide legal 
ground compulsion crop marketing by growers. 
 
Strickland who as mentioned assigned the legislation he managed to submit a draft 
in March 1931 that, heavily borrowed from the Indian Co-operative Act No 2 of 1912; 
and the 1927 Act of Myanmar (Burma), particularly on agricultural marketing 
clause.377 Some clauses with modifications were borrowed from British Columbia, 
Malaysia (Malaya’s 1922 Co-operative Societies Ordinance), Sri Lanka’s Co-
operative Societies Ordinance no 34 of 1921, and other elements were drawn from 
Jamaica, and also Queensland Australia; 378 as well as South Africa’s 1922 co-
operative legislation, particularly a clause that provided for the compulsion of 
growers to sell their produce to co-operatives. It also took into consideration to 
accommodate all types of co-operatives just the same as the 1912 Indian Co-
operative Act. This clearly shows that, legislation sections were considered given 
their relevance to Tanzania and successful experience in the mentioned countries. 
 
The draft legislation was circulated to the Provincial Commissioners in the country 
for comments. It was made clear in the attached letter that the legislation was not 
intended for the whole territory, but ‘primarily for application to the coffee growing 
area around Kilimanjaro’.379 In principle, it was aimed at weakening the power of the 
KNPA (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3 for details). Again, this was a political intention 
rather than commitment to promote co-operative movement in Tanzania. A month 
later, in April the draft was sent to the Secretary of State for Colonies by the 
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Tanzanian colonial authority for approval.380 At the same time, the Bill was presented 
to the LEGCO where it was made clear by the colonial officials that, ‘the immediate 
necessity is to save the KNPA (so as) to organize itself in a manner known to the law 
and under a certain amount of control’.381 
 
When the legislation was presented to the Colonial Office, the Governor, George 
Stewart Symes, appealed to the CO to support the Tanganyika Colonial authority 
objective to weaken the powers of the KNPA and to have a control over native 
produced coffee in the region.382 The Governor further proposed that the Ordinance 
be enacted at the January 1932 LEGCO’s session, demonstrating a determination to 
restructure the KNPA.383 The same message was conveyed in Douglas James 
Jardine, the CS’s dispatch384 arguing that ‘to enable this to be done I seek your 
approval to the early enactment of a co-operative Ordinance on the lines of the 
Ordinance draft submitted on dispatch No. 372 April 23rd 1931’.385 Sidney Webb was 
impressed by the draft, but and he did not approve it and instructed the Tanzania 
colonial authority ‘not to proceed with passage of the legislation on the view until 
when the Registrar was available to facilitate guidance to co-operatives’.386 
 
However, as the British Labour Party was defeated in October 1931, Webb lost his 
position as Secretary of State for the Colonies. This coincided with a change of 
Governorship in Tanganyika with George Stewart Symes taking over in 1931 from 
Donald Cameron and Sir Douglas James Jardine was appointed as CS. He advised 
                                                          
380 The Secretary of State for Colonies Dispatch No. 413, June 15th 1931,TNA 
19005; Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Confidentila), April 23rd 
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382 Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Confidentila), November 20th 
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the Colonial Office ‘to discontinue incorporation of the KNPA as a company in 
accordance with the amended provisions of the Companies Ordinance (No. 46 of 
1931) because it does not appear to be practicable and it is quite clear to me (him) 
that the correct course is formally to constitute the enterprise as a co-operative 
society’.387 
 
The development that were taking place in Tanzania was due to the departure of 
Webb’s that created an opportunity for the colonial authority in Tanzania to pursue a 
new approach through pressurising the CO. Although the Governor in his dispatch to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies388 seemed to concur with Webb’s earlier 
recommendation who maintained that any attempt to develop the co-operative must 
await the availability of a fully informed Registrar. They successfully persuaded Sir 
Phillip Cunliffe-Lister (later Lord Swinton) to approve the implementation what they 
viewed as proper and in favour of the prosperity and development of the co-
operative movement that led to an approval of the application of the Ordinance in 
May 23rd 1932.389 Consequently, the colonial authority immediately took the 
opportunity to restructure and replace of the KNPA by Kilimanjaro Native Co-
operative Society (KNCS) that was followed by the registration of the KNCU and its 
affiliated societies with effect from January 1st 1933 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3); 
and the appointment of Mr Arthur Leslie Brice Bennett390 as the Association’s 
Manager in April 1st, 1932 by the Governor,391 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3). This 
demonstrates the extent to which the colonial authority employed their power in 
bringing the co-operative legislation in operation and intervening in the process of 
restructuring of the KNPA; subsequently in the registration of the co-operatives in 
Kilimanjaro (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3).  
 
                                                          
387 Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Confidentila), November 20th 
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The approval of the Ordinance by Cunliffe-Lister demonstrates policy inconsistency 
on the part of the CO which ignored the Webb’s recommendation; and obviously 
better preparation and planning was required to embark upon the development of co-
operatives. It also illustrates approval was a matter of urgency to both CO and the 
colonial authority with no regard of availability of qualified staff.  
 
The policy from the onset was frustrated by a lack of trained staff to guide co-
operatives. The position of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was very 
important and it was agreed that this position had to be filled by a qualified person. 
Since co-operatives were expected to be formed in many districts it was agreed that 
the District Officers be assigned a position of Assistant Co-operative Societies 
Registrars in their respective administrative locations.392 In an attempt to fill the gap, 
in March 4th 1932 the CS, Jardine on behalf of the Governor appointed Acting 
Registrars of Co-operative Societies and then Acting Land Officer. The Moshi’s DO, 
Mr C.A. Flynn, became Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies provided under 
Government Notice No.61 of 1932 issued in March 4th under section 3 of the Co-
operative Societies Ordinance, No. 7 of 1932. The appointment of Flynn, became 
Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies was described by Strickland as an ad 
hoc Registrar.393 This demonstrates the desperate situation that the colonial 
authority faced in trying to instigate the policy, appointing whoever they considered 
could help. Flynn’s appointment was the most important to facilitate the formation 
and registration of the KNCU affiliated primary co-operative societies in Kilimanjaro.  
 
A clear policy on the appointment of the Registrar became obvious as early as 1931 
when the government decided to take the essential preliminary steps recommended 
by Strickland. It was decided to select an officer and send him abroad to study for 
training in the co-operative methods with a view as Registrar of Co-operative 
Societies in 1931/32. It was then envisaged that an officer to be appointed must 
serve for 4-6 years.  
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As pointed out earlier, training of staff on co-operation was a priority for both the CO 
and colonial authority; and it was one of the key policy aspects in the development of 
the co-operative movement. By August 1930 the Tanzania’s colonial authority 
decided to send an officer to study co-operatives394 in Sri Lanka and the Federated 
Malay States (Malaysia) as they had many years of experience, particularly in 
agricultural marketing.395 In October 1931 the colonial Governors and CS had a 
conference from which it was further suggested that, the colonies should emulate 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka.396 In response the Tanzania colonial authority contacted 
these recommended countries as well as the Horace Plunkett Foundation for 
guidance, indicating a commitment to ‘establish co-operatives in primitive and 
ignorant societies.397 In a letter to Sri Lanka’s CS, the Tanzania’s CS pointed out that 
‘our problem is rather to harness co-operation as to influence an experience that 
proved successful in South America among the Negro’.398This indicates that, the 
colonial authority was committed to addressing backwardness and ignorance by 
employing the co-operative movement to modernise the colonised. The intervention 
clearly suggests an intention to promote the movement through a top-down 
approach by borrowing ideas from other countries. This stance was contrary to the 
position being held by the CO, which encouraged voluntary participation that had to 
follow after awareness on the co-operative movement among the growers. 
 
It was considered necessary that the co-operative officer should be recruited from 
among the local colonial civil servants or recruit trained officers from London. Mr 
Mitchell, who was a key player in the whole process proposed two colonial civil 
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servants, Mr Ronald Cecil Northcote and Mr Martin Kayamba Mdumi.399 Mitchell 
personally knew Kayamba400 from Tanga Province, where he served as a Senior 
Provincial Commissioner.  
 
Further discussion on the co-operative movement in the country was held between 
the Secretary of Native Affairs, Mr Mitchell and C.F. Strickland in which they 
indicated their optimism of success due to support from Sidney Webb, who was 
described as a person keenly interested in co-operation.401It was out of this 
discussion that the key characteristics or the profile of the Registrar was agreed. 
They also discussed where to locate the co-operative department in Moshi once is 
established was considered as a right place given the experience gained from the 
KNPA in crop marketing; whereas Mpwapwa, Tabora and Morogoro were rejected 
because they lacked a lesson to learn from.402  
 
All in all, the challenge was to earmark an officer with the desired attributes. In an 
attempt to address the challenge, the CS decided to contact the Provincial 
Commissioners of the Central,403 Lake404 and Tabora405 provinces in an attempt to 
broaden his options. In response, both the Central,406 Lake407 Provincial 
Commissioners replied with regrets that they had no suitable officers in their 
respective Provinces. The Western (Tabora) PC proposed Mr R.C. Northcote as a 
suitable man for the post;408 a proposal that was accepted by P.E. Mitchell then the 
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CS409 who subsequently appointed Nortchcote for training. Northcote accepted the 
offer and confirmed his availability.410 Countries to be visited were proposed, which 
included the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. The same approach had 
been employed by Malaysia before co-operatives were introduced. The training fund 
was supposed to be made available by the British government.411 
 
The Governor, Sir George Stewart Symes informed Sidney that Mr Northcote was 
selected by the government to undertake a study tour on co-operation in the 
mentioned countries.412 In the letter the Governor presented a funding request to 
facilitate Northcote’s study. Regrettably, in response the Colonial Office in London 
informed the Governor and Northcote that there were no funds413 at that particular 
time; apparently, this was due to the economic depression of which training could not 
be a priority. The Governor was advised to postpone the trips as efforts to establish 
funding sources were underway.414 For Northcote this was a time when he had to 
undertake a literature review on the co-operative movement worldwide that helped 
him to write important reports as discussed in the following section. In 1932 the CO 
applied funds from the Carnegie Corporation Scheme’s for the training of Registrar; 
Carnegie agreed but could only fund one candidate.415 Thus, Northcote was selected 
and Martin Kayamba was not.   
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Although the administrators were occupied with setting up co-operative models, 
technicalities, vetting on the Registrar of Co-operative Societies they also had in 
mind to have a Kiswahili term for co-operative too. The research to establish a term 
was assigned by the authority of the Inter-Territorial Language Committee, which 
originally identified two terms, Ushirika and Ujima. It was finally concluded that 
Ushirika was appropriate which by then was translated as work of the activities of the 
society also participation in the results of the activities.416 Literally, ushirika is a 
Kiswahili term that implies co-operation. Whereas Ujima was viewed as unsuitable 
as it translated to work done with the assistance e.g. crop cultivation, house 
building.417 The expression given on Ujima by 1930s was misleading or incorrect and 
Ushirika was more appropriate as Ujima implied a primitive mode of production. 
Therefore, adoption of Kiswahili word, Ushirika signified an appreciation and 
understanding that co-operation in Tanzania has been part and parcel of the 
Tanzanians existing lifestyle. The official incorporation of the term by the government 
provided co-operation a unique stature and status that was not only accepted in 
Tanzania but also, across the Kiswahili speaking countries.  
 
To sum up, the political decisions and policy development explained in this section 
indicated a road map for overall development of co-operative movement in Tanzania. 
It has been shown that there was close collaboration between the colonial authority 
and the CO in the matter. The implementations of their decisions and their impact 
are discussed in the following section.   
 
3.3: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND POLICY DECISIONS  
This section draws on primary evidence to assess the impact of the decisions of the 
overall co-operative movement during the interwar period. The decisions were made 
to revolve around colonial officials’ responses to recommendations provided by 
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Northcote, then the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The promotional approaches 
employed and their implications are also identified and are critically discussed.  
 
The promotion and control of the co-operative movement was the responsibility of 
the Registrar of co-operative societies; but Tanzania has been yet to appoint one. 
Therefore, it was agreed that had to be recruited and trained for the functions. It was 
thought that whoever is appointed for the post must be one of the colonial civil 
servants and has to receive training to enhance the ability and knowledge for the 
position. This was an important policy and technical decision in providing 
administrative machinery for the co-operative movement. The functions and duties of 
the Registrar were clearly defined most of which were replicated from India and 
Strickland’s personal experience. The functions and duties of the Registrar found 
support from the co-operative sector school, which emphasised that co-operatives 
were economic entities that required a regular mechanism by the government 
through the Registrar.   
 
The colonial authority identified a qualified personnel for the post in which Northcote 
was appointed. However, Northcote had no background training for executing his 
duties. Again, Tanzania had no funds to send Northcote for training. Therefore, it had 
to apply for funds from the CO but with no success for. The colonial authority with an 
approval from the Colonial Office managed to get funds from Carnegie training 
scheme that assisted the Registrar designate to have a six month study tour from 
August 1934 to April 1935.418 His study tour took him to India, Burma, Zanzibar and 
Sri Lanka that lasted for 102 days.419 This was a time when the government clearly 
remained whole heartedly prepared to spare an officer for the purpose. 
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On his return in May 1935 the Registrar designates published a report420 that, 
recommended a clear road map for co-operative development in which he proposed 
types of co-operatives and introduction of credit, dairy and livestock for the colony. 
He also emphasized co-operative education. Importantly, the setting up of the Co-
operative Department and tertiary (apex body) society were proposed.  
 
In his report, he criticised Section 36 of the co-operative legislation that provide for 
the compulsion of membership of a co-operative societies; similarly compulsion 
marketing of the produce by growers to a co-operative society. This provision was 
borrowed from the South Africa 1925 compulsory principle mainly for co-operative 
marketing.421 However, its application in South Africa was to control adulteration by a 
minority of growers who ruined sale schemes. Additionally, in South Africa the 
legislation empowered the Minister of Agriculture to declare or compel particular 
product/s to be sold through co-operatives.422 When it was realised by the colonial 
authority that the Section had detrimental effects to the settlers, new legislation was 
passed to provide for their exclusion (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3 for further details). 
These Sections were criticised by Northcote in his report423 that this study supports 
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on the ground that the compulsion provision was against the co-operative principle of 
voluntary association.  
 
However, at this time the government official's mind and policy was not the same as 
senior colonial officials who supported him were transferred. For example, P.E. 
Mitchell, who was the Secretary for Native Affairs and CS, was appointed Governor 
of Uganda in 1935 and later to Kenya. New officers were Sir Harold MacMichael, the 
Governor and the acting CS was W.E. Scupham until when Henry Charles Donald 
Cleveland Mackenzie-Kennedy424 took office in 1935. The new colonial authority 
officials were irritated by such criticism. For example, in his comments on 
Northcote’s report425 the acting CS, Gerald Fleming Sayers, was highly sceptical 
about co-operative policy and pointed out ‘it must be understood that the government 
has no doctrinaire (or other) predilection for co-operation and has no wish to urge it 
on anyone,426 nor on any group, European, Asiatic or African; and no Co-operative 
Department be set up, nothing of that kind (whatsoever) is needed, at any rate but, if 
there is a genuine local desire on the part of anybody’.427 
 
This was a significant policy shift as it indicates that the colonial authority had no 
interest in promoting co-operatives regardless of interests shown and the provision 
of education to instil an understanding was ruled out. This decision brought to an end 
the enthusiasm shown in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Furthermore, the CS 
opposed Northcote’s recommendation to set up the Co-operative Department and for 
him ‘to establish such a Department will only result in drowning a possibly useful 
development in ink’.428 Against the backdrop, Northcote’s proposals were rendered 
inoperative and it became difficult for the co-operative movement to be promoted. So 
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to say, Northcote ambition was brought to an end and failed to be a game changer 
as far as the development of the co-operative movement in Tanzania is concerned. 
This was partly due to lack of policy or policy consistency and non-existence of 
planning strategies. 
 
The policy direction of Tanzania’s new officials, especially the CS, was significantly 
different from his predecessors. In the first place, the colonial authority and officials, 
particularly, the CS disassociated itself from the Northcote’s report. Specifically, it 
was argued that ‘the government would like to make (it) clear that the opinions 
formed and views expressed by the author (Northcote) do not necessarily indicate 
the policy which the government consider should be followed and sending him for 
study does not imply a desire on the part of government to impose co-operatives on 
anyone’.429 It was also made clear by the CS that neither staff nor funds would be 
made available for the purpose.430 
 
In one instance Northcote was invited by the Central Provincial Commissioner to his 
Province to initiate creamery co-operatives.431 But his invitation was put on hold by 
the CS who authoritatively disclaimed any attempt for co-operation or any official to 
wish to urge it on anyone.432 It was alleged by the CS that this would remain the 
position pending an approval from the Secretary of State.433 An alleged need for 
approval mentioned was just an excuse to stamp out any emerging interest from the 
Provincial and districts officials; it was insisted it has to emerge spontaneously from 
the growers.434 This demonstrates the single minded character of the CS who put 
forward an excuse that had an unequivocal detrimental effect not only on the 
envisioned creamery co-operatives, but to the development of an entire movement in 
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the country. The CS was determined to suppress any initiatives from the Provincial 
Commissioners who were informed by CS that ‘Northcote was assigned other duties 
(not co-operation) in which more of his time has to devote to’.435 It was emphasised 
by the CS that Northcote would be available to help with advice and organisation, but 
he was employed merely in a consultative capacity.436 With such a limited role 
assigned to the Registrar, the movement could hardly take off.  
 
The CS’s letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he further demonstrated 
his averseness in promoting the co-operatives. He pointed an accusing figure to 
Northcote’s report which was of contentious nature as a basis. In some respect, 
Northcote was responsible for paying no attention to non-natives mainly, Europeans 
and Indians and too much on natives that, seems was viewed as racist. This 
suggests that the CS was delivering political manoeuvres to neglect the co-operative 
development policy. The CS further argued that, ‘to be frank, his report is 
disappointing and contain some extraordinary opinions to which this government 
could not subscribe and paid no attention to non-natives mainly, Europeans and 
Indians and too much on natives that would raise sorts of misunderstandings’.437 In 
bolstering the decision, the CS sent the same contents in a letter to Carnegie 
Foundation in which he made clear that, ‘Mr Northcote’s report contained a good 
deal of matter of theoretical and contentious nature that, the government cannot 
subscribe to’.438 Additionally, it was maintained by the CS that, ‘there was no 
question to setup Department or Organisation to deal with co-operation’.439  It was 
also strongly emphasised that, ‘Northcote would only be able to act in a consultative 
capacity, mainly to advice when a genuine local desire for co-operation emerged’.440 
He ordered that such matters should be referred to him regardless of Northcote’s 
appointment.441 Clearly, this indicates that, Northcote’s support from the colonial 
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authority for co-operative development was halted as the CS stressed that, ‘there 
would be no suggestions that any special Department should be set up and no 
financial help or subsidy, direct or indirect would be given.442 Northcote’s 
recommendation was made useless and an attempt to reform the way co-operative 
movement was being developed was crippled. This is a clear indication that, there 
was a lack of commitment in promotion of co-operatives within the colonial 
administrators and colonial power or the CO as there was no action taken against 
the Tanzania’s colonial authority. The emphasis by the CS refutes Develtere’s critical 
proposition against colonial authority interventionist policy in promotion of co-
operatives;443 and such development indicates that Develtere generalised his 
assumption and lacks substantive evidence as he does not identify a specific time 
and country where his assumptions was applied.  
 
An emphasis by the CS was that, ‘co-operatives should emerge spontaneously’;444 
again, this was a failure to acknowledge the low knowledge level of growers to co-
operation in Tanzania’s rural areas. The spontaneous growth of co-operative 
movement is desirable, but the colonial authority had to address the difficulties facing 
the growers. Having the CS maintaining co-operative spontaneous growth policy 
illustrates an attempt by the colonial authority to distance itself from providing 
growers a chance and creating the necessary conditions, under which co-operation 
could be propagated, thrive and develop. Therefore, by limiting the Registrar’s role to 
a consultative capacity the CS hindered the growth of co-operatives throughout his 
tenure in office. This shows that, the policy that encouraged the spontaneous growth 
of co-operatives did not make a significant impact. Historically, the spontaneous 
growth principle belongs to the 19thc during the laissez faire epoch in Europe, where 
the Rochdale and Raiffesein pioneers commandeered high levels of exposure (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for details). For example, Strickland pointed out in 1933 that 
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‘it appears that Co-operation is almost unknown in tropical Africa’.445 That suggests 
conditions that led to the emergence of co-operatives in Europe did not exist in the 
colonies like Tanzania where most societies commanded subsistence economy 
(ujima) and the Rochdale, Raiffesein co-operative principles were unheard of among 
the illiterates rural growers. 
 
All in all, promotion and registration were taking place in a number of places; but 
progress was slow. For example, in Kilimanjaro which was the colonial authority’s 
interest it was disappointing. In his report the Acting Registrar pointed out that, ‘for 
two years since the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was passed only 21 societies 
have so far been registered and in the last 12 months only one application was 
submitted from European society which was also based in Moshi’.446 By 1944 a 
number of societies in Moshi District were 27.447 Outside Moshi district there were 
some developments for example, the tobacco marketing co-operative Union, the 
NGOMAT in Songea district (and current Mbinga district) was established in 1936448 
with thirteen (13) affiliated societies and 6,640 members.449 The Bugufi co-operative 
society which marketed coffee was established in the same year450 and by 1944 had 
6,000 members.451 The Colonial Development Fund made available £5,000 to 
facilitate their formation of the two, the NGOMAT and Bugufi.452 Also, various types 
of societies, including credit societies were registered by 1947 (See names of 
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societies in Appendix 3c and 3e). Generally, growth of co-operative movement failed 
to reflect the enthusiasm expressed by the colonial authority in the late 1920s and 
lobbying to the CO for approval of the legislation. Nevertheless, the limited growth is 
an illustration of colonial authority reluctance also refused to support the Registrar’s 
initiatives. Regardless of how the expansion took place, the record remained 
disappointing which indicated there were areas or growers who were deprived of an 
opportunity.  
 
This section has examined policies and political decisions that provided an impetus 
to the development of the co-operative movement in Tanzania. Some of the political 
decisions taken by the colonial officials undermined the growth of the co-operatives 
resulting in their uneven distribution in the country. The post-war years saw the 
expansion of the co-operative movement footprint as discussed in the following 
section. 
 
3.4: POST-WAR CO-OPERATIVE RENAISSANCE  
This section examines post-war colonial policies on co-operative development. In the 
discussion, an attempt is made to evaluate to what extent the co-operatives were 
established at the behest of the British colonial government. Against the backdrop, 
there was clearly a global enthusiasm for the encouragement of the co-operative 
movement worldwide. But to what extent did it address uneven development or bias 
in promotion of co-operatives in other parts of the country? 
 
In his thesis Dondo examined development of co-operative movement in the post-
war period, but only regards the UNO as a key player to such development.453 
Dondo does not indicate how and why the UNO influenced a policy towards the 
promotion of co-operatives and ignores other key players. This study has established 
that, the interest in co-operative development was discussed at the UNO Conference 
held at Hot Springs in 1943. This was due to the role played by the co-operative 
movement in assisting the UNO agencies in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
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programmes during and post war.454 The conference examined how co-operatives 
could be employed in post-war reconstruction efforts. It was during this period when 
co-operative movement was internationally accepted as an instrument for 
invigoration of development in poor countries. However, Dondo has not mentioned 
the significance of the ILO in its 26th Session conference recommendations that 
stressed the colonial authorities to play an integral part in promoting the co-operative 
movement455 which was dominant in the post-war years. 
   
In general terms, the colonial authority intervention in promotion of co-operatives, in 
Tanzania was impressive compared to other East African countries where it faced 
opposition in the 1930s. However, no matter how impressive the progress was in 
Tanzania, this was a matter of concern in the Colonial Office which in 1944 
appointed Mr W.K.H. Campbell to conduct an investigation into opportunities for co-
operative development in East African countries. In his report on Tanzania Campbell 
identified five key factors that led to the slow progress in Tanzania which were: 
shortage of staff, the KNPA experience as well as nervousness   created by the 1937 
coffee riots in Kilimanjaro, the inability of growers to manage societies, and fears that 
the movement would interfere with affairs of the NA.456  In his report it was made 
clear that, ‘time was ripe to embark in promotion of co-operatives owing to 
prevalence of embryonic associations that suggested some degree of spontaneous 
growth that required legislation and government guidance for their promotion, 
formation and registration’.457 He also emphasised that, co-operatives should be 
formed to accommodate soldiers returning from WWII battle fields in Ethiopia and 
Asia. This was widely viewed as important policy to defuse or divert their interest in 
engaging in the struggle against the colonial rule. 
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In his report, Campbell recommended the encouragement of growers to form the co-
operative societies. Ideally, he argues that, ‘the co-operation ought to spring 
spontaneously from the people themselves and the government should have no 
need to help in its propagation’.458 However, he indicated the inability of growers to 
form co-operatives without the government’s encouragement and support. In this 
case, he believed that, ‘the government intervention is justified’ in but cautioned for 
the greatest care to be taken not to devitalise the co-operative movement that lack 
the lifeblood of belief by their members.459 
 
In response to the Campbell recommendation on the spontaneous growth of the co-
operatives, the Tanzania colonial authority challenged the policy on the view that it 
cannot succeed owing to lack of knowledge about co-operation;460also, the 
experience that Tanzania had in the years between the two wars when the 
spontaneous policy failed to bring about changes. This signified a policy shift and 
justification of top-down approach employed in the formation and registration of the 
KNCU and BCU (see Chapters 4, Section 4.3 and Chapter 5, Section 5.5). In this 
case, it was strongly held by the colonial authority that, the government should 
intervene in the formation of co-operatives.461 This confirms the commitment 
Tanzania’s colonial authority’s training policy towards promotion and performance of 
the co-operative movement. This was part and parcel of the colonial authority’s post 
war approach that justified previous attempts in which top-down approach was 
employed in the promotion and formation of co-operative societies. But, uncertainties 
as to how could the co-operatives be established remained a critical challenge to the 
colonial authority. This is reflected in their perception that they had to be formed at 
every centre of native authority in the country where various types of co-operatives 
should be formed such as agricultural and animal products as well as consumer 
societies resulting to the registration of such societies in the country,462 as the 
Mwanza African Traders Consumer Co-operative Society (MATCS) in 1946 which 
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became a driving force and significant impetus to the growth of the cotton marketing 
co-operatives in the WCGA (See Appendix 5 and chapter 6, Section 6.3).  
 
The Tanzania’s colonial authority position was that the co-operative movement was 
of the greatest value in the construction of a prosperous African community.463 It was 
argues that, Ushirika popularity had been growing year after year among progressive 
farmers.464 However, there was a lack of knowledge in formulating plans for social 
and economic progress that required government intervention.465 In principal, the 
colonial authority attempted to focus its attention specifically on the progressive 
farmers who were the minority. This suggests that, the delay in promotion of co-
operatives in the WCGA was partly due to the priority given to develop progressive 
farmers who would be handed over marketing co-operatives without taking into 
consideration the interests of small scale cotton growers who were the majority. The 
progressive farmers were envisioned as key players not only in production but also 
in the marketing of their produce, mainly export crops.  
 
Furthermore, Campbell’s report coincided with influence from the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau to the Colonial Office. As the War neared its end they established a Special 
Committee in 1941 to report on what co-operatives had already achieved and what 
they might achieve in the future. A member of the Special Committee was Arthur 
Creech Jones, MP who became Colonial Secretary in the Labour Government. Its 
report, published in 1945, described the co-operative movement as being ‘all but 
non-existent in the majority of the British colonies’ and recommended the setting up 
of a co-operative department with central department in the Colonial office.466 The 
Fabian report helped influence British colonial policy in relation to co-operatives by 
outlining the advantages of co-operatives as:467 
a) Lowering of the costs of production; 
b) Distribution and marketing; 
c) Obtaining credit on reasonable terms; 
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d) Ending the monopolization of trading by big European firms; and 
e) Improving agriculture by the use of better stock and seeds, and by the use of 
fertilisers, machinery. 
 
The advantages outlined clearly attempt to address the disadvantaged position of 
majority of small-scale growers not only in Tanzania but also in many other 
developing countries in a situation where they remained side-lined. The Fabian 
propositions maintained the modernisation ideals under which the co-operative 
movement was envisioned to spread modern agricultural practices. In general terms, 
the advantage listed attempt to end the confinement of growers of agricultural 
production and broaden their participation in other economic spectrum by having 
growers participate in the marketing of their produce acknowledging their exploitation 
by middlemen and powerful traders. However, an emphasis remained in the 
promotion of agriculture co-operatives. Further emphasis and impetus for the 
promotion of agriculture co-operatives were given by the post WWII planning 
committee.468 
 
In the wake of the Report, the greater emphasis was placed on co-operatives. For 
example, in 1947 the Colonial Office appointed an Advisor on the co-operative 
movement. He was B.J. Surridge who had served as Registrar of Co-operatives in 
Cyprus between 1934 and 1943 and later became a Vice Chair and Trustee of the 
Plunkett Foundation. The impetus for the promotion of co-operatives in British 
African colonies was accelerated by the Labour Party’s victory in the 1945 General 
election.469 From the beginning the Labour government was overburdened with 
unprecedented difficulties regarding colonial questions, economic and political. India 
was on the way to independence with other Asian colonies following suit. Another is 
the so-called dollar crisis.470  Britain had to repay its war debts in dollars, but the 
export capacity of the damaged economy was still limited.471   
 
In order to lessen the burden of external debts and to finance its domestic move to a 
welfare state, the Labour government opted for a policy of massive “export drive” 
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from the colonies. Africa and the Caribbean suddenly turned out to be valuable 
assets for the ailing British economy472 and this perception led to hasty, reckless 
agricultural projects such as the highly mechanized groundnuts production scheme 
in Tanganyika, only to produce disastrous failure. 
 
The Labour Party’s victory was an impetus for development of the co-operative 
movement, especially with the appointment of Arthur Creech Jones from Fabian 
Colonial Bureau to the position of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Creech 
Jones greatly reorganised and reshaped the Colonial Office to reflect the demand for 
changes in the colonies and to respond to both international and local pressure for 
the encouragement of co-operatives.473  This was achieved by pressuring colonies to 
pass or amend co-operative legislation to enable the establishment of the Co-
operative Departments which were pivotal in fostering the co-operation. At this 
juncture, the Colonial Office policy towards the co-operatives was that ‘the value of 
co-operative societies is no longer a matter of any dispute’474 and it should be used 
as an instrument for the construction of a prosperous African community.475 Against 
the backdrop, colonial authorities in British colonies were called upon to realise a 
planned development of co-operative associations and enterprises by employing 
them as instruments in introducing an appropriate and modern agricultural policy. 
 
The colonial authority in Tanzania took the Campbell’s recommendations seriously to 
further efforts to promote the co-operatives in which, among its recommendations 
was to employ the co-operatives to absorb the returning soldiers who served Britain 
in the Second World War. For example, between 1945 and 1948 co-operative and 
native agriculture marketing policy was reviewed leading to the adoption of 
Northcote’s previously rejected proposals mentioned previously except setting up of 
the co-operative apex body due to shortage of staff;476 when Northcote retired the 
government had to appoint the Director of Lands and Mines, Mr R.S.W. Malcom to 
                                                          
472 Billy Frank, (2002), pp.26, 75. 
473 The Bombay Co-operative Quarterly, October 1950, p.90, TNA 24870 
474 Co-operative Movement in the Colonies, (London: HMSO, 1946), Col. No. 199, 
TNA 19005. 
475 Extract from speech by Lord Winster in the House of Lords March 1, 2 or 3 1944, 
TNA 33017 
476 Tanganyika Territory, Report on Co-operative Development, Dar Es Salaam: 
Government Printer, 1947), paragraph 6, TNA 37192; T.R. Sadleir, (1963), p.7. 
133 
 
act as the Registrar.477 This was in addition to his responsibility as Director of Lands 
and Mines. As his predecessor, he had no staff to assist him that raised a concern to 
the CS ‘I feel that I have neither time to spend in Kilimanjaro’ to supervise societies 
which were experiencing some management problems.478 This was the earliest 
impact as a result of rejecting Northcote proposal in the mid-1930s and beginning to 
adopt them. The co-operative legislation was amended in 1945 in accordance to the 
guide provided by George Hall and Northcote in the mid-1930s to provide for setting 
up of fully fledged the Department mooted from the Departments of Lands and 
Mines, and placed under the Registrar of Co-operative Societies.479 The Registrar 
was charged with giving advice to and promotion of the producers' societies. The 
Department employed two European staffs in 1945, also three African clerks and two 
co-operative inspectors.480 Moshi became the Department headquarter and training 
and education for the Department as well as of the co-operative movement staff was 
unveiled;481 and a training college was opened at Mzumbe to train native Department 
and co-operative societies staffs from 1947.482  This signified a major post-war policy 
shift in favour of co-operative development, unlike during Northcote era when such 
policies were primarily rejected by the colonial authority.  
 
Therefore, a combination of both supportive policies and the availability of individuals 
who were committed to execute the policy was not only an impetus, but also 
unveiled a new era of the co-operative renaissance in Tanzania. All these provided 
for expansion of the movement footprint that covered more geographical areas (see 
Table 10 below) and growers that for years were starved of or viewed as deserts due 
to lack or limited number of societies. But again, to facilitate marketing of agricultural 
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produce, most of which were exported to Britain as mentioned in the previous 
chapter.  
 
In early 1946 George Hall, the under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, dispatched 
circular to the colonies detailing a roadmap for co-operative promotion.483 This is 
when serious attempts were made by the CO in promoting the co-operative 
movement in the colonies. A model co-operative Ordinance, which was based on the 
India Co-operative Societies Act of 1912 was circulated to all British colonies 
including Tanzania. To ensure the policy was enforced co-operative adviser and 
advisory committee was appointed in 1947. The adviser operated from the Colonial 
office charged with a responsibility to monitor progress in the colonies. Similarly, the 
Co-operative Departments were established. 
 
The colonial strategies of co-operative development were designed based on the 
modernisation thinking of the colonised. This was an assumption that was strongly 
underscored by the colonial authority in promotion of co-operative movement was 
that it would be beneficial to the overall development process in transforming the 
rural population;484 it was envisioned to provide a forum for increasing agricultural 
productivity and preserve the communitarian basis of traditional Africa.485 The 
contention was also held by Digby who posits that co-operation provides for a 
transition from the primitive to the modern economic and social worlds.486 This was a 
significant departure from a position held by the Labour in the 1930s, which the co-
operatives were envisaged to could be employed for preserving traditional Africa.487 
 
Along with the argument put forward for promotion of the co-operatives the Circular 
by Hall was important because it provided impetus and confidence in the course 
taken by the colonial authority in Tanzania in amending co-operative legislation and 
adoption of the Northcote proposals. This came at an important time when post-war 
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policy on agricultural produce marketing emphasis was primarily geared towards 
rationalization and synchronisation of crop purchase in favour of a single government 
appointed buyer which was in line with bulk purchase (discussed in Chapters 2, 
Section 2.3 and 2.4 and Chapter 4, Section 4.4, also in the following paragraphs).  
 
In the post-war years there was a widespread understanding that the co-operative 
movement as an essential tool for development that required the CO to play its part; 
for example, this was demonstrated in its Circular dispatch that gave detailed 
guidance in regard to the establishment and management of the co-operative 
societies. Models of the co-operative Ordinance, Regulations and Rules were 
circulated to colonies in which it was stressed that they had to be adopted in 
accordance with local conditions and culture. However, the circular did not prescribe 
approaches under which co-operatives could be promoted; but, the ILO’s 1944 
recommendation on the government intervention488 was seemingly in mind among 
the colonial officials. This suggests that, individual territories had a mandate to 
assess the best way to promote co-operatives. This clearly indicates that local 
conditions implies a response from growers may dictate the colonial authority policy 
strategy as seen in Kagera where the top-down approach was employed because of 
a lack of enthusiasm. It is obvious that, the circular ushered the British policy 
regarding co-operative development in her colonies. The circular emphasised the 
role that the government had to play, embodied in the office of the Registrar not only 
in encouraging the movement but also controlling and supervising societies.  
 
The models of the co-operative Ordinance, Regulations and Rules might have been 
prompted by a desire to have a uniform approach throughout her colonies. The 
policy came at a time when Britain and the colonial authority in Tanzania were 
encouraging production of cash crops and funds were made available under the 
1945 Colonial Development and Welfare legislation. This was entailed to invigorate 
the economic development of the country based on modernisation thinking. The 
encouragement of agriculture marketing co-operatives and intervention by the CO 
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clearly illustrates that the intention was mainly to salvage Britain from economic ruin 
caused by the war.  
 
The promotion of co-operative movement policy was embedded in the Colonial 
Office post-war Marketing Policy for Colonial Primary Products which was circulated 
to the colonies489 stressing that; first, to ensure that producers were organized either 
in producers’ associations or under some form of Government statutory marketing 
organization so that they could market their produce in an orderly manner and to 
obtain the best possible price. Secondly, there is no doubt that the policy took into 
consideration the success and weakness of the bulk purchase system (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.3 and 2.4) with its emphasis on marketing and production was 
neglected. It is clear that, the marketing boards played a part in the supervision of 
production but, they were limited as they were not directly in contact with growers. 
Thirdly, the success of the agriculture improvement or modernisation policy had to 
be linked to the employment of the co-operatives as an instrument to facilitate 
improvement in cultivation methods was strongly held as outlined by Fabian Colonial 
Bureau.490 
 
The achievement of explained policies had one critical challenge which was a lack of 
co-operative movement promotion policy. This is evident by the inconsistent 
approach in promotion of co-operatives as analysed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The 
1937 Native Coffee Control legislation did not facilitate the improvement crops other 
than coffee. Thus, a comprehensive agriculture and marketing policy was vital. This 
was realised when the Colonial Office unveiled its post-war policy on agriculture 
development (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).491 The CO policy on agricultural crop 
marketing prompted the amendment of the marketing legislation by the colonial 
authority that provided for integration of the co-operatives in the marketing.  
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In developing the policy the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was accorded 
powers to draft of legislation, the African Agricultural (Control and Marketing), 
Ordinance No. 57, 1949 that provided for a forum for exerting pressure to existing 
Marketing Boards, mainly the BNCB to promote the co-operatives. The object of the 
legislation was to foster co-operation;492 the marketing boards were instituted largely 
as an interim measure pending the formation of producers’ co-operatives and 
definite steps had been taken by Boards which were instruments of the government 
to promote such societies starting at the primary level for crop marketing. Under the 
legislation, the marketing boards were required to disburse part of profits accrued 
from sales of coffee in accordance to Section 10 of the Ordinance to neither the 
government, nor to Indians, but to growers through co-operative societies as 
incentive to encourage production among the growers with effect from January 
1950.493 Clearly, the policy was a step in crippling the boards financially and this was 
a significant in compelling the BNCB to provide support to co-operative societies. In 
a further development, all the Provincial Commissioners were informed that, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies has instructed that with effect from 1951 the 
Commissioner of Co-operative Development became the liason officer between his 
Department and the Boards in all matters regarding co-operatives, marketing and 
commercial accounting.494 The CO’s intervention an approach was reinforced further 
the control over control and marketing of the native produce by the Co-operative 
Department and weaken the status of the boards. This commitment formed a basis 
for promotion of co-operative of the BCU (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5). 
 
Digby posits that the co-operative movement prevents the exploitation of the less 
advanced individuals or groups.495 Digby’s argument supports the Tanzania’s co-
operative legislation, Section 36 in particular. However, she fails to admit that the 
Section provided a legal basis for the exploitation of growers through the co-
operatives as it denied them a bargaining power in regard to price for their produce. 
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It also provided for them to be controlled by the government through marketing 
boards. Against the backdrop, the use of the movement was a viable way to provide 
for exploitation of colonial resources by pooling them with an excuse to promote and 
encourage co-operatives which were controlled by the government through the 
marketing boards and they had no power to bargain price for commodities. 
 
The African Agricultural (Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949 was not only a key 
prime mover but also wider in terms of crops involved, unlike the 1937 legislation 
which provided only for the coffee industry. Thus, it was a facilitating policy for the 
growth of co-operative movement as it compelled the Marketing Boards to promote 
the co-operatives which under the previous legislation had immersed power in 
control of crop marketing (see further details in chapter 5). Its application proved 
effective and successful. While development of co-operative movement was uneven, 
the legislation led to expansion of the co-operative footprint as demonstrated by a 
number of societies in new locations such as Rungwe district in the Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania and Kagera regions (then Bukoba district) see Table 10 
below. 
 
Under the marketing legislations, the boards were charged with crop marketing. 
They had power to appoint an agency in which co-operatives were a priority because 
unlike private enterprises, they did not offer conflicting interests with those of the 
Board. The functions of the Boards were complementary to the work of agriculture 
marketing co-operatives. Under this relationship the colonial authority employed the 
co-operative as the principal tool for crop collection points. This resulted in the 
expansion in the cash crop producing areas as a result of intensified involvement of 
marketing boards, support that also had an effect on the growth of co-operatives in 
Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, the WCGA and Southern Province (Mbeya, and Iringa) and 







Table 10: Geographical Distribution of Co-operative Societies in 1959 and 1960 
S/No Provinces Total 
1 Northern 61 
2 Southern 33 
3 Southern Highlands 59 
4 West Lake 79 
5 Lake 341 
6 Tanga 8 
7 Eastern 34 
8 Western 1 
9 Central 1 
Total   617 
Source: Annual Report on Co-operative Development 1959, Dar Es Salaam, 1960 
 
This section has examined the development and expansion of co-operatives in the 
post-war years. This was partly due to pressure from external forces and the 
Colonial Office that paved for creation of a Co-operative Development Department, 
which was allocated staff, funding and challenged to promote co-operatives across 
the country. It has also discussed the promulgation of the marketing board’s 
legislation and its impact and impetus upon the growth of the co-operative 
movement. In the next section provides an evaluation of the on co-operative 
movement policy continuity and changes during the post - colonial era. 
 
3.5: THE POST-COLONIAL CO-OPERATIVE POLICY CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE 
This section examines three major aspects of the co-operative movement’s 
development in the post-colonial era. Firstly, it lays a background on the post-
colonial co-operative development policy. Secondly, it discusses the co-operative 
development policy continuity. Finally, the section provides a critical analysis on the 
development of co-operative movement in relation to the changing political and 
ideological inclination in shaping the co-operative movement during the first two 
decades of independence.  
 
Tanzania attained independence in December 1961 under TANU inheriting the 
economy from colonial rule that was governed by capitalist policies. It has to be 
noted that the only asset that was at the disposal of Tanzanians was the co-
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operative movement. The government vowed to effectively utilise them, which 
signified an important policy commitment and a continuity of the co-operative 
renaissance era. At this juncture, the co-operative movement was envisioned to 
meet similar policy goals, mainly to control of the marketing of the agricultural 
produce. 
 
The post-colonial government saw the co-operative movement as an instrument for 
Africanisation of important economic sectors such as processing and marketing of 
agricultural produces in an attempt to consolidate itself,496 provided under the 
National Agricultural Products Board Act, 1962 which was primarily envisioned to 
control of the crops marketing (See Section 2.6). It embarked upon setting up co-
operatives not in every part of the country, but also for every economic sector where 
urban and rural community could be involved. Such co-operatives ranged from 
credit, industrial and supplier of consumer goods, and transport, which were 
traditionally under the control of Asians.497 Against this view, it was considered that 
Africans would have control of the economy that for many years had been under the 
control of the expatriates.498 
 
It has been pointed out in this thesis that the colonial post-war signified co-operative 
renaissance era in Tanzania. However, the inherited co-operative movement 
footprint was limited in some regions and not-existent in most parts of the country. 
The regions that were underserved or co-operatives were non-existent was a 
concern to the post-colonial government had to address accordingly. It was 
envisaged that transplanting was a suitable approach and a success of such 
initiatives required deliberate political efforts. In promoting co-operatives politicians 
and government officials were deployed in rural areas where they encouraged 
                                                          
496 Kjell Havnevik, (1993), p.29. 
497 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika, Ushirika Wetu. (CUT: Dar E Salaam, 
1977),p.55 
498 URT, Report of the Presidential Committee of Enquiry into co-operative 
movement and marketing Boards. (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), p.5. 
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growers to set up co-operatives in public meetings.499  This demonstrated political 
commitment and policy continuity in regard to the top-down promotion of co-
operatives. But, such transformation was meant to suit the interest and to fit new 
national development plans in which co-operatives were envisaged to play part 
particularly to help the government in handling cash crops that are vital for the 
economy of the country.  
 
Given the desire of the politicians to comply with national policy the growers had 
limited, to accumulate knowledge and interest to form their own societies that would 
serve their interests.500 In this, there was disregard for members’ interests and need 
as the basis for forming new co-operatives. The ‘potential’ members had to be 
passive and accept organisations imposed on them from above which did not serve 
their interest but implemented the national policy. As a result of political efforts, there 
was a surge and burgeoning number of the co-operative movement and expanded 
footprint unlike in 1960 in handling a wide range of agricultural commodities as 
shown in Appendix 2 on distribution of co-operatives in 1965 in regions.501 This was 
a crash programme and hastily prepared since did not adhere to certain basic 
aspects. As pointed out, at independence TANU regarded the co-operatives as 
suitable rural institutions that would facilitate economic independence. It was 
certainly viewed that, in the absence of the government intervention social change 
and agricultural transformation were unlikely.502  
 
To achieve this, the government amended Section 50 of the co-operative legislation 
in November 1962503 by substituting the responsibilities of the Registrar of co-
                                                          
499 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012; Gabriel Kagaruki 
November 8th, 10th and 11th 2012; Pius Ngeze November 5th 2012. 
500 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012; Gabriel Kagaruki 
November 8th, 10th and 11th 2012; Pius Ngeze November 5th 2012. 
501 Regions are new political administrative area that replaced Provinces in 1962 
502 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012; Gabriel Kagaruki 
November 8th, 10th and 11th 2012; Pius Ngeze November 5th 2012. 
503Under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance (Amendment) Act, No. 72 of 1962, 
Cap. 211 the amendments were made in sections 37, 49, 50, 55, of by deleting a 
word registrar'' and substituting therefor the word ‘Minister’ Section 45 of the 
Ordinance is hereby amended by deleting the words ‘Governor in Council’ wherever 
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operative societies which were handed over to George Kahama who was the 
Minister responsible for co-operatives until 1965.504 Under the amendment the then 
Registrar’s powers and functions were vested in politicians. Registration and 
promotion of the co-operatives became a political issue and a priority dominated by a 
desire to expand the footprint. At this juncture, the Minister approved societies and 
the Registrar’s role was reduced to record keeping for registered societies and 
membership. This undermined the ICA procedures that commend the co-operative 
movement should remain as an economic aspect that aims to serve members’ 
interests.   
 
Furthermore, the idea behind the promotion of the mass co-operative societies 
across the country served both a political and economic agenda. The policy aimed to 
utilise co-operatives as a tool to unify the Tanzanians from the divisions created 
during colonial rule. To achieve national unity, saw the government and the ruling 
party TANU (CCM since 1977) directly engaged in a policy move by appointing some 
co-operative movement leaders to Ministerial positions. Such leaders were George 
Kahama from the BCU (Home Affairs Ministry), Paul Bomani from the VFCUS 
(Agriculture and Co-operatives), Asanterabi Zaphaniah Nsilo Swai from Meru Co-
operative Union (Commerce and Industries), and Jeremiah Christina Kasambala 
from Rugwe Co-operative Union (Transport and Buildings, under the 1965 reshuffle 
he became Minister for Co-operative and Community development).505 At this 
juncture, state consolidation was clear and foundation for the post-colonial 
government making an attempt to compromise with potential opponents. 
 
Having the co-operative movement incorporated in the government machinery a 
unity remained wide open until when the government sponsored the formation and 
registration the apex co-operative body the Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) 
in 1962506 that drew membership from all co-operative unions in the country and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
they appear therein except where they form part of the expression ‘Governor in 
council of Ministers and substituted therefore in each case the word ‘Minister’. 
504 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012. 
505 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012 
506 Horace Plunkett Foundation, Year Book of Agricultural Co-operative, (London: 
Basil Blackwell, 1962), p.242; Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 
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total of 760 primary societies.507 Despite, the government role in the creation of the 
CUT was very important in some aspects. The organisation was charged with 
providing co-operative education and advisory services replicated the from the 
British’s co-operative union. Also, this was a significant step as it can be recalled that 
Northcote proposed for its formation, but the colonial authority rejected it (see 
Section 3.3).   
In accordance with expansion policy, the co-operative unions were also encouraged 
by the government (see table 11 below). This was a significant development given 
that this was only four years after independence. These Unions and those formed 
before independence were assigned by the government a number of functions such 
as distribution and control of agriculture credit to societies ultimately to growers.508 
The newly registered Unions are listed in Table 11 below. 
 
Table 11: The Co-operative Unions Registered after Independence 
Union Region Year  
Njombe Iringa June 1962 
Mbeya  Mbeya April 1963 
Tarime Mara June 1963 
Ulanga Morogoro October 1963 
Mtwara Mtwara December 1963 
Kilosa Morogoro February 1964 
Singida Singida July 1964 
Tanga Tanga July 1964 
Kigoma Kigoma February 1965 
Nguvumali Tabora June 1965 
Igokelo Kagera 1965509 
Tunduru Ruvuma June 1965 
Source: Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika Tanganyika, Ushirika Wetu, (CUT: Dar 
Es Salaam, 1977), p.51 
 
It is evident from Table 11 above that there were no additional Unions in Kilimanjaro 
and WCGA as they were already saturated; but, two primary societies were 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2012; Gabriel Kagaruki November 8th, 10th and 11th 2012; Pius Ngeze November 5th 
2012. 
507 Horace Plunkett Foundation, Year Book of Agricultural Co-operative, (London: 
Basil Blackwell, 1962), p.242. 
508 URT, Annual Report on Co-operative Development for Tanganyika,(Dar Es 
Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), p. 1. 
509 URT, Annual Report on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es Salaam: 
Government Printer, 1965), p.22. 
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registered in Kagera, which were Itongo and Ilemera.510 Igokelo was formed to 
handle cotton in Biharamulo which was one of the districts in Kagera and Livestock 
Union, Wafugaji Co-operative Union was formed in Tarime district in Mara region in 
the WCGA.  
 
The post-colonial government viewed the co-operative movement as the vehicle to 
achieve the government’s rural development also to facilitate unity among growers. 
At independence the NAs were abolished, hence creating a vacuum in regard to the 
implementation of rural development. This necessitated the promotion of co-
operatives to take over development function at grassroots level to administer 
projects by targeting individuals who are not organized in groups; also to facilitate in 
raising production and productivity in agriculture. This represents the continuity of 
colonial agricultural policies. The co-operative movement was envisioned to play a 
part in the modernisation of agriculture as a medium for provision of knowledge and 
skills under which growers to improve would learn modern farming practices.  
 
The First Five-year Plan511 marked a beginning of the political shift away from 
capitalism towards socialism unveiled in the Arusha Declaration of February 5th 
1967.512 Under the ArD the major means of production and exchange were 
extensively nationalised and placed under the control of the workers and peasants 
through the government and co-operatives. With the nationalisation of estates and 
plantations the government could not cope with managing nationalised farms due to 
lack of staff and funding. Therefore it had to rely on the co-operatives. For example, 
the KNCU which was given nationalized coffee plantations. Thus the movement 
became an integral part in the control of all the major means of production and 
exchange.  It was argued that:  
To build and maintain socialism, it was essential that all the major means of 
production and exchange in the nation were controlled and owned by 
                                                          
510 The BCU Report for years 1961/62, 1962/63 and 1963/64, (Bukoba: BCU Printing 
Unit), p.1. 
511 URT, First Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, (1964-1969), 
Vol. I. (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1964), p. 43. 
512 J.K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, (Dar Es Salaam: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), pp.13-37. 
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peasants through the machinery of their government and their co-
operatives.513 
To this effect, the government strengthened the administrative apparatus responsible 
for co-operation, adjusted co-operative legislation to fit the new strategy, and 
became subject to strictly political and ideological imperatives under the Government 
and rulling party. Against the backdrop, it was also envisioned that the under the 
policy the co-operative movement will facilitate in engaging Tanzanians towards 
economic independence and self-reliance. 
 
Within the implementation of the First Five-Year Development Plan, the Presidential 
Special Committee of Enquiry into the Co-operatives Movement and Marketing 
Boards was appointed by the President Nyerere in January 26th 1966 amid 
complaints from growers and co-operative members about the terms of payments on 
their produce. The Committee was given terms of reference that was entailed: 
To review the staffing and, where necessary, the organisational structure of 
the co-operative movement and Marketing Boards in order to recommend 
what steps should be taken to strengthen them for the maximum benefit of 
producers and consumers alike.514 
 
The 1966 Commission of Enquiry recommended strengthening of the Co-operative 
Unions. Consequently, a number of developments took place; firstly, Paper No.4 of 
1967 was published that provided a new policy direction that the movement should 
embark upon. Secondly, the policy recommended the creation of multi-purpose co-
operative societies intended to replace 14,000 Asians who majority controlled retail 
and 4,000 in wholesale businesses and a number of Africans was negligible.515 All in 
all, the marketing was retained as the backbone of the movement. It was envisaged 
that for effective utilisation and profit realisation the co-operative movement had to 
diversify their businesses to include marketing food crops, processing plants and 
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agriculture production so that they become multi-purpose.516 This signified a shift of 
emphasis by having co-operatives undertake new businesses. However, this was in 
addition to serving affiliated primary societies that overburdened their plans, 
performance and progress. This overburdened their managerial and financial 
capacity and exposed a lack of knowledge to execute some of the new business.  
 
In January 1968 the VFCUS was dismantled (see Chapter 6, Section 6.6 for further 
details). The government’s position was that the VFCUS had divorced itself from the 
grassroots members, societies and the Unions.517 The reorganisation of the VFCUS 
into the Nyanza Co-operative Union (NCU) was followed by the Government’s order 
to form the co-operative unions in each region in the country. The policy was backed 
by Government Notice No 3 of 1966 that called for the amalgamation of co-operative 
unions in each region into one.  
 
It has to be noted that the passage of the 1968 co-operative legislation stemmed 
from the 1966 Presidential Committee recommendation that co-operatives have 
autonomous status and political interferences should be minimized if not 
eliminated.518 The legislation justified the government decision to dismantle and split 
up the NCU, which was the predecessor of the VFCUS which it was also illogical for 
a secondary society, the VFCUS to operate in three regions. Moreover, the BCU and 
KNCU were also affected (see Chapters 4, Section 4.5, Chapter 5, Section 5.6 and 
6, Section 6.6); logically, policy consistency could be derived by having one Union in 
each region.  
 
The amalgamation of the Unions was viewed by the government as costs effective 
and helped or a measure to resuscitate poor performing unions.519 The government’s 
policy was politically motivated because cost effectiveness was a question to be 
                                                          
516 URT, The Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, (1964-
1969), (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p.31 – 32. 
517 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika Tanganyika, (1977), p.36. 
518 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012; Gabriel Kagaruki 
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519 Interview with George Kahama in November 27th 2012; Gabriel Kagaruki 
November 8th, 10th and 11th 2012; Pius Ngeze November 5th 2012. 
147 
 
considered by unions themselves and not to be told or instructed by the government. 
The forced amalgamations were carried out without the consent of the members. In 
implementing this order the authority considered regional administrative boundaries 
as a primary factor and totally neglected key aspects such as business risks and 
prospects, and importantly, members’ interest and their commitment to the co-
operative ideal. 
 
The post-Arusha Declaration, especially the Second Five Year Development Plan 
(1969 – 1974) supposedly revolved around the ArD policy. At this juncture, the 
salient feature of the co-operative policy was that the movement was perceived as a 
key instrument for the implementation of socialist policy as well as rural 
development. This was a shift away from having co-operatives serve the interest of 
its members to save local to development plans and the ideology propagation of 
which they were engaged in affairs beyond their establishment. It also suggests that, 
their functions were being hijacked and were falling under control of the party and 
government.  
 
The basis for the promotion of co-operatives and development explained above was 
in practice an integral part of the government’s socialist policy that aimed to promote 
the welfare of the poor, mostly growers in rural areas. Since the Tanzania 
development policy was anchored upon Ujamaa, the involvement of the government 
was justified as provided by the ILO’s 1966 Recommendation No 127 that calls for 
the state intervention in the promotion of the co-operative movement throughout 
developing countries. On the other hand, Nyerere asserted that the government was 
active for two reasons, first, because it was strongly held that it was only through co-
operatives that growers could defend themselves against exploitation, something 
echoed by the socialist co-operative school.520 Secondly, it was geared towards 
achieving the modernisation of rural communities. This was reinforced under the 
Government Paper No.4 of 1967 which stated that: 
                                                          
520 Alex F. Laidlaw, Cooperatives and the Poor: A Review from within the 




There was no other type of organisation (than co-operatives) which was so 
suited to the problems and concept of rural development. The reutilisation of 
the co-operative movement in Tanzania was therefore vital to any programme 
of rural development. It was also emphasised that a co-operative society was 
basically a socialist institution and a considerable strength for the growth of 
socialism. This underlined a push by the government of the co-operatives 
core orientation from their original crop marketing purpose to concentration on 
serving the party’s Ujamaa ideological objectives.521 
 
This was a significant break from the ICA co-operation model, supposedly to be 
more appropriate and specific to the national context and by enlisting them to suit in 
country’s ideological orientation. The co-operatives obliged to be production 
oriented;522 and were expected fully participate and become a machinery in the 
building and propagating modern production techniques based on the socialist ideals 
in rural areas where they had a strong base among the growers. The movement was 
utilised because it was the only institution with a rural stronghold and had thousands 
of members to whom socialist/Ujamaa ideals could be passed. It was argued by the 
government that: 
There was no other type of organisation which was so suited to the problem 
and concept of rural development; it would be impossible for government’s 
administrative machinery to deal with individuals requiring government 
assistance and services, including credit for raising production and 
productivity. Without the use of co-operatives, the number of people wanting 
government help would make the dissemination of government services and 
assistance financially very expensive and administratively almost 
impossible.523 
 
A further shift was signalled in a policy document, Socialism and Rural Development 
(Ujamaa na Maendeleo Vijinini) in September 1967 which aimed to address social 
and economic inequality in rural areas and bring to an end exploitation of man by 
man. The policy was a framework for rural and national development that was further 
underlined in the Second Five Year Development Plan (1969-74) and the 
Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969. This stressed the importance of rural 
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transformation under524 the Ujamaa villages where people in rural areas should live 
together, own means of production and work communally. The Ujamaa villages were 
a model that borrowed some elements from the colonial era settlements schemes, 
and also echoed the Chinese and Israeli rural development programmes which in 
1962 experimented with the support of the Israel experts in the WCGA to assist in 
the development of agriculture particularly co-operative farming,525 as well as Indian 
community development programmes. Powerful Unions such as the KNCU, BCU 
and VFCU resisted the implementation of the government plans as was viewed they 
would harm some of its members who had accumulated wealth, for example land, 
through progressive and transformation approaches.526 This heightened friction 
between the government and movement. It also indicates the failure of the 
government to subdue or win over the co-operatives and the difficulty of drafting 
them into implementing its policies as well as having them to play a role in 
propagating its ideology. 
 
The Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 was passed to provide legality to all newly 
established villages. The Act designated villages as agents and basic crop collection 
points for crop authorities for Coffee, Cotton (formerly referred as the marketing 
boards) also newly formed institutions such as the National Milling Corporation 
(NMC), GAPEX (General Agricultural Export Company) all created in 1973 with 
much wider vertical responsibilities for production, development, and eventually the 
state itself, took on the role of the merchant in the form of crop authorities. Under the 
new marketing arrangement the primary co-operative societies and Unions were 
made redundant.   
 
The Act rendered previous co-operative legislation redundant as primary co-
operative societies that were a dominant feature in villages were replaced by villages 
which were recognised as the co-operative entities responsible for and acting as 
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sub-agent of marketing boards charged with multi-purpose functions (marketing or 
collection of crops and input distribution). Against this background, the regional co-
operative unions could no longer have access to crops. This was also an indication 
of declining government interest in the traditional model of co-operative as both 
agents of social and economic change as well as for political purposes. 
 
Practically, the effect of the Act was to by-pass and eventually makes the primary co-
operative societies and the regional co-operative unions redundant as it provided the 
villages opportunity to buy crops from producers and market their produce directly to 
the statutory crop authorities on the one hand and denied the primary co-operative 
societies to do so. The village as the lowest level in the government’s hierarchical 
structure were unlike co-operatives and more suitable to be incorporated in both 
political control of the rural community and engaged in supervision of crop production 
as well as marketing.  
 
It has to be realised that under the villagisation membership for all adults became 
compulsory. This certainly suggests that, the commitment to build a socialist state by 
the post-colonial state by use of the inherited co-operative system was in jeopardy. 
At this juncture the co-operative movement with capitalist oriented elements 
characterised and guided by accommodation of the principles that encourages 
individualism based on voluntary membership. Such features failed to deliver 
envisioned a communal way of life that enshrined under Ujamaa. Additionally, each 
village became a political and ideological unit. This failed short of the principles that 
govern that co-operative movement that need to be established as a result of felt 
needs of the members which have to voluntarily join the society. Importantly, politics 
became part and parcel in the daily function of the co-operative movement which 
was contrary to the co-operative principles. 
 
However, the co-operatives raised concerns over the engagement of crop authorities 
in crop marketing. This was viewed by the movement as disruptive. As a result, in 
the 1975 the government appointed a Massomo Committee mainly to address 
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impending challenges.527 The Commission was also charged with a task to identify 
ideal economic plans and economic viability of all co-operative unions and 
recommend for deregistration of uneconomic unions. The Committee recommended 
deregistration of four unions and strengthening of sixteen of them to attain economic 
viability.528 However, the government shelved Massomo recommendations; instead, 
the co-operatives were dissolved in May 15th 1976. This was an unfortunate moment 
for co-operatives which were the most advanced and biggest in Africa and oldest in 
East Africa. This was nothing other than nationalisation exercise propagated under 
the 1967 Arusha Declaration that aimed at control over the agricultural economy by 
the state. This was also an attempt by the government to distance itself from its 
policy that maintained the economy of the country would be under the control of 
workers through trade unions and by the peasants through co-operatives. It also   
demonstrates that, a failure of government to exploit and use the co-operative as its 
tool to propagate socialist ideology. Again, this was an exercise of power by the 
authority against any element that posed a stumbling block to its policies. It should 
be realized that, the government’s decision to dissolve the agricultural marketing co-
operatives did not affect consumer, industrial and savings and credit co-operatives; 
thus, it was a vengeance against agricultural marketing co-operatives.  
 
The dissolving of the movement was, however, a shock to growers as the agencies 
were imposed on them were not their choice but dictated by government. This 
marked a beginning of villages and entire rural community coming under direct 
control of the government through its parastatals. This political decision culminated 
in the move towards nationalisation of major means of economy of which the 
agriculture sector was finally placed under the government’s socialist-planned and 
controlled economy. With such background, the government installed socialistic co-
operatives at the village level, the socialization of the means of production, whereby 
the growers were detached from his or her assets. The growers were separated from 
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their property in a new co-operative arrangement at the expense of household 
private capital accumulation. This pattern of capital accumulation at the local 
household level created apathy and a low level of commitment to the new village co-
operatives. This state mobilization could not produce genuine membership and 
genuine co-operative organizations in Tanzania.  
 
There were other factors that prompted and reinforced the government to take such 
decision; for example, with the wake of the 1973 oil crisis and drought in the early 
1970s Tanzania experienced economic crisis.529 The imposition of village based co-
operatives societies was a legalistic government measure for the exploitation of rural 
resources. Membership was compulsory and automatic at 18 years old. This meant 
a lack of incentive because membership was not free and voluntary. When co-
operatives are externally driven and mobilized by the government we cannot expect 
genuine membership. The leadership and governance was not a product of 
democratic practice, but was imposed by the government.  
 
Other factors were, declining price for agricultural products in the international 
markets and worsened terms of trade530 which had far reaching effect on Tanzania’s 
balance of payments. Government control over the entire economy was thought 
could salvage it from the crisis. For example, the dissolution of the co-operatives was 
a stepping stone towards access and control of levy accrued by the co-operatives for 
every kilogram sold by every grower in the country.  
 
The government was obvious trying to exploit an increase in coffee price in the world 
market which was 217 per cent between 1969/70 and 1978/79 which was an 
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Adjustment in Tanzania (1986-95),” in P.G. Forster and S. Maghimbi (eds.), Agrarian 
Economy, State and Society in Contemporary Tanzania. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 
pp.3-25; Benno Ndulu, Stabilization and Adjustment Policies and Programmes. 
Country Study 17 Tanzania. (World Institute for Development Economic Research of 
the United Nations University, 1988), pp. 1-2. 
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increase from 7.224 shillings to 22.899 shillings per kilogram; but growers price 
increased only by 90 per cent which was 5.816 shillings to 11.025 shillings per 
kilogram.531 The increase of coffee price in the world market led to an increase of 
marketing board’s running costs too, for example during the 1969/70 it was 0.435 
shillings per kilogram and in 1978/79 it rose to 4.037 shillings per kilogram which 
was 6 per cent to and 18 per cent increase respectively.532  This indicates that the 
abolition of co-operatives in 1976 was not a relief to the growers, but intensified 
deductions which were siphoned by the crop authorities on behalf on the 
government. 
 
The policy also disempowered growers who were left without institutional 
arrangements or forum where they could meet, discuss and decide on the fate of 
their general welfare. Understandably, such functions were handed over to the 
village government and were expected to operate like Israel’s kibbutz and 
Moshav.533 The Ujamaa villages were designed to be production co-operatives, ideal 
for economies of scale by pooling resources together such as land in which to farm 
together by use of modern farming machinery. Ideally the primary objective was to 
meet the political need and commitment of the ruling party. In this the party was 
committed to eradicate all types of exploitation of man by man But, the village 
leadership in this respect paid more attention to the ruling party’s interests than 
those of the co-operatives. To this effect, issues regarding co-operatives were 
neglected by the leadership; thus the village as a co-operative or kibbutz and 
moshav concept failed to nurture from the outset as they were more geared for 
political ends managed by ruling party branch leaders who lacked skills, training and 
knowledge of the co-operative business. 
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The village co-operative had neither legal mechanisms nor by-laws that provided for 
managing village co-operative businesses. The only guidance available was based 
on the village’s party branch powers that had nothing to do with the co-operative. In 
a critical case, the government did not utilise the managerial competence that could 
be offered by ousted staff and committees if co-opted village government. The co-
operative model was shredded, crippled and became meaningless and was paid 
only lip service by the ruling party. Furthermore, the co-operatives held up as a 
draconian political approach in suppressing growers’ interests. 
 
This transformation was against the original Rochdale’s or ICA’s co-operative 
philosophy. Under the new model, the village had to reorganise into a multi-purpose 
producer co-operative society responsible for agricultural production and 
marketing.534 Such societies established under the legislation were merely pseudo 
co-operatives with leaders appointed by the government as well as the political party, 
TANU which was in 1977 renamed Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) following 
amalgamation with the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP) of Zanzibar which was in power. At 
this juncture, the co-operative principles were marginalised and completely replaced 
by the political features, structures and political objectives were slotted in.   
 
Moreover, looking at such structure and function prescribed one could make a clear 
judgment that this was not a co-operative organisation, but a political and 
government entity. These pseudo co-operatives were established and legally 
entrenched in rural areas. The government installed a completely new structure that 
the villagers did not demand; but forcefully installed on them just in the same manner 
as were forced to settle in the new villages prescribed by the government. The 
installed co-operatives were politically motivated to meet the interests of political 
leadership in which member control did not exist. Consequently, a different structure 
was developed and operated differently from co-operatives in the West. The ICA 
principle of the centrality of democracy in a member based organisations such as co-
                                                          
534 Gabriel Kagaruki November 8th, 10th and 11th 2012. 
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operatives, was clearly subverted as the secretary of a society was a government 
appointee appointed by the government as a village executive officer. 
 
Villages became an administrative and political unit of the party and government with 
elected representatives at lower levels of the party hierarchy imposed on growers – 
serving the political interests rather than economies. One of the changes that were 
brought in by this Act was the direct and immediate takeover of crop marketing 
function by the villages to the grounds that regional Unions were too bureaucratic 
and expensive middlemen had to be replaced by direct transactions between villages 
and crop authorities. Villages were appointed agents of the crop authorities and 
Boards. The multi-purpose producer co-operative societies sold crops to crop 
authorities and boards which were directed by the government to do so. Under this 
new arrangement the co-operative societies and unions were sidestepped and made 
redundant.   
 
The dissolution of the co-operative movement in 1976 left the farmers without 
organisations to which they could turn for credit, agricultural inputs, extension 
services and marketing. As previously mentioned, the co-operative apex body, the 
Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT), had been formed in 1962 by the 
government.  In 1979 under the Jumuiya ya Washirika Act of 1979 the CUT was 
renamed the Union of Co-operative Societies (UCS) Jumuiya ya Washirika it 
officially became the arm of the ruling party responsible for mobilising, providing 
guidance and supervision of growers and villages as well as to propagate all types of 
co-operatives.535 
 
A measure culminated into employing it as an integral part of the ruling party and this 
was further reinforced in the 1982 Co-operative and Societies Act whereby all 
villages in the country became members marking the climax in integrating the 
movement in the ruling party structure. It also provided for considerable government 
interference in the affairs of co-operatives, for example, the relevant Minister or 
Registrar of Co-operative societies could appoint the party members in key co-
operative positions. Against this backdrop, the movement became a political wing for 
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control of the entire movement members. It is obvious that the co-operative 
legislations are important for the development of the movement only if they are 
complementary to the co-operative principles. Contrary to that 1982 co-operative 
legislation created no room for growth and development of independent movement 
free from government interference. 
 
However, these measures did not solve the Tanzania’s economic crisis that gripped 
the country in early 1973. The intensity of the crisis was still evident in the 1980s, 
when there was a severe deterioration of social services. Shop shelves were empty 
as industries could not produce commodities due to lack of raw materials most of 
which were imported and government’s parastatals responsible for importing 
consumer goods were short of foreign exchange to pay for goods. Worse, the 
country was in acute balance of payment deficit. These problems generated a 
political rift on means to resolve the crisis. The first group was the die-hards, which 
were led by the President Nyerere and some followers as the Party ideologists and 
cadres such as Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the ex-Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa 
and the economist Kighoma Malima.  
 
This group maintained the crisis was primarily due to factors such as rise of oil price, 
Uganda war, and unfavourable commodity price in the world market, which for them 
were all temporary, thus promoting a ‘wait and see’ policy. For them status quo 
dominated their position whereby they were in favour of self-reliance which was 
embedded in ArD policy as way for economic recovery through utilisation of internal 
resources under the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) instead of 
embarking on reforms which were prescribed by the Bretton Wood institutions, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, such as privatisation of 
economy that would sway the country towards capitalism.536 In so doing, ujamaa 
policy was compromised.  
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The pro-economic reform groups were led by Paul Bomani (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.4 for details about him) and Cleopa Msuya, previously Minister of Finance.537 This 
group was in favour of the market-oriented approach. For them socialist policy has 
failed and was unworkable. This group had support from donor countries that 
pressurised the government and eventually gave in to accept to implement the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) from 1982 in which it became obvious for 
the government to loosen its noose against agricultural marketing policy and the 
economy in general.538   The implement of SAP paved the way for the reinstatement 
of the co-operative movement provided under the 1982 Co-operative Societies Act. 
However, the Acts objectives stated that the co-operative movement should strive in 
accordance with its democratic socialist and co-operative outlook which implied that 
they remained under ruling party influence and control. 
 
This section has examined post-colonial policies and political decisions as well as 
the motivations of the co-operative movement which was both economic and 
political. Political motivation was geared towards achieving political unity and 
facilitating a common socialist ideology. However the ideological goal created friction 
between the ruling party and kulaks that emerged out of progressive and 
improvement approaches and believed their interests were threatened; in the long 
run the movement had to be abolished in 1976. The economic motivation was 
geared towards rural development and control over the rural economy by the co-
operatives; on the contrary the ruling party and the government’s interest were 
priority that led to the abolition of the co-operative movement whose functions were 
taken over by the government with effect from 1976 to 1982. 
 
3.6: CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown how the colonial policies during the interwar and post-war 
periods engaged in the promotion of the agricultural marketing co-operatives. From 
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the early stages in 1929 it was evident that political motivation was a driving force, 
mainly to justify the suffocation the KNPA which was viewed by the colonial authority 
as a threat as it was consenting and mobilising the growers against some policies. 
To achieve this goal, the colonial authority pressed and conspired for the passage of 
the co-operative legislation that brought the KNPA rule to an end and paved the way 
for the KNCU in 1933. This clearly indicates the extent to which the co-operatives 
were established at the behest of the colonial government with no regard to member 
interests. But, at the time the colonial authority maintained that the growth of co-
operatives outside Kilimanjaro had to be spontaneous. But the approach failed to 
materialise because the conditions for spontaneous growth did not exist in a 
colonised country like Tanzania; where it happened the colonial authority obstructed 
such as the case of the NGA in Bukoba and KNPA in Kilimanjaro which were 
suppressed on the pretext that they were of a threat to the establishment. These 
developments were also held back by lack of trained personnel for inculcation of co-
operative ideals and for the teaching business methods. However, during the same 
period some District Officers promoted and registered societies which were contrary 
to the advocated policy. Generally, the policy towards promoting co-operatives within 
and outside Kilimanjaro was erratic and as top-down.  
 
In other areas excuses were given by the colonial authority regarding their disfavour 
of co-operatives. This was not only double standards, but also a deliberate move by 
the colonial authority to arrest of the growers’ initiatives, particularly where they 
demanded for the formation of the co-operative societies. The cases demonstrate a 
lack of policy consistency and political commitment in promoting co-operative 
societies and non-existence of plans whatsoever. 
 
Additionally, the growth of societies was limited in some regions which was a 
concern to the Colonial Office but, it recommended for spontaneous growth of co-
operatives which proved a failure also growers lacked the knowledge in formulating 
plans for social and economic progress that required government intervention for 
stimulation of co-operatives of various types. This signified a policy shift and a 
justification of the top-down approach employed in the formation and registration at 




These developments were primarily geared towards exploiting Tanzania’s economic 
resources. For this, the post-war years witnessed the colonial authority persistently 
encourage agricultural marketing co-operatives with more attention given to the 
progressive farmers. Notably, the progressive farmers were envisioned to play a part 
in the modernisation of agriculture among small-scale growers. The encouragement 
of the co-operative societies was mainly to facilitate marketing and in aiding and 
sustaining the British economy. At this juncture, the growers and Tanzania 
agriculture industry as a whole was increasingly linked directly to address the 
colonial power’s post-war reconstruction. Against the background, the existing co-
operative societies maintained and new ones had to be promoted in the course of 
enabling Britain to accelerate its access to export crops which were important in 




Following independence, the post-colonial government vowed to support co-
operatives signifying the continuity of colonial policy. It increased recognition as a 
major and the driving force in invigoration of rural development and economy of the 
country. The post - colonial government had to demonstrate its commitment by 
adopting a policy that provided for increased and expansion of the co-operative 
movement footprint in the country that implied more members being drafted in. This 
was undertaken through similar approach experienced during the colonial rule. 
However, this was viewed important mainly to mobilise and modernise agricultural 
and rural development which was in disarray following years of colonisation and 
perpetuated inequality that fostered inequality which were a threat to the national 
unity and stability. The policy was also geared towards eliminating Asian traders 
from crop marketing. The success of the policy brought the government into direct 
involvement in agricultural marketing. Importantly, the intervention undermined 
members' interests which were relegated to secondary level that demonstrated the 
continuity of the colonial policy approach not only in the promotion of the co-




In 1967 Tanzania embarked upon building a socialist state after the Arusha 
Declaration. The purpose of co-operatives was envisaged to implement 
government’s social and economic development plans. The purposes were also 
diverted to the support of political objectives in building a socialist state, hence, fell 
short of the ICA’s principle governing voluntary and open membership.  
 
The amendment of legislation in 1968 culminated into amalgamation all the co-
operative unions into one for each region, and within regional political and 
administrative boundaries. This signified a serious intervention in the affairs of the 
co-operatives. The policy was a shift away from the colonial policy that encouraged 
such co-operatives as the VFCUS to cover a number of districts in the WCGA. A 
drive behind such policy was motivated by political rather than economic 
considerations. Co-operatives were deprived of autonomy status and subjected to 
the control by government as instruments of state economic policy. 
 
A further shift from colonial policy was brought in through the passage and 
implementation of the Villages Act (1975) that deemed villages in the form of the 
collective settlements in rural areas as a co-operative entity. Clearly, a new co-
operative model was brought in place. Hence, this marked a watershed in the 
replacement of the colonial inherited co-operative model and structure. The measure 
was followed by the subsequent abolishment of established agricultural co-
operatives and their unions by the Government in 1976. At this juncture, the co-
operative principles were marginalised and the political features, structures and 
political objectives were slotted in that marked a significant shift from the colonial 
model pattern of co-operation. A new co-operative model in the collective 
settlements that, was supposedly according to the post-colonial authority was more 
appropriate in the specific national socialist context and deprived growers of their 
institutions and their interest were further undermined.  This generated a completely 
new organisation, quasi-co-operatives that were designed to serve political interests 
rather than the economy and thus the growers were brought under control of the 
state; and the co-operative movement marginalised. The co-operative movement 
was reinstated in 1982. However, the legislation essentially meant that co-operatives 
were still integral to the construction of a socialist state. This marked a shift away 
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from core crop marketing business to politics without consultation of the members 
who were supposed to undertake the task.  
 
This chapter has critically explored the history of the co-operative movement in 
Tanzania from 1925 to 1982. It identified specific policy aspects and political 
decisions that led to passage of co-operative and compatible marketing legislations 
that gave rise to the movement and integrated them into crop marketing system. It 
also examined the changing political and ideological influences of the emerging 
Tanzanian state shape the co-operative movement during the post-colonial era. The 
following three chapters provide the a practical implication of the policies by 
exploring how were translated and transpired in the specific co-operative 




CHAPTER FOUR: KILIMANJARO NATIVE CO-OPERATIVE UNION 
 
4.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the birth of the first co-operative movement in Tanzania, the 
Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), based in the Kilimanjaro region. This 
chapter analyses the factors that led to the KNCU’s emergence following the colonial 
authority’s restructuring of the KNPA into the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative 
Society (KNCS) in 1932 and its renaming as the KNCU in 1933. It also analyses the 
significance of coffee marketing compulsion legislation provided under the 1934 
Chagga Rule that plunged the KNCU into chaos following the collapse of coffee 
prices. Furthermore, the chapter examines the 1932 Co-operative Ordinance, which 
provided under Section 36 the basis for colonial and post-colonial control of native 
coffee growers of, their produce through the KNCU and its affiliated societies. 
Importantly, Section 36 formed a watershed for Tanzania’s colonial and post-colonial 
agriculture marketing policy until 1976 when the co-operative movement in Tanzania 
was abolished and its functions were replaced by villages at grassroots or primary 
society level. As a result, of the abolition of the KNCU, its functions were taken over 
by the government’s Coffee Crop Authority, which remained in operation until 1982. 
Historiography regarding the development of the KNCU is examined in the literature 
review in the following section. 
 
4.2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
This section reviews the literature regarding the origins of the KNCU. There is a 
consensus that the KNPA was the first ever indigenous small-scale coffee marketing 
co-operatives in Tanzania. The native coffee growers formed the KNPA in a struggle 
against the monopoly of European settlers over the crop and to help them defend 
their interests in the coffee industry.539 But, the literature does not fully identify the 
factors that led to its establishment. McCarthy provides a legal assessment of the 
                                                          




formation of the KNCU.540 However, his work literature is predominantly based upon 
secondary sources. Dubell, rejects a fact that, the KNPA was restructured then 
renamed KNCS in April 1932 and renamed the KNCU when it was registered in 
January 1933. He is also in rejection that it was taken over by the colonial authority 
by deceitful means. For him, the KNPA was self-reorganised through a split up.541 
He further suggests that, the KNCU was a breeding ground of the co-operative 
movement in Tanzania.542 For him, policy factor is negligible. Andrew Coulson in his 
attempt to present the growth and development of the co-operatives in Kilimanjaro 
does not illustrate how and why the KNPA was restructured into the KNCU; 543 he 
also, fails to provide a linkage between the co-operative legislation and registration 
of the KNCU and its affiliated societies.544  
 
Manga’s unpublished Masters Dissertation devotes substantive discussion to the 
development of co-operative movement in Tanzania and Kilimanjaro region with a 
focus on Same district.545 Furthermore, Eckert argues that the co-operatives in 
Tanzania were generally not imposed upon Africans by the British.546 Eckert 
indicates that ‘it was the colonial state that gave these organisations a specific 
shape, one fitted to colonial economic and political interest’.547 The mentioned 
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literature lacks the primary evidence regarding the reorganisation of the KNPA and 
the eventual emergence of KNCU. This chapter addresses the lack of primary 
evidence by drawing on a cross-section of previously under used and unused 
archival evidence.  
 
In contrast, Roger’s thesis is rich in primary sources, focusing primarily on KNPA and 
the extent to which Chagga or tribal nationalistic politics has limited the evolution of 
the co-operatives in Kilimanjaro as well as coffee marketing policies.548 A thesis by 
the political scientist such as Susan Geinger Rogers is one of comprehensive 
literature that extensively utilised primary sources on co-operative movement in 
Kilimanjaro.549 The focus of her thesis is on a focus is primarily on KNPA and the 
WaChagga or tribal nationalistic politics with limited historical development of the co-
operatives in Kilimanjaro and native coffee marketing policies in the region.  Unlike 
Rogers, this study traces the development of the native coffee industry in 
Kilimanjaro. It also examines colonial authority intervention in the affairs of the KNPA 
eventually its replacement by the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU); 
and examines coffee marketing through the Chagga Rule and native coffee control 
and marketing legislation that provided for the formation of the MNCB and its 
significance of the marketing legislation upon the marketing policy in Tanzania from 
1937 to 1980s.   
  
Furthermore, Lyimo has discussed the formation of the KNPA and the subsequent 
transfer of its function to the KNCU. However, his thesis lacks clarity regarding the 
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reorganisation of the KNPA.550 Leubuscher provides a misleading interpretation of 
the KNPA by emphasising that financial difficulties and misappropriation of funds as 
being the key factors for its restructuring.551 She also does not show its political 
activism that triggered the promulgation of the Co-operative legislation that laid a 
ground for the restructuring of the KNPA.   
 
Maaga has recently published an article that exploits secondary sources;552 similarly, 
W.K.H. Campbell,553 but, both provide a misleading interpretation on how the KNCU 
evolved. For example, Campbell misinforms readers that, the KNPA was not a 
registered organisation and was formed in 1923 and it was reorganised because it 
was realised it was faulty. 554 Maanga utilised unreliable and contradictory secondary 
sources to explain how the KNCU evolved.555 Maanga illustrates that, KNCU was 
formed by Merinyo. Maanga’s article is an autobiography of Merinyo that focuses on 
a coffee grower in Marangu, and does not provide a detailed history of the industry 
and KNCU.556 Campbell has mentioned these disputed clauses, but, has not 
identified them.557 Iliffe has produced a well-documented history of the KNPA and 
KNCU; however, he has not established the reasons for its reorganisation and how 
the process was carried out.558 
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These oversights and gaps are addressed in this chapter, which offers fresh insights 
into the formation of the KNCU and its operation as provided by marketing 
legislations. The chapter establishes a clear historical linkage between the 
establishment of the KNCU and the promulgation of the 1932 Co-operative 
Ordinance (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). This chapter is based on the following 
research questions;  
 In what ways did the colonial authority influence and shape the emergence of 
the KNCU? 
 How far did the co-operative and coffee marketing legislation strengthen 
colonial control over the KNCU? 
 How did the local communities respond to colonial coffee marketing policies? 
 To what extent was there continuity in the structure, personnel and objectives 
between the colonial and post-colonial periods?  
 
4.3: THE GROWTH OF THE KNCU 
This section examines the emergence of the KNCU. Its history is further examined to 
bridge gaps that exist in the literature reviewed in the section above. This study, 
however, concurs with most of the authors on the KNCU’s historical background (see 
Appendix 6. 6a, 6b on membership and the objects of the KNCU and affiliated 
societies). It emerged from a restructuring of the KNPA which was registered in 
1925559 under the Indian Companies Act No. 6 of 1913. The formation of KNPA was 
motivated by a threat to African/native coffee growers from the settler community 
who strongly opposed Africans produce coffee (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  
 
The senior commissioner in Moshi district, Lt. Commander A.M. Clark, who 
succeeded Major Charles Dundas following his appointment as assistant Chief 
Secretary as a Secretary for Native Affairs,560 acted as its first President and 
Secretary until when Mr G.D. Patterson was appointed as honorary secretary.561 
Appointment of civil servants to manage the KNPA was prompted by what was 
thought as lack of qualified or sufficiently educated WaChagga/natives to act as 
                                                          
559 Its inaugural ceremony was attended by association representatives (wawakilishi) 
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560 In 1934 this office was merged with that of Deputy Chief Secretary, the reason 
given being that the supervision of native affairs should be the concern of the whole 
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561 R.J.M Swynnerton and A.L.B Bennett, (1948), p.4; Minutes of the Inaugural 
KNPA’s Meeting held on January 15th 1925, TNA 13060. 
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officers. The employment of civil servants was targeted to manage the Association 
and provide supervision and help for growers to market their produce was an 
additional burden on the colonial government. Importantly, this denied the native 
growers full autonomy (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Politically, civil servants were 
considered suitable due to an ethnic rivalry among the WaChagga groupings which 
was deemed to require a central organisation so as to unify them under one 
umbrella. 562  
 
The KNPA operated as a central organisation without branches at village levels. This 
shows that the Association had a pan-district character with individual membership 
from all chiefdoms on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. The Association and its 
leaders were influential among the growers across all the WaChagga’s chiefdoms. In 
this respect, the colonial government viewed it as appropriate institution and platform 
to enforce the provisions of the Coffee Industry (Registration and Improvement) 
Ordinance and Plant Pest and Disease Regulations of 1928. This legislation 
provided for promotion of good coffee husbandry largely to control coffee diseases 
and pests. The KNPA was appointed by the government to implement and supervise 
the policy throughout the district.  
 
Apart from provision of the agricultural extension services the KNPA managed to 
influence the government to grant it a monopoly in the coffee market in the Moshi 
District. This opportunity was granted following the KNPA’s leaders request, to 
market coffee produced by native growers. The request was based on four reasons. 
First, to emulate the European Planters Association that was the settlers’ coffee bulk 
marketing association. Secondly, to allow the Association to generate revenue, and 
generate funds to purchase pesticides and insecticides that were supplied to 
growers. The application was accepted by the colonial authority that resulted in the 
promulgation of coffee marketing monopoly legislation provided under Section 15 of 
the Native Authority Ordinance (No.18, 1926).  Under the legislation, the KNPA was 
granted exclusive control over native produced coffee in Kilimanjaro.  
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It was clear that the KNPA and growers were facing a threat from Asian traders 
owing to their cheating practices. In ensuring the growers were protected against this 
threat their produce was placed in the ‘safe hands’ of coffee marketing agents. In this 
regard, the KNPA appointed C.C. Monckton and Company to facilitate marketing of 
their coffee in European markets with effect from 1927/28 season.563 The company 
assigned J.P. Molloy to handle the Association’s shipments. This was in response to 
colonial government policy that encouraged non-partisan relationship with the 
association mentioned previously. 
 
Importantly, the marketing agent was geared towards guiding the growers on 
processing coffee; and was responsible for enforcing coffee quality for the world 
market by involving various stakeholders in ensuring that growers complied with the 
required standards. Such stakeholders were government’s coffee inspectors, the NA 
and coffee instructors. Similarly, the growers were able to learn from the settlers 
about the best coffee processing practices which enabled them to be successful.   
 
However, the Association was distrusted by the colonial authority as well as chiefs. 
This led to its restructuring. Iliffe has discussed the restructuring of the KNPA into 
KNCU.564 Nevertheless, he has not identified the factors that prompted the 
restructuring. This chapter harnesses hitherto unused evidence that demonstrates 
that reorganisation can be traced to the KNPA’s conflict with the establishment.   
 
As mentioned the Association had a pan-district character as it was operating across 
all WaChagga Chiefdoms, and had power to supervise coffee cultivation. In this 
regard, it had control over all coffee growers in the district; and as mentioned earlier, 
it had the monopoly on marketing of the native-produced coffee and rights to collect 
revenue just in the same way as the NA. Yet it was a paymaster for coffee in its 
operating area.  
 
The KNPA’s cross-political boundary operation in all WaChagga chiefdoms and 
mentioned vested powers obviously created a friction between it and local chiefs 
who were losing power to the Association, and being incorporated into its 
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organisation. For example, the Chiefs were required by law to enforce the mentioned 
coffee disease and pest control legislation with supervision of the KNPA’s 
wawakilishi. This meant that the KNPA was administering and controlling the Chiefs 
just in the same manner as growers. For the Chiefs this infringed upon their political 
authority.565 The colonial authority was equally concerned; it viewed the 
Association’s activities and behaviour as shifting away from its core business to 
politics. For example, one official lamented that; 
‘I heard frequently and observed also that Merinyo, Clerk in the District Office 
and the President of the Association was politically ambitious and was suing 
the Association to further his own influence; I regard his activities with 
tolerance not unmixed with amusement except when he wrote me a scurrilous 
letter against Europeans in which he stated that he regarded it as his duty to 
champion the rights of the WaChagga’.566   
 
Therefore, the colonial authority in the Province sought to disallow the KNPA from 
engaging in politics. The Northern Province PC and Moshi DC advocated disbanding 
the Association in 1928.567 This was not achieved immediately. Instead, the Coffee 
Industry Ordinance was passed in September 1928. Among several aspects of the 
Ordinance was registration of the WaChagga coffee farms and their land.568  
 
Registration of land was intended to facilitate land tax collection specifically those 
who had excess farm plots. The announcement of land registration was made by 
Hallier and Northern Province Provincial Commissioner in June and July 1928 
respectively. However, the message was not effectively communicated. Additionally, 
the attempted introduction of the policy came at a difficult time when tension 
between the growers and the settlers was not yet resolved.  
 
Against the backdrop, land registration was strongly opposed by growers who were 
led by the KNPA.569 Opposition to land registration was based on the fear that the 
                                                          
565 Government of Tanganyika (LEGCO), Annual Report on the Kilimanjaro Native 
Co-Operative Union, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1937), p.6. 
566 Northern Province to the CS, October 20th 1928, TNA 12809. 
567 Government of Tanganyika, Annual Territorial Report, (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1928), Appendix I, Paragraph 11, TNA 12809. 
568 Government of Tanganyika, Annual Territorial Report, (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1928), Appendix I, Paragraph 13, TNA 12809. 
569 KNPA to the SNA, October 6th 1928, TNA 12809. 
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government was preparing a list of plots for confiscation which was not the reason 
behind the policy. The policy was aimed at identifying and registering land to 
facilitate land taxation; but this was not communicated to the KNPA either by the 
colonial authority or NA. In an attempt to oppose the policy the KNPA leadership 
successfully pressed the CS to withdraw the policy.570 This heightened tension 
amongst the Provincial Authority which requested the CS’s approval for abolition of 
the Association. The idea was made public to all Chiefs who were assured that it 
would be placed under the control of government; 
I can assure you that we will successfully take the Native Coffee Industry from 
the hands of the Association, disband it, and bring the organisation effectively 
under the proposed new paramount Native Authority.571 
 
 
The intention to disband the Association was leaked to the KNPA and Merinyo 
sought help from J.P. Molloy572 to oppose its disbandment. They presented a petition 
to the CS against the Northern Province PC’s proposal to disband the Association. 
The CS and Governor rejected the idea of disbandment because it would escalate 
tension further and would have a negative effect on the development of the coffee 
industry of which the Association was a key player. Interestingly, the decision by the 
Governor was interpreted as a triumph for the KNPA against its enemies (District 
and Provincial authorities).573   
 
As a result the KNPA gained further popularity among the growers for opposing and 
protesting against land registration. This was so because their concerns were not 
being aired by the Chiefs. In this, the KNPA leadership viewed themselves as more 
committed to serve and defend the growers than the Chiefs. In this regards, the 
Chiefs were regarded by their subjects as colonial collaborators. The Northern 
Province PC was also unhappy with it due to its opposition against land alienation.574 
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However, in order to minimise the possibility of disbandment, the KNPA leaders 
vowed to refrain from politics and focus on crop marketing business. The 
commitment to business was unveiled in March 1931 when the KNPA indicated its 
desire to recruit a manager which was considered more economic or cost effective. 
Molloy was offered the position, which meant abandoning employment of an agent to 
market coffee produce.575  
 
The newly unveiled Association’s policy was accidentally leaked to the Northern 
Province PC and was confirmed by the Association when he inquired about it during 
the meeting with the Association’s committee members. The PC acted upon the 
matter by reporting it to the CS. At the same time Molloy was ordered not to take the 
appointment until it was decided and approved by the CS.576  
 
The government decision to discourage Molloy was based on criminal allegations 
that he was facing. At the same time a criminal investigation was launched by 
government against Merinyo and Molloy for their collusion in misappropriations of the 
KNPA funds. But such allegations could not be substantially proven, and when the 
Northern Province PC asked the Association to dismiss Merinyo, his request was 
rejected by the members pending publication of the KNPA’s own investigation,577 
which established there was no discrepancy in the Association financial records. 
Thus, the PC’s demand had no ground for implementation. 
 
However, the C.C. Monckton and Company management was displeased with 
Molloy’s involvement in KNPA’s politics. The company launched an investigation 
against him and audited his transactions which revealed some mismanagement and 
                                                          
575 J.P. Molloy, London to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office July 29th 1931, 
TNA 13060, Coffee Ordinance and Regulations: Attitude of the KNPA; PC, Northern 
Province to CS, Ref. No. 80/iii/178 (Confidentila), TNA 13060. 
576 J.P. Molloy, London to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office July 29th 1931, 
TNA 13060. 
577 Report of the General Meeting of the KNPA held in June 30th 1931, TNA 13060. 
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the misappropriation of funds especially on some coffee shipments to London.578 
Molloy could not account for the misappropriation of funds. As a result, he was 
sacked.579  C.C. Monckton and Company’s intent was to maintain credibility with the 
Tanzania colonial authority with future contracts in mind.  It also demonstrates its 
authority to punish an employee who dared to engage in politics against the 
government as well as company policy. 
 
On the other hand the government seemed determined to criminalise Merinyo. It 
launched a new investigation against misappropriations of the KNPA funds which, 
once again, could not be substantially proved.580 Immediately, Merinyo was 
suspended from signing cheques;581 and he was charged with misappropriation of 
420.22 shillings which led to his imprisonment on August 4th 1931 for six months.582 
On his release from jail was appointed by the government in October 1934 as tax 
collector in Monduli, then Maasai District, tens of miles away from Moshi district that 
led to the end of his career in co-operative movement.  
 
Throughout the crisis surrounding the KNPA’s political activism the government 
found itself in a dilemma regarding the need to organize the growers. This dilemma 
surrounded the Colonial Office and colonial authority’s obligatory commitment to the 
Mandate conferred by the League of Nations, (later the UNO) in protecting the 
economic interests of the natives. There was also its role in protecting African 
producers from the settler community who strongly opposed seeing Africans 
producing coffee. In justification of relevance and suitability of the Association the PC 
pointed out that ‘its existence is significantly important as it offers protection of 
growers from competition as they are likely to be offered a fair price for their 
                                                          
578 Messrs C.C. Monckton, Nairobi to Messrs C.C. Monckton, Moshi, July 25th 1930, 
TNA 263034. 
579 Sessional Paper no. 4, 1937, p.6 
580 Northern Province, PC to CS, August 25th 1931, TNA 26038. 
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produce’.583 Moreover, the colonial government position was that the KNPA was the 
appropriate institution and cost effective mechanism employed by the government to 
enforce the provisions of the Coffee Industry (Registration and Improvement) 
Ordinance and Plant Pest and Disease Regulations, 1928.584 All this suggests 
support for African organisation, but the KNPA’s opposition to government policies 
led to it being deemed a subversive organisation. Restructuring was, therefore, 
considered as the best option as this would enable it to maintain the same services, 
pave the way for the co-operative organisation and it would not create suspicion 
among the growers.   
 
To achieve restructuring, the initial attempt was made by the Governor who 
appointed a caretaker manager to run the Association585 Mr A.L. Pennington, the 
Assistant District Officer who was seconded for special duty586 which was primarily to 
prepare a roadmap towards restructuring and take over the KNPA from its leaders 
and wawakilishi (see a list of wawakilishi who attended Pennington meeting 
Appendix 4c). The Northern PC applauded the Governor’s decision that ‘I am 
grateful that the Governor has appointed Mr A.L. Pennington to take over 
management of the Association’.587 In executing its duties, the colonial authority 
gave Pennington terms of reference. The official was given responsibility to 
investigate the Association affairs and produce a recommendation for restructuring. 
In its report, Pennington pointed out that ‘the KNPA was deeply in debt’;588  
therefore, help was necessary to rescue it from the financial crisis, which ironically 
                                                          
583 Northern Province, PC to Chief Secretary, Ref. No. P.224/B/2, November 26th 
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584 The KNPA History, TNA 13060.  
585 Extract from Minutes of Conference of Senior Administration Officers held in Dar 
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occurred during the economic depression of the 1930s, when the KNPA failed to pay 
coffee growers on delivery of coffee due to lack of a market.   
 
This presented an opportunity for the colonial authority to provide free services to the 
Association as a pretext to infiltrate it. Joseph Maliti, the Association’s Chairperson, 
was appointed as the new President at a meeting chaired by A.O. Flynn, the DO of 
Moshi.589 New KNPA committee members were also appointed to replace those who 
supported Merinyo590 on the condition that they collaborated with the colonial 
authority. Pennington and Maliti’s appointments were crucial in asserting government 
control of the organization and were justified on the basis that they would reinforce 
its commercial management.  
 
The recruitment of managerial team was considered by the colonial authority 
because it was also argued that financial crisis was not the only a challenge that 
faces the Association. Other challenges were ignorance of business, lack of 
organisational experience and misfortune in the choice of collaborators that brought 
the Association in the difficulties.591  A vacancy was advertised and it drew a number 
of applicants for the position. These applicants were; Molloy, Major Perkins, Mr 
Bennett and Mr H.P. Smith. Bennett who was the ex-colonial labour officer in the 
Northern Province, was the colonial authority’s favoured candidate. However, some 
of the government reports extensively shows that, Bennett was appointed following a 
consultation of the Association with the colonial authority.592 In the KNPA’s early 
stages of restructuring he served the Association on a voluntary basis.593 The 
Governor saw the appointment of Bennett as a significant achievement and he 
sounded so optimistic in his letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in which 
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explained that ‘it is anticipated that he will be a thoroughly satisfactory Manager and 
a great assistance and future progress of the Association is assured’.594 He was also 
described by the Northern Province Commissioner as ‘whole heartedly and able to 
co-operate with the government and thus, he has confidence that the Association 
was on good hands which is an essential factor for a successful society’.595 The 
Moshi DC described him as ‘being a man of absolute integrity, with long business 
training and experience equitable temperament knowledge of Kiswahili in addition 
his know and liked by a large number of WaChagga.596 It was argued also that the 
KNPA was fortunate to obtain his service’.597 The WaChagga honoured him as 
Mbuya-o-WaChagga (the intimate friend of the WaChagga).598  
 
Describing the appointment of Bennett, the PC of Northern Province wrote ‘the future 
of the Association is now, I hope, assured, but it is a matter of urgent importance that 
it should be accorded legal status without further delay’.599 Bennett’s appointment 
accelerated the restructuring. From April 1932 campaigns were underway for the 
formation of primary societies conducted by the Chiefs, KNCS committee. During the 
campaigns Mr Bennett assured the growers that the society would address all 
problems that the KNPA failed to resolve. It was made clear that societies would help 
coffee producers within a short walking distance and facilitate coffee marketing at 
village level. The passage of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance was intended to 
give the restructuring legal backing because the Co-operative Ordinance under 
which the Association was registered proved unsuitable for co-operative societies; 
thus, had to be disregarded. It also proved difficult to restructure the KNPA while 
maintaining colonial control as the Ordinance provided for registration of a company 
in which the Registrar could not directly intervene. Against this legal backdrop, the 
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colonial authority had to conspire to achieve the restructuring of the KNPA (see 
Chapter 3).  
 
It has to be realised that the infiltration and takeover of the Association by the 
government was approved by growers through appropriate avenues. The 
extraordinary general meeting which was held in November 4th 1930 was a platform 
that provided consent of members to withdraw the leaders’ powers (President and 
Committee) and Pennington was accorded powers to control funds was obtained.600 
This was easily achieved when members were promised that the action was 
temporary and the changes were presented as an opportunity to rescue its business 
from collapse. However, this marked the beginning of the loss of the Association’s 
independence to the government (see a list of meeting attendees Appendix 2c).   
 
The developments shown preoccupied the colonial Government from 1929 (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2). Plans for restructuring began during a Senior Administration 
Officers conference which was called by the Governors; also Permanent Mandate 
Commission conferences.601 It is noteworthy that the conference minutes (mentioned 
in chapter 3, Section 3.2) were dispatched to the Colonial Office in London, 
requested an expert to provide guidance in drafting co-operative legislation,602 so as 
to provide a legal basis for restructuring the KNPA.603 In implementing the policy, the 
colonial authority took care to avoid a crisis in handling the KNPA. It was obvious the 
matter had to be handled by an appointed committee which was in addition to 
Pennington to recommend on the co-operative model appropriate for Tanzania.  The 
committee appointed in 1931 to recommend on the future of the co-operative 
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movement in Tanzania presented its recommendations by stressing a number of 
aspects.604  
 
The committee proposed a new structure different from that of the KNPA.605  It was 
decided to reduce its size and its geographical coverage by creation of affiliated 
societies that would operate at the village levels. Hence, to be restructured into a co-
operative society and have buying posts within a village. It was viewed by having 
societies at a village level weaken the KNPA’s independence were envisioned they 
would be under the Chief who would monitor and control their movement and 
behaviour. The report also recommended that, the Association be registered under 
the co-operative legislation. This was not a move towards fully dismantling the 
KNPA, as it was to play a new role as the central body (the Union)606 to which 
primary societies would affiliate. In this regard, the restructuring followed the Unified 
co-operative model. 
 
The colonial government’s interference in the management of the Association was 
concealed from the members. For example, during the elections to the committee, of 
which the government played a part in the nomination of candidates, the impression 
was conveyed that the Association was owned and controlled by members.607 
However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the Association was controlled and 
its policies determined by the government. This development signified an important 
step in dissolving the KNPA.  A number of safeguards were made by the government 
to ensure every step was properly and carefully handled.  
 
While waiting for the approval of the co-operative legislation the colonial authority 
renamed the KNPA as the KNCS in May 30th 1932.608 With legal backing the KNPA 
was forced to cease trading and dispose of its assets and liabilities to the KNCS. The 
                                                          
604 Extracts from Reports on the Reorganisation of the KNPA, TNA 20378; Report on 
the Reorganisation - Pennington Report, TNA 13060. 
605 PC, Northern Province to CS, August 25th 1931, TNA 26038. 
606 Land Department to SNA, Ref. No. E. 1407/12663, June 25th 1932, TNA 13698. 
607 Extracts from reports on the reorganisation of the KNPA, Confidentila of 
September 14th 1931, and TNA 20378. 
608 Uremi, No. 2, June 1932. 
178 
 
culmination of the restructuring was the approval of the Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance on June 15th, 1931 by Sir Phillip Cunliffe-Lister, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies (see Chapter 3). This justified rendering the KNPA as null and void 
given that it had been registered under the Indian Companies Act of 1913; thus 
would no longer operate as a co-operative organisation.    
 
The transfer of functions was timely and cautiously undertaken to ensure that it did 
not cause disruption to coffee marketing which began in June. At the same time the 
KNCS requested to the PC, Northern Province that it be granted coffee marketing 
monopoly. The request was forwarded to the CS for approval.609 The PC suggested 
publication of an order in the government gazette instructing all Native coffee 
growers in Moshi to have coffee sold to or through the KNCS as per section 36 of the 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance.610 Application of the Section implied that the 
KNPA would not have legal approval to market coffee in the district, a function that 
had to be undertaken by the KNCS. This development marked a final suffocation of 
the Association as it was deprived of revenue by restricting it from marketing coffee. 
 
However, the request could not be implemented because the co-operative rules 
were not in place.611 It has to be noted that Section 36 (i and ii) of co-operative 
legislation required native produced coffee to be sold through one agency. It also 
provided for co-operatives to be incorporated in the government marketing policy. 
Also, co-operatives which were reluctant to sell the produce through the agency 
were subdued and to help weak co-operatives by providing a monopoly over coffee 
marketing. In this respect, this was viewed by the government an appropriate 
approach in promoting societies; such approach contravened the ICA voluntary 
principles by application of the measure that compelled growers sell their produce to 
co-operatives. 
 
                                                          
609 CS to Northern Province, PC, Dispatch No. 413, May 23rd 1932, TNA 20378. 
610 CS to Northern Province, PC, Dispatch No. 413, May 23rd 1932, TNA 20378. 
611 Land Office (Registrar of Co-operative Societies) to CS, Ref. No. E.852/12501 
413, May 27th 1932, TNA 19595.  
179 
 
Importantly, Section 36 of the 1932 co-operative legislation provided for registration 
of societies, but it did not mention establishing a Union. The KNCU was registered 
under Section 4 as the facilitating body for primary societies. This clearly illustrates 
that the KNCU was imposed onto the growers and under Section 6 of co-operative 
legislation they were compelled to be members and sell their produce to affiliated 
societies; in this, any competitors to it were not accommodated. Regardless of its 
imposition the growers accepted it because it offered an opportunity for them to sell 
their coffee produce.  
 
A prerequisite for a society to be registered were set out by the KNCU in addition to 
the Co-operative Ordinance and Rules. This was intended to facilitate control of 
affiliated societies. The Union was a key player in policy formulation and its 
managing committee had an extremely large say in the affairs of affiliated 
societies612 which became coffee collecting or buying points. In its role as leading 
organization, the KNCU’s leaders submitted a registration application in October 
1932.613 Registration began in January 1933 in which the KNCU and registration of 
12 affiliated co-operative societies began in January 1933 (see Appendix 8a, 8b, 8c 
on the Primary Co-operative Societies Affiliated to the KNCU that were registered in 
1930s, 1940s, and in 1950s); that had to operate in an area of approximate 800 
square kilometres.614 As table 12 below shows these were the first 12 registered 
societies not only in Kilimanjaro but also in Tanzania. According to the by-laws the 
native coffee growers should be the members of the KNCU affiliated co-operative 
societies.615 Registration began in January 1st 1933 out of which Kibong’oto Co-
operative Society Limited was the first registered society).  
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Table 12: Co-operative Societies Registered (1.1.1933) and Membership in 1935 
S/No Name of the Society Date of registration Reg. No. Members in 1935 
1 Kibong’oto Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 1 441 
2 Machame Lyamungo Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 9 5057616 
3 Kibosho West Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 8 920 
4 Kibosho East Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 7 2,045 
5 Uru East Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 14 1,299 
6 Mbokomu  Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 6 392 
7 Old Moshi Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 5 852 
8 Kirua Vunjo West Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 4 2385617 
9 Kilema 1.1.1933 3 1589 
10 Marangu West Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 20 892 
11 Marangu East Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 18 900 
12 Mamba Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 2 1225 
13 Mwika West Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 21 1345 
14 Uru West Co-operative Society Limited 1933 14 646 
16 Keni Mriti Co-operative Society Limited 1933 15 623 
18 Mwika East Co-operative Society Limited 1933 17 855 
19 Mwika West Co-operative Society Limited 1933 21 460 
20 Mengwe Co-operative Society Limited 1933 22 335 
Source: Uremi, No. 15. November 1st 1933. Moshi, KNCU; also compiled from KNCU Reports and Tanganyika Territory Annual 
Reports on Co-operative Development Annual Reports (1947, 1948), TNA 37192. 
                                                          
616 When split in 1935 to form new societies (Machame West had 2,173, Machame East had 1,1105 and Central had 1,779 
members respectively). 
617 When split in 1935 to form new societies (Kirua Vunjo West had 569, Kirua Vunjo West had 591 members respectively). 
181 
 
By November 1933 a total of 20 societies were registered618 and the number 
remained the same by March 1934.619  The number increased to 24 in the late 1940s 
most of which were set up after the WWII and 18 of them were registered in 1950s 
(see Appendices 8a, b and c; also Appendix 9 on the: KNCU membership and coffee 
trees by 1930s; Appendix 10 on coffee production (in tons) and amount paid to the 
KNCU growers from 1932 – 1946 and Appendix 9b on membership of the affiliated 
societies by June 1947) located across the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro as shown in 
map 1 below;  
 
Map 1: Registered Primary Co-operative Societies Affiliated to KNCU 
 
Source: KNCU Annual Report 1947 
 
The restructuring of the KNPA had several ramifications as far as supervision of 
coffee cultivation is concerned. The setting up of the KNCS then registration of the 
KNCU led to the dismantling and the uprooting of the KNPA network that was 
established through the wawakilishi (see a list of wawakilishi from various locations 
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in Kilimanjaro, Appendix 4b). It can be recalled that the wawakilishi among others, 
were responsible for supervision of coffee cultivation. In this regard, a vacuum was 
created that was not filled until when the agriculture officers were deployed when the 
native coffee (control and marketing) legislation was passed in 1937 in which 
extension services and supervision of coffee cultivation became a responsibility of 
the government in the same way as in Kagera region and in the WCGA. This clearly 
indicates that the government extension policy was put in place and further 
reorganised. It also shows that the co-operatives were no longer responsible for 
providing extension services, but their tasks were limited to crop handling, payment 
of growers on delivery of coffee and supply of agriculture inputs (seeds, seedlings, 
insecticides, pesticides, and spraying pumps) to its members. 
 
This section shows that, the restructuring of the KNPA to form the KNCU was a 
result of a struggle between the Association leadership and the political 
establishment mainly over its resistance against colonial land policy. The KNCU was 
set up and imposed by members of the colonial authority. Its management was 
appointed by the government involvement and its bylaws were prepared in 
conformity with government interests. The affiliated societies were set up by the 
KNCU with the support of the government. The affiliation of each society had to be 
approved by the KNCU. The affiliation process was not clearly elaborated to the 
members. The conditions imposed on affiliated societies removed their 
independence because they were required to show allegiances to the Union. The 
allegiance to the Union was made compulsory under both co-operative and the 
native coffee marketing legislation of 1937 as discussed in the following section.   
 
4.4: THE COFFEE COMPULSION MARKETING LEGISLATIONS  
This section critically analyses coffee marketing policy and control of growers 
through the KNCU provided under Section 36 (i and ii) of the 1932 co-operative 
legislation. The background to the growers’ response to KNCU and affiliated 
societies and marketing legislation is also laid. It has been mentioned earlier that 
KNCS, later KNCU requested the colonial authority to approve compulsory 
legislation over a monopoly on coffee produced in Kilimanjaro. The application of the 
legislation was embedded in the co-operative societies’ legislation of 1932 Section 
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36 (i). Under the Section all growers in the region were compelled to sell their 
produce through KNCU.  
 
The colonial authority established measures to control coffee marketing in 
Kilimanjaro. The policy was incorporated under section 36 (ii) of the 1932 Co-
operative Ordinance,   which laid down that if 75 per cent of the producers in an area 
had to sell through one agent. In principle the mentioned sections formed the 
bedrock to the cash crop marketing policy in Tanzania but, its significance is 
seriously neglected in the existing literature and where attention is paid is treated in 
isolation with native produced crop marketing policies. The legislation’s section 
provides also that non-members of the organisation are automatically members of 
the society and should sell to the organisation or its affiliated societies. Strickland, 
who drafted the legislation for example, points out that, this section provides for 
obligatory membership that cannot be described as a native co-operative.620 
However, he has not shown why obligatory membership was necessary. The 
clauses prohibited growers to sell their produce at other places than established co-
operatives or any other appointed agent which created a marketing monopoly and 
the policy facilitated the bulk purchase from a given point. 
 
Kimario,621 Gorst,622 Leubuscher623 and Strickland624 they discussed the compulsion 
marketing arrangement and legislation in Moshi. However, Kimario has not 
established its source; Leubuscher utilised one source, the 1937 Tanganyika 
Territory’s Legislative Council (LEGCO) report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-
operative Union. This is the colonial authority report on an investigation of the riots. 
As a result, Kimario’s, Gorst and Leubuscher’s analysis does not go far enough to 
identify the background to the passage of the Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) 
legislation resulting in a knowledge gap that this section fills by use of various 
                                                          
620 C.F. Strickland, Co-operation for Africa, Africa Journal, January 1933, Vol. 6. 
Issue No. 01, pp. 15-26, TNA 19005. 
621 Ally M. Kimario, (1992), p. 6. 
622 Sheila Gorst, (1959), pp.165-169. 
623 Charlotte Leubuscher, (April, 1939), pp. 163-188. 
624 C.F. Strickland, (1945), pp. 78-79. 
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primary evidences such as correspondences among the colonial officials regarding 
the policy; and policy implication to rioters as well as co-operatives societies are not 
covered. All mentioned weaknesses are in-depth discussed in this section.  
 
In 1933 KNCU applied from the colonial authority to employ Section 36 (i and ii) of 
the co-operative legislation.625 However, the colonial authority was hesitant to 
approve its implementation in Kilimanjaro due to the existence of both the settlers 
mostly Europeans and small-scale Chagga/native growers. The hesitation was 
obviously due to its impact on European coffee planters who had to sell their 
produce through the KNCU and its affiliated societies. Separate legislation was the 
only option to keep European planters safe and immune from the provision. 
However, implementing separate legislation was a violation of the Order of Mandate 
that prohibited racial segregation.626 Yet, it was viewed as impractical by the colonial 
authority to have members comprising of both the natives and non-natives as 
stressed by Strickland who drafted the legislation on the basis that, it was 
unreasonable to expect these different types of coffee to be bulked and marketed 
through the same agency.627 Strickland indicates to everyone that, the provision in 
undisputable and the emphasis was, not only who produces; but also, what is 
produced should be separated based on race. 
 
In an attempt to get over such defect in the co-operative ordinance, the government 
had to bring forward a specific section for the WaChagga growers. It was decided 
that an ordinance, the Coffee (Moshi District) Rules popularly referred as the Chagga 
Rule or masharti in Kiswahili should be made under section 15 of the Native 
Authority (NA) Ordinance (see Appendix 7 on the Native Authority Ordinance 
popularly known in Kilimanjaro as the Chagga Rules).628 Accordingly, the Chagga 
                                                          
625 KNCS to Chief Secretary in April 22rd 1932 signed by Joseph Maliti (President), 
Stefano Lema (Secretary) and A.B. Bennett (Manager), TNA 20378. 
626 Extract from Lord Winster in his speech March 1, 2 or 3 to the House of Lords, 
TNA 357883. 
627 C.F. Strickland, (1933), p.78. 
628 Legislation on Control Native Agriculture and Industry, History of the Chagga 
Rule, TNA 25038. 
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Rules were drafted in August 1934 and passed on October 1st, 1934 by the Chagga 
Council to compel native growers to sell coffee through the KNCU.  
 
It has to be noted here that the idea originated with the colonial government. 
However, the Chagga Council was persuaded by the colonial government to pass it. 
This demonstrates an attempt by the colonial government to delegate powers for 
promulgation of native legislations in accordance to the Indirect Rule policy primarily 
on the pretext of protecting the native coffee growers. In reality it was intended to 
protect the European settlers from being compelled to market their produce to the 
co-operative societies, the memberships of which were predominately natives. The 
policy was justified by the colonial authority as a necessary measure that;  
No satisfactory marketing arrangements can be made until every native 
grower is compelled to sell his coffee through the Association as this would 
eliminate the local buyers from competing with the Association. It also 
ensures that the association remained in existence.629 
 
It is obvious that, engagement of the NA was to keep the colonial authority from 
being implicated with racial policies which went against the Mandate policy. The 
Chagga Rule was rooted in racial segregation policy and compelled native growers 
only to marketing the coffee to the co-operatives. All in all, the colonial authority was 
responsible for creating racial barriers by pressuring to the NA to promulgate the 
legislation. In this view, the NA and Chiefs found themselves embroiled in the affairs 
of growers and societies without their participation. The compulsion/automatic 
membership contravened the ICA and Rochdale voluntary co-operative principles. 
This clearly suggested a violation of the co-operative principles regardless of the 
pretext that it was designed to protect growers from unscrupulous traders and 
intention to develop the native coffee industry.  
 
The employment of the Rule coincided with the collapse of the coffee price in the 
world market in which Kilimanjaro especially the WaChagga coffee was not spared. 
Table 13 below shows a decline and decrease of coffee paid to growers. In 1934/35 
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coffee season suffered a drastic fall of coffee price in the world market630 which was 
triggered by the flooding in the market of the produce from Brazil.631 Table 13 below 
shows a decline and increase of coffee price paid to growers. 
 
Table 13: Coffee Production and Amount Paid to the KNCU (1932 – 1946) 
Season Coffee crop 
parchment (in tons) 
Amount paid in £ 
to growers 
Price per lb. paid to 
growers  
1932/33 1,072 35,426 29.55 
1933/34 1,167 35,384 27.03 
1934/35 1,587 35,456 19.85 
1935/36 1,684 33,995 16.94 
1936/37 882 18,707 18.95 
1937/38 1,472 33,336 20.16 
1938/39 1,959 58,747 26.78 
1939/40 2,680 72,275 24.17 
1940/41 4,063 84,798 18.53 
1941/42 1,948 52,184 23.97 
1942/43 3,103 145,399 41.96 
1943/44 2,114 131,012 57.49 
1944/45 3,974 276,380 62.96 
1945/46 3.102 173,032 49.81 
Total 30,807 1,186,131  
Source: Moshi District Book I 1939/40 to 1943/44 seasons and the KNCU 1946/47 
Annual Report. Appendix B 
 
Table 13 above shows payment trends in which 1934/35 season advances paid 
were only -/16 cents per lb. (Pound) of parchment coffee delivered. 632 It shows a 
sharp fall in 1935. The crisis was so serious that the KNCU could not pay growers a 
second instalment (‘mabaki’ in Kiswahili). The KNCU issued a communiqué through 
the KNCU Monthly bulletin, the Uremi on 22nd August 1935 of the members on 
impending problem that could not sell most of coffee in London market.633 However, 
the message did not show why coffee could not fetch a buyer and the reason for the 
fall of prices. However, the growers showed trust in the KNCU and there was not 
reaction from them. At the same time the KNCU had to embark upon measures to 
                                                          
630 Fabian Colonial Bureau, (1945), p. 76. 
631 T.S. Jervis, ‘Marketing of Coffee’ in the East Africa Agricultural Journal, May 
1957, pp.459- 464, in Bukoba District Book. 
632 Uremi, August, 22nd 1935. 
633 Uremi on 22nd August 1935. 
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resolve financial problems to meet its commitments to pay growers in 1934/35 
season.  
 
On the other hand, the settlers, especially of German origin, were not affected by the 
crisis since they exported their coffee directly to German and fetched a higher price 
that was fully paid in cash.634 At the same time there were several traders, mostly 
Asian, German and British settlers, missionaries and traders paid better prices than 
the Union. For example, the KNCU paid 15 cents per a lb. While such companies as 
Sheriff Jiwa paid 20 cents and H. Bueb paid 21 to 25 cents, depending on the quality 
of the delivered coffee.635 The German settlers offered between 10 and 15 per cent 
above the market price on condition that part of the payment was spent to purchase 
agricultural implements that they were selling636 and exported coffee to Germany. 637 
In this effect, the growers demanded to sell coffee wherever and to anyone provided 
s/he is ready to pay them well and promptly.638  
 
Therefore, growers could not see the KNCU justification for paying them lower 
prices.  For them, they felt that they were being cheated.  This generated criticism 
and by November 1936 growers/members had lost patience and pressed for 
implementation of various alternatives to resolve the problem; first, that they pull out 
of the KNCU for an open market alternative where they could fetch a better price; 
and secondly, removal of societies leaders from office for failure to defend their 
interests and welfare in the Union forums. The societies in question were Machame 
Central and East, Marangu Central and East but the members alternatives were 
dismissed by the KNCU because they were contrary to the Chagga Rule.639 The 
permission was briefly granted by the end of 1935 but was cancelled before a start of 
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the 1937 coffee marketing season.640 This fuelled further discontent and 
dissatisfaction amongst the WaChagga coffee growers. It was pointed out that 
discontent was widespread over the whole mountainside engineered by some 
individuals;641 but more so in Machame Central and East and Marangu East 
societies that composed of about 3,784 members in all and owned 24 percent of the 
total crop produced in Kilimanjaro. 642 On September 15th, 1937 riots broke out in 
these societies. Between September 16th and 17th 1937 there was rioting in Marangu 
East, where growers replaced existing leaders with members who ‘refused to 
recognise the existing bylaws’.643 
 
The riots popularly referred to by growers as ‘Coffee Riots’ also occurred in 27 other 
primary societies in Lyamungo, Masama, and Machame North. During the riots the 
primary society’s stores were ransacked.644 The rioters complained that owing to 
heavy overhead expenses the Union paid lower prices than they could obtain 
outside.645 The Chiefs were also accused by growers of conspiring in the passage of 
the Chagga Rule; therefore the Chiefs were viewed as being against their economic 
interests and welfare. The Fabian Bureau report646 and Campbell647 have analysed 
the riots. The Fabian Bureau report has defended the Chagga Rule as it offered a 
solution to existing complications in similar manner as Strickland by arguing that it 
has to be applied given the fact that ‘the Chaga area (Kilimanjaro) was complicated 
by the juxtaposition of small scale growers and the settlers’648 by treating the two 
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separately; whereas Campbell has not shown how they related to crop marketing 
policy or how they were resolved.  
 
The government restored order by drafting in the police and air force.649 Around 70 
rioters were apprehended and sentenced to jail.650 Some of the ring leaders were 
imprisoned and about 14 others were deported to Singida, Iringa and Sumbawanga 
in the Southern highlands of Tanzania (see Appendix 11).651 The KNCU also 
suspended sending money to all societies where riots had taken place.652 These 
actions were intended to ensure that growers accepted the coffee price paid by 
KNCU regardless of how low it was. These measures to reinforce Section 36 of the 
1932 co-operative legislation sought to secure the loyalty of members of co-
operative movement through force.  
 
Other societies disaffiliated themselves from the KNCU over its failure to meet its 
obligations.653 This created an impasse that forced the PC and Moshi’s DC to 
intervene. The PC had meetings in Marangu and Machame which successfully 
ended by restoration of societies’ committees.654 In 1939 efforts were initiated by the 
Moshi District officer, Mr Bruce Hunt for reorganisation of such societies and get 
them back to the KNCU framework. In one instance the DO wrote655 to Mangi Addiel 
Solomon of Mwika asking him to facilitate the exercise for West Mwika Primary Co-
operative Society which was in his Chiefdom.  
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It was viewed by the colonial administrators that the riots were politically motivated 
because of a number of the German settlers, about 882 in total for the whole district 
and Missionaries in the area.656 The accusation against the traders illustrates the 
belief that the growers were too ignorant to protest and on the same premise were 
expected to be obedient to the Chagga Rule. In an investigation of the causes of the 
riots it was reported by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Mr R.C Northcote, 
that they were instigated by the agitators, mostly Asian traders  as well as German 
settlers, Greeks, teachers and missionaries657 who exploited the poor price paid by 
the KNCU as an avenue for them to accumulate coffee.  
 
Additionally, Northcote’s accusations about the riots have been linked to Germany’s 
campaigns for the return of some of her colonies which were mentioned by Hitler in 
conversations with Sir John Simon on March 25, 1935. At the same time Germany 
was lobbying victor power to be considered for membership in the League of Nations 
so that it could qualify to administer colonies. However, did Britain rejected 
Germany’s proposal, as by returning its former colonies Britain would have been 
sacrificing sources of raw materials and foodstuff supply to a potential enemy.  
Northcote allegations were adopted by Leubuscher in her argument.658  
 
 
Lord Winster in his speech to the House of Lords misleadingly asserted that one of 
the reasons for the riots was the failure to educate the members of the Union in co-
operative principles,659 which led members to refuse to adhere to the society by-
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laws.660 The KNCU reacted by suspending such societies and suspended coffee 
payments, advances though the Chagga Rule was applicable.661  
 
In a communiqué the DC informed and ordered the members to rejoin the society 
which was the only option available for them to sell their 1939 produce.662 This was 
clear government interference and an obvious compulsion that became a dominant 
factor. It was stressed that its only if a society affiliated back to the Union could they 
sell produce in accordance to the law. This message was communicated in Kiswahili 
that ‘ni lazima wafahamu ya kwamba ni lazima wote wawe chini ya masharti ya 
KNCU na basi hawataweza kukifungua chama chao na Union’ through a memo read 
aloud by the Mangi at a growers meeting held on July 1st 1939.  
 
At the meeting the Mangi managed to convince his subjects convinced and it was 
decided to elect new leadership ‘dedicated’ and committed to comply with the KNCU 
by laws. Marua bin Kishimbo was elected as Chairperson, Abel bin Maktano, the 
vice-Chairperson and Yohanne bin Manaseh as Secretary. 663 To this effect Mangi 
asked the DO to restore West Mwika Primary Co-operative Society into the list of the 
KNCU affiliated societies; and asked for permission for that case to have the 
society’s office opened for business to serve his subjects. A decision to elect new 
faces by rejecting the old ones to take society’s office was translated by Mangi 
Abdiel Solomon as a significant step towards restoration of confidence in the 
Union664 at a point where growers had lost trust on it. However, it should be 
highlighted that affiliation was initiated by the Chiefs and the government, which 
demonstrates a lack of member agency.  
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All in all, the riots generated nervousness amongst the colonial authority regarding 
the co-operative movement. There was also a fear for repetition and spread of such 
and smilar troubles where societies existed. This was also viewed as a political risk, 
particularly if growers throughout the country were to rebel against the colonial 
authority managing their produce. This study is of the opinion that this was a 
contributing factor that led to uneven and delays of promotion or accommodation of 
co-operatives in other parts of the country. The lesson learnt was sufficient to 
warrant the colonial authority to bring about appropriate legislation that Lyimo has 
also discussed on formation of the MNCB in 1937,665 but he has not explored factors 
that prompted its establishment, an aspect that is discussed in this section.    
 
As a result of the riots the government decided to alter how it exercised control over 
the native coffee industry. In October 1937 the Native Coffee (Control and 
Marketing) Ordinance No. 26 was passed to replace the Chagga Rule. The 
Ordinance provided for the control of the native coffee industry and compulsory 
marketing of the produce, but it did not compel growers to sell their produce through 
a specific organisation. Promulgation of a new policy can, therefore, be viewed as a 
victory for the growers. But it was embarrassing to Chiefs and central government 
when the Chagga Rule was revoked by the Governor on December 21st, 1937 in 
response to the recommendation made by a committee that was formed to 
investigate the crisis/riots that faced the KNCU.666  
 
Nevertheless, the legislation did not make a significant departure from the Chagga 
Rule as it restricted growers from selling coffee to the open market. The important 
contrast with the Chagga Rule in the Native Coffee Ordinance was that did not 
specify to which organization the growers were compelled to sell their produce, but 
only mentioned an agency that the Board may suggest. In Moshi the KNCU was 
recommended. KNCU maintained its monopoly over native produced coffee because 
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it was the only coffee marketing organization in Moshi due to the Chagga Rule. This 
provided an indirect integration of the co-operatives into marketing policy. Similarly, 
no organisation apart from the KNCU and affiliated societies was allowed to operate 
coffee marketing in the district.  
 
The legislation targeted Native coffee growers and ensured that European growers 
were not compelled to sell their produce through the KNCU and its affiliated 
societies. Thus, the native coffee industry was one that was brought under more 
direct control than that attainable by Co-operative Societies Ordinance Section 36 
(Part 1), which required the compulsory sale of produce through a registered society.  
As pointed out in Chapter 2 the Ordinance led to the formation of the Moshi Native 
Coffee Board (MNCB), in which under Section 6 all producers of native coffee in the 
Moshi District were compelled to sell coffee produce to the agency chosen by the 
Board.   
 
Under the native coffee industry legislations the MNCB became a sole buyer of 
native produced coffee and it was empowered to appoint an agent/s. As a result, 
legal ground was provided for application of section 6 that appointed the KNCU as 
the agent of the MNCB which was set up in November 20th 1937.667 Under the 
monopoly system provided under the legislation growers had no choice or alternative 
sell their produce other than co-operatives. Clearly, upon appointment of the KNCU 
by the MNCB it was integrated into the government marketing machinery. This 
illustrates that, the KNCU was created and organised by the government so that to 
facilitate coffee handling and marketing under legal protection. Thus, this does not 
imply KNCU was an independent business entity, but became the government 
facilitating machinery for handling the coffee produced by the native growers.  
 
This clearly demonstrates that the co-operative legislation violated the voluntary co-
operative principles. However, it was justified by the colonial authority as necessary 
measure that, ‘no satisfactory marketing arrangements can be made until every 
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native grower is compelled to sell his coffee through the Association.668 A 
compulsion measure was pursued by the government on view that the members 
would remain loyal due to the KNPA and later KNCU’s efforts to defend growers 
from coffee growing suppression attempts by the settlers, but the introduction of the 
policy was ill timed as it coincided with coffee prices plummeting.  
 
A three tier marketing system was established whereby primary societies were at the 
bottom, KNCU in the middle and the MNCB at the top of the structure.  Under the 
system primary societies collected the produce from growers and sold it to the KNCU 
which forwarded them to the Board. This was applauded by the Agriculture 
Secretariat, who pointed out that ‘the MNCB now has a weapon to use’.669 This 
illustrates the colonial authority had meant for the economic subjugation of the 
growers. It was also pointed out that the Chagga Rule was an embarrassment as it 
had placed the NAs on the same footing as the Department of State.670 The 
establishment of the MNCB rendered the Chagga Rule inoperative.  
 
The Coffee Industry Ordinance marked the official end of the application of Chagga 
Rule in Dec 21st 1937. The replacement of the Chagga Rule was considered as a 
decisive step in restoring growers’ confidence in Chiefs and the NA and thereafter no 
immediate challenge to their authority arose. This could be explained by the 
intimidation growers experienced when the government intervened to quell the riots. 
Moreover, replacement of Chief Abdiel Shangali as paramount Chief of WaChagga 
for his support of the grower’s demand for better coffee price and the subsequent 
‘riots’ may have encouraged other Chiefs to collaborate with colonial authority and 
support its policies.671 Of course, although the legislation replaced the Chagga Rule 
it strengthened government's grip over the KNCU, and ultimately the affiliated 
societies and growers through the MNCB. The control of marketing by the Boards 
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implied that co-operatives were denied the necessary independence to operate as 
member controlled organisations. 
 
To avoid future unrest the growers were kept well informed by Provincial officials, 
especially, C.F. Hallier, about this new development and the appointment of the 
KNCU as MNCB’s agent. Such information was communicated to growers in public 
meetings and articles in the Uremi. The PC made tours in Kilimanjaro where he 
informed the Chiefs and growers in meetings on the government decision to abolish 
the Chagga Rule. He also informed them of setting up of the Moshi Native Coffee 
Marketing Board whereby KNCU would be appointed as its agent.672 This 
announcement was met with great satisfaction by growers because it was 
interpreted as a sign that the government was ready to listen and implement their 
concerns. Chiefs were equally pleased as they had long been conscious of the 
anomaly of their positions as sponsor of the Rule which brought them into conflict 
with their subjects.673 Due to meetings and Uremi publication of articles the PC 
concluded that ‘the withdrawal of the Chagga Rule and its replacement by the MNCB 
are fully and widely understood in Kilimanjaro’.674  
 
Coincidentally, the setting up of the statutory board came at a time when the coffee 
price was improving and generated and restored confidence of both co-operatives 
and the board to growers (see Table 13 above). It was the view of the government 
officials that such development was met with great satisfaction since it was seen as 
protection of growers’ interest as well as of their organization by the government.675  
Importantly, unlike Chagga rule the MNCB members were drawn from the 
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government and growers as well as co-operative societies676 of which growers felt 
were represented. It also appointed according to the November 28th 1941, November 
6th 1942 and January 19th 1943 Government Gazettes one of the deportees, Daudi 
Ngamini677 as a Board member.  
 
Additionally, compulsion of growers to sell his coffee through the agency (societies) 
appointed by the Board was a feature that dominated for decades. The post-riots era 
and legislation saw the colonial authority being directly involved through the MNCB 
in which those who did not adhere were liable to penalty or imprisonment or both 
under Section 14 of the Native Coffee Ordinance, No. 26 of 1937. In this regard, the 
KNCU became part of the government machinery for organizing the compulsion 
marketing of native produce that was utilised by the colonial power and colonial 
authority during WWII and for almost a decade after the outbreak of the war to 
handle coffee from growers (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). The control of coffee by the 
post-colonial government through the co-operatives envisioned to facilitate 
development of the industry for national development as presented in the following 
section. 
 
4.5: POLICY CONTINUITY IN THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD  
The post-colonial government asserted its support of co-operatives as the driving 
force in the invigoration of rural development and the national economy. The Co-
operative Act was amended in 1963 (see Chapter 3 for details). The amendment 
basically provided for the formation of co-operatives in regions where they hardly 
existed. Thus the legislation had no significant impact to the KNCU as societies 
already existed in all locations for coffee marketing.  
 
The post-colonial government policy on rural development was an added advantage 
to the KNCU and Moshi district, regardless of the limited coffee cultivation area in 
which production increased from 20 per cent in 1955 to 35 per cent in 1964, of the 
total Tanganyika crop. In 1961/62 growers under the KNCU accounted for more than 
                                                          
676 PC, Northern Province to CS, Confidentila, Ref. No. 377/7/96, December 28th 
1937, TNA 25442. 
677 The MNCB’s Board member, PC, Northern Province to CS, Re. No. 377/7/180, 
November 10th 1941, TNA 255442 Vol.II 
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half of the Arabica coffee produced in the country. The number of growers also 
increased from 45,000 in 1961678 to 65,000 in 1968 representing a 44 per cent rise, 
while the rise in acreage in the same period was from approximately 34,000 to 
35,000 acres representing a 4 per cent rise. In 1963/64 and 1964/65 it made up 
approximately 60 per cent of the total small scale producers of Arabica from 1968 
the approximate number of growers rose from 65,000 to 87,060.679 By 1973 a rise of 
35 per cent had occurred, but the number of growers remained constant at 87,060 
growers because the pieces of land could no longer be divided. Young men now 
realized the shortcoming; as a result, most of them migrated to urban areas. Also, as 
production remained constant the land suitable for coffee cultivation was exhausted 
after years of mono crop cultivation. Increasing population density, coupled with 
redistribution of the limited land among male family members started to stagnate 
coffee production. 
 
In 1967 and 1968 the government introduced a policy in which agricultural marketing 
co-operatives had to be multipurpose. For example, they engaged in other 
agricultural production, for example on its Gararagua estate which has 3,429 
acres.680 The coffee estate was granted to KNCU by the government following 
nationalization exercise implemented under the ArD policy. Thus, it became 
apparent that the co-operatives had to be an integral part in rural and national 
development and building a socialist state.  
 
In response to government policy KNCU started to engage in a wide range of 
businesses such as hospitality (hotels) and insurance, which were largely in Asian 
business spheres. This was an attempt by the government to utilize co-operatives to 
Africanise businesses and the economy as a whole. Thus, implementation of 
mentioned policies demonstrates that KNCU became part of the government 
machinery for organizing production and the marketing of consumer goods. 
 
                                                          
678 Horace Plunkett Foundation, Year Book of Agricultural Co-operative, (London: 
Basil Blackwell, 1961), p.241. 
679 URT, Annual Report on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es Salaam: 
Government Printer, 1964), p.3. 
680 Interview with Mzee Phillip Tesha (October 22nd 2012). 
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In this regard, the KNCU business venture increased, the business volume also 
increased. To introduce new businesses had an implication to the KNCU budget and 
it had to recruit new employees to run new ventures. Due to the realization that 
coffee export is controlled by world market the union took measures to diversify its 
activities like dairy projects so as to focus on local consumers.  
 
 
In 1968 the co-operative legislation was amended to provide for amalgamation of 
Unions to create a position in which one Union existed in every region (see Chapter 
3, Section 3.3 and 6, Section 6.6 for further details). The good performing co-
operatives, the KNCU, was compelled to amalgamate with cotton marketing, 
Tambarare Co-operative Union which had 10 affiliated societies; but 7 of them were 
incorporated in the amalgamation.681 Regardless of the status or economic viability 
they were required to amalgamate that came at cost of Tambarare losing assets and 
financial burden to the KNCU which had to absorb new employees. Additionally, in 
1974, the KNCU consisted of 49 primary co-operative societies; 42 of these are 
coffee handling societies and 7 of them are cotton handling societies.682 
 
Unlike most locations in the country villages on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro were 
resettled because of limited land and the government did not want to disrupt coffee 
cultivation. However, the Village Act (1975) was applicable whereby villages were 
recognized as the co-operative entity. The primary co-operative societies which 
operated within the villages were required to close their businesses and dispose 
assets and liabilities to the village council. The villages with that effect became 
responsible for marketing crops produced in a respective village; hence, leading to 
the end of co-operative societies.  
 
The government abolished co-operative movement in 1976 (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.5 for details). A couple of days before the abolition of the co-operatives in May 
1976 information was leaked to the KNCU. It took drastic measure to rescue its 
                                                          
681 Interview with Mzee Phillip Tesha (October 22nd 2012). 
682 Interview with Mzee Phillip Tesha (October 22nd 2012). 
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properties and assets by convening an extra-ordinary board meeting. It was resolved 
in the meeting that the formation of a company, the Kilimanjaro Uremi Corporation 
Limited, to which properties, assets as well as functions were transferred. It was 
through change of ownership that the KNCU circumvented the government 
confiscation process. It was pointed out that, ‘when the abolition announcement was 
made public by the government, it was then too late as the government had nothing 
to grab from us, and it was out of intelligent and drastic decision that all properties 
remained under the growers’.683  
 
The replacement of the Tanganyika Coffee Board (TCB) by Coffee Authority of 
Tanzania (CAT) took place in 1977. The CAT began coffee marketing directly from 
growers through villages and it was involved in auctioning of coffee produced in the 
country. Abolition of the Union and affiliated societies had a serious impact. For 
example, there was no supply of farm inputs (fertiliser, pesticides, fungicides and 
equipment) and declined extension services that led to decline of coffee produce 
from a minimum of 250 to 50 kilograms per season.684 Both led to deterioration of 
incomes among the majority of growers who could not afford inputs such as 
insecticides and also had social repercussions like failure to meet social services 
costs such as school fees for children in both secondary and primary schools as well 
health services.685  
 
Under new marketing arrangements the peasants were subjected to cheating by 
crop authority’s staff through underpayment by use of low coffee grade prices. The 
officials in some instances used incorrect scales. In most cases the growers’ 
payments were delayed. In response, passive resistance was wide spread among 
coffee growers who uprooted coffee trees to plant other crops.686 Some of them who 
had capital diverted their production activities to other crops such as fruits and 
vegetables so that they could earn income and maintain their livelihood. Those who 
                                                          
683 Interview with Mzee Phillip Tesha (October 22nd 2012). 
684 Interview with Emanuel Kitely Mbowe, Joseph Mchomba, John Joseph Munishi, 
October 24th 2012. 
685 Interview with Emanuel Kitely Mbowe, Joseph Mchomba, John Joseph Munishi, 
October 24th 2012. 
686 Interview with Emanuel Kitely Mbowe, Joseph Mchomba, John Joseph Munishi, 




had no capital and depended on the CAT were exposed to financial difficulties to 
manage their coffee farming as they could not afford agricultural inputs. As a result 
cash crops decline among the growers was widespread. This was a serious setback 
for an agriculture dependent country in generating foreign revenue.   
 
In 1982 the co-operative legislation was passed that provided for the reintroduction 
of co-op unions.  The KNCU was re-registered in March, 9th 1984 under mentioned 
legislation; hence, it became KNCU (1984) Ltd. Although the Unions were reinstated 
in 1982 they were not allowed to handle crops because the legislation that provided 
for the Crop Authority to handle crops from the villages was still in place. In this 
regard, coffee from growers in Kilimanjaro was handled by societies until 1984 when 
marketing board legislation was amended (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3 for details).   
 
4.6: CONCLUSION 
It is evident that the transformation of the earliest growers association, the KNPA into 
the KNCS and eventually the KNCU was motivated by the colonial authority’s desire 
to curtail the KNPA’s activities and involvement in the coffee industry. The colonial 
authority’s promulgation of the co-operative legislation in 1932 was intended to 
suffocate the KNPA by ceasing its activities related to the coffee industry. This 
demonstrates the government’s motivation was not only to control the movement, 
but also to discourage the development of voluntary and independent societies. In 
this regard, restructuring of the KNPA and formation of the KNCU provided a political 
expedient solution to the colonial authority. But, it operated primarily in the colonial 
authority’s interests, hence, and constrained the independence and agency of the 
growers. 
 
The restructuring process was by and large dominated by the colonial government 
with approval from the CO. The process was participatory, but lacked transparency 
as the government's ultimate intention was not made open to the KNPA’s wawakilishi 
and members. In the process of accomplishing its mission the radical KNPA leaders 
were side-lined by the government. The collaborators were embraced and the 
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government influenced the appointment of a suitable candidate as the manager. This 
was crucial to securing internal control of the organisation.  
 
Section 36 of the co-operative legislation brought growers into primary societies and 
compelled them to sell their produce through the co-operatives.  This further brought 
the KNCU under the control of the colonial authority. The Chagga Rule and the 
native coffee control and marketing legislation underscored this process by 
prescribing who growers could sell their produce through. The price was determined 
by the buyer which facilitated exploitation of labour.  
 
Understandably, such colonial control and monopolisation of native produced coffee 
through the KNCU generated serious unrest. To restore order and native growers’ 
faith in the KNCU the colonial government passed the Native Coffee (Control and 
Marketing) Ordinance of 1937. The legislation also reinforced the KNCU position on 
one hand, but suppressed growers’ interests on the other particular by having it 
appointed by the Board to handle coffee grown by African on the slopes of Mount 
Kilimanjaro.  It was out of this restructuring that KNCU emerged as a dominant and 
unchallenged organization. It effectively employed self-imposed powers to promote 
and endorse new societies to the Registrar for registration. It was out of promotion 
and endorsement policy the KNCU managed to increase its footprint by establishing 
primary societies throughout the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Committee members 
and leadership of affiliated primary societies were closely vetted by the KNCU and 
Chiefs as in the case of those in Mwika.  
 
Such colonial intervention into the affairs of the affiliated societies undermined their 
autonomy and violated the ICA and Rochdale voluntary co-operative principles. The 
imposition of the KNCU on grower-members generated a feeling that they did not 
own the primary societies, which came to be viewed as KNCU branches. Policy and 
decision making was centralised from the KNCU’s inception whereas societies and 
members were reduced to responding to dictates from committee members of the 




Following independence, the post-colonial government asserted its support for the 
co-operatives as the driving force in the invigoration of rural development and the 
national economy. This signified a continuation of the colonial policy in supporting 
the movement. The KNCU was used by the post-colonial government during the 
phase of Africanisation of the economy immediately after independence. It was 
appointed as the NAPB agent in 1962 and also became important in implementing 
socialist policy from 1967. In both phases just as during the colonial era, it became 
part of the state apparatus. Following the passage of the 1968 Co-operative Act, 
KNCU was forced to amalgamate with the Tambarare Co-operative Union to form 
Kilimanjaro region Union. Unlike the BCU although it became one of the government 
institutions in the region, it retained some of its former identity and a very limited 
amount of autonomy. In this regard, KNCU’s fully fledged independent status lasted 
for only ten years between 1951 when it began auctioning coffee produced by 
individual members of affiliated societies until early 1962 when the post-colonial 
government reasserted state control.  
 
The next chapter on the BCU evaluates early growers’ initiatives to form marketing 
co-operative and examines government coordinated initiatives that prompted the 
formation and registration of co-operatives in Kagera region. It explains why the co-
operative movement did not emerge at the same time as in Kilimanjaro given that the 
colonial authority launched coffee cultivation encouragement at the same period. 
The chapter also explores the extent to which the policies that led to the formation of 










CHAPTER FIVE: THE BUKOBA CO-OPERATIVE UNION  
 
5.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the history of the Bukoba Co-operative Union (BCU) in Kagera 
region (the then Bukoba District and West Lake region). The BCU is a peculiar co-
operative in terms of how it evolved as the only co-operative society that handled 
Arabica and Robusta coffee varieties. Although coffee farming in the region began at 
the same time as in Kilimanjaro, co-operative societies were not involved. This 
chapter analyses the colonial authority’s role in undermining the development of the 
co-operative movement in Kagera region during the inter-war periods. Thereafter, it 
examines the top-down strategy of promoting and establishing co-operative societies 
in the region from 1950. The strategy was spearheaded mainly by the Co-operative 
Department and the BCU’s first two managers were colonial authority appointees. 
Furthermore, it explains the process through which the BCU was granted a 
monopoly which was maintained until 1982 when it was abolished. As the following 
section reveals, the few academics who have researched the BCU have not 
adequately addressed the research questions considered in this chapter. 
 
5.2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The history of the BCU has been neglected and most of the literature has been 
produced by political scientists and sociologists, such as Rwegoshora687and 
Lyimo688 Curtis is the only historian to have published on the development of co-
operatives in Kagera region.689 The existing literature contains oversights and 
misinterprets the BCU’s historical development. Kimaro failed to illustrate its 
historical development.690 Smith misinterprets its historical growth as it is argued it 
                                                          
687A.G. Rwegoshora, ‘The Bukoba Cooperative Union: A Success?’ In Göran Hydén, 
(et al.), Cooperatives in Tanzania: problems of organisation building, (Dar Es 
Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), pp. 63 – 77. 
688 Francis Fanuel Lyimo, Rural Cooperation: In the Cooperative Movement in 
Tanzania, (Dar Es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2012), p.37. 
689 Kenneth R. Curtis, Cooperation and Cooptation: The Struggle for Market Control 
in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika, The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1992), pp. 505-538. 
690 Ally M. Kimario, (1992), pp. 8-9. 
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was ‘bottom up’ in response to class struggle.691 This study concurs with Curtis, who 
posits that the Co-operative Department organized or promoted co-operatives,692 
which is a vertical co-operative style or ‘top-down approach’. However, Curtis has 
not explained why the top-down approach was applied in Kagera. Moreover, Smith 
and Curtis have not explained why co-operatives did not formed at the same time as 
the KNCU given that coffee cultivation was encouraged by the colonial authority at 
the same time (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  
 
Iliffe examines the NGA and its leadership693 Again, little attention is given in regard 
to its failure to transform into a full-fledged co-operative society and has disregarded 
the historical findings as to why the co-operative movement was overdue in Kagera 
where the encouragement for coffee cultivation began at the same time as in 
Kilimanjaro; and the formation of the BCU does not feature. The growth and 
development of the co-operative movement in the WCGA is neglected and 
misinterpreted.694   
 
The Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) in its volume on the history of co-
operative movement in Tanzania, has distorted the historical aspect of the BCU and 
other stakeholder involved in coffee marketing that this chapter attempt to correct by 
use of underutilised primary evidences. For example, the CUT distorts that the origin 
of the BCU as shows that it emerged from reorganisation of the NGA in the same 
manner as the KNPA in Kilimanjaro 695 and the BCPA was an attempt by some 
growers in Ihangiro and Kamachumu to defect from the BCU.696 None of the 
literature has shown why the embryonic societies could not be transformed into fully 
fledged co-operative societies given that co-operative legislation was in place.  
 
                                                          
691 Charles David Smith, Did Colonialism Capture the Peasantry: A case of the 
Kagera District, Tanzania, (Upsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 
Uppsala, Research Report No. 83, 1989), pp.21 – 24; 691 Kenneth R. Curtis, (1992), 
p. 516. 
692 Kenneth R. Curtis, (1992), pp. 527. 
693 John  Iliffe, (1979), pp. 279-181. 
694 John  Iliffe, (1979), pp. 464-465. 
695 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika, (1977), p.10. 
696 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika, (1977), p.10. 
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This chapter attempts through the use of primary evidence to address these 
contradictions and oversights to generate new understanding on the co-operative 
movement in Kagera region as a whole. In the course of the discussion, this chapter 
establishes why external pressure and influence was necessary to set up the BCU 
and affiliated societies. In so doing, it illustrates the evolution of the co-operative 
movement in Kagera from 1936 to 1982 by examining its connections with coffee 
industry marketing. Against this background the focus of discussion in this chapter 
revolves around three key questions; 
1. How the agriculture and crop marketing policies were linked to the promotion 
of co-operatives during the interwar period?  
2. In what ways did colonial political and policy decisions influence and shape 
the emergence of the co-operative movement? 
3. In what ways did the changing political and ideological influences of the 
emerging Tanzanian state shape the co-operative movement during the first 
two decades of independence?      
 
5.3: THE INTER-WAR AGRICULTURE AND CROPS MARKETING POLICIES 
This section explores three interrelated issues regarding the growth and 
development of co-operatives in Kagera region. Firstly, it discusses why the natives 
were incorporated into the colonial coffee marketing policies as to how and why the 
natives were incorporated. The factors that delayed the emergence and 
development of the co-operatives in Kagera are also identified and examined. 
Secondly, it demonstrates how the colonial political decisions undermined the 
emergence of co-operatives. Thirdly, it explores why the embryonic societies 
emerged and analyses the factors that prompted the collapse of the NGA. Thirdly, it 
examines the role played by the Co-operative Department in the formation of the 
BCU and affiliated societies.  
 
Coffee marketing in Kagera region began at the same time as in Kilimanjaro in the 
1920s following maturity of coffee trees which were planted four years earlier (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3). From the outset, coffee produced in Kagera was bought by 
merchants from outside the region. Most of the traders were from Uganda and as far 
afield as Mombasa, Kenya. It has to be understood that, the attraction of the coffee 
buyers (merchants) was a key policy in encouraging coffee cultivation. It has also 
been noted that, owing to geographical proximity with Uganda special arrangements 
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were put in place in which the Ugandan colonial authority controlled the policies that 
governed coffee marketing in the region.697  
 
Importantly, a free market policy was the dominant feature in the region whereby 
traders mainly Indians, Arabs and Africans were encouraged into coffee marketing 
as summarized in Appendix 14 and Table 14 below.698 There were 393 licensed 
dealers in Kagera who were categorised as bigger buyers of which some were 
operating in 9 trading centres.699  The two European were planters and had 
traditionally purchasing a small quantity of coffee that they exported in various 
markets overseas and Indians sold their purchase to merchants in Mombasa.700 It 
has to be realised that, most Indians and Arabs traders were licenced and were 
operating their business in various trading settlements/centres of which 31 of them 
were licensed whereas African traders were operating outside settlements, mostly as 
roadside and village buyers or bought coffee from growers that they sold it to Indians 
and Arabs.701  Again, most of the Arabs and Africans traders were itinerant 
traders.702 The itinerant traders had well established trade relations and were well 
utilised big buyers locally to collect coffee, a task that was easily done by the local 
traders owing to their acquaintances and trust from growers.  
 
Significantly, one effect of the participation of natives in coffee purchase regardless 
of their status either licensed or as itinerant traders in Kagera created a harmonious 
relations that minimised conflicts with Indians and Arabs. This limited native demand 
for the formation of co-operatives unlike in Kilimanjaro and WCGA. Although this 
clearly illustrates that, native traders were granted licences to operate in the villages, 
they were not issued a licence for exporting coffee to the world markets and had no 
chance to learn and practice international business. Such exporting licences were 
                                                          
697 The Defence (Control of Cotton) Order of 1944, Section 4. 
698 Kenneth R. Curtis, (1992), pp.506, 508, 509. 
699 R.C. Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, 1936, p.2, TNA 24545. 
700 R.C. Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, 1936, p.2, TNA 24545. 
701 R.C. Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, 1936, p.2, TNA 24545. 
702 R.C. Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, 1936, p.2, TNA 24545. 
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reserved for Asians who kept a watchful eye on whether or not they were granted to 
Africans.703 
 
Table 14: Licensed Coffee Dealers in all Eight Chiefdoms in Bukoba District 
 European Indian Arab African Total 
Kianja  2 50 34 11 97 
Ihangiro - 8 23 45 76 
Kiziba - 13 7 36 56 
Kinyengereko - 2 23 25 50 
Kiamtwara - 24 14 36 74 
Karagwe - 1 7 4 12 
Bugabo - 1 - 14 15 
Misenyi - 2 - 4 6 
Source: R.C. Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, 1936, p.2, (Appendix 
H), TNA 24545 
 
In this regard, a division of function and role was clear that the local traders were 
accommodated at local level as they could use local languages, Kihaya or Kinyambo 
for business transactions; all in all, their livelihood was not at threat. The mentioned 
traders were operating in all eight Chiefdoms (see Map No. 2, below).  
     
                                                          
703John  Iliffe, (1979), pp. 374- 375. 
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Map 2: Chiefdoms in Kagera Region 
 
 
The coffee traders of Indian and Arab background from Uganda and as far as 
Mombasa could easily be attracted in the region by the colonial authority which kept 
the opportunities open for them. Curtis argued that Africans were introduced to 
coffee marketing by Asians as agents as well as porters because transport within the 
region was difficult and it remained so even when the transport infrastructure 
improved.704 The Indian coffee dealers were either agents of traders based in 
Kagera or were self-employed, some of whom like Sheriff Jiwa transferred 
businesses from Moshi in the 1920s following the granting of the coffee marketing 
                                                          
704 Kenneth R. Curtis, (1992), pp.506, 508, 509. 
209 
 
monopoly to the KNPA and later KNCU. There were also big coffee exporters based 
in Bukoba town either as principal buyers and major exporters or acting as company 
branch managers or agents of big merchants and companies based in Mombasa 
where coffee was auctioned.705  
 
Coffee marketing in Kagera experienced a number of challenges. For example, there 
was laxity in control as there was no legal institution empowered for quality 
assurance. Among the challenges were that, coffee marketing was marred by an 
intensive struggle among the traders which compromised coffee quality. For 
example, the growers were marketing broken processed coffee beans whereby 50 
per cent of the entire crop was hulled by growers on wooden mortar/huller (kinu); 706 
and rock outcrop (see Photograph No. 2 above).  In addition the growers were 
mortgaging their produce before harvest, which led to them being paid an unfair 
price. Cheating was widespread and sporadic marketing was also common. 
Concerned by this the colonial authority in the district and province invited Northcote 
to investigate and recommend measures required to improve coffee marketing (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  
 
In an attempt to improve coffee processing and marketing Northcote recommended 
the establishment of central marketing/buying posts, as to achieve by pointing out 
that, ‘any improved marketing, it seems fundamentally necessary for the grower to 
sell coffee to a central deports or collecting stations’.707 This was meant to change 
the prevailing market system whereby traders collected coffee directly from growers. 
Secondly, it was stressed that licences for coffee buying be introduced which would 
eliminate and control the itinerant traders.708 Finally, in a minute to the Provincial 
Commissioners by Northcote presented his evaluation of the NGA that ’the NGA can 
successfully operate bulking, grading and pooling their crop and becomes an 
                                                          
705 Report on Reorganisation of the Bukoba Native Coffee Industry, March 31st 1949, 
TNA 23752. 
706 R.C. Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, p.18, TNA 24545; TNA 
24545 Bukoba Chamber of Commerce to CS, 22nd 1929. 
707 Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, p.19, TNA 24545.  
708 Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, p.19, TNA 24545. 
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automatic check on the unscrupulous buyers’.709 Based on the evaluation of its 
capability, Northcote recommended the reorganisation of the NGA by pointing out 
that ‘the Associations should be encouraged with concomitant formation of a co-
operative society is a matter of policy’.710 Northcote’s recommendation for the 
reorganisation of the NGA was accepted by the Colonial authority in the Province. 711 
 
One of the measures recommended by Northcote was the promotion of co-
operatives to ensure improved coffee hulling. Northcote took the view that 
undoubtedly the co-operatives would be the easiest form that Africans to understand 
and more adapted to his financing and organisation capabilities’.712 He argued that 
‘the first step towards improvement in marketing should be by small co-operative 
power hullieries in order to improve coffee quality which would secure a better price.  
These co-operatives were, according to Northcote to serve growers at a family or 
household levels. This suggests that, co-operatives were mainly envisaged as family 
enterprises, focusing specifically on hulling to improve the quality of coffee. For him, 
the hulling co-operatives were envisaged not only to process coffee, but also to 
facilitate the collection of the produce for marketing which they could then develop 
into a district co-operative union for bulk coffee handling’.713 This approach was likely 
to reinforce the existing division of activities between coffee traders and merchants 
who concentrated on marketing and natives who focused on cultivation and 
processing.  
 
However, Northcote sounded cautious in his recommendation as he argued that ‘any 
attempt to effect many changes all at once might be fraught with disaster and cause 
serious disorganisation in the disposal of the crop during the transition period’.714 He 
                                                          
709 A minute to the Lake Province Provincial Commissioner by Northcote May 18th 
1936, TNA 25777/1 
710 A minute to the Lake Province Provincial Commissioner by Northcote May 18th 
1936, TNA 25777/1 
711 Lake Province Provincial Commissioner to CS, Ref. No. 976/233, July 6th 1936, 
TNA 25777/1 
712 Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, p.21, TNA 24545. 
713 Northcote Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, p.13, TNA 24545. 
714 Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing, p.13, TNA 24545. 
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also warned that ‘there are little prospects of success since there was no widespread 
desire for any co-operative selling agency; nor is there yet any external pressure so 
strong towards the direction to stimulate interest.715  This could be achieved through 
propaganda and explanation over a period of two years or more to encourage 
interest. During propaganda growers need to be convinced of the resulting financial 
advantages so that they could willingly form societies to handle the crop and later 
stage to form a co-operative union; however, he argued that, ‘I do not visualise this 
to happen in a considerable period’.716  
 
The implementation of his proposals was unlikely given that, his superiors were 
against such an approach (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3).  It can be recalled that 
Northcote was restricted from stimulating interest in co-operatives to growers, but 
they could be provided as guidance only when they spontaneously emerge (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.3). It was further argued that, given growers’ lack of exposure 
to modern co-operatives it was unlikely that societies would emerge spontaneously. 
Northcote provided a road map that emphasized sensitisation of the growers, which 
illustrates a desire to instil an understanding that was presumably expected to 
generate a spontaneous need for the formation of co-operatives. Moreover, 
Northcote’s proposal was unlikely to succeed because there was no department, 
funds and staffs to facilitate the propaganda.   
 
Northcote emphasised that the Chiefs could be informed, but they should not be 
actively engaged in the promotion of co-operatives;717 and idea that Strickland had in 
mind NA but, he suggested that, Chiefs/NA should have a limited control over the co-
operative societies.718 This demonstrates that, both Strickland and Northcote were 
committed to a top-down approach that would ensure the loyalty of societies to the 
colonial establishment and ran contrary to the voluntary co-operative principle. 
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718 C.F. Strickland, Co-operation for Africa, (London: George Allen and Unwin Co. 
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However, his recommendations were seriously affected by decisions taken by senior 
colonial officials as discussed in the following section. 
 
5.4: THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL DECISIONS ON THE CO-OPERATIVES  
The previous section has examined coffee marketing that was in place and its 
discrepancies. It highlighted Northcote’s recommendation which was in favour of 
promotion of co-operatives in Kagera for coffee marketing. This section provides 
analysis on the response to the report and the position which senior colonial officers 
adopted towards his recommendations. In the course of discussion it will outline the 
impact of such decisions on the NGA which was an embryonic organisation. The 
section also examines policies that promoted co-operatives and the role played by 
the Co-operative Department in the formation of the BCU and affiliated societies.  
 
The Northcote report attracted attention from various government officials at 
Provincial and territorial levels who vehemently opposed. For example, the Director 
of Agriculture (DA) commented that ‘I cannot recommend a drastic change in dealing 
with Bukoba coffee, the co-operative scheme is not important but where necessary 
has to be implemented slowly and grow as a result of its value on the industry’.719 It 
was his opinion that, ‘co-operative societies are not desirable’.720 The DA was 
cautious owing to the existence of numerous stakeholders such as Arab and Indian 
traders who are engaged in the industry and concluded that, establishing co-
operatives ‘would threaten their livelihoods thus, may lead to the eruption of riots’.721  
 
However, the DA ruled out encouraging the co-operatives by pointing out that, ‘a 
family can own a huller and sell their processed coffee to buyers’.722 He further 
maintained that, ‘efforts and interest should entirely be focused on the groups to instil 
a co-operative spirit; therefore, the necessity for co-operative societies and 
                                                          
719 DA to CS Ref No. Confidentila 1/29/36, November 28th 1936, TNA 24545.   
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organised marketing is not of the primary importance’.723 The DA’s view clearly 
demonstrates that, the colonial authority opposed any attempt for development of co-
operative movement. Their preference was maintaining the status quo regardless of 
the prevailing chaotic marketing system. Coffee quality was their priority by 
encouragement of family hulling. This illustrates also that, a desire was to ensure 
that, growers were not organised outside a family unit. This again, was evidence 
that, Northcote’s recommendation was virtually downgraded to the litter bin.  
 
Despite the DA’s opposition to the organisation of growers into co-operatives by 
1936 some Africans in Kamachumu were organised under the Native Growers 
Association (NGA),724 which was under the leadership of Herbert Rugazibwa who 
was the President, and Clemens Kiiza as Secretary. Both were the local TAA 
committee members. In spite of its affiliation to TAA the NGA was predominantly 
engaged in coffee marketing, unlike the KNPA which concentrated on the extension 
services and coffee marketing.  
 
During his investigation, Northcote had discussions with the NGA leaders. It was 
established that the NGA had 970 members who produced and marketed an 
average of 360 lbs. or 156 tons of coffee per annum.725 Such records indicate that 
the members were coffee producers who were interested in selling their produce in 
bulk. These members were from all eight Chiefdoms. In Kianja there were 186 
members, Ihangiro had 111, and Kiziba had 524 while in Kiamtwara, 93 in 
Kinyangereko, 29 in Bugabo and 27 members were from two other Chiefdoms.726 By 
having members from all Chiefdoms in Kagera region; this demonstrates that, the 
Association had some affiliations, regardless of how small across the regions.  
  
                                                          
723 DA to CS, Ref. No. Confidentila 1/29/36, November 28th 1936, TNA 24545.   
724 The NGA was unregistered society 
725 PC Lake Province to CS, Ref. No. 976/233 of July 6th 1936, Native Growers 
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6th 1936, TNA 41011. 
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It is obvious that, the Association was in competition with coffee merchants. This was 
reflected in their request in a discussion with Northcote that the colonial authority 
should ‘prohibit the middlemen from buying coffee’.727 This indicates that, they hoped 
to be granted a monopoly like the KNPA and KNCU. They assured Northcote that 
they were capable of efficiently operating a marketing monopoly if granted.728  This 
illustrates that, the Association envisioned focusing on the collection of coffee from 
growers through Section 36 of the 1932 co-operative legislation.  
 
It was intended to operate in a similar way to the KNPA with no affiliated societies at 
grassroots level. In a discussion with the NGA’s leaders, the colonial authority made 
it clear that, the NGA would not be allowed to outright purchase coffee from non-
members.729  Again, this demonstrated a double standard in providing the necessary 
support to growers who have shown interest and desire in marketing their produce 
and undermining section 36 (1) of the co-operative Ordinance (explained in chapter 
4, Section 4.4).   
 
The NGA did not envisage being transformed into a co-operative society, instead 
preferred to operate as a company. This did not correspond with Northcote’s vision, 
and he dismissed the NGA on the grounds that, ‘it is insignificant given that there 
was no widespread desire for any co-operative selling agency, nor there yet any 
interest for growers to take joint action to save their own interests’.730 However, 
Northcote’s arguments were baseless given that the NGA regardless of its size had 
managed to establish itself in some Chiefdoms where it had members and support 
from the NA.  
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729 Appendix M, Summary of Northcote’s conversation with the President of the 
NGA, TNA 25777/1. 
730 Northcote 1936 Inquiry Report on Bukoba Coffee Industry in Report on Bukoba 
Coffee Marketing, p.21, TNA 24545. 
215 
 
Northcote also asserted that, the NGA was financially weak with little knowledge of 
accountancy/bookkeeping and that its business was poor. 731 However, the report by 
Northcote did not suggest how to address these weaknesses (see Appendix 14 on a 
summary of a conversation with the President of the NGA). This was an obvious 
neglect of his duties as Registrar of Co-operative Societies, as he should have been 
guiding the association to improve its business knowledge, although it was uncertain 
whether the NGA could be transformed into a fully-fledged co-operative society,732 
Northcote devised a roadmap for the development of the co-operative movement in 
Kagera.  
 
Following discussions with Northcote and the NGA leaders consulted the PC and in 
June 1936 presented a request for a loan amounting to £500 which was equivalent 
to 10,000/ shillings to enable it to trade coffee supplied from its hulling factory.733  
The loan application by the NGA sought to raise capital following the financial crisis it 
experienced during the collapse of coffee caused by the oversupply of coffee from 
Brazil during 1934/35 season.734 When the PC received the NGA’s loan application 
letter he indicated that funding would be available. Northcote seemed ready to 
consider the NGA’s loan application in an attempt to build its business capacity. But, 
the PC disapproved the application as he stated that ‘will be simply throwing money 
away’.735 However, the PC did not let the NGA leaders know his position. He 
pretended to be supportive by setting out conditions to the NGA to qualify to be 
considered for a loan. One of attached condition was that, the NGA should 
disassociate itself from politics.736 However, all these were impossible to implement 
given the fact that money lending to natives was prohibited under the 1923 Credit to 
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732 Northcote 1936 Inquiry Report on Bukoba Coffee Industry in Report on Bukoba 
Coffee Marketing, p.13, TNA 24545. 
733 Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing ‘Confidentila’, TNA 24545 
734 T.S. Jervis, ‘Marketing of Coffee’ in the East Africa Agricultural Journal, May 
1957, pp.459- 464, in Bukoba District Book 
735 Report on Bukoba Coffee Marketing ‘Confidentila’, TNA 24545 
736 PC, Lake Province to CS, Ref. No. 9756/233, July 6th 1936, TNA 41011. 
216 
 
Natives (Restriction) Ordinance,737 that restricted Africans from access to credit 
unless specific permission from the colonial authority at Provincial levels. 
Nonetheless this was not so, as had been the case with KNCU when it experienced 
financial problems in 1934/35. After the NGA agreed to be politically neutral, the PC 
requested the police to investigate the activities of NGA officials to identify any 
connections to the TAA. The police report indicated that the Association had no 
connection with the in Dar Es Salaam based TAA, and that Rugazibwa and Kiiza had 
resigned all positions with the TAA.738 All in all the colonial authority did not approve 
a loan. This demonstrates that the government never intended to support growers’ 
initiatives to engage in crop marketing through either business knowledge or funds to 
purchase coffee. In reality, it had used the funding request as a lever to remove NGA 




The then PC, Lake Province Mr C. MacMahon, remained suspicious of the NGA’s 
involvement in politics, but was optimistic that if subjected to supervision the NGA 
would be more effective at marketing than traders.739 He, therefore, urged support 
for the NGA for economic and political reasons as ‘any efforts to guide the 
Association at infancy stage will be of great assistance not only to the coffee 
industry, but will also enable us (colonial authority) to restore confidence between 
the Chiefs (NA) and many other educated Wahaya who have lost confidence in their 
NAs’.740 This suggests that, the colonial authority was anxious to learn from its 
experiences in Kilimanjaro where the KNPA had challenged the chiefs and the 
colonial authority.  
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Thereafter, the colonial authority argued that ‘it would be a fallacy to regard the NGA 
as marketing organisation, it has done little and had not substantial experience in 
marketing’.741  That was a basis to suggest that the NGA had no business potential 
or credibility. This conclusion was based on evidence that it marketed only 11 tons in 
1934, 6 tons in 1935 and none in 1936.742 Thus, it was concluded that it had no 
prospect for becoming a successful marketing organisation.743 This was a new twist 
just in less than a year since his indication to support the idea following a 
recommendation from Northcote. 
 
The PC, Lake Province warned that the Chiefs and NA would regard the NGA as a 
new centre of political power if it was registered for coffee marketing. He reassured 
the CS that the NGA would automatically vanish when its members joined newly 
formed co-operatives.744 The PC argued that the co-operatives should initially be 
formed as hulling groups that would gradually grow into larger societies, but he 
emphasised that the private buyers should remain the only outlet for coffee 
marketing.745  
 
In addition, it has been highlighted that the coffee merchants, mainly those who were 
members of the Chamber of Commerce successfully managed to influence the 
colonial authority to disregard the promotion of co-operative marketing societies in 
the region (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). 746  For example, they strongly presented 
their case in their conference held in Tabora and Dodoma in 1935 that, 
‘encouragement of co-operatives will create artificial barriers against free trade as 
the case of Kilimanjaro by registration of the KNPA and later KNCU in which the 
WaChagga were granted coffee marketing monopoly provided under the Chagga 
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Rule and the native coffee control and marketing legislation; such policy  resulted in 
the displacement of the trading population (Indian traders) from Kilimanjaro only to 
flock in Kagera to conduct coffee marketing business.  
 
The mentioned pressure from Asian coffee traders forced the PC to become more 
sceptical about promotion of the NGA as they feared that, if it was allowed into 
coffee marketing the Asian traders would resist eventually creating political and 
racial tension in Kagera that would threaten the stability of the colonial authority.747  
For him, the NGA represented an inherent threat to the establishment which would 
ferment political awareness and eventually challenge both the Native Authority and 
central government. They also realised that unorganised growers were easier to 
exploit than the organised who would possess more bargaining power in the 
marketing of their produce. The Lake Province PC opposed the immediate creation 
of co-operative societies as they ‘would create opposition from groups comprised of 
Arabs and Asians who had a vested interest in the industry and they would be a 
threat to the Chiefs as they would be a centre for fermenting political unrest’.748 This 
suggested that, the idea to promote or to register spontaneous grower organisations 
like the NGA was ruled out in favour of established stakeholders in coffee marketing; 
and it was declined for fear that they could pose a threat to the establishment and 
ostensibly  that would disrupt the whole industry. The position of the PC, Lake 
Province reinforces further his support for Asian traders in Kagera which was 
obvious when he protested against the 1929 coffee export legislation (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3). This indicates the role, powers and influence of the Provincial 
administration in matters of interest and priority in its jurisdiction. Clearly, the 
Provincial administration lacked political will and commitment to independent 
growers’ organisations as it feared the Indian and Arab coffee traders being 
eliminated from the coffee marketing as had occurred in Kilimanjaro.  
 
Importantly, under the League of Nations Mandate the Provincial administration 
should have promoted all traders regardless of race to have a stake in coffee 
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marketing. Incredibly, the protection of Indians and Arabs coffee traders was a policy 
that the Provincial administration strongly defended against co-operative societies on 
the grounds of maintaining racial harmony in coffee marketing in the region. The 
protection of Indians and Arabs coffee traders in the region demonstrates policy 
inconsistency in the promotion that led to uneven development of co-operative 
movement in Tanzania. It also indicates that, the colonial officials had powers and 
options at their disposal in deciding whether to accept or reject an attempt to 
promote co-operative societies. 
 
Other government officials who commented on Northcote’s report failed to come up 
with a time frame and strategy for encouraging co-operatives among the growers. 
The growers were not consulted on the matter. Thus, the official decisions remained 
inadequate and bias in addressing the whole question regarding the modality for 
encouraging co-operatives and a strategy to develop and guide the NGA based on 
the co-operative principles. Under these circumstances, it was very difficult for the 
Association to survive. 
 
The disapproval of a loan and colonial officials’ scepticism had nothing to do with 
discouraging the NGA to pursue its business strategy on self-reliance basis. For 
example, it imported hulling plant for coffee processing bought out of members’ 
contributions, which was installed in the Mbatama village in Ihangiro Chiefdom at the 
invitation of Chief Ruhinda.749 The members’ contribution to purchase hulling 
machine was obviously based on the understanding that, properly processed coffee 
beans fetches better prices than those processed by the olwazi ne ibale lyokusa. 
The NGA business thrived following installation of hulling machine.750 However, its 
license was withdrawn by the government in 1939 due to its involvement in 
protesting against coffee rules passed by the colonial authority in 1937.751 This 
demonstrates that the colonial officials and administrators were solely concerned 
with maintaining the peace and the status quo. 
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By 1938 the Lake Province PC remained unmoved regarding promotion of marketing 
co-operatives in Kagera. He argued against establishing marketing co-operatives 
‘even if were shown to be desirable on economic grounds’. 752 To him, so long as 
there were traders buying coffee from growers, marketing co-operatives were 
irrelevant. He insisted that ‘it was not necessary and consider that would be 
politically unwise to eliminate the present licensed buyers who are too ready to 
provide the service’.753 He further argued that, ‘promotion of co-operatives are 
nothing other than brewing unrest as it has been the case with coffee riots in 
Kilimanjaro’, by stressing that, ‘this would add to unrest in case growers are paid low 
prices for their produce’.754 The policy was not only maintained at Provincial level but 
also by senior colonial officials in a move to create business security in Kagera. One 
of such officials was the DA who throughout the interwar period maintained his 
position against an attempt to promote the coffee marketing co-operatives period. In 
so doing he kept on assuring coffee traders in Kagera and those in Mombasa by 
stressing that, ‘they should remove any fear or misapprehension that their interests 
were in endangered in the same way as in Kilimanjaro’. 755 
 
Consequently, the prospects for the development of the movement in Kagera were 
placed on hold and further delayed due to the outbreak of the Second World War. 
During the war direct government intervention was commenced under Emergency 
Order. The matter was aggravated even further by adoption of the Native Coffee 
(Control and Marketing) Ordinance No 26 of 1937 that led to setting up of the 
Bukoba Coffee Control Board in 1941. Implementation of this policy came at an 
important time when the emphasis was primarily geared towards rationalization and 
synchronization of crop purchase in favour of a single government appointed buyer 
(discussed in chapter 2). At this juncture, the opportunity began to open up for the 
promotion of the co-operatives.  
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This section, has demonstrated why the colonial authority was reluctant to promote 
independent growers’ organisations and involve them in crop marketing during the 
inter-war years. The hesitation was by and large, politically driven and undermined 
early attempts by growers to develop the native coffee marketing organisation. All 
this changed after the Second World War, which was characterised by government 
involvement in the formation of the BCU and its affiliated societies and the 
appointment of its managers, as discussed in the following section.   
 
5.5: THE POLICY DECISIONS ON THE CO-OPERATIVES  
This section attempts to examine new development after the Second World War 
when a number of policy changes influenced the formation of the BCU and affiliated 
societies. Faced with identified challenges in the previous section, the colonial 
government through the Co-operative Department initiated the formation and 
registration of societies. Accounts of the colonial authority initiative in promoting co-
operatives in Kagera regions have tended to misinterpret the developments. Eckert 
and Hydén  posit that co-operatives in Tanzania were mainly the result of initiatives 
from the local rural population in reaction to the Asian traders’ monopoly in the cash 
crop marketing,756 and can thus be seen as a movement ‘from below’ and were not 
imposed upon Africans by the British.757 Similarly, Baldus758 and Manday759 posit 
that co-operatives were set up and charged with combating exploitation by traders; 
and Coulson fails to demonstrate the policy decisions that provided a road map in 
the promotion of co-operatives in the region. He does not illustrate the legal grounds 
that provided coffee marketing monopoly powers to the BNCB that obstructed the 
Co-operative Department intervention and how the Department managed such a 
challenge.760 These arguments can be challenged by using evidence from Kagera 
region.  
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It has been noted that in an attempt to suffocate agents and rationalise and 
synchronise coffee marketing there was one important policy challenge. It has been 
highlighted earlier that coffee marketing policy in Kagera region was dictated from 
Uganda due to its geographical proximity on special agreement with Tanzania’s 
colonial government. It has been mentioned that the crop traders in Uganda opposed 
a co-operative societies’ bill in 1935 which had implications for Kagera region. This 
was almost the same time as when the NGA emerged, but was rejected by the 
colonial authority for reasons explained in section 5.2. However, pressure from the 
CO that led to passage of co-operative legislation in Uganda enhanced chances for 
the formation and registration of co-operatives in Kagera region.    
 
Developments in Uganda reflected colonial officials’ preoccupation with co-
operatives during the 1940s and early 1950s. Pressure from the UNO and Colonial 
Office following reports by the Fabian Colonial Bureau and Campbell (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4) were also important in encouraging the formation of growers’ co-
operatives in Uganda from 1945. Such pressure had an impact in Tanzania. 
Importantly, this was a period when colonial policies regarding co-operatives and 
African produced marketing were being brought into line with the Colonial Office 
post-war marketing and development policy (explained in chapter 3). Therefore, the 
colonial authority in Tanzania had to play its part to ensure co-operatives were 
formed in Kagera.  
 
After the war creation of marketing boards was strongly encouraged by the Colonial 
Office. This was due to the success of the Cocoa Boards in West Africa in 
generating revenue for the colonial authority. The intention was to align the functions 
of the marketing boards with those of co-operatives. Emphasis was placed on co-
operatives as they were viewed as more complementary to the work of the marketing 
boards than private traders. The British government intervention in crop marketing 
through bulk purchase was not challenged by co-operatives, such as the KNCU, 
which were more suited to this approach than the private traders in the Kagera. 
Importantly, both the co-operatives and colonial government shared the common 




Therefore, the DA drew up a Memorandum in 1946 which earmarked the following 
preliminary issues.761 
a) Bukoba is ready for a co-operative effort which should be actively fostered 
before end of coffee agreement with the Ministry of Food expires on 
November 30th 1954; 
b) For rationalization of the industry coffee crop must be purchased by a single 
buyer i.e. the government/agent appointed by the government or co-operative 
society; and 
c) The government should provide assistance in teaching co-operative society's 
staff in Bukoba accountancy and bookkeeping. 
 
This commitment signified a new chapter and a shift from the 1930s negative attitude 
of the colonial officials in the promotion of co-operatives in the region. This was a 
response to the colonial authority’s post-war policy direction in promoting the co-
operatives in Tanzania. Again, this was a significant step in replacing private firms in 
Kagera region and have the growers sell coffee to their societies. However, the DA’s 
memorandum lacked a clear road map for implementation or acknowledgement of 
the legal obstacles to be overcome. BNCB had legal control of coffee marketing 
under the Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1937, but the legislation 
did not recognize co-operatives. It was on this legal basis that the BNCB delayed for 
over two years in accepting co-operatives into the coffee marketing system.762  
 
The Co-operative Department viewed co-operatives as suitable organisations to 
operate a marketing monopoly as by replacing private firms they would assist the 
colonial authority in controlling profits. Private traders could not be controlled by the 
government in the same manner as co-operatives, to which the Board could dictate 
prices. Private traders were familiar with global commodity prices as they had well-
established marketing networks (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3), unlike the co-
operatives whose committee members lacked knowledge of external markets.  
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The Co-operative Department deployed, Mr J. S. Elliott, the co-operative officer to 
Bukoba in 1947 to launch co-operatives in collaboration with the BNCB which had 
been restructured and renamed in the same year (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  
However, the Board did not cooperate with him owing to its entrenched attitude 
regarding the legal recognition of co-operatives. The Board asserted that it was 
legally correct to reject Elliott’s proposals, and continued to appoint agencies and 
contractors of its choice to market coffee produced by growers. Owing to this 
impasse the Registrar threatened to transfer Elliott to a region where his expertise 
could be utilised.763  
 
The Registrar proposed the appointment of a co-operative officer, Mr A. Horley764 to 
fill the post as Executive officer of the BNCB.765 The Registrar managed to convince 
the government during the 1947 Provincial Commissioners conference to consider 
appointing Mr A. Horley as Executive officer of the Board, as ‘here would be more 
reality in the aiding of co-operative societies’.766 This demonstrated the Department’s 
determination to overcome the obstruction that Elliott had encountered.    It was 
envisioned that the appointment was an opportunity to stir enthusiasm within the 
Board and manipulate policies in favour of the Registrar and the Department to 
promote co-operative societies in the region. This development illustrates that the 
Department’s intention to have Horley recruited would have far reaching impact on 
the Department of Co-operatives and the movement as a whole.   
 
Nonetheless, a Secretariat meeting declined to appoint Horley as executive officer of 
the Board on the ground that the country had shortage of co-operative officers. 
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Instead, Mr T.M. Revington was recruited.767 The Registrar was assured the Board 
would now facilitate promotion of co-operative societies.768 However, the Board 
remained reluctant to foster co-operatives. All in all, this was not an isolated incident 
given the reluctance of the Provincial administration to promote co-operatives (see 
Section 5.3). As a result, the Registrar queried why ‘the good intention and 
commitment of the Board to foster co-operation have paved the road to nowhere’.769  
 
Since there was no prospect for policy change in the near future the Co-operative 
Department had to resort into a measure that propelled its determination. The new 
approach was unveiled under the African Agricultural (Control and Marketing) 
Ordinance, 1949, which was drafted by the Co-operative Department. This reflected 
the Co-operative Department’s desire and commitment to control crop marketing and 
to compel the BNCB to co-operate in the course of promoting the co-operatives. To 
achieve this, the Department had to ensure that it produced a comprehensive 
legislation that had to deal with all native/African-produced cash crops, of which co-
operative societies had to play a key role in handling/marketing them just as in 
Kilimanjaro and other areas in the country. Unlike the previous 1937 native coffee 
control and marketing legislation, the 1949 Ordinance recognised the existence of 
co-operatives and compelled the Marketing Boards to promote co-operatives. In this 
regard, the Department exerted its dominance over policy decisions and direction 
ultimately implementing them in favour of promoting co-operative societies. 
However, this was a significant step and necessary policy that provided for the 
weakening of the powers that the colonial Provincial administration and BNCB in 
preventing the promotion of co-operative societies. This represented the colonial 
government asserting its authority over the Provincial administration and BNCB. As a 
result, the Provincial administration and BNCB were both obliged to engage in 
promoting co-operatives. Under the Ordinance the Board’s functions were further 
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extended to include the promotion and development of the co-operative 
movement.770  
 
Consequently, the marketing legislation weakened the Provincial administration and 
BNCB powers to impede the Co-operative Department’s attempts to promote co-
operatives by compelling Boards to appoint co-operative societies as their crop 
handling agencies. It has to be noted that, the policy shift was significant and 
necessary not only to control agricultural products, but also to ensure that production 
and marketing had to play a part in the recovery of the post-war British economy. 
This was part of the extension and perpetuation of the extractive bulk purchase 
policy on coffee from Kagera region by directly engaging the native growers through 
co-operatives. Additionally, the legislation went hand in hand with ensuring that, 
surpluses that were accrued by the Boards be returned to growers through the co-
operatives.771 Thus, the Boards no longer retained control of the surpluses, which 
were now to be distributed amongst growers as co-operative members in line with 
the ICA and Rochdale principles.  
 
The policy shift was a clear victory for the Co-operative Department, which had been 
empowered by the colonial authority to engage itself directly in the promotion of the 
co-operative societies. To some extent this can be viewed as a renewal of such 
initiatives and commitment by the colonial authority seen in the late 1920s (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2). The promotion of the co-operative societies by the Co-
operative Department under the legislation was also clearly advantageous to coffee 
growers in Kagera who were to benefit from the distribution of surpluses.  
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All in all, the whole exercise was implemented by the government on a top down 
basis.772 This approach was necessary due to the lack of enthusiasm from growers 
owing to some historical challenges from the outset of commercialisation of the 
coffee trade in Kagera explained previously (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). The 
employment of Indian and Asian traders in crop marketing minimised racial tension 
in Kagera, unlike in Kilimanjaro where the settlers agitated against Africans growing 
coffee and in the WCGA where the Indian traders cheated growers to the extent of 
emergence of the mabebete (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). This was further 
reinforced by the Provincial administration’s reluctance in promoting co-operatives 
(see section 5.2). 
 
Yet in setting up co-operatives, the colonial authority, mainly the Co-operative 
Department, did not conduct education amongst the members. There were no clear 
reasons for this. The establishment of co-operatives would likely have faced 
opposition from traders whose control over coffee marketing would be threatened. 
The government’s move towards employment of this approach was also justified by 
its commitment or desire to have a single buyer for the region and attain policy 
consistency as in Kilimanjaro, and Ruvuma regions where societies were an integral 
part of marketing policy. A single buyer in this case implied a replacement of agents 
to whom it was obviously expensive to pay commission to all which was an 
arrangement governing contracts provided under the Ministry of Food; the 
commission rate as per contract was amounting to 3/- shillings per ton.773 A single 
buyer was one of main motivation for the promotion of co-operatives in Kagera. This 
is contrary to the argument presented by Holmén that the co-operatives were formed 
by the colonial authority to facilitate tax collection.774 However, the developments 
explained were not mentioned by Coulson, who simply pointed out that the decision 
to form co-operatives in Kagera region was reached in 1950.775   
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In achieving its objective, forty (40) co-operative societies were registered by March 
1950 and the figure increased to 49 by the end of the year (see Appendix 16 for a list 
of registered societies). Nine registered co-operatives commenced operations prior 
March 1950 and handled 3,612 tons of coffee.776 The newly registered societies 
were formed in various villages across the region.  
 
It has to be noted that the formation and registration of the co-operative societies in 
Bukoba emerged during the renaissance era with an impetus prompted and stirred 
by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. He had to do so owing to the prescribed 
mandate of his office. The initiative was taken as the growers seemed disinterested 
in co-operatives. Importantly, it was not an outcome of growers demand, but was 
essentially the act of Government anxious to set up co-operative societies for 
growers serve the colonial interest.  
 
Develtere criticises colonial authority initiatives and intervention policy in promotion 
of co-operatives.777 For him this was a prejudiced policy which viewed the colonised 
as incapable of taking the initiative. However, the reason for lack of enthusiasm was 
that Bukoba presented a unique case in which the indigenous were actively involved 
in coffee purchase. This was further demonstrated by a number of indigenous 
traders who were granted licences for this purpose in the 1930s. 
 
At the time of the registration of co-operative societies there were 31,642 growers 
who were the members of whom 200 were women,  which was only 31 per cent of 
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entire growers’ population.778 The number of societies increased to 58 in 1954 and 
73 in 1964 with 58,765 members.779 It has to be underlined that by 1950 
membership and delivery of coffee produce to a co-operative society was 
compulsory. The compulsory membership of co-operatives was necessary because 
growers were responsible for the majority of coffee production and could deliver 
coffee to societies as to fill the vacuum that was due to emerge following the expiry 
of the zonal agents’ contract (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3).780 In understanding that a 
vacuum will be created a measure was provided under clauses 2 and 10 of the 
agreements with societies permitted to deal with or through the zonal agents at the 
will of the Board. The emphasis at this stage was ensuring coffee marketing was not 
disrupted such that there was neglect of viewing the movement as an essential tool 
for development. 
 
The formation and registration of societies was a significant development that led to 
the functions of BCNB transferring to co-operatives. One of the BNCB 
responsibilities was to facilitate and induce growers to improve production by 
encouraging them to weed their coffee farms, pruning of coffee trees and spraying 
insecticides; all of these were intended to increase coffee productivity, an area that 
Coffee Cultural Section of the BCU oversaw (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). It was 
obvious that this could effectively be delivered through co-operatives.781 The African 
Agricultural Products (control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949 provided for 
devolution of some of the Board functions and directed such functions to be handled 
by the co-operatives. In 1956 the BNCB provided BCU with a sum of 875,000 
shillings as a free loan to purchase the BNCB 51 per cent share from the Bukoba 
Coffee Curing Plant782 (BUKOP).783 In this respect, the BCU was able to buy the 
BNCB shares 784 that provided for control of marketing and coffee processing.   
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The registration of the BCU was followed by a process for the appointment of 
supervising manager. The process has not been documented in any existing 
literature; this includes in the autobiography of one of its former managers, Sir 
George Kahama.785 When the BNCU was registered Mr A. Horley786 was appointed 
by the Governor as the first BCU supervising manager up to 1951. The power to 
make such appointment was provided under Section 36 Cap 211 of the African 
Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance of 1949. Mr Chapman787 
replaced Horley from 1952. Intervention by the colonial authority in the appointment 
of the BCU’s supervising manager involved the Governor on two occasions. On both 
occasions the colonial officials (co-operative officers) were appointed to the post. 
The government intervention, however, reflected its realisation that in Bukoba there 
was insufficient enthusiasm amongst growers to foster co-operation. What this 
illustrates is that the BCU was an extended body of the government with a growers 
face. Furthermore, this sent a strong signal that the Governor supported the BCU 
and proved to the BNCB that the Department had no staff shortage. It also signals 
the extent to and attention that the Department provide to development of co-
operative movement by deploying their staffs to manage the BCU. It also indicates 
the colonial authority’s political will and renewal of its commitment in supporting the 
co-operative movement in compliance to the CO’s policy (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.5).  
 
As mentioned, both Horley and Chapman had once served as co-operative officers 
in the Bukoba District before their appointments. In an effort to reinforce the Union’s 
personnel, in 1955 it recruited a Treasurer, Sir George Kulwa Kahama who received 
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management training from his superiors. 788 When his training was complete, 
Kahama was appointed to a managerial position in 1956 to replace Mr Chapman. 
Following his appointment, Sir Kahama became the first African manager who 
served until 1961 when he took Ministerial position in the independent 
government.789 Thereafter, Kahama’s position was filled by Mr G. M Rugarabamu 
who was the BCU’s Head of Coffee Cultural Section.790 He was later replaced by G. 
Ishengoma following his appointment soon after independence as Assistant 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture.791   
 
The funds that were accumulated by the BNCB were set aside as a stabilisation fund 
to act as a buffer against possible falls in coffee prices. The BNCB accumulated 
9,328,911.18 shillings and 20,553,267.31 shillings in 1949 and 1950 respectively.792 
In Bukoba societies were financed by the BNCB from its accumulated surplus from 
coffee sales, which amounted to 25,000,000 shillings from 1945 to 1952.793 Some 
funds were made available to newly established societies for purchase of crops and 
construction of storage facilities. This was in accordance to the 1949 African 
Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance in which the Registrar of co-
operatives were empowered to recommend the Board to advance a loan for newly 
and existing co-operatives as working capital and purchase of equipment in an 
understating that the co-operatives had insufficient funds. Under this relationship the 
colonial authority employed its funds loaned to the co-operative as the principal tool 
for collection and handling of the coffee produce.  
 
A fund accumulated by the Board was made available to co-operative societies for 
purchase of coffee a total loan of 302,913.32 shillings were provided to societies.794  
A loan breakdown for buildings was 225,000.00 shillings, equipment 75,100.47 
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shillings and 226,913.85 shillings as working capital795 for crop finance at one per 
cent interest796  that enabled them in 1951 to handle 80 per cent of the coffee 
crop.797  Having societies proved able to perform their duties satisfactorily, the 
colonial authority relived the BNCB function to promote co-operatives.798 The 
facilitation of the funds by the Board illustrates a cordial business relationship. It also 
shows that, the co-operatives were by and large complementary to the work of 
agriculture marketing policy. However, through the Board and co-operatives the 
colonial authority controlled the marketing of coffee produced by Africans. A relived 
the BNCB function to promote co-operatives opened a new chapter as it was 
stressed that, ‘a closer co-operation with growers organisation remained vital for 
development of the industry’.799 
 
 
The practice in Kilimanjaro was that, the co-operatives were granted a marketing 
monopoly on the produce produced by natives as provided under the Chagga Rule 
and later the native coffee marketing legislation (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4). This 
maximized profit and protected growers from middlemen. However, this was not the 
case in Kagera when co-operative societies were registered in 1950. There was a 
strong case for not granting them a monopoly as from 1949 the government began 
speedy decontrol.800 It was argued that co-operatives had limited capacity and 
experience, and were not establish across the region. It has been mentioned that co-
operatives were operating parallel with zonal agents who had a long term contract 
with between the agents and the Ministry of Food, which was in operation until 1954. 
On this ground, the Commissioner of Co-operatives Development declined a 
                                                          
795 Extracts from BNCB Minutes No 322, 340 and 371, July 20th 1951, TNA 29585.   
796 Extracts from BNCB Minutes No 322, 340 and 371, July 20th 1951, TNA 29585; 
Tanganyika Government, Annual Report on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es 
Salaam: Government Printer, 1950), p.6. 
797 Extracts of the 25th meeting of the BNCB held on October 25th 1951, TNA 
11969/9. 
798 DA to Members of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Ref. No. 1368/7561, May 
19th 1952, TNA 29585. 
799 Extracts from BNCB Minutes held in November 6th 1952, TNA 29585.   




requested by the BNCB to compel traders under the African Agriculture Products 
(Control and Marketing), cap.211 of 1949 to sell through the BCU.801  
 
Nevertheless, by 1955 the co-operative societies had secured a majority share in 
coffee marketing at 51 per cent.  This would probably have been a much higher 
percentage share if it had not been for the parallel marketing system with zonal 
agents, which gave growers more options to choose from when selling their produce. 
The existence of the parallel marketing system had its effects on the co-operatives. 
For example, the growers and traders response to co-operatives were by and large 
uncertain and mixed. Firstly, the conditions created by the accommodation of a 
parallel marketing system and having all races competing in coffee marketing had far 
reaching impact as various stakeholders reacted differently upon establishment of 
the co-operatives.  Under such conditions the response towards the co-operative 
movement was largely detrimental to the colonial marketing policies and co-
operative movement in region as a whole.  
 
This was evident when co-operatives were introduced as coffee smuggling (okutwala 
emwani oumagendo) sprung up from Bukoba to Uganda where Robusta fetched a 
better price than in Tanzania (for further details see Chapter 2, section 2.4).802 Indian 
and Arab traders exploited their networks to smuggle coffee as far as Mombasa 
where it was sold in the auction with the Board and had Bukoba Native Plantation 
fair average quantity (FAQ) mark.803  
 
It has to be noted that non-natives were also cultivating coffee in Bukoba but the 
African Agricultural (Control and marketing) legislations exempted them from being 
subjected to the NA regulations and were not required to sell coffee through the 
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BNCB.804 Smuggling in Bukoba was facilitated by geographical proximity with some 
districts in the southern part of Uganda, the border being long and porous. Along the 
border in both countries’ communities share the same ethnic background and family 
ties, which made it possible for people to travel or visit each other. It is believed that 
during such visits they carried coffee with them to sell in Uganda where 25 per cent 
of the crop was smuggled to.805 An attractive price was an incentive for coffee 
smuggling to Uganda where the price was bolstered by a price stabilization fund.806 
In contrast, as coffee from Kagera had to be sold under contract to the Ministry of 
Food, its price was low. At the same time, coffee auctions were set-up in Kampala 
which offered better prices than co-operatives. Such conditions prompted smuggling 
from Kagera by traders so that they could fetch better prices. Thus, okutwala emwani 
oumagendo practices emerged as traders paid growers better prices compared to 
the co-operatives. 
 
The non-native produced coffee could be sold and exported with no restrictions but 
was strictly monitored by the colonial authority in an attempt to ensure quality was 
adhered to and to curb smuggling. BNCB records show that the non-native annual 
coffee production per year was only 10 tons of Arabica and 50 tons of Robusta which 
they exported and auctioned in Mombasa.807 However, in 1951 the non- natives 
exported 315 tons, 450 tons in 1952 and 844 tons in 1953. These records confirm 
that most of their exports were bought from growers.808 This was also an indication 
that smuggling practices were taking place in which non-natives were involved who 
exploited their trading network to facilitate such malpractices. This led to a 
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considerable quantity estimated around 3,155 tons between 1959/60 and 1960/61 
seasons being smuggled across the border to Uganda.809 
 
It was possible to terminate the licences of traders of whom about 200 were non-
natives and 400 Africans810 under Section 44 of cap 211 of the African Agricultural 
Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949, which provided for the 
compulsory sale of produce through a registered co-operative society which the 
BNCB attempted to exploit. But, this required the co-operative societies in 
compliance with the Government Notice No. 200 of 1951 regarding the African 
produced coffee crop to request the Commissioner of Co-operatives to invoke 
Section 44 of cap 211.811 
 
The Commissioner of Co-operative Department clearly believed that the traders had 
good intentions and any drastic change would lead to problems; but the way in which 
traders ‘advanced credits’ to growers was nothing other than advanced purchase of 
the product before it was harvested. This was popularly referred as okuguza 
obutula812 in Kihaya or kuchumbia kahawa in Kiswahili which implies mortgaging of 
coffee produce. The Bukoba DC shared a similar view to the Commissioner of Co-
operatives that there should not be an abrupt discontinuation of coffee traders’ 
licences even after the expiry of the Zone Agent agreement in October 1954813 due 
to concerns that if the co-operatives could not efficiently handle the crop this would 
ferment agitation to the detriment of the movement.814 On the other hand, however, it 
was perceived by the BNCB that the Co-operative Department policy was creating 
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space for traders to escalate coffee smuggling to the detriment of the industry and 
the movement.815 At this juncture, the BNCB appeared to support the co-operatives 
because the rate of smuggling was increasing placed its existence in jeopardy. 
Moreover, failure to collect a levy was feared could lead the BNCB into bankruptcy 
and prevent the NA from meeting its development goals and obligations.816  
 
In an attempt to reassure stakeholders’ in the co-operative movement the BCU 
launched a strategy to curb smuggling by increasing coffee prices.817 It also sought 
to raise awareness of the risks of smuggling through a newspaper named the 
Buhaya Co-operative News in 1957,818 which was printed in two languages, Kiswahili 
and Haya editions. The Bukoba Monthly was launched in the same year, selling 
3,500 copies. In 1967, the paper was renamed Bukoba Co-operative News. 
However, smuggling persisted until the early 1960s when world coffee prices fell 
drastically.819  
 
In addition to smuggling the BCU and its affiliated societies experienced a challenge 
from the Buhaya Coffee Planters Association (BCPA) which was formed in 1954 in 
Bukoba under the leadership of Mr H. Rugizibwa who in the 1930s led the NGA. 
Rugizibwa was the chairperson of TANU, Bukoba branch from 1954, and utilized 
TANU to resuscitate the NGA interests in the late 1950s to react against the failure 
of the BCPA leadership to recall and appreciate the difficulties faced by the NGA 
regarding registration due to its affiliation to politically motivated organisations.  
 
 
Its object was to serve 800 non-co-operative individual growers in Bukoba and to 
help them export and sell their coffee produce directly to Mombasa so as they could 
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benefit from a better price. It was also meant to address the smuggling problem that 
was growing following decontrol of coffee marketing. BCPA challenged BNCU by 
instilling in farmers a sense that it was a better alternative for coffee marketing and 
income. It also presented itself as a non-exploitative organisation as farmers could 
hold their crop for some time before selling. The BNCU responded by launching a 
successful campaign to convince farmers that it was not exploitative, which made 
clear that the price offered by the BNCU was dictated by the world market.820  
 
The BCPA’s idea was timely and coincided with the amendment of Section 6 of the 
1949 African Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) in July 1951, which 
repealed the boards’ powers to appoint agents and the requirement that growers 
market their produce through co-operatives. The amended Section 6, which provided 
for free marketing policy, was interpreted by the BCPA as an opportunity to be 
granted a license. The BCPA targeted its members from Kamachumu and Ihangiro 
where Arabica coffee was produced. Apart from serving non co-operative members 
the association was meant to challenge both, the BCU and BNCB by creating a new 
and alternative coffee marketing outlet. However, it was declined registration by the 
colonial authority on the grounds that the Bukoba and Kimwani Native Coffee 
(compulsory marketing) order of 1954 that was published as government Notice No. 
199 of 1954 still empowered BNCB to control coffee produced by the natives in the 
BCPA targeted villages.821  
 
Moreover, the Order was further enforced by the BNCB which declared that all 
coffee must be sold by producers to BNCU and in that case the registration of BCPA 
was null and void.822 In this respect, the BCPA intention to have a control of coffee 
industry could not materialise as the monopolistic marketing regulation embedded in 
the Order was granted to the BCU and BNCB. The legislation was introduced by the 
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colonial authority to protect the BCU which it created from facing competition from an 
organisation formed from below, and to secure a cheap supply of coffee.  
 
Rugazibwa made several national appeals and to the UNO against the declined 
registration. For example, he pursued registration of the BCPA with the CS following 
a declined registration approval at Provincial level. In his appeal letter he alleged that 
BCU was involved in gross misconduct, cheating its members and growers and 
employed compulsion approach to non-co-operative members to sell their produce 
through BCU affiliated societies which he viewed as a violation of human rights.823 
However, the CS rejected his appeal824 because he produced a fabricated complaint 
that the BCU was cheating growers. 825 
 
Despite the rejection of his application, Rugazibwa continued to pursue registration. 
He took his appeal to the UNO arbitration but it was not discussed. The matter 
became more serious as it was decided by the colonial government to deregister the 
TANU Branch in Bukoba on the ground that ‘the society was being or was likely to be 
used for purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with the maintenance of peace, 
order and good government’.826  
 
The closure of TANU, Kiberezo branch in Bukoba displeased its members. This led 
to intervention by TANU at Provincial level. In 1958 TANU discussed Rugazibwa’s 
BCPA and abuse of office in demanding registration of a co-operative society or a 
company that aimed at marketing coffee with no consensus from the TANU 
members. Rugazibwa was given two options by TANU; first, to remain in TANU 
leadership or concentrate on the BCPA. He opted to concentrate on BCPA instead of 
politics. His aim of using TANU to accelerate the BCPA’s popularity was put on hold, 
and denied him a vehicle to build popular support. The TANU decision culminated in 
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Rugazibwa’s loss of an anchor that he depended upon. The TANU’s decision 
demonstrates that it prioritised its own political development in Bukoba which was 
being exposed to a tug of war with the colonial authority by Rugazibwa. It was 
evident that TANU wished to keep politics away from the co-operative movement to 
avoid jeopardising its right to engage in political activity.    
 
At this stage Rugazibwa considered a new option to register BCPA as a company 
and presented an application to the Lake Province, PC.827  Once again, his 
application was rejected. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies sent a letter to the 
BCPA explaining that its application ‘could not be registered because it contravened 
the provision of section 352 of the Companies Ordinance (1921) that requires a 
company to have not more than 20 members but BCPA had 800 members’.828 
 
In summary, this section has examined the rise of the BCU. It has demonstrated the 
concerted top-down approach used by the colonial authority in its promotion and 
registration. The promotion of co-operatives and efforts to provide them with a 
monopoly over coffee handling however, experienced mixed results. On one hand, 
growers sold coffee to co-operatives but a substantial number also sold to private 
traders. This was mainly due to the free market policy. The policy provided grounds 
for an unsuccessful attempt by Mr Rugazibwa to form a co-operative society to 
market coffee in competition with the BCU. Rugazibwa was not successful because 
the colonial government had to intervene to pass legislation that provided the BCU 
with a monopoly on coffee produced in Kagera. The monopoly policy was extended 
after independence as discussed in the following chapter. 
 
5.6: POST-COLONIAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES  
This section discusses post-colonial co-operative development policy in the early 
1960s. It also examines the continuity of the colonial era policies and changes which 
were influenced by the political and ideological reforms which shaped the co-
operative movement. 
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The amendment to the Co-operative Act in 1963 had generally no significant impact 
on BCU as societies existed in almost all villages. However, the post-colonial 
government would implement policies that ran contrary to the internationally 
accepted co-operative principles and values. In particular, they failed to support a co-
operatives business model guided by voluntarism, democratic member control and 
return of surplus to members. 
 
For example, the Union and its affiliates were in 1964 appointed as agent of the 
NAPB for marketing maize in the district as well as a sole supply of sugar.829 This 
provided it with monopoly in grain. With enforced multipurpose functions co-
operatives’ volume of business increased, which required the recruitment of some 
new employees to manage the BCU. Simultaneously, the Union diversifies its 
activities into the dairy and pineapple projects to cater for local consumers. The 
Union became responsible for 100 acres of banana and pineapples in Kishunjo and 
Ihangiro.830 The new projects were implemented as a response to the ArD policy in 
which all 74 BCU affiliated societies were engaged in co-operative communal 
production. This was agreed at a general meeting that each society should have 10 
acres for banana and pineapple cultivations. However, pineapple projects failed and 
were ultimately abandoned as they were planted in unsuitable soil and climatic 
conditions. Where cultivation proved successful the stumbling block was the lack of 
market and storage facilities. 
 
The 1968 Co-operative Societies Act culminated in amalgamations to create one co-
operative unions for every regional political and administrative boundary. This 
involved strangulation of the BCU by the government on the pretext of amalgamating 
to enhance efficiency and productivity. The BCU had to disappear as it was 
amalgamated with two other Unions in June 28th 1974 to form the West Region Co-
operative Union (WERECU). The Unions were Bugufi (see appendix 18 for a list of 
Bugufi affiliated societies) registered in 1959 with five affiliated societies and Igokelo 
with 14 cotton marketing affiliated societies registered in 1965 (see appendix 17 for a 
                                                          
829 The BCU Annual Report for the Year 1968/69, (Bukoba: BCU Printing Unit), p.8. 
830 The BCU Report for years 1968/69, (Bukoba: BCU Printing Unit), p.8. 
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list of Igokelo affiliated societies).831  At this juncture, the co-operative principles were 
marginalised and the political features, structures and political objectives were 
slotted in that marked a significant shift from the colonial model pattern of co-
operation which was supposedly inappropriate in the specific national socialist 
context.  This generated a complete new organisation, quasi-co-operatives that were 
designed to serve political interest and thus, marginalised those of the movement.  
 
Since the Village Act (1975) deemed villages as a co-operative entity, it was a 
milestone that backed the government policy reorganising the co-operative 
movement. The Act rendered previous co-operative legislation redundant as primary 
co-operative societies that were a dominant feature in villages had to be replaced by 
the village which was responsible for and acted as sub-agent of marketing boards 
charged with multi-purpose functions (marketing or collection of crop and agricultural 
inputs distribution). As a result, the primary co-operative societies, in accordance to 
the legislation had to wind up businesses and dispose assets and liabilities to the 
village council. The measure was followed by the subsequent abolition of the 
WERECU in 1976. Under such changes the WERECU marketing functions and all 
assets such as coffee processing plants including the backup mill and the 
Tanganyika Instant Coffee Company (TANITA) were handed over to the Coffee 
Authority of Tanzania (CAT) established under the coffee Industry Act of 1977. 
 
Two years after the abolition the WERECU Tanzania went into war against Uganda 
following the occupation of part of the region, north of river Kagera in October 
1978.832 The Tanzania forces managed to push Ugandan forces out of Tanzania by 
early 1979. This is an indication that the region was a theatre of war for over four 
months with devastating effects in terms of human suffering, property, infrastructure 
and destruction. This disrupted coffee production as growers were either killed or 
could not engage in cultivation. As a result of the war, which continued until 1980, 
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coffee production and the co-operatives’ marketing was disrupted and dislocated.  
Since the co-operatives were disbanded there was no specialised organisation to 
provide growers with agricultural inputs resulting in declining crop production. The 
government’s support was non-existent, as the focus was the war. 
 
The end of the war generated a new serious problem, HIV and AIDS. Kagera region 
was at the epicentre of the spread of the disease. The disease led to loss of human 
labour as far as coffee production is concerned as farms were abandoned mainly by 
families which were affected.  At the national level, the war inflicted a great toll on the 
economy of the country because of mobilisation of resources, human and financial 
for the war. 833  It was this war that accelerated the country’s economic collapse, 
which was already facing a slowdown from 1973 due to the oil crisis and the collapse 
of commodity price.834 In an attempt to recover from further agriculture production 
decline reinstatement of the co-operatives was necessary to facilitate the country’s 
economic recovery. The co-operative was reinstated under the 1982 Co-operative 
Act. The WERECU was renamed Kagera Region Co-operative Union (KCU) which 
had 178 affiliated primary societies over 75,000 members.  
 
This section has examined the post-colonial policies which during the first seven 
years was characterised by support and protection of the BCU against private 
traders. This was also to ensure that the revenue accrued from coffee was protected 
for the interests of the national economy. From 1968 amalgamation of co-operative 
unions in each region was made obligatory. This depicted state interference on the 
co-operatives. In 1976 the union that was created by government was banned. A war 
against Uganda 1979 led to the near collapse of the coffee industry in the regions as 
                                                          
833 Interview with Edwin Mtei, the former Governor of Bank of Tanzania (March 14th 
2014); World Bank, Tanzania at the Turn of the Century: from Reforms to Sustained 
Growth and Poverty Reduction; A World Bank Country Study. Washington D.C: 
World Bank, 2001), p.50; URT; A Study on Integration of Employment Issues on 
Development Frameworks. (Dar Es Salaam, Ministry Of Labour, Employment And 
Youth Development and ILO 2010), p.iii; Benno Ndulu; Stabilization and Adjustment 
Policies and Programmes: Country Study 17 Tanzania, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (WIDER, 1987), p.11. 




inputs could not be supplied. The collapsing coffee industry and other external 
economic shocks forced the government to reinstate the Union in 1982.   
 
5.7: CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the inter-war period was characterised by an attempt by 
the colonial authority to streamline coffee marketing in Kagera region. This 
preoccupation did not take into consideration the promotion of the co-operatives to 
market native produced coffee as the focus was on private traders. It has to be noted 
that although the 1932 co-operative legislation was in place the colonial officials did 
not use the legislation as the basis for strategising the promotion of co-operative 
movement in the region. This clearly suggests that the colonial authority in the 
region, therefore, promoted the interests of the coffee merchants at the expense of 
native coffee growers.  
 
The colonial authority’s motivation was clearly dominated by political agenda as they 
viewed co-operatives as a threat to the establishment and a stepping stone to 
disorder and lawlessness. This was demonstrated by rejection of Northcote’s 
proposals to promote the NGA to a fully-fledged co-operative society. The colonial 
authority accused the NGA of representing a threat just as its leaders were members 
of the TAA. The political excuses were well manipulated to deny the NGA technical 
and financial support to facilitate its collapse. Basically, the NGA, particularly its 
leaders did not qualify the colonial test to become collaborators. Additionally, the 
colonial authority was unwilling to pass legislation that would provide the NGA with a 
monopoly over the coffee marketing. All these were not technical reasons but rather 
political excuses which were meant to accelerate its failure which did not occur until 
1937 when it was implicated with coffee improvement riots that warranted its 
abolition. Failure of the NGA to gain approval from the colonial authority was a 
serious blow to establishing a co-operative society in Kagera region by 1930s. 
Nevertheless, the treatment of the NGA by the government disregarded Section 4 of 
the Co-operative Societies Ordinance that permitted the Registrar to register co-
operatives which had objects to promote the economic interest of its members in 
accordance to the co-operative principles. This was also a defiance of its own 
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commitment to provide guidance and to satisfy any spontaneous demand for co-
operatives. It was only supportive in circumstances where co-operatives could be 
formed on top-down approach regardless of growers’ reactions.    
 
The post-war years saw an attempt to promote the co-operative movement mainly 
through external influence from the CO which stressed that development should take 
into consideration of the country’s prevailing condition. For example, in their 
response to external pressure from the CO, the Tanzania colonial authority through 
the DA issued a policy directive that dictated the promotion of the co-operatives in 
Kagera. The policy directives were merely an attempt to prepare ground for 
engagement of the co-operatives to take over coffee marketing when the long-term 
contract between the Ministry of Food and its agents in Kagera, the BNCB and 
agents came to an end. Importantly, the policy directives were designed to meet the 
colonial power and colonial authority’s needs in maximisation of coffee supply 
whereas those of growers were not primary for example improvement of their 
income. 
 
The Co-operative Department deployed an officer to promote co-operatives only to 
face a stumbling block in promoting the co-operatives. In this, the BNCB which had 
exclusive powers in coffee marketing as well as the contract to supply coffee to the 
Ministry of Food undermined the Co-operative Department initiatives. The stumbling 
block was removed through passage of the African Agricultural (Control and 
Marketing) Ordinance in 1949 which compelled all marketing boards to promote and 
appoint co-operatives as its agents. However, the growers were not prepared to form 
the co-operatives and the task was carried out by the Co-operative Department and 
the Governor who had to appoint the first two managers. Such appointments were, 
by and large political despite the fact that the appointees were qualified co-operative 
officers.  
 
Additionally, the way the BCU and its affiliated societies were formed characterised 
the top-down approach; and the appointments of the co-operative officers to manage 
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the BCU and its affiliated societies represented an extended arm of the government 
attempting to control coffee marketing. However, it must be underlined, that co-
operatives could not have made headway if they had faced opposition among the 
growers. It was on this premise that, when the BCPA was formed with interest to 
compete against the co-operatives or become an alternative outlet, the monopoly 
was granted to the BCU and its affiliated societies by and large  to deny BCPA 
access to coffee.  
 
Interestingly, when Tanzania achieved independence the colonial policies were 
further extended. The BCU was from that effect utilised by the post-colonial 
government to realise the same goal which was extraction of coffee revenue from 
growers. During the period the colonial model pattern of co-operation was adjusted 
to suit specific national policies. In general terms, the BCU was meant to handle 
crops from growers which were then exported by government’s marketing boards. To 
this effect, the post-colonial governments strengthened the administrative apparatus 
responsible for co-operation, and adjusted the co-operative legislation to fit the new 
era. But the approach and pattern employed during the 1950s by the colonial 
authority was the same during the post-independence era.   
 
The next chapter is on the VFCUS in which it evaluates why the early demands to 
form did not succeed. It also examines efforts involving a number of stakeholders 
and pressure exerted to the government that prompted formation and registration of 










CHAPTER SIX: THE VICTORIA FEDERATION OF CO-OPERATIVE UNIONS 
 
6.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the history of the VFCUS which was the first and only apex 
agricultural marketing organisation in Tanzania. The VFCUS had 20 affiliated unions 
and over 500 primary societies all of which emerged on the bottom-up basis. Its 
background can be traced to 1946 when the colonial authority intervened in the 
formation of co-operatives such as consumer societies that resulted into the 
registration of the Mwanza African Traders Consumer Co-operative Society 
(MATCS). The MATCS leaders played a key role in bringing various grassroots 
forces under the Lake Province Growers Association (LPGA) by pressurising the 
colonial authority which made an attempt to exclude the cotton growers and other 
stakeholders from collective action to the register cotton marketing co-operatives 
from 1953 that under the VFCUS were by 1959 marketing 90 per cent of the small-
scale growers produced cotton in Tanzania that brought to an end the dominance of 
Indian traders in the Industry which began as early as 1920s. By mid-1960s it was 
marketing and ginning the entire cotton produced in the WCGA only emerging as the 
largest co-operative organisation in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this 
achievement, the post-colonial government viewed the VFCUS and its structure as 
undesirable, inefficient and exploitative. Hence, in 1968 the government decided to 
dismantle it. This development has been misinterpreted by a number of authors as 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
6.2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Despite its importance to the business economy of the country and growers, no 
historical literature has documented the history of the VFCUS. There is limited 
literature on the co-operative development in the WCGA with none examining the 
VFCUS. The work by Maguire835and Magotti836 is based on political science. 
However, they have an enormous contribution as they have discussed the role 
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played by various stakeholders such as traders that led to the rise of movement in 
the WCGA.  
 
In examining the co-operatives and politic relationships, Maguire’s analysis is 
dominated by the role played by personalities such as Paul Bomani; the growers are 
neglected. Maguire’s focus is clearly about Bomani’s autobiography, thus, provides a 
limited history of the movement in the WCGA. Magotti’s dissertation narrowly 
focuses on the Mara region, which is part of the WCGA, with a small number of 
societies, only three unions and its business volume was low. In this regard Magotti 
does not explore the VFCUS. Carl’s dissertation837 misleads and distorts 
development in the WCGA. For example, he indicates that the growers played a part 
in the formation of the LSMB under the leadership of TANU. He is also of the view 
that the emergence of co-operatives was partly prompted by their opposition against 
cotton price. Dubell misleads the history of the growth of the co-operative movement 
in the WCGA as he points out that the VFCUS affiliated Unions were formed in 
1953.838 He is also on denial as to how the co-operative movement emerged in the 
area and the role played by various stakeholders in the entire process that led to the 
bottom up emergence of the co-operative societies. Coulson work which is political 
science based is also characterised my misleading ideas and arguments regarding 
the emergence of the mabebete and avapimi va magafu as well as the growth and 
development of the co-operative movement in the WCGA. For Coulson, the 
mabebete and avapimi va magafu mabebete were formed by Paul Bomani839  which 
is untrue, a matter which this chapter addresses at length; and it also corrects 
misinformation in which he shows out that, the VFCUS was formed in 1953.840   
 
                                                          
837 Josephs, Norman Carl Tanzania and the World Bank Group: socialism and self-
reliance? MA Dissertation, pp.139-140, Durham University, (1977), 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9748/ Accessed on December 26th 2014. 
838 F. Dubell, (1970), p. 7. 
839 Andrew Coulson, (1982), p. 67. 
840 Andrew Coulson, (1982), p. 67. 
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Thus, activities/events that revolved in the WCGA are neglected. Lyimo has 
discussed the rise of co-operatives in the WCGA;841 but there is a lack of clarity as to 
how they evolved. Lyimo also failed to provide a detailed account on the dismantling 
of the VFCUS which was replaced by the Nyanza co-operative Union. Unlike 
Maguire, Lyimo and Magotti, this chapter shifts away from profiling a biographical 
approach, incorporation of other groups, events, policies that led to the historical 
evolution of co-operative movement in the WCGA.  
 
Additionally, Lyimo’s work is disconnected and fails to provide a comprehensive 
account the VFCUS’s history. Maguire linked the development of the movement to 
the independence (Uhuru) struggle;842 and Magotti are inclined on political science 
whereas Lyimo focus is on rural sociology. So to say, all are non-historians. Lyimo 
has exclusively relied on secondary sources. Maguire has a well-documented 
chapter, but linked its development on the politics related to independence (Uhuru) 
struggle mainly for political science discipline.843 This chapter utilises previously 
unused primary sources to provide a more comprehensive historical account of the 
VFCUS. This chapter analyses the impact of colonial political decisions and cotton 
marketing policies on the growth of the cotton marketing co-operative movement in 
the WCGA. The chapter demonstrates the background and the role played various 
stakeholders in pressurising the Co-operative Department to register co-operative 
societies. It demonstrates why the colonial authority was not pro-active during inter-
and post-war years in promoting co-operatives. It also demonstrates why it became 
proactive and its significance to the development and response from cotton growers. 
Thus, in an attempt to address identified aspects, the discussion in this chapter is 
guided by three key research questions: 
                                                          
841 Francis Lyimo, (1984, pp. 59. 
842 G. Andrew Maguire, pp.45 – 149; Göran Hydén, The Politics of Cooperatives in 
Tanzania, In Göran Hydén (et al), Cooperatives in Tanzania: problems of 
organisation building, (Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), pp.7-19; 
George Bennett, Tribalism in Politics in P.H. Gulliver (ed.), Tradition and Transition in 
East Africa: introduction, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 81.  
843 G. Andrew Maguire, (1969), pp.45 – 149; Göran Hydén, (1976), pp.7-19; George 
Bennett, (1969), p. 81.  
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1. How were the agriculture and crop marketing policies linked to the promotion 
of the co-operatives during the interwar period?  
2. How did the colonial political and policy decisions influenced and shaped the 
emergence of co-operatives? 
3. In what ways did the changing political and ideological influences of the 
emerging Tanzanian state shape the co-operative movement during the first 
two decades of independence?      
 
6.3: THE POLITICAL DECISIONS ON THE CO-OPERATIVE 
This section analyses various aspects of how the co-operative movement that 
emerged in 1930s was arrested for political reasons; similarly in the 1950s. It has 
been mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 that the WCGA is a vast geographical 
area which has produced 90 per cent of the cotton in Tanzania (see map No 3 
below). The area in the north-west of the country which comprised of such regions 
as Mwanza, Mara and Shinyanga, formerly were part of Lake Province. The area 
















Map 3: Chiefdoms and Western Cotton Producing Area 
 
 
Since 1920s Indian traders flocked in and dominated cotton purchase from growers 
at established/centralised cotton market and engaged in ginning.844 The industry was 
closely supervised by the Department of Agriculture, the ECGC, as well as the 
Provincial and District authorities and the NA (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4 for details), 
to ensure that the quality of the produce was met.  
 
The Indian traders’ domination of the market was obvious because the growers had 
no knowledge of cotton markets beyond their villages or neighbouring towns and 
they had no capital; but were interested in having a stake in marketing that 
demonstrated through their struggle against the Indian monopoly. In their struggle, 
                                                          
844 DA to CS, Ref. No. 6/5389, July 24th 1935, TNA 23218. 
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various attempts for entry into marketing were made. These attempts differed 
according to the district and they lacked cohesion as examined below. 
 
The primary evidence shows that Chiefs in the WCGA initiated the earliest cotton 
marketing co-operatives. In May 1932 by Chief Mgemela of Bakwimba in Kwimba 
District approached the DC to present a formal request on behalf of his subjects for 
establishing a co-operative society.845 His request came at a time of economic 
recession, when growers’ income was seriously affected by the falling price of 
cotton. For him, co-operatives offered a solution to the problem as he envisioned it 
would improve their income.846 The economic crisis also had an impact on 
government revenue, which led it to withdraw funds for building a planned hospital in 
his Chiefdom.847  
 
The existing literature is unable to account for the colonial authority’s decision. For 
example, Iliffe points out that, the reasons for Chief Mgemela ‘unsuccessful 
proposals are not clear’.848 This study has established that Kwimba DC gave two 
reasons for declining his request. Firstly, the co-operative legislation was yet to be 
approved by the Colonial Office (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2 for details).849 Clearly, 
Chief Mgemela’s proposal was unlikely to succeed because the colonial authority's 
policy at the time was against registering co-operatives outside Kilimanjaro (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2 and chapter 4, Section 4.3 for details). Secondly, the DC 
indicated that it was not necessary to have a co-operative society, as the Native 
Treasury had effectively been playing the same role;850 an argument that was 
accepted by Chief Mgemela. In an attempt to stimulate the growth of co-operative 
                                                          
845 Extracts from meeting between P.M. Huggis, the DO of Kwimba and Chief 
Mgemela, May 20th 1932, TNA 20999 Economic Development: Agriculture 
Production in the Colonies; Iliffe, (1979, p.295). 
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848 John Iliffe, (1979), p.295. 
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Mgemela of Bakwimba, held in May 20th 1932, TNA 20999.  
850 Extracts from meeting between P.M. Huggis, the DO of Kwimba and Chief 
Mgemela of Bakwimba, May 20th 1932, TNA 20999. 
252 
 
movement in Africa, Strickland had idea to utilise NA but, with limited control of co-
operative societies.851  This suggests that, Strickland had an idea of top-down 
imposition of co-operatives to the colonised; but, the DC was not interested 
altogether as he indicated the disadvantages of the co-operatives that co-operative 
societies would lead to the loss of the NA treasuries revenue by taking over cotton 
marketing. The advantages were all accepted by the Chief that highlights his 
(Chief’s) ignorance of matters relating to co-operatives and local government given 
that, the two were not the same but, the DC and managed to convince Chief 
Mgemela to abandon his idea. For example, a co-operative society is a members-
based business organisation; the native authority is a government institution at local 
level charged with executing law and order, and provision of services from funds 
generated from taxes.  
 
However, the DC forwarded the matter to the PC who sent it852 to the CS for further 
action.853 The CS was against the formation of the co-operative society in Kwimba 
district as the KNPA threat was still fresh in the mind of colonial authority officials. In 
his reply to the Kwimba, the DC pointed out that ‘if the society is allowed, it must 
progress with care, and with great care without conflict among the members of the 
Chiefs.854 The CS pointed out further that: 
as you are aware, owing to absence of trained staff, this government is at 
present not in a position to give assistance or encouragement to the 
development of co-operative societies; however, there are some natives who 
are capable of managing societies, but it is not possible to contemplate the 
immediate registration of co-operative societies either in Kwimba or anywhere 
else with the exception of the KNPA owing to peculiar circumstances.855  
 
However, the following year A.A. Wills, a Mwanza based barrister representing the 
BCGA’s in the WCGA, noted that ‘the idea of co-operatives and ginning was tickling 
in the minds of some of Natives’.856 This was an attempt by Wills to convince the 
                                                          
851 C.F. Strickland, (1932), p.36. 
852 DC, Kwimba to PC Lake Province, Ref. No. 2/15/16/2, May 30th 1932, TNA 
20999. 
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government to enable the NA in the WCGA to purchase three of its two ginneries 
based at Nyambiti and Nyanguge in Kwimba district and one in Biharamulo district.  
 
The BCGA initiative was prompted by trading difficulties it faced due to intense 
competition from Indian traders. However, the idea was rejected by the SNA who 
pointed out that ‘time to accommodate them (co-operatives) was not ripe’.857 
However, two years earlier Chief of Bukwimba showed interest. It also indicates that 
the authority had inconsistent answers to whoever approached them. As a result of 
the SNA decision, the BCGA was forced to hand over the ginneries to Native 
Authorities in Biharamulo as a gift.858 The progress and number of societies 
mentioned demonstrate clear evidence that there was an unsupportive environment 
for growth and development of co-operatives in other parts of the country. 
 
Apart from internal challenges highlighted above, the WCGA’s remoteness from 
Tanga and Dar–Es-Salaam ports, poor roads and lack of railway transport until 1928 
from Mwanza to Dar-Es-Salaam prompted the Tanzania colonial government to 
mandate the Ugandan government to dictate marketing policy for cotton produced in 
the WCGA. It was on the same premise that cotton marketing was dominated by 
Indian traders from Uganda.   
 
Development in Uganda in regard to the co-operative movement had far reaching 
effect in the WCGA. Tanzania had its co-operative legislation in 1932 that Kenya and 
Uganda showed interest to have the same.859 The Ugandan colonial government 
had had a co-operative bill in place in 1935 but it was rejected by the LEGCO on the 
ground that, it was too early to promote co-operative movement, as this would led to 
the participation of the colonial authority in commerce and the natives were not 
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capable to handle cotton marketing;860 thus, this implied that, the sphere should left 
to Asian traders without interferences. It was insisted in the 1935 that, further 
investigation and consultations need to be carried out so as to justify the passage of 
the legislation that in 1937 it as presented to the LEGCO for a second time but was 
dropped due to strong opposition mainly from Asian LEGCO members861 on the 
grounds that time was not ripe to accommodate the co-operatives.  
 
The outbreak of WWII led to a further delays as cotton marketing was handled by 
Exporters Group under Bulk purchase contract in which the Ugandan role was 
dominant. At this stage, the cotton marketing policy favoured of private traders; thus, 
promotion of co-operatives was not a priority as it was in Uganda. However, new 
policy development began to emerge in 1944 when Mr W.K.H. Campbell was sent by 
the Colonial Office to conduct an investigation into opportunities for co-operative 
development in East African countries.  
 
In his report, Campbell made clear that the time was ripe to promote co-operatives 
owing to the prevalence of embryonic associations that suggested some degree of 
spontaneous growth that required legislation and government guidance.862 It was out 
of his recommendations that the legislation was passed in Uganda in 1946 leading to 
the creation of the Department of Co-operatives and registration of societies.  
 
Nevertheless, this policy change in favour of co-operatives in Uganda had minimal 
effect in the WCGA. A lack of effect in in the WCGA was compounded by a lack of a 
Cotton Marketing Board; also the Cotton Ordinance of 1937 neither provided for the 
formation of the Board nor encouragement of co-operatives. The same was with the 
Africa Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance of 1949. The Lint and Seed 
Marketing Ordinance No. 11 of 1952 that provided for setting up of the LSMB in April 
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35783; S.K. Kobia, (2011), p.3.                         
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1st 1952 was a significant watershed for the development towards the promotion of 
the co-operatives. Nevertheless, the formation of the LSMB was not an automatic 
guarantee for promotion of co-operatives largely because of contracts with the 
Ministry of Food in which the East African Group was still handling the WCGA-
produced cotton (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Obstructions from Tanzanian colonial 
authority contributed to further delay as highlighted below.   
 
It has to be noted that, for decades, the cotton buyers in the WCGA exploited various 
loopholes to manipulate their dirty tricks. For example, they exploited growers 
because majority of them were illiterate and could not read scales and price provided 
by the cotton price reckoner;863 they could not differentiate cotton grades and 
counting money paid to them. They were disadvantaged as the existing regulations 
and restrictions were inadequate to curb the practices;864 this was so because, in 
some cases colonial civil servants in Geita District were bribed by Indian traders to 
collude in cheating of growers.865 In other instances growers were intimidated if they 
questioned traders’ tricks.866 It is obvious that the growers were intimidated growers 
as to silence them from raising an alarm over their tricks.  
 
Ruthernberg argues that cheating of growers by Indian traders was non-existent and 
mere campaigns to tarnish their reputation.867 Ruthenberg’s findings and conclusion 
are based on a small sample out of hundreds in the WCGA. He cites evidence from 
Ukerewe that he generalised as the practice and trend throughout the WCGA. The 
evidence from Ukerewe shows that ‘50 per cent of scales from 9 buying posts used 
by avapimi va magafu were defective’.868 Evidence shown by the Ukerewe DC 
shows that there were 7 and not 9 defective scales that were being used by avapimi 
                                                          
863 The DA’s Minutes records of a meeting to review strategies for improvement in 
cotton marketing, (January, 1949), TNA 215/1423/A. 
864 DA to CS, Ref. No. 1312, February 22 1935, TNA 22813. 
865 Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza (Council of Chiefs), October 2nd 1950, TNA 
215/1423/A.     
866 Popat Ranji to Lake Province PC June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947 and Dec 
22nd 1947 to Bishop of Mwanza, TNA 215/1423/C; Uzinza Farmers Association to 
Ibanza (Council of Chiefs), October 2nd 1950, TNA 215/1423/A.     
867 Hans Ruthernberg, (1964), p.57. 
868 DC, Mwanza to  PC, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 1423/C. 
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va magafu at Murutunguru and Bwilo cotton buying posts.869 These are some of the 
scales that were supplied by the Lake Province Ginners Association which was 
comprised of Indian cotton traders. According to DC, the defects were not 
intentional.870 Ruthernberg conclusion clearly misleads and downplays the 
magnitude and cheating extent. Again, he did not take into account that traders kept 
the two types of scales (kapani871 in Kisukuma).872 It was one recommended by the 
government and working perfectly, but not regularly used in the absence of 
inspectors and there were also those which were defective that were regularly used 
to weigh growers’ produce.873 Additionally, there is evidence by individuals like Popat 
Ramji and the Sukuma Federation Council of Chiefs shows cheating practice by 
India traders was widespread. Minutes records of a meeting held between the 
Assistant DA and ginners in Mwanza town shows cheating during and after the 
Second World War was widespread, this was due to monopoly granted to buyers in 
zones.874 Control of the practice was difficult because government officers were 
bribed by buyers.875 The practices were critical and were reported by some whistle 
blowers to colonial authority in the WCGA. For example, Popat Ramji who was one 
of cotton buyers pointed the magnitude of the practice that ‘only 75 per cent of the 
                                                          
869 DC, Mwanza to  PC, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 1423/C. 
870 DC, Mwanza to  PC, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 1423/C. 
871 Interview with E.Y. Masele, John Richard Madata (October 30th 2012) and John 
Joseph Kabado (November 12th 2012). 
872 Agriculture Office and Ginnery Inspector, Ref. No. 262/1310, May 4th 1950; DO 
Maswa Dstric to Pc, Lake Province, Ref. No. 286/90, February 19th 1949; Popat 
Ranji to Lake Province PC June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947  and Dec 22nd 1947 
to Bishop of Mwanza, TNA 215/1423/C; Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza 
(Council of Chiefs), October 2nd 1950, TNA 215/1423/A; BNCB Annual Report, 
November 1947 – 1948, pp. 14 – 16. 
873 Agriculture Office and Ginnery Inspector, Ref. No. 262/1310, May 4th 1950; DO 
Maswa Dstric to Pc, Lake Province, Ref. No. 286/90, February 19th 1949; Popat 
Ranji to Lake Province PC June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947 and Dec 22nd 1947 
to Bishop of Mwanza, TNA 215/1423/C; Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza 
(Council of Chiefs), October 2nd 1950, TNA 215/1423/A; BNCB Annual Report, 
November 1947 – 1948, pp. 14 – 16. 
874 Minutes records of a meeting held between the Assistant DA and ginners, 
(undated, 1949) TNA 215/1423/C. 
875 Minutes records of a meeting held between the Assistant DA and ginners, 
(udated, 1949) TNA 215/1423/C. 
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government’s set price was paid to growers’;876 he specifically cited buyers 
employed by Messrs Ladha Meghji and Sons Ltd in Ukerewe.877  
 
Other whistle blowers were the Uzinza Farmers Association under the leadership of 
Masanje Shija Mabenga and Luka Chimani who presented their complaints to the 
Sukuma Federation Council of Chiefs (Ibanza) by arguing that the Buchosa ginnery 
which had a monopoly over the purchase cotton of which its cotton buying clerks 
cheated farmers in the Buchosa Zone.878 In response, the government established 
the centralised cotton markets which were placed under the NA879 to facilitate 
supervision, checking weight and quality control. Government officials as Messers 
N.V. Rounce who was the Provincial Agriculture Officer, Renman and E. Drankley 
who were the Agricultural and Ginnery Inspector respectively were deployed to 
conduct inspections and to ensure cheating was minimized. But curbing the 
practices by government officials was either poor or inadequate due to shortage of 
staff that it was too difficult to arrest. Thus, the control of the practice was difficult 
because government officers responsible to control cheating were bribed by 
buyers.880 These officers were on some occasions seen in bars by traders.881 This 
proves again that Ruthernberg conclusions were unfounded. 
 
The government response was viewed as a deliberate by growers and they 
responded forming informal groups, the mabebete first in the Magulanja village in 
Nassa among the Wasukuma then spreading to other villages and districts, also the 
                                                          
876 Popat Ranji to Lake Province PC June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947 and Dec 
22nd 1947 to Bishop of Mwanza, TNA 215/1423/C. 
877 Popat Ranji to Lake Province PC June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947 and Dec 
22nd 1947 to Bishop of Mwanza, TNA 1423/C. 
878 Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza (Council of Chiefs), October 2nd 1950, TNA 
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881 Minutes records of a meeting held between the Assistant DA and ginners, 
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avapimi va mangafu in Nansio, Ukerewe among the Wakerewe.882 Most authors 
refer these groups as independent weighers. These groups comprised of volunteers 
who provided some help to growers to read scales all over Sukumaland and the 
Ukerewe Island. Moreover, these groups did not confine their functions to reading 
scales and weighing services in cotton buying posts managed by Indian cotton 
buyers, they also checked the quality of cotton delivered by farmers and helped them 
to grade it. They also helped the illiterates to count their money paid by the cotton 
buyers.883 
 
The colonial authority in the WCGA was not happy with the mabebete and avapimi 
vamagafu as were labelled by some of the colonial officials as being troublesome.884 
But, they were not declared illegal. Gorst in her illustration of the Cotton Ordinance 
points out that, the mabebete and avapimi vamagafu were licenced throughout the 
WCGA.885 This was not the case as the Cotton Ordinance provided for cultivation 
marketing and ginning. Again, the Ordinance had nothing to do with these groups, 
but separate regulations and by-laws were passed in 1949 by the NA to provide for 
their operations and control mainly in Buchosa and Nassa.886 Under regulations and 
by-laws they were not allowed to operate within 400 yards of cotton buying posts in 
most of the WCGA. But in Ukerewe they operated in the Indians’ buying posts. The 
regulations and bylaws obliged use of government recommended scales which were 
supplied by the cotton Ginners Association, the Tanganyika Africa Association (TAA) 
and NA for correct weighing of cotton. However, these groups primarily addressed 
cheating. Their objective did not, however, provide a sustainable solution as far as 
entry of growers into cotton market, but laid a foundation for organised groups that 
expressed their concern over cheating and curbing the practice with the support of 
TAA, NAs and Ginners Association. The existence of these groups was 
                                                          
882 Co-operative Buying and Ginning in the Lake Province, TNA 1423C; O. Gottfried, 
and M.B. Lag, Problems of Social and Economic Change in Sukumaland, 
Tanganyika, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 35, No.2, April (1962),  p. 86-101.   
883 Interview with E.Y.Masele (October 30th 2012), Festo Ganzila (October 29th 2012) 
and John Richard Madata (October 30th 2012); John Joseph Kabado (November 12th 
2012) and K.K Nangale (November 13th 2012).  
884 Geita’s DC to Sukumaland (Ibanza) Administrative Officer Incharge, July 6th 1952, 
TNA 215/1423/C.  
885 Sheila Gorst, (1959), p.172. 
886 A Report on the Co-operative Development, TNA 215/1423C. 
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fundamentally important in the growth of co-operatives in the WCGA as shown in the 
next section. 
 
6.4: PRESSURE FROM BELOW 
This section sheds light on developments leading to the registration of co-operatives 
in the WCGA. Unlike in the previous cases, the pressure in the WCGA was 
dominated by cotton growers at different capacity; but political decisions played a 
part in slowing down the pressure from below. After years of uncertainties and lack 
of activities as shown in the section above, new developments emerged from 1949 
to early 1950s. These are presented separately in this section covering one district to 
the other and at Provincial level, involving Chiefs, growers, and the MATCS who 
exerted pressure on the colonial authority for registration of co-operative societies in 
the WCGA. In February 8th 1952 Chief David Kidaha Makwaia of Usiha approached 
the Lake Province Commissioner to pressurise for co-operative development in the 
WCGA.887 In the discussion with the PC he was informed that, the difficulty lay in the 
lack of trained staff to facilitate guidance of the co-operatives.  
 
New plans were in place by 1951, proposed by the Lake Province Council,888 which 
met to evaluate the development of the cotton industry and to review implementation 
of the Governor’s memorandum to expand cotton production that was issued a year 
earlier.889 At the meeting it emerged that cotton production was 39,000 bales which 
was disappointingly below the previous year and the government estimates which 
had envisaged an excess 40,000 bales (see Table 6 for more statistics). The 
Provincial Council speculated a number of reasons for poor production at a point 
when conditions were favourable.  
 
Additionally, growers received reasonable prices which were 53 cents per lb. in 1951 
from 34 cents in 1950.890 The price increase was prompted by a boom due to the 
                                                          
887 PC to Provincial Council, TNA 21032. 
888 Annual Report of the Lake Province Council on Agricultural and Natural 
Resources Committee 1951, TNA 21032. 
889 PC, Lake Province to PC, Lake Province Member of Local Government, 
Confidentila, Ref. No 29121/41, December 10th 1951, TNA 28259/21 
890 John Iliffe, (1979), p.453. 
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Korea War, which broke out in June 1950 that heightened a panic among raw 
material and food stuff importers also and widespread build-up of strategic 
inventories in industrialised countries who anticipated shortages which added to 
demand and pushed up prices for such crops as sisal, tea and coffee.891 The 
earnings from export of mentioned crops were directed into improvement of 
communication network and extension of the Tanga railway line from Korogwe to 
Moshi.892   
 
As a result of increased demand for the mentioned crops, two policy options to 
stimulate and increase cotton production were considered. First, compulsion 
measures were reintroduced under Ordinance No 57 of 1951 for growers to cultivate 
minimum cotton acres and make sure they are well attended; and the second option 
was that, such performance would have been much better if the co-operative 
movement were in place.893 However, promotion of co-operatives was a long term 
plan unlike compulsion measures which had to be implemented immediately. 
 
Consideration of co-operatives by the Provincial Council meeting was a secondary 
option but its recognition illustrates the movement was becoming significant within 
colonial authority circles. At the meeting Africans who were unofficial members of the 
Lake Province Council seized this opportunity to exert pressure on the government 
to promote co-operatives.894 As a result, it was unanimously agreed that the co-
operatives of the peasant to be encouraged. A resolution was immediately circulated 
to all districts in the WCGA for implementation. This suggests that the policy was not 
part of the national plan and it was not mandatory and legally binding as shown in a 
discussion below.  
 
                                                          
891 Billy Frank, (2002), pp.213-214. 
892 Billy Frank, (2002), pp.218-219. 
893 Annual Report of the Lake Province Council on Agricultural and Natural 
Resources Committee, 1951, TNA 21032. 
894 Note from PC, Lake Province to Commissioner to Commissioner of Co-operative 




Interestingly, Geita District responded positively,895 anticipating that co-operatives 
would enhance the local economy and standards of living. They framed their support 
in the context of Article 10 of the Trusteeship Agreement and Article 76 of the UN 
Charter, which emphasises the promotion of political, economic, social and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika. They also perceived that 
the Sukuma people were lagging behind their counterparts in Bukoba and 
Kilimanjaro where the movement was already advanced stage.896 Clearly, the 
colonial authority in Geita district viewed the international agreement as the viable 
commitment that the Provincial administration was obliged to adhere to; and it casts 
doubts on the colonial policy and commitment regarding the promotion of co-
operatives which proved to bias coffee marketing. 
 
The efforts undertaken in Geita District regarding the co-operative movement were 
echoed in the Lake Province Council Memorandum for Natural Resources. However, 
doubts were raised about the feasibility of co-operative development; that clearly 
illustrates that the colonial authority had not prioritised to use co-operatives for any 
purpose ranging from marketing of cotton to utilise them as instruments for 
invigoration of development as championed by the UNO, CO as well as Fabian 
Colonial Bureau. It was the view of the Council that such a development has to wait 
until the co-operative officer was deployed to provide guidance to societies.897 This 
reticence was ultimately due to the decisions made by the colonial authority in the 
1930s, when it declined to establish the Co-operative Department, recruitment as 
well as training of staff. The Council was also influenced by Ugandan experience 
where co-operatives proved a failure owing to lack of funds when were introduced in 
1949.898  
 
                                                          
895 DO, Geita District to Chairman Lake Province Council, November 10th 1951, TNA 
215/1423/C. 
896 DO, Geita District to Chairman Lake Province Council, November 10th 1951, TNA 
215/1423/C. 
897 Note from PC, Lake Province to Commissioner to Commissioner of Co-operative 
Development (on official visit in Bukoba), November 16th 1951, TNA 215/1423/C. 
898 Note from PC, Lake Province to Commissioner of Co-operative Development who 
was on official visit in Bukoba, November 16th 1951, TNA 215/1423/C. 
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A lack of support from the Provincial Council did not deter colonial officials in Geita 
district. For example, in a meeting of the Geita District Team held in January 7th 1952 
it was stressed that the PC should ‘facilitate availability and the services of a co-
operative Officer as soon as possible’.899 Thereafter, the Commissioner of Co-
operative Development,900 who was responsible for deployment of an officer, was 
informed that the growers were becoming more vocal and more interested in the 
controlling marketing of their crops especially following the introduction of the zone 
scheme that led to monopoly buying and increased cheating.  
  
However, the Commissioner was sceptical regarding the prospects for co-operatives 
in the WCGA and cited Uganda's difficulties as an example.901 He disregarded the 
Lake Province government officials’ efforts to promote co-operatives and rejected the 
proposal for the formation of cotton marketing co-operatives by pointing out that ‘I do 
not see clearly what is envisaged and I am not in faith (favour) with cotton marketing 
organisation in Tanganyika as the Africans are not easily traceable and they do not 
have postal address that would render society’s meetings impossible’.902 The 
Commissioner’s position was contrary to the prevailing idea to use co-operatives as 
instrument for development advocated by the UNO, and Fabian Colonial Bureau. 
This indicates also that, the idea was out of the question in the Tanzania’s colonial 
policies that appears to support the promotion of coffee marketing co-operatives as 
the case of Kilimanjaro and Kagera on the one hand and discards co-operatives for 
cotton marketing. In an extreme case, it shows that there was a lack of informed 
policy making and discrepancies between the CO policy intent and policy outcome in 
Tanzania, which emerge in the process of policy implementation or the colonial 
officials who were the key policy implementing agents who had either distanced 
themselves or had no idea of how to implement the policy. 
 
                                                          
899 DO (signed by Edward Hawlenge), Geita District to PC, Lake Province, Ref. No. 
1/19/1, February 23rd 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
900 PC, Lake Province to DC, Geita District to, Ref. No. TNA 215/1423/A/303, March 
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901 Commissioner of Co-operative Development to PC, Lake Province, Ref. No. Co-
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902 Registrar of Co-operative Societies to PC, Lake Province, Ref. No. Co-
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The Commissioner’s stance reflected the government policy of supporting the private 
sector. It also illustrates the absence of local co-operative development policies and 
disregard of the CO circular that required colonial authority to encourage co-
operatives where were non-existent. The Commissioner might have had some 
justification for being hesitant given that the LSMB was only formed in 1952; too 
young to provide support to co-operatives. However, the Commissioner’s position 
was contradictory as he agreed to provide support in Bukoba where government 
officials from across neighbouring districts were mobilised to facilitate formation of 
co-operative societies.903 The policy implementation and the colonial officials’ 
attitude, demonstrate the double standards which brought the whole approach into 
disrepute. 
 
Regardless of the administrative and procedural difficulties detailed above, the 
societies kept on growing in Geita District, where development was independent 
from those in other districts (Mwanza, Ukerewe and Kwimba). This illustrates the 
commitment to meet the aspirations of the growers regardless of any impediments 
from the Co-operative Department. The evidence from Geita District shows that in 
1952904 there were emerging embryonic growers’ associations mainly in Buchosa 
and Karumo Chiefdom such as Wakulima wa Kiafrika, Wafikiri African Union 
Association of Sengerema, Wakulima Stadi, Sukuma Union and Zinza Union; also 
the MATCS which had 200 members. 905  
 
Some of these societies formed a secondary society called the Mweli Co-operative 
Union which had 1,700 members.906 The Mweli Co-operative Union was formed in 
                                                          
903 DO (signed by Edward Hawlenge), Geita District to PC, Lake Province, Ref. No. 
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906 Geita’s DC to Sukumaland (Ibanza) Administrative Officer Incharge on July 6th 
1952, TNA 215/1423/C.   
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July 1952 for all societies in Buchosa and Karumo Chiefdoms907 to pursue their 
aspirations for registration and start cotton marketing and ginning. The Union was 
more vibrant and active in Geita District. In addition to pursuing registration it 
presented several demands to the district authority government which were: 908 
a) Scrapping of the zoning system because it created a monopoly and 
undermined free marketing competition and it was of no use in the post WWII 
era 
b) Stamp out cheating in cotton marketing  
c) Reconsideration of the cotton rule that required mabebete to be stationed 400 
yards from buying post as it stimulated cheating. 
  
For Official’s like Mr Halwenge this was a development worthy of recognition and 
support. Indeed, the Mweli Farmers Union enjoyed support from Colonial Officials in 
Geita District (see location on map 3 below). Halwenge reiterated that ‘the delay to 
register it was a politically motivated agenda and unnecessary punishment to 
Wasukuma who were not troublesome, in favour of the non- native in the cotton 
industry’.909 For him, the Provincial administration should register co-operatives as 
resources and experiences to do so were available, the same as in Kagera where 
colonial officials were mobilised from the neighbouring districts for a registration of 
societies exercise.910 
 
The frustration expressed by Hawlenge demonstrates that the government, 
particularly the Co-operative Department, had no plan in place for immediate action. 
The engagement of Hawlenge was likely viewed by the colonial authority as an 
important delaying tactic and as absorption of the growers’ frustrations. In other 
WCGA locations such as Mwanza, Ukerewe and Kwimba districts (see locations on 
map 4 below) there were also a growing number of embryonic societies that 
emerged spontaneously.  
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Unlike in Geita, societies in other WCGA’s districts had cohesion under the umbrella 
of the Mwanza based Mwanza African Traders Co-operative Society (MATCS) and 
had registration number 61. The MATCS was established in 1946 by African traders 
in Mwanza town following the outbreak of the Second World War. This was the first 
African consumer co-operative society in the WCGA. It was formed to facilitate 
wholesale purchase of rationed consumer goods on behalf of shopkeepers in the 
WCGA or Lake Province.911 Its formation was necessitated after the colonial 
authority regulated supply of consumer goods through rationing. This was so 
because production during the war in Britain, which was main supplier, was mainly 
geared to War needs rather than exports leading to a shortage of supplies. It can be 
recalled that rationing was employed in Britain during the war, but in Tanzania it was 
marred by some corrupt practices mainly by Indians traders who sold in black 
markets to African consumers. The MATCS was a significant impetus to the growth 
of agriculture marketing co-operative ideals in the WCGA and had branches in towns 
and villages across the WCGA attracting a significant number of members among 
traders and local chiefs. Such membership was important when it was envisaged to 
engage in cotton marketing as it has been shown in Appendix 19. 
 
The increased number of societies in Mwanza, Ukerewe and Kwimba districts, some 
of which were affiliated to the MATCS, alarmed the Provincial authority. In 1952 the 
Lake PC in a confidential letter912 instructed all the DCs to conduct reconnaissance 
on the growth and development of societies in the Province in order to identify their 
specific activities. The reconnaissance was deemed necessary at that time due to 
the Mau ‘rebellion’ in Kenya. In this case it was aimed at establishing whether their 
activities were political and if so, and to devise strategies to arrest them. The 
government investigation revealed that there were many associations with hundreds 
of members, some of which were unregistered independent or clandestine societies 
as summarised in Appendix 19.  
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The listed societies had the by-laws and its own elected leadership; but the 
command centre was in Mwanza led by MATCS. However, Maguire posits that 
Bomani was pivotal in influencing development in Ukerewe;913 but, this study has 
learnt from primary evidence that unregistered societies in Ukerewe openly and 
independently conducted its activities from any force outside the district. The most 
prominent society was the Ukerewe Famers Society, which had members among the 
growers and traders who were seeking primarily a greater share in the proceeds of 
the cotton industry.  
 
Unlike in Geita district colonial officials did not provide support to any embryonic 
society in Ukerewe. The DC in particular was not accommodating and was sceptical 
about such societies, perceiving the co-operatives as an unreliable means for the 
natives to undertake their own cotton marketing. He claimed, 'such a scheme in 
Ukerewe would be calamitous'.914 He was of the opinion that, it would lead to 
exploitation by a few individuals for private gain.915 Therefore, the DC supported the 
continuation of marketing under Indian traders as that guaranteed the government 
revenue as it was ‘not much financial losses.916  
 
The Ukerewe DC was strongly against the avapimi va magafu (independent 
weighers groups), viewing them as troublesome and thye were ‘a nuisance to buyers 
and they have made trouble in buying posts as a national sport in the district’.917  He 
pointed out that, they are ‘manned by semi-illiterates who frequently made errors and 
that 50 per cent of their scales were proved defective when they were checked on 
August 24th 1948’;918 an evidence that Ruthernberg capitalised to support his 
conclusion against a widespread notion that, growers were being cheated by Indian 
cotton buyers.919  For Ruthernberg this suggests that, not only Indian cotton buyers 
cheated the growers, but the practice was being employed by the avapimi va 
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magafu. All this was an attempt by the DC to degrade and undermine the credibility 
of the Ukerewe Famers Society. The DC’s position against the promotion of the co-
operative movement was clear. He strongly argued that ‘I offer the opinion that such 
scheme would be a calamitous failure if introduced in Ukerewe because there is no 
spirit of co-operation among the people’.920 He further argued that, ‘cultivators would 
suffer under a co-operative scheme’. 921 He clearly indicated that ‘although cultivators 
suffer (exploited by traders) but financial loss incurred is exaggerated’.922 This 
expresses his opinion against cheating practices mentioned earlier, including those 
raised by an insider, who whistle blew the practices to the Provincial authority. On 
the other hand, he appeared hypocritical in supporting the avapimi va magafu on the 
ground that ‘they provide employment and revenue’.923 He stressed further that, ‘if 
we forbade them we are likely to be accused of being in the same league (collusion) 
with the cotton buyers and may raise eyebrows or distrust of the NA by growers’.924 
 
The leaders of societies in Ukerewe remained committed to their objectives despite 
the opposition. Their determination was shown in their attempt to provide services as 
cotton buying agents for the Tanganyika Cotton Company and Ukerewe Cotton 
Company925 by using the MATCS license owing to its affiliation. The application was 
rejected because the MATCS’s registration licence was for the bulk purchase of 
consumer goods for African traders which were in short supply during the WWII and 
shortly afterwards.926   
 
However, arising from this, the Ukerewe Famers Society and the Growers Co-
operative Society Ltd were to operate in various buying and ginning in the Mwanza 
Cotton Company and Ukerewe Cotton Company facilities in order to gain some 
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experiences and familiarize their staff and members with the business.927 These 
societies were accommodated in buying facilities, although they were unregistered. 
The decision to accommodate them in buying facilities was reached in meetings with 
mentioned firms on behalf of the Tanganyika Cotton Corporation (TCC). However, 
when the agreement was forwarded to the Commissioner of Co-operative 
Development it was declined on the ground that; first, the MATCS’s consumer goods 
marketing license was not transferable and second, it could not be used for the 
purchase of cotton.928 Again, the CUT misinterpreted this policy as a restriction 
imposed by Ukerewe DC to MATCS to handle cotton. 929 
 
As a result of the Commissioner of Co-operative's decision, the Ukerewe DC, R.K.M. 
Battye, banned the Growers Co-operative Society Ltd930 from engaging in cotton 
marketing as per Notice No. 5/119 published in the 16th, May 1952 since it was not a 
registered organisation. The prohibition/ban was viewed by the Ukerewe Growers 
Co-operative Society Ltd as racially motivated and unjustified discrimination against 
Africans in favour of non-Africans. This was reiterated in their letter to the DC in 
which it was (in Kiswahili) pointed out that, ‘kwa sababu unapinga Waafrika ama 
kama ingekuwa mataifa mengine usingejaribu kupinga’ (your Notice undermines the 
rights of Africans to engage in business; and this could not be so in case it was other 
races). The Society further and angrily reacted against the notice and demanded its 
withdrawal, concluding that ‘na inaonyesha wazi kuwa serikali haina nia ya 
kutuendesha’ (an impression is obvious that, there is lack of political will and 
commitment on part of the government to promote co-operatives).931 In an attempt to 
resolve this misunderstanding, the DC called a meeting932 to elaborate the reason 
                                                          
927 Extracts of the meeting between Ukerewe DC and Ukerewe Farmers Society 
delegation held in May 23rd 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
928 PC, Lake Province to Tanganyika Cotton Company Ltd, June 18th 1952, TNA 
215/1423/C. 
929 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika, (1977), p.11. 
930 Ukerewe Growers Co-operative Society Ltd which was a branch of MATCS under 
the chairmanship of Mr Eupharazi Mahunde 
931 Ukerewe DC to PC, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C. 
932 The meeting held between 20 and 23 May 1952 was attended by Mr Eupharazi 
Mahunde, Ibrahim Tanganyika, Mfalme Gataki and Mzee Seff from the Ukerewe 
Growers Co-operative Society Ltd, also representatives of the Ukerewe Cotton 
Company and Mwanza Cotton Trading Company. 
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behind publication of the notice and why it was illegal for them to engage in cotton 
marketing based on the Co-operative Ordinance Section 65.  
 
The Ukerewe Growers were not satisfied. Further consultations were made by the 
Commissioner of Co-operative Development after a meeting in which it was made 
clear that ‘the MATCS is debarred by its by-laws, from trading cotton’.933 Thus, the 
traders affiliated to the MATCS considered other means that would provide entry into 
cotton marketing business. Hence, the Lake Province Growers Association (LPGA) 
was formed in 1952 in which Mustafa Shija Mabenga became its President and Paul 
Bomani as the Secretary.  
 
However, the challenge that faced the LPGA was that it was inexperienced and had 
no license to allow them to engage in cotton marketing. They were denied access to 
marketing facilities to acquire knowledge of cotton handling. Therefore, the LPGA 
decided to conduct a study tour in Ugandan cotton marketing co-operatives. The tour 
team consisted of Paul Bomani, Stefano Sanja and Ndaki Italiacha. The TAA’s 
Nassa branch financed the tour. The experience Bomani, Sanja and Italiacha gained 
from Uganda was fully utilised in sensitising the producers all over Sukumaland, 
Ukerewe, Geita, Musoma district (mainly areas which are within Bunda district) as 
well as the Ntuzu Chiefdom in Maswa that laid a platform for spontaneous growth for 
co-operatives and leadership that spearheaded the development of societies in the 
WCGA.  
 
The support from Chiefs demonstrated their readiness to address the exploitation of 
their subjects by Indian traders.934 This also demonstrates that entry into cotton 
marketing was a factor that unified the interests of the commoners, traders and 
Chiefs. In this respect it posed no political threat to the NA as has been the case of 
the NGA in Bukoba and KNPA in Kilimanjaro. Such convergence of interest created 
                                                          
933 PC, Lake Province to Tanganyika Cotton Company Ltd, June 18th 1952, TNA 
215/1423/C. 
934 G. Andrew Maguire, (1969), p.91. 
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a strong force towards a common agenda in establishing cotton marketing co-
operatives.  
 
Such convergence of interest was at an advanced stage in Buchosa and Geita 
where co-operative societies were formed much earlier with the support of district 
officials, mainly Edward Halwenge. The LPGA saw a need for growers in the Geita 
district to join them. But, Geita growers were initially hesitant fearing domination by 
non-Geita personalities. After some consultations and dialogue between the LPGA 
leaders and Mweli Farmers Union distrust came to an end.935 As a result, the LPGA 
managed to gain influence in Geita, which brought its embryonic co-operatives under 
one umbrella and common front.  
 
The LPGA was therefore further strengthened in all Wasukuma chiefdoms;936 it 
became an umbrella and guiding organisation for informal groups (the mabebete and 
avapimi va magaafu). Clearly, at this stage its footprint growth managed to cover 
most of the WCGA by galvanising groups with a common goal that justified its 
pressure for the formation and registration of co-operatives that was envisaged to 
bring to an end cheating of growers by traders; importantly handling or marketing of 
cotton. In this respect, the LPGA became a formidable organisation with significant 
energy and credible support to pressurise the colonial authority for entry into the 
marketing of cotton.   
 
The backing and influence gained by the LPGA in the WCGA was an impetus for 
launching its campaigns for registration of co-operative societies through official 
channels at District and Provincial level as well as in the Lint and Seed Marketing 
Board (LSMB) through dialogue. It has to be realised that, this was necessary 
                                                          
935 Interview with E.Y. Masele, and John Richard Madata (October 30th 2012) 
936 Such Chiefdoms were Nassa, Ukerewe, Massaza I and II, Magu, Dutwa, Ntuzu, 
Itilima, Karumo, Kanadi, Nunghu, Sima, Ndagalu, Usmao, Bukoli, Uduhe, Nera, 
Kome, Buchosa, Ushashi, Buyombe, Mwanza, Bujashi, Bukumbi, Bugeneji, Ikizu, 
Usiha, Sukuma, LPGA to PC, Lake Province, November 19th 1953. 
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because the colonial authority had shown no commitment despite the consensus to 
promote co-operatives in the Provincial Council a year earlier. On April 30th, 1952 
the Association had a fruitless meeting with DC of Mwanza to discuss the 
registration of co-operatives and another fruitless meeting was with the PC in May 
1952. The failure was due to lack of the co-operative officer to guide them.937 It was, 
however, agreed that they should meet the Commissioner of Co-operative 
Development in Moshi; 938 see their names of delegation in Table 15 below.   
 
Table 15: The LPGA’s Member Delegation  
S/N Name District 
1 Petro Kazi Maswa 
2 Jacob Mtiro Ukerewe 
3 Stephen Sanja Mwanza  
4 John Katorusa Geita 
5 Paul Bomani Mwanza 
Source: TNA 215/1423/C a letter to the Lake Province from the LPGA of June 21st 
1952 and from Commissioner of Co-operative Development to PC, Lake Province, 
Ref. No. Co-op.1038/3/A/25, July 10th 1952 
 
The meeting prompted the PC to write a letter to the Commissioner of Co-operative 
Development stressing the urgency to register co-operatives due to the ‘undoubtedly 
growing demand throughout Sukumaland and Ukerewe District for the formation of 
co-operative societies to handle cotton’.939 He argued that ‘There is undoubtedly a 
growing demand for the formation of co-operative societies in the WCGA mainly in 
Sukumaland and Ukerewe district to handle cotton. My chief fear is that, if the 
posting of a co-operative officer is too long delayed the producers may attempt to 
form societies on their own and without guidance with probably disastrous results’.940 
The Provincial Commissioner for Lake Province sounded cautions and pressed for 
                                                          
937 PC, Lake Province to Commissioner of Co-operative Development, Ref. No. 
1423/C/27, May 1st 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.  
938 PC, Lake Province to Commissioner of Co-operative Development, Ref. No. 
1423/c/27, May 1st 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. Paul Bomani to PC, July 5th 1952, TNA 
215/1423/C; Gottfried, O. and Lag, M.B. Problems of Social and Economic Change 
in Sukumaland, Tanganyika. Anthropological Quarterly. Volume 35, No.2, April. 
(1962), p. 86-101.  
939 PC, Lake Province to Commissioner of Co-operative Development, Ref. No. 
1423/C/27, May 1st 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.  
940 PC, Lake Province to Commissioner of Co-operative Development, Ref. No. 
1423/C/27, May 1st 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.  
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the deployment of the Co-operative Officer. This was partly to poor and slow 
response shown by Commissioner of Co-operative Development. This might have 
been his reaction given a number of societies formed by MATCS. It was also an 
alarm due to a growing number of the mabebete and avapimi va magafu in the 
WCGA that was seen as an imminent threat to the establishment and to a proper 
growth and controlled co-operative movement. 
 
A meeting with the Commissioner of Co-operatives attended by delegates mentioned 
in Table 15 above was held between July 8th and 9th 1952. However, the meeting did 
not produce the desired results. For example, the Commissioner asked the 
delegates to recommend individuals from WCGA with some secondary school 
education for co-operative course training. This appeared to be a good idea in the 
long-term, but would not resolve the immediate need. However, this was a positive 
development, but prevented an immediate engagement of producer co-operatives in 
cotton marketing. 
  
The Commissioner informed the PC that ‘it was not able to obtain assistance for the 
1952 cotton season, but the Government would deploy the co-operative officer in 
1953’.941 In addition to the campaigns, and meetings with various authorities Bomani, 
effectively utilised his Board membership to articulate growers’ aspirations to be 
considered in marketing cotton. He aired such aspirations at the LSMB meetings in 
Dar Es Salaam on May 19th, 1952, in which possibilities for engaging co-operatives 
became obvious, but its implementation would depend upon the availability of the co-
operative officer in the WCGA.942  
 
All these resulted in a disappointment for the LPGA’s delegation and growers in 
general for not seeing a possibility for societies being registered in the year as 
expected. At this stage Bomani presented the growers concerns in the LSMB that 
were becoming more vocal and threatened to boycott selling their produce unless 
co-operatives were registered so that they could have control over handling their 
                                                          
941 Commissioner of Co-operative Development to PC, Lake Province, Ref. No. Ref. 
No. Co-op.1038/3/A/25, July 10th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
942 Extracts from Second LSMB meeting held in May 19th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
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produce.943 All in all, there was no evidence that suggests growers were about to 
withhold cotton, but, the matter was taken seriously by the Commissioner of Co-
operative Development who was present in the LSMB meeting. The threat and 
mounting pressure unexpectedly forced the Co-operative Development Department 
to deploy co-operative officers. This was a positive development, but it was an 
indication that the colonial authority was driven by events. Most of the deployed 
officers were seconded from other departments with no background on co-
operatives. The action had to be taken because the Department had a shortage of 
staff largely to defuse a threat and calm down mounting pressure in the WCGA.  
 
The first officer was Mr Garvin B.J. Green from Provincial Co-operative Development 
Department who was deployed on 1952 October 16th in Mwanza and eight more co-
operative officers were also deployed in 1953 to assist him.944 Mr Green was 
seconded from the Provincial Administration and two other officers (one seconded 
from the Department of Agriculture and Juma Maharage was from Health 
Department).945 The six newly trained assistant co-operative inspectors were also 
deployed charged with the responsibility to foster the movement946 as discussed in 
the following section.  
 
6.5: THE POLICY DECISIONS ON THE CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Gottfried and Lang have discussed the process that led to the registration of the co-
operative societies in the WCGA.947 Their article is basically anthropological in 
nature and rich in knowledge/information which is partly credible as argued in the 
previous section but their article lacks supporting evidence. Also, the article misleads 
as it demonstrates that the LPGA was either secondary or apex co-operative society 
of which registered societies were affiliated to it. They are attempts to show in their 
article that the growth of these societies took the same development as in 
                                                          
943 Extracts from Second LSMB meeting held in May 19th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
944 Muungano wa Vyama vya Ushirika, (Dar Es Salaam: CUT Press, 1977), p.12. 
945 G. Adrew Maguire, (1969), p. 98   
946 G. Adrew Maguire, (1969), p. 98   
947 O. Gottfried and Martha B. Lang, Problems of Social and Economic Change in 
Sukumaland, Tanganyika, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, East  and 




Kilimanjaro where the unions were a leading institution in promoting societies which 
was not the case as partly demonstrated in this an in the previous section.  
 
This chapter and this section in particular shifts away from Gottfried and Lang to 
provide an explanation of the growth and development of co-operatives in the WCGA 
based on historical perspectives and extensive utilisation of primary evidences. From 
the moment of his appointment, Mr Green and his team worked closely in 1953 with 
the LPGA leaders. The LSMB made available 3,000,000/- shillings, which were part 
of balances reserved by the colonial power during the WWII948 and from the cotton 
price stabilisation funds for development of co-operatives.949 The earliest task was 
conducting a feasibility study of the co-operatives and those that qualified were 
registered. However, due to the shortage of staff, some villages had priority over 
others. Thus, in 1953 only 38 societies were registered in Kwimba, Mwanza, Geita 
and Ukerewe districts where they began handling cotton in their respective zones in 
June (see Appendix 20).  
 
Registration of these societies ended the era of uncertainty and marked the 
beginning of formal co-operative marketing. Again, given that the cotton buying 
season was about to start, registration activities for Musoma and Shinyanga districts 
was postponed until later months950 to avoid disruption of cotton buying.951 The 
majority of these societies were in Nassa, in Magu district (the then Kwimba District), 
where there were ten, of which six were formerly mabebete. Other mabebete were 
as follows; two in Nyamililo and Nyambiti zones respectively. Also, one group, 
avapimi va magaafu, was registered in Ihale zone in Ukerewe. Such numbers 
demonstrate the rapid spread of mabebete in providing services to growers prior to 
the registration of the co-operatives, which reinforced the need for marketing 
societies.  
 
                                                          
948 Billy Frank, (2002), pp.23-24. 
949DC, Geita to Sukumaland (Ibanza) Administrative Officer Incharge on July 6th 
1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
950 G. Andrew Maguire, (1969), p.98-99   
951 interview E.Y. Masele, John Richard Madata, (October 30th 2012) Thomas 
Ntegwa (November 12th  2012), Festo Ganzila (October 29th 2012), Kulwa King 
Nangale (November 13th  2012) 
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Apart from mabebete and avapimi va magafu the formation and registration of 
societies, a volume of cotton produced at a given location was the priority and 
important element for their economic viability. It was also considered that each 
society had to have a maximum of between 500 to 600 members;952 presumably, 
given the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the Tanzania colonial authority has to take 
precaution measure that considers the members are from the same village or two 
where they are confined within its boundaries for close monitoring and easy control. 
Although the measure was a political strategy it had its implication as it shortened 
the members’ travel distance to the cotton marketing posts.  
 
Registration of these societies ended the era of uncertainty and marked the 
beginning of legality for co-operatives in cotton marketing. From the 1953/54 season 
they proved their worth by managing 13.5 per cent of the total crop.953 This involved 
38 co-operative societies in 8 zones. In 1954/55 season the highest collection was 
recorded at Nassa in which 1954/55 it was 77.1 percent, Luguru was 58.5 per cent, 
Buchosa it was 24.8 per cent, Mwanza it was 16.60 per cent, Murutunguru was 18.3 
per cent, Nyambiti it was 10.60 per cent also Ihale and Bukumbi it was 9.6 and 3.8 
per cent respectively.954 Similarly, for 1956/57 the highest collection was recorded at 
was at Nassa (see Table 16 below) producing 5,722,936 lbs. (2,861.47 tons or 







                                                          
952 G. Andrew Maguire, (1969), p.99. 
953 The Co-operative Union of Tanganyika Annual and Balance Sheet 1963/64 
Report, p.17 – 18 O. Gottfried and Martha B. Lang, (April, 1962), pp.86-101.  
954 Cotton Collection in 8 zones for 1954/55, TNA 28259/5. 
955 LSMB end of the year Report, June 30th 1954, TNA 215/1423/A. 
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Table 16: Cotton Purchased in 1956/57 by Societies and Ginners in various Zones 















































































































   148,001,453  
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C 
 
 
Year after year, the co-operatives gained ground by capturing a greater share in the 
cotton market. Appendix 21 summarises the percentage of cotton handled by 
societies in every zone in the WCGA. It shows a decline of volume and percentage 
of cotton purchased by ginners and a corresponding increase by co-operative 
societies. It has to be stressed here that this success was not prompted by the 
compulsion measures as there had been revoked in July 1951 and this facilitated the 
existence of the parallel marketing system. At this juncture, the growers voluntarily 
sold their produce unlike in Kilimanjaro where the KNCU was provided with 
monopoly under the 1937 native coffee industry and 1949 African agricultural 
products legislations.  
 
                                                          
956 Kasamwa ginnery was bought, owned and installed by the VFCUS in 1956 
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Consequently, the 1957 report on co-operative Development957 indicates that, 
societies in Maswa District that were affiliated to the Lukubanija Growers Co-
operative Union, which was operating in Luguru zone and Isangijo in Malampaka 
Zone, had a total of 33 affiliated primary societies. The co-operative societies in 
Luguru handled 75 per cent of cotton produce in the zone; whereas Lukubanija 
affiliated societies handled 63 per cent of 10,000 bales produced in the zone. In 
some zones, the trend was attributed to the availability of co-operatives which 
appeared to be credible buyers. It is obvious that the growers sold cotton to co-
operatives owing to years of perpetual cheating by traders and the ginners. 
Subsequently, the ginners decided to abandon buying posts located outside 
ginneries because it was uneconomic.958 The Department of Agriculture responded 
immediately by asking the DCs in the WCGA to persuade the co-operatives fill the 
gap left by ginners.959 The abandoned buying posts were taken over by the co-
operatives, reinforcing their position in marketing of cotton monopoly. Such 
developments led in 1959 to the appointment of the VFCUS by the LSMB as its 
agency, which marked a climax in the integration of the co-operatives into cotton 
marketing policy. By 1960 the movement had secured a monopoly, a remarkable 
achievement for the newly formed societies. A summary for a number of societies 
and a volume of marketed cotton from both members and non-members are shown 
in table 17 below. 
Table 17: Number of societies, cotton purchased and membership (1953 -1959) 
Year No of 
societies 






1953/54 38 13.5 15,334 144,276 
1954/55 65 32.5 33,935 149,845 
1955/56 113 45.2 53,282 165,568 
1956/57 198 60.1 86,627 158,373 
1957/58 235 70.1 92,400 175,600 
1958/59 275 85.4  248,546 
1960 360 100   
Source: The Co-operative Union of Tanganyika Annual and Balance Sheet 1963/64 
Report, p.17 
                                                          
957 Maswa District Report on Co-operative Development for 1957, TNA 215/1423/C. 
958 Cotton Cultivation: Orders under Section (8) of Native Authority from DC Mwanza 
to Native Authority Bulima, Ref. No. A.3/4/500, October 1957, TNA 29121. 
959 The Department of Agriculture to DCS of Mwanza, Maswa, Kwimba, Geita, 
Shinyanga, Musoma, Ukerewe and Biharamulo, Ref. No. NOC/COT/BP, April, 23rd 
1957, TNA 29121.  
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Table 17 above shows an annual increase in the number of co-operative societies 
before and after independence in the WCGA (Mara, Mwanza, and Shinyanga). They 
also proved formidable in confronting the competition from the ginners. The success 
of the co-operatives in handling cotton in their first season was likely to have been 
attributed to years of cheating by traders and advocacy role played by the mabebete 
and avapimi va magafu. The increased number of societies at this time reflected an 
increase in the volume of cotton collected and marketed.   
 
The capacity for co-operative societies to gain ground in marketing cotton was given 
an impetus by the government backing as well as financial and logistical support 
from the LSMB.960 The sum of £32,500 was made available to registered co-
operative societies in 1953, repayable over 5-10 years with an interest of 4 per cent, 
for the purchase of equipment such as cash boxes, safes, and tarpaulins.961 A total 
of £3,900 was allocated to purchase trucks for the transportation of cotton.962 In 1954 
the LSMB provided a loan to 65 societies to erect cotton stores as well as to 
purchase capital equipment.963 Further, in 1957 the LSMB made a loan amounting to 
540,000/- shillings to two societies in Maswa district.964  The support provided by the 
LSMB and Co-operative Department was by and large to enable them to market 
cotton efficiently.   
 
The increase of primary co-operative societies created a need for a secondary co-
operative society (Union) for each zone, which would look after the needs of primary 
societies in, for example, the marketing of their crop. This was geared towards 
reinforcement of primary societies’ capacity. This was also to ensure that primary 
                                                          
960 Commissioner of Co-operative Development to LSMB, Ref. No. Co-op. B/9/24 
and Co-op. B/9/26, April 11th and April 24th 1953, TNA 215/1423C.   
961 Commissioner of Co-operative Development to LSMB, Ref. No. Co-op. B/9/24 
and co-op. B/9/26 of April 11th and April 24th 1953, TNA 215/1423C; Tanganyika, 
Annual Report on Co-operative Development, 1954, p.11; LSMB Annual Report, 
June 30th 1954, TNA 215/1423/A.  
962 Ag Regional Assistant Director of Agriculture, Lake Province to the Secretary 
LSMB Ref. No. 247/35, June 1st 1953,TNA 215/1423C. 
963 LSMB Annual Report, June 30th 1954, TNA 215/1423/A. 
964 Maswa District Annual Report, 1957, TNA 215/1423/C. 
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societies were not susceptible to the ginners influence and competition because they 
had limited experience in managing and organising growing cotton marketing. The 
decision to form secondary societies was a significant departure for primary 
societies’ reliance on assistance from government institutions, the LSMB and the Co-
operative Development Department. In an attempt to move away from depending on 
government support and cotton traders also the ginners’ intimidations, the process of 
forming Unions was co-ordinated by the LPGA that brought in significant reforms in 
the creation of the cotton marketing structure in each cotton production zone. Such 
reforms went hand in hand with recruiting personnel to manage the cotton marketing 
process.  
 
The Unions were charged to supervise the activities of affiliated societies. They 
became a link between societies and the ginners, and control over the movement of 
crops from buying post to a ginnery. The Unions operated within cotton producing 
zones some of which were set up in 1930s. In 1955, seven Unions were formed and 
registered. The names of most Unions were intimidating or discouraging Indians and 






Table 18: The Secondary and affiliated Societies, Registration and membership 




Ikumbo  Broom  Manawa - Kwimba  1956 24 14,648 
Iyungilo  Filter   Bukumbi – Mwanza 1960 15 8,894 
Kimisha  Awakening  Nyambiti – Kwimba  29 14,648 
Chenge cha Balimi Torch/firebrand Uzogole – Shinyanga 1956 37 23,117 
Kipyena Bayanda Exorcize  children Bukumbi, Buyagu – Geita July 1956 22 9,150 
Kigunabahabi Sponsor of the poor Nassa – Mwanza 1955 25 9,991 
Nyamagana  One who give birth to hundreds Ngasamo - Mwanza    
Kishamapanda  Road builder  Mhunze A & B Shinyanga 1960 &1964 39 21,370 
Tupendane  To love each other Ushashi – Mara    
Mweli/Ng’weli  Western Farmers  Geita – Mwanza 1954 25 7,313 
Mugango  - Mugango - Musoma 1955   
Namuzuna  Supporter  Kibara - Ukerewe Mainland 1955   
Buchililo  A place to Recuperate Nyamililo - Geita 1954 18 6,927 
Idetenya Bageni Terror to aliens/aliens Kasamwa - Geita 1955 22 9,150 
Isangijo  Meeting place  Malampaka - Maswa 1955 31 15,114 
Kilagabageni  Parting with strangers/aliens Sola – Maswa 1960   
Lukubanija  Concern  for others Luguru – Maswa 1955 34 16,772 
Engabo967 (Bukerebe) - Murutunguru - Ukerewe Island 1955/1961 23 4,212 
Kilelamhina  One who cares for the poor  Ihale-Mwanza 1956 8 4,212 
Gwaging’olo Bageni  Disappointment of 
strangers/aliens  
Magu-Kwimba 1960 24 11,383 
Source: Tanganyika Annual Reports on Co-operative Development 1959 – 1961 (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer); Local 
language to Kiswahili translations968 and English translations by Researcher  
                                                          
965 URT, Annual Reports on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), pp.16 – 19. 
966 URT, Annual Reports on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), pp.16 – 19. 
967 Engabo  was liquidated and was replaced by Bukerebe  




Animosity against the traders was exploited by growers to support the movement. By 
1964 the number increased to 20 scattered through the three cotton growing areas 
that cover Mwanza, Shinyanga and Mara regions969 as summarised in Appendix 25. 
The setting up of the Union created a need for an umbrella organisation to look after 
the interest of affiliated primary and secondary societies, and to facilitate 
negotiations on behalf of the cotton growers with the Government and the ginners 
which were at that time dominated by Asian traders. This culminated in the LPGA 
transforming into an apex organisation which was renamed the Victoria Federation of 
Co-operative Unions (VFCUS) in May 15th 1955 and was registered in July with its 
funding accrued from a levy of 2 cents per lb. of cotton collected by societies by 
members.970 At this time the first seven Unions were affiliated to the Federation, but 
the number increased as more unions were formed in various zones as shown in 
Table 18 above.971 This was a significant blow to the Indian cotton traders as the 
LSMB ceased to use them as agents to handle cotton.972 
 
In terms of personnel, Mr Mustafa Shija Mabenga became the first President of the 
Federation and Paul Bomani became its General Manager. This signified a smooth 
transfer of power from the LPGA to VFCUS. The General Manager was responsible 
for the administration and coordination activities and was aided by a committee 
elected from the Unions. The Federation recruited highly skilled personnel to work in 
various departments such as marketing, accounting and production.  
 
When the co-operatives emerged, they did not own a ginnery, and so had to rely on 
the Indian owned ginnery, which was costly. The ginners had high charges, and this 
necessitated the need for Unions have their own ginneries. The first ginnery was 
purchased and imported in 1956 for £88,000 from a loan provided by the LSMB. It 
was installed at Kasamwa in Geita District where cotton production has risen from 
                                                          
969 CUT, 1962/63 Annual Report, p.18 
970 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es 
Salaam: Government Printer, 1955), p.5. 
971 Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es 
Salaam: Government Printer, 1955), pp.9 – 11. 
972 N.R. Fuggles-Couchman, Agriculture Change in Tanganyika: 1945 – 1960, 
(Stanford, California: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1964), p.50. 
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1,000 in the late 1940s to 3,000 bales in 1952.973 The increase of production was a 
result of resettling of population in the district in the implementation of the Sukuma 
Development Scheme. The Kasamwa ginnery was officially opened by the Governor, 
Edward Twining, in June 1956.974 The second ginnery was bought in 1958 and 
installed at Ushashi. In 1959 four more ginneries were bought and installed in Sola, 












                                                          
973 Co-operative Marketing in the Lake Province, extracts from record of meeting 
held on February 22nd 1954, TNA 25066. 
974 East Africa Railways and Habours Magazine. June, 1956, Vol. 2 – 9, p.302, TNA 
215/1423/C. 




Table 19: The Ginneries, Year of Installation and Ownership in the WCGA 
Ginnery/Zone Union  Installation Year First Owner  Second owner 
Buchosa  Mweli  1938 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Bukumbi Kipyenabayanda 1958 VFCUS  
Buyagu  1960 VFCUS  
Kasamwa Mweli Farmers Co-operatives Union Ltd 1956 VFCUS  
Magu  1960 VFCUS  
Manawa Ikumbo 1924 Indian VFCUS - 1964 
Nassa Kigunabahabi 1924 Indian VFCUS - 1964 
Nyambiti  Kimisha 1935 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Nyamililo  Kilelamhina 1930 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Ukerewe  Bukerebe  1932 Indian & White Fathers VFCUS - 1965 
Kahama Igembesabo  1967 VFCUS  
Luguru Lukubanija 1933 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Malampaka Isangijo  1933 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Mhunze ‘’A’’ Kishamapanda  1960 VFCUS  
Mhunze ‘’B’’ Kishampanda  1964 VFCUS  
Sola Kilabageni 1960 VFCUS  
Uzogole Chenge cha Balimi 1940 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Kibara Namzuna 1952 Indian VFCUS - 1965 
Mugango  1936 Indian VFCUS - 1964 
Ushashi  Tupendane  1958 VFCUS  
Source: The VFCUS annual reports; Tanganyika Territory Annual Reports on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es Salaam: 
Government Printer, 1955), pp.9-11; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); Kabado (Shinyanga), E.Y. Masele, Festus Ganzila, 
Mayala and Bomani (Mwanza). 
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In summary, the registration of co-operative societies from 1953 was a significant 
step in tackling the Asian traders’ monopoly on the cotton market. Such success had 
an impetus from growers as well as financial support from the LSMB. Such 
development in seven years proved that the Commissioner of Co-operative was 
wrong to assume growers in the WCGA were incapable. The role the Board was 
important for achievement attained by the co-operatives in handling cotton eventually 
wresting the traders who had been in business for decades in which secondary 
societies and apex body, the VFCU were formed to provide services to primary 
societies. The VFCU enjoyed a brief support from the post-colonial government, 
which was followed by its dismantling it discussed in the following section. 
 
6.6: POST-COLONIAL POLICIES 
This section shows the extent to which the post-colonial authority depended on the 
VFCUS to fostering cotton production in the WCGA. When Tanzania attained 
independence in 1961, the government attempted to exploit the VFCUS to deliver 
government targets in cotton production. This demonstrates the continuity of colonial 
policy as production was geared towards export commitments, such as to the 
Chinese government who had an agreement from 1962 to import the top grades of 
cotton.976 Other countries importing Tanzanian cotton were West Germany, Japan 
and Hong Kong that boosted prices to around 6 cents a pound.977 These were new 
additional markets out of India and Britain, which where main cotton buyers during 
the colonial era.978  
 
In order to meet these export commitments, support was provided by the post-
colonial government. Such support comprised of provision of 168 tractors for 
modernisation of cotton farming, supply of fertiliser; and introduction of block 
farming, which was part of the modernisation of cotton cultivation through irrigation. 
These projects were envisaged to engage the VFCUS into cotton production 
                                                          
976 Department of Agriculture, Mwanza to the VFCUS, Ginners Association, TANU, 
Government Departments And Districts Teams, March 7th 1962, TNA 215/1423/A. 
977 Department of Agriculture, Mwanza to the VFCUS, Ginners Association, TANU, 
Government Departments And Districts Teams, March 7th 1962, TNA 215/1423/A. 
978 Section 13 of the Defence (Control of Cotton) Regulation of 1942 and 1943. 
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mechanisation and modernisation of cotton cultivation,979 in which the target was to 
produce 161,000 bales in 1961 to 323,000 in 1966980 (see Table 20 below and 
Appendix 20 on cotton production targets).   
 
Table 190: Volume of Cotton Handled by VFCUS’s Affiliated Unions 














Mwanza 11 254 102,247 92,722 173,806 4,862,625 
Shinyanga 5 175 92,560 54,797 109,596 3,178,881 
Mara 3 78 23,384 17,637 8,769 924,884 
 19 507 218,191 165,156 292,171 12,966,390 
Source: URT, Annual Report on Co-operative Development, (Dar Es Salaam: 
Government Printer, 1965), pp.10, 36-37. 
 
The post-colonial government also provided support to the VFCUS with the view that 
it would play a part in the Africanisation of the economy, which was aimed to 
displace the Indian traders in the WCGA. The support provided help the VFCUs to 
build a business empire that comprised of cotton marketing, processing (ginning) 
and cooking oil processing which were formerly the Indian traders’ spheres.981 Local 
businesses outside of cotton production were sisal marketing, whole and retail 
businesses, as well as hardware. Entry to the mentioned ventures was encouraged 
by the government in an attempt to circumvent Asian traders which were of financial 
benefit to the VFCUS which was able to amass profits. Part of the costs for 
importation of tractors through the Agricultural Credit Agency under a hire purchase 
scheme and block farming projects funded by the government as part of its 
development plans.982 During the time it handled 90 per cent, which was 165, 156 
tons of unprocessed cotton that produced 292,171 bales as summarised in table 21 
below. But, the VFCUS was forced to undertake the projects by the government in 
                                                          
979 Department of Agriculture, Mwanza to the VFCUS, Ginners Association, TANU, 
Government Departments And Districts Teams, March 7th 1962, TNA 215/1423/A 
980 Increase Cotton Production Programme, Appendix M, TNA 215/A3/1 
981 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International 
Development Association Agricultural Credit Project Tanzania, Report No. TO-498a, 
November 15th, 1965, p.4. 
982 Mwanza, DO to the VFCUS, Ginners Association, TANU, government 
departments and districts teams, October 1st 1963, TNA 215/1423/A. 
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which they had to spend part of its unplanned budget. However, the VFCUS was 
reluctant and coincidentally, it incurred loss amounting to £160,000 during 1962/63 
and 1963/64 seasons that it decided to abandon the projects.  
 
Consequently, the government became increasingly suspicious of the VFCUS and 
launched an investigation into its activities in 1966 undertaken by the Presidential 
Special Committee of Enquiry into the Co-operative Movement and Marketing 
Boards (briefly described in chapter 3) produced a special and separate interim 
report regarding the VFCUS. The report identified a number of issues. Nepotism was 
one concern, ranging from recruitment of staff, embezzlement of funds and 
corruption. All these were supported by Saul.983 Some of these accusations may 
have had substance. For example, Paul Bomani had family members employed in 
the VFCUS some of whom were in-laws his own father Lazaro Bomani who was 
Kimisha Co-operative Union Manager and his brother, Emmanuel who was deputy 
manager at Buyagu ginnery at the Kipyanabayanda Co-operative Union;984 but, Saul 
either failed to mention any.985 
 
Under good governance criteria the recruitment of relatives on this scale might be 
seen as a demonstration of nepotism. However, the VFCUS recruitment policy had 
been clear since its inception in 1955. Throughout this period, it maintained a 
tradition of recruiting staff from within its operational area. The idea was to create 
employment for qualified individuals with an understanding of the culture, mainly 
local languages spoken by the people in the Province since Kiswahili was not 
popular in rural areas among the growers. It was also considered important to 
employ staffs that were knowledgeable of the cotton industry. However, it has to be 
noted that staff were paid as per its scheme of service. Generally, salary and fringe 
benefits offered were far better than what was paid to civil servants. All these were a 
concern of the Committee that led to inequality within the Federation. It was thought 
                                                          
983 John S. Saul, Reorganisation of the VFCUS, in Lionel Cliffe (et al), Rural 
Cooperation in Tanzania, (Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 
pp.212-220. 
984 Interview with Jonathan Bomani in Mwanza (November 16th 2012). 
985 John S. Saul, (1975), pp.212-220. 
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that the Federation exploited growers only for the benefit of a small section of staff 
who were enjoying a luxurious life contrary to Ujamaa/socialist policy. 
 
The Federation Manager at the time of the investigation was Emanuel Bomani, who 
was personally accused of corruption and wealth accumulation. The Board members 
were also accused of nepotism. The VFCUS was viewed by the government as a 
centre of corruption. However, neither investigation pursued led to prosecution. The 
entire leadership had to be removed from office by the government not only contrary 
to the co-operative principles but also the VFCUS’s own policy. The measure was 
described by Saul as the setting in of a democratic process; 986this can be explained 
as Saul became the government’s mouthpiece.  
 
This dramatic change took place on January 1st 1968 when it was abolished by the 
Government.987 Immediately, Maharage Juma, the Co-operative Officer responsible 
for Mwanza, Bukoba and Geita was appointed by the government as new 
manager.988 Maharage appointment led to a reorganisation of the VFCUS which 
resembled the experience of the KNPA in 1932 into the KNCU despite the 
government’s claim to establish a democratic state. Maharage was replaced by Mr 
Iddi Mtingwa who was the government appointee with effect from 1969. But, Mtingwa 
remained under Maharage’s close watch so as he adheres to government guidelines 
and to ensure that corrupt practices do not resurface.989 Mtingwa was, however, not 
new to the VFCUS, having been manager of the VFCUS’s industries and had served 
as the CUT Deputy Secretary. Mtingwa was replaced by John Malongo following his 
transfer to MWATEX as Manager. 990 Such transfers were implemented by the UCS; 
an individual could be transferred from a co-operative union to the crop boards or 
any other government institutions. 
                                                          
986 John S. Saul, (1975), pp.212-220. 
987 URT, The Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operatives 
Movement and Marketing Boards, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printers, 1966), p.3 
988 Interview with Massele, Mayala, K.K. Nangale (November 30th 2012; Jonathan 
Bomani in Mwanza (November 16th 2012); Jonathan Bomani in Mwanza (November 
16th 2012); Ambassador Juma Maharage Mwawado (August 21st 2014) 
989 John S. Saul, (1975), pp.212-220. 
990 Interview with Jonathan Bomani in Mwanza (November 16th 2012). 
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The changes that affected the VFCUS administration were also the same as its 
structure, whereby under it there were 20 Unions and hundreds of affiliated primary 
societies in which most of its staff were made redundant. The government's 
restructuring was based on the contention that the VFCUS had divorced itself from 
the grassroots members, societies and the Unions. Moreover, it was also illogical for 
a secondary society to operate in three regions where they could have their own 
societies and perform the same functions at reduced costs.   
 
The VFCUS was seen by the government and the Presidential Committee as being 
too big and too costly to run; therefore it recommended to be restructured. It was 
also considered as a burden on the producers whose faced deductions (levy) from 
cotton sales for administrative purpose. This was viewed by the government as 
being squandered by the officials. However, the accusations on misappropriations of 
the Federation funds were unfounded and none was prosecuted for the allegations. 
This was likely meant to instigate divisions within the Federation and probably to 
have affiliated Unions to break away to weaken it.  
 
It was the Government’s view that the secondary society and the VFCUS were 
managerial and inefficient. Such allegations and accusations were basically 
unsubstantiated. But what was clear is that the Federation was successful in 
managing business that enabled it to emerge as the biggest and richest growers’ 
managed organisation in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Consequently, it was decided to adopt a new name, the Nyanza Co-operative Union 
(NCU), which operated under Government supervision.991 The reorganization left the 
VFCUS with a fraction of the power it once had. This demonstrated the government’s 
desire not only to control the movement, but also, to destroy any institution that 
appeared to the government as being troublesome. This was the beginning of the 
state’s intervention in the movement during the post-colonial era. Its autonomy was 
                                                          
991 Interview with Massele, Mayala (November 30th 2012); K.K. Nangale (November 
13th 2012), and Kabado (November 12th 2012) 
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eroded and the participation of its members marginalised in decision making 
processes and regarding the future of the VFCUS.  
 
Owing to the restructuring of the VFCUS and its affiliated Unions all functions were 
delegated and handed over to the cotton production zones, some of which were 
created in the 1930s as previously explained and were reinforced further in 1949 
when the Ministry of Food and Supply had a contract to purchase all cotton from the 
WCGA. The primary societies affiliated to the Nyanza Co-operative Union were 
grouped into zones (see Appendix 22a to 22n and Table 22 below).  
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Table 21: The Districts, Zones and Co-operative Societies under a Two-Tier Marketing System 
Districts Zones Number of societies 
Geita  Buchosa  38 
 Buyagu 23 
 Kasamwa 25 
 Nyamililo 21 
   
Kwimba  Magu 23 
 Manawa 23 
 Nyambiti 28 
   
Mwanza Nassa 24 
 Ngasamo 26 
 Sanjo 32 
   
Ukerewe  Ukerewe 22 
   
Shinyanga  Kishamapanda 39 
   
 Change cha Balimi 30 
   
Maswa  Lukubanja  32 
 Kilabageni 30 
   
Malampaka  Isangijo  31 
Musoma Mugango 32 
Musoma Ushashi 31 
Musoma (Bunda) Kibara 17 
Source: Massele, Mayala (November 30th 2012); K.K. Nangale (November 13th 2012), and Kabado (November 12th 2012) 
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Given that the structure that formed the VFCUS was demolished, by-laws were also 
rendered null and void and new by-laws were enacted to better suit the structure and 
the government’s aspirations. These amendments affected some positions/titles 
such as the President of the Union was changed to the chairperson/chairman. This 
affected all the co-operative unions in the country. The governing Board that 
comprised of members of the Unions was rendered useless. Since the Unions were 
not in existence and by-laws were null and void it was recommended by the 
Presidential Special Committee that society members should elect new board 
members.992 The government prescribed by-laws disowning the members of their 
societies. This was nothing other than installing state control which conflicted with 
the co-operative principles of independent member control. 
 
According to the Presidential Special Committee the ginneries and processing plants 
were placed under the industrial wing of the ‘Federation’. Under the new institutional 
organisation, the NCU several business subsidiaries were set up so that it could 
enhance efficiency in providing services. One such subsidiary was the Nyanza 
Industrial Company (NICO) Ltd., which was established in May 1968 to manage 
ginneries. NICO began its operations from July 1968. A second subsidiary was the 
Nyanza Distributors Company, which was set up in response to the call by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operative that Co-operative union, not only to 
handle and supply of seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides and farm implements. They 
were supposed ion this effect to supply consumer goods.  
 
The disbanding of the VFCUS by the government was expected to provide space for 
societies in each region that would easily translate into participation of members by 
broadening democracy. A new structure was installed by the government, which 
reduced it to a fraction of what was once the largest growers’ organisation in sub-
Saharan Africa. The fragmentation process as recommended by the Commission, 
the three-tier marketing structure that created under the VFCUS was dismantled with 
                                                          
992 URT, The Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operatives 




immediate effect only to be replaced by a two tier structure. This recommendation 
was implemented by the government by dissolving all twenty (20) Unions that were 
affiliated to the Federation on the January 1st 1968.993  
 
The restructuring of the VFCUS had far reaching effects. For example, the grouping 
lost its majority representation in the national apex, the CUT. From a political 
perspective, regions also lost representation in the apex body was reduced to one of 
11 unions for Mwanza, from 5 in Shinyanga and from 3 in Mara region. Thus, their 
vote in the CUT was affected by which their policy and decision making influence 
was affected too. The gap was identified by the policy makers and politicians who 
had to influence the amendment of the co-operative legislations to provide for this 
representation. In so doing, the 1968 co-operative legislation provided for the 
formation of co-operatives based on political and administrative regional boundaries 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.6). Consequently, the policy provided for the further 
disintegration of the VFCUS to provide for Mwanza, Mara and Shinyanga regional 
co-operative unions. 
 
In the WCGA there were several other types of co-operatives such as livestock 
keepers, the Wafugaji wa Mara Co-operative Union and the Tarime Wakulima Co-
operative Union. They amalgamated these unions in 1970 to form the Mara Co-
operative Union. In June 1971, the primary societies affiliated to the Nyanza Co-
operative Union, but they decided to break away to join the Mara Co-operative 
Union; but a year later after its inception, that is, in 1972 it was dissolved by the 
government due to factionalism and mismanagement.994 Two months later, in August 
8th 1971 the Prime Minister made an announcement that primary societies in 
Shinyanga have shown interest to break away from Nyanza to form Shinyanga 
Regional Co-operative Union. Nonetheless, a year later after its inception, that is, in 
                                                          
993 Interview with Massele, Mayala, K.K. Nangale (November 30th 2012; Jonathan 
Bomani in Mwanza (November 16th 2012); Jonathan Bomani in Mwanza (November 
16th 2012); Ambassador Juma Maharage Mwawado (August 21st 2014). 
994 Göran Hydén, The Politics of Co-operatives in Tanzania, in A.Z. Mutaha (et. Al), 
Co-operatives in Tanzania: Problems of Organisation, (Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania 
Publishing House, 1976), pp.7-20. 
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1972, the Mara Co-operative Union was dissolved by the government due to 
factionalism and mismanagement.995   
 
It was obvious that, the Government‘s desire was to have a co-operative union in 
each region, regardless of the economic viability and type of business. Moreover, 
this shows that the Government was directly involved in the creation of secondary 
societies without the consent of the members. In this respect the co-operative 
ceased to be a voluntary organisation. Additionally, political decisions and authority 
prevailed over economic logic which illustrates the government was more interested 
in economic failure and scrambling a part of growers’ organisations than their 
success which was demonstrated in 1976 when the co-operative movement, 
including the newly created co-operative Unions were abolished.  
 
6.7: CONCLUSION 
The chapter has shown the role played by various stakeholders engaged in 
marketing of cotton. The participation of each group was prompted by the 
exploitation they suffered from selling their produce to Indian cotton buyers under 
which they were being cheated. Cheating by cotton buyers was widespread and was 
known to the colonial authority that could not curb it. This prompted a desire from 
cotton growers and other stakeholders to find a solution. However, each stakeholder 
attempted its own approach which was viewed most suitable that ranged from 
weighing cotton deliveries, counting money paid by the cotton buyers to negotiation 
on helping out in purchasing cotton in the buying posts. Others, they went as far as 
setting up co-operative societies. All these demonstrate the diversity of groups that 
had a common objective which was entry into cotton handling and a commitment to 
do away with cheating.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which the colonial authority responded 
against the groupings mentioned. The reaction differed from the district to the other. 
In Geita district they enjoyed support from the district’s colonial officials. But, it was 
                                                          
995 Göran Hydén, (1976), pp.7-20. 
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contrary in Ukerewe. The development in Ukerewe and Geita generated a necessity 
to forge an alliance, the LPGA that operated throughout the WCGA under the 
leadership of Paul Bomani. The formation of the umbrella organisation came up with 
broader objective that included the registration of co-operative societies.  
 
The colonial authority in the WCGA saw the relevance of the idea, but it was hesitant 
fearing the rise of a political force that could be a threat to the establishment. In an 
attempt to frustrate and demoralise them from exerting further pressure for 
registration of co-operatives such by the colonial authority which insisted that co-
operatives could not be registered because there was no co-operative officer who in 
principle was expected to control co-operatives from becoming political organisation. 
The delaying tactics were frustrating as far as growers and the LPGA leadership was 
concerned; but it was advantageous to the LPGA in its efforts to campaign and 
educate growers to join co-operatives as an alternative to cotton buyers. Unlike in 
Kagera and Kilimanjaro primary societies were first registered followed by secondary 
and apex organisation, the VFCU three years later. This shows how the co-
operatives grew from below. This growth was an indication of positive response from 
growers and members that within six years the cotton buyers lost business. The 
growth of co-operatives might have been a political strategy in which every step had 
to be closely watched by the colonial authority to ensure that societies remained 
fragmented at grassroots level. This is illustrated by a refusal by the colonial 
authority to register the LPGA though it allowed it to carry some co-ordinations which 
was closely watched by the co-operative officer.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not suggest that, the VFCU and its affiliated societies 
evaded the government’s control as they were part and parcel of the cotton 
marketing mechanism in which the LSMB had an upper hand whereas the co-
operatives were merely the Board’s agents charged with cotton collecting from 
growers. When Tanzania attained independence in 1961, the government made an 
attempt to exploit the VFCUs to execute government plans that generated financial 
loss which was translated as misappropriation of funds; hence, its reorganisation that 
demonstrated the continuity and discontinuity policy towards the co-operative 
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movement and the ways political decisions influenced and undermined democratic 
member controlled organisation. 
 

























CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
 
7.1: THE CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES  
This thesis is a historical study which examines the growth and development of co-
operative movement in Tanzania from 1932 to 1982. Since its inception in 1932 has 
proved important to the small-scale coffee and cotton producers as it provided them 
with access to market for their produce. Importantly, it has also established the 
economic importance to a successive Tanzanian authorities in generating revenue 
from coffee and cotton exports. The perpetuation and encouragement of the co-
operative movement was a success that by mid-1970s the co-operative movement 
was the biggest in Africa and the oldest in East Africa. Despite such achievement, for 
decades, the Tanzania co-operative movement history has received very little and 
punctuated attention that this thesis attempts to fill the gap by drawing a new 
knowledge regarding its growth and development.  
  
 
This study has examined five histrorical phases of the Tanzania’s co-operative 
movement. The study has revealed the significance unlike any other that, of the 
interlocking forces, policy and political decisions during all five phases that provided 
for the growth of co-operative movement during colonial and post-colonial periods. It 
has been shown that, the first phase that spanned between 1929 and 1931 there 
was the collective and co-ordinated policy and political decisions making among the 
colonial officials in collaboration with the CO that led to the promulgation of the co-
operative legislation in 1932 and then training of Registrar in 1935. Under such co-
ordinated policies an impetus was provided that led to the formation of co-operatives 
in Kilimanjaro that replaced the KNPA which was viewed by the colonial authority as 
a threat. Evidently, the development was driven by the political motivation mainly to 
suffocate the KNPA. However, this was a significant step in having not only the 
formation and registration of co-operatives at the behest of the colonial government 
but also, the coffee industry was placed under the control of the colonial authority.  
 
However, this thesis has established that, the second phase was characterised by 
having policy decisions by some senior colonial officials that undermined or 
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distracted the implementation of the co-operative legislation and recommendations 
made by the Registrar. The officials stressed spontaneous growth of co-operatives 
was a viable policy. This failed because the growers lacked the knowledge; and the 
growers were deprived of government support where interest was obvious. This 
marked an era of the policy implementation inconsistencies. In many instances some 
of the colonial officials had excessive powers and utilised any options at their 
disposal either to accept or reject promote and form co-operative societies to serve 
small-scale growers. During the time the Registrar’s position and functions were 
undermined by the CS who used his position and capacity to deliberately neglect the 
co-operative development policy. The CS did so by suggesting that, the Register 
recommendations such as setting up of the co-operative department, a union and 
recruitment of staff, which were envisaged to stimulate and create an enabling 
condition for the growth and development of co-operatives were contentious. This 
demonstrated that, the co-operative legislation was not binding and individual 
decisions were paramount and above the law. It also depicts that, the colonial 
authority made its own co-operative development policy useless. As a result, a slow, 
stunted growth and uneven development became evident during interwar period that 
persisted until late 1940s.  
 
This thesis has highlighted a third phase that marked by a significant development 
that covers the post-war to the late colonial period. This was partly due to pressure 
from external forces and the Colonial Office in particular that paved for creation of a 
Co-operative Development Department, recruitment of staff and allocation of funds 
so as to promote co-operatives across the country. This was a significant step in 
addressing the effects of over a decade neglect. The phase coincided with critical 
economic difficulties that Britain was facing a resulted of its engagement in the war. 
Under such difficulties the colonial power had to intervene by unveiling the post-war 
colonial development policy. The war effects led to an increased pressure from 
colonial power to the colonies to increase production and promote co-operatives to 
facilitate marketing of the produce. The colonial power envisioned that the co-
operative movement as one of the most important element is raising the standard of 
life the colonised. In invigorating economic development in the colonies agriculture 
development was a priority and it was supposed to benefit the colonial power in an 
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attempt to resolve its ailing economy. Apparently, the growers and Tanzania 
agriculture industry as a whole was increasingly linked directly to address the 
colonial power’s post-war economic reconstruction. Against the background, the 
existing co-operative societies had to be maintained and new ones had to be 
promoted in the course of enabling Britain to accelerate its access to export crops. 
 
The development of co-operative movement was vital to facilitate crop handling from 
growers. Thus, a policy has to be brought in place to promote agriculture production 
and marketing of produced crops. In Tanzania was implemented under the African 
Agricultural (Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949 which immersed colonial 
power in control of crop marketing further. The legislation was not only a key prime 
mover but also necessitated for integration the growers through the co-operatives by 
setting up organisations as the BCU for Kagera coffee growers which like KNCU was 
granted exclusive monopoly to buy their coffee produce. The policy shift justified the 
top-down approach which was employed in the formation and registration at the 
behest of the colonial government with no regard to members’ interests.The policy 
however, was a smokescreen incentive to growers as it was employed to encourage 
crop production and as a viable means for exploiting them so as in principle salvage 
Britain from economic difficulties. Such economic difficulties had to be tackled by a 
number of policies that comprised of the expansion the co-operative footprint in 
Tanzania and other colonies. This marked an end of an era of inconsistent policy in 
promoting co-operatives and clearly demonstrates that, the post-war British 
economic difficulties were a key facilitating factor to the policy shift. Obviously this 
was not in the interest of the growers, but was primary only to solve the British 
economic difficulties purposes and restore its economic powerproductive ability.    
 
Despite the highlighted policy inconsistency during interwar period and a significant 
development after the war the co-operative movement was consistently entangled 
within Section 36 of the co-operative legislation as far as marketing policy is 
concerned. The Section provided for dictation of the native produced crop marketing 
policies. The Section overrides the co-operative the role of growers who were 
compelled to sell their products through the co-operatives. The policy was first and 
further reinforced by three policies, the 1934 Chagga Rule in Kilimanjaro. Other 
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legislations were the 1937 Native (control and marketing) Ordinance and the 
Defence Ordinance, Orders of 1939 and 1940; and the African Agricultural Products 
(Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949. The post-Chagga Rule policy formed the 
backbone of Tanzania crop marketing policies that reinforced the government’s 
control over the co-operative movement and the native cash crop producers. The 
Defence Ordinance, Orders of 1939 and 1940 as well as the African Agricultural 
Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance, 1949 were effectively used to address 
and dictate the British post-war colonial agricultural extraction resources policies, 
particularly small-scale produced coffee and cotton from Tanzania. In this regard, the 
KNCU and BCU were appointed by local marketing boards, the MNCB in Kilimanjaro 
and BNCB in Kagera to supply coffee to the Ministry of Food at a fixed quantity and 
price which was determined by the buyer so as it could maximise its revenue 
generation, particularly the dollar earnings; hence resolved the post-war sterling 
pound crisis. Clearly, the legislations provided for utilisation of co-operatives as the 
colonial power machinery in extracting resources and exploiting small-scale growers.      
 
The study, unlike any other has provided a motivation behind a comprehensive 
continuity and change during the fourth phase whereby the marketing policies during 
the post-colonial era. Clearly, the post-colonial authority perpetuated the colonial 
policies in promoting co-operatives. It also perpetuated state intervention in produce 
marketing through state controlled marketing institutions so as to have a control over 
the agricultural export revenues provided under the 1962 and expand its tax 
collection base and sources. The policy was derived from the colonial the 1949 
African Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance by renaming it as 
the National Agricultural Products Board (Control and Marketing) Act that 
monopolised agricultural product marketing by the state of which the co-operatives 
were appointed as agents. The new legislation, unlike the colonial ones incorporated 
the settlers and planters under the Africanisation of the economy policy.   
 
The National Agricultural Products Board (Control and Marketing) Act scrapped the 
locally based native marketing boards and provided for the establishment of nation-
wide boards. The legislation provided for scrapping of the natives boards which in 
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some way, under Section 36 of the co-operative legislation was brought into force as 
the settler produced crops were incorporated. This partly formed a stepping stone for 
the 1967 nationalisation of major means of production in which plantations were 
affected.  
 
The control over the agricultural export was a continuation of the colonial policies 
that was characterised by intensified intervention over the co-operative movement by 
expanding the footprint so as to have a control over the rural economy envisaged to 
address social and regional imbalances; importantly, to realise the national 
development plans. This was implemented and achieved through political decisions 
and mechanisms. All these were achieved by amending and repealing co-operative 
legislations to provide for the political and economic purposes to facilitate to run the 
state. As a result, during independence the co-operative movement never attained 
the autonomous status just as during colonial rule.  
 
The fifth phase was characterised by the realisation of the goals culminated in the 
strangling and restructuring and political control of the co-operative movement which 
became a political entity and part of the government machinery in extracting 
resources and controlling the small-scale growers and entire rural population. This 
depicted an increased politisation and infiltration of the movement’s function to the 
extent of transforming them to become an integral part of the propagation of the 
socialist/ujamaa ideology particularly, the 1976 villagisation policy. Under the 
villagisation the co-operative movement was abolished. The established crop 
authorities were granted direct access to handle crops from growers. In essence, the 
colonial inherited marketing system overhaul and the government monopolised crop 
marketing and took over the function of the merchant.   
 
This thesis has not only focused on the general policy aspect but also 
comprehensively looked at three major case studies, the KNCU which was formed in 
1933, BCU in 1950 and VFCUS in 1955. The study has provided the analysis of their 
growth and development, and how they have been used by successive authorities 
for their own purposes and advantages. The time gap in the formation of the 
mentioned co-operatives is one of the most ignored aspect as there is a lack of 
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explanations in the existing literature. This was partly due to the colonial authority 
neglecting its own co-operative development policy.  
 
By drawing the variations in the policy implementations the thesis has revealed 
inconsistencies regarding their growth from one case to the other. The policy 
implementations in the investigated cases has resolved the misconceptions, 
distortions and contradictions that are prevalent in the existing literature; thus, the 
revelations has filled, broadened and improved the knowledge gap about the cases. 
The KNCU and BCU were formed at the behest of the British colonial government in 
a move to control the native coffee industry. Whereas, the VFCUS growth which was 
the cotton apex marketing co-operative in the WCGA was bottom-up. The identified 
approaches have addressed a widespread distortions, misleading and contradicting 
conceptions in the existing literature. However, just as the KNCU and BCU they were 
all appointed as the agents of the local or/and specific crop control marketing boards 
in handling crops provided under the 1932 and the 1937 and 1949 marketing 
legislations. The study has shown as a result of the policy the co-operatives area of 
operation was essentially local and sometimes provincial in case of the VFCU. The 
confinement policy was also provided under the post-colonial 1968 co-operative 
legislation that confined the co-operative unions within a specific political and 
administrative boundaries. Under the confinement policy the Unions in the country 
were all not only confined within geographical boundaries but had to operate as part 
of the government machinery.  
  
This study has ironed out the co-operative development policy aspect by addressing 
the misconceptions, distortions and contradictions that are prevalent in the existing 
literature. The study is of the opinion that, the Ismailia credit societies, and cop 
marketing societies, particularly NGOMAT and Bugufi which were formed in 1930s 
as well as the TCGA and Rungwe Co-operative Union which are by and large 
neglected in the existing literature. The mentioned societies aspect have been 
highlighted in this research however, their neglect provides the potential lines for 
further investigation primarily to get a more rounded picture of the policy and their 
growth and development. It is also important future research to consider a study that 
examines the extent the external agencies support to the co-operative movement 
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and co-operative education and training at the post-colonial era contributed to a 
sustained growth and development despite policy changes. 
 
7.2: THE KILIMANJARO CO-OPERATIVE UNION 
The evolution of the KNCU is presented in the existing literature as an overnight 
development. This study gone further by demonstrating how the KNCU evolved. It 
has clearly been shown that, it was imposed to growers by the colonial authorities. 
Again, the process was predominantly guided by political decisions designed to 
undermine the voluntary participation of growers in the process of building a co-
operative organisation.   
 
The KNCU emerged from the restructuring of the KNPA in 1932. Most of the authors 
demonstrate that, this was a smooth transition. Mostly, they do not take into account 
how and who was involved in the restructuring process. This study has shown, unlike 
any other, that, the restructuring was undertaken by the colonial government with 
approval from the CO and the growers were tricked by being falsified about the crisis 
that the KNPA was facing. Clearly, the restructuring and ultimate replacement of the 
KNPA was a political expedient solution to the challenges the colonial authority was 
facing from the Association. This was achieved through the legal mechanism by the 
passage of the co-operative ordinance in 1932 under cynical and deceitfulness 
circumstances deluding the growers as well as the CO which was consistently by 
pressurised on the urgency to approve the legislation. The urgency was geared 
towards placing the Association, growers and their produce, coffee under the control 
and was necessitated owing to its financial difficulties.  
 
The restructuring and dismantling process of the KNPA was to some degree 
participatory but, it lacked transparency from the colonial authority. It was also 
maintained by the colonial authority that a change was necessary and the only viable 
solution to resolve the crisis. In so doing, the leadership, wawakilishi and members 
were made to believe by the colonial authority that status of the Association remains 
unchanged which was not the case. This was a strategy to ensure that the coffee 
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growers maintain allegiance largely to ensure that the KNCU have control over the 
native produced coffee and the KNPA lose access. This was envisaged to 
strengthen the KNCU economically and crippling the KNPA’s economic ability which 
was implemented under Section 36 of the co-operative legislation by compelling 
growers to sell their produce to the KNCU and its affiliated societies and not to the 
KNPA. The KNPA was not declared illegal, but under the clause this implied it was 
null and void. All these are neglected by secondary sources. This thesis examines 
the policy and provided an analysis of its impact as it shows, in principle that, the 
policy was designed to control and monopolise the coffee marketing by the 
government through the co-operative movement. It has been demonstrated that, the 
section could not be employed until 1934 when a new and separate legislation, the 
Chagga Rule, which was a compulsory marketing policy was promulgated. The Rule 
provided KNCU monopoly over native-produced coffee in Kilimanjaro. The thesis, 
unlike any other source has revealed that, the legislations were employed by the 
colonial authority to ensure that KNCU became part of the government machinery for 
the control, organising the marketing of native produce. In examining its impact, the 
thesis clearly indicated that the Chagga Rule faced mixed responses from coffee 
growers following the decline of coffee price which led to widespread riots in 1937 
that hardly documented in the existing literature.  
 
By and large, the KNCU was not a democratic organisation as one expects. Its 
membership was compulsory membership perpetuated by Section 36 of the co-
operative legislation and reinforced under the compulsory marketing legislations. It 
was out of the power that the KNCU emerged as the dominant and the unchallenged 
organisation with excessive government intervention through market monopoly 
legislations. This, clearly, depicts that without compulsion measures the KNCU was 
unlikely to survive; therefore, the government had to ensure its survival by all means 
demonstrating that its success was through use of force and compulsory marketing 
legislation. Under the legislation, the KNCU position was reinforced on one hand, but 
suppressed growers’ interests of the other particular by having it appointed by the 




The KNCU position was further reinforced following the passage of the Native Coffee 
(Control and Marketing) 1937 Ordinance that empowered boards to appoint KNCU 
was the sole coffee handling agent of the MNCB; also under the Defence Ordinance 
and Orders of 1939 and 1940 which came into effect following the outbreak of the 
Second World War. Conversely, the existing literature justifies the legislations by 
portraying them as relationship or partnership building policies. This study has 
revealed that, under the legislations, the KNCU was obliged to play a central role in 
facilitating the bulk-purchase contract. The legislation reinforced the control over the 
native produced coffee throughout the war and post war periods. This was in 
principal placing coffee marketing under military and war orders by having the 
colonial authority in Tanzania utilising the KNCU and MNCB as its administrative 
machinery and as implementing agencies to provide for the supply of coffee which 
was compulsorily in fixed quantities throughout the period. Coffee was sold at low a 
price that was determined by the buyer, the British Ministry of Food which 
demonstrated the determination of the colonial power to extract cheap resources 
from the poor small scale growers. This was contrary to the British post-war 
commitment to welfare development on increasing income and social benefits aimed 
to raise the standard of life of the colonial subjects.   
 
Following attainment of independence, the post-colonial government asserted its 
support to the co-operative movement as a major and the driving force in invigoration 
of rural development and economy of the country. This signified a continuation of the 
colonial policy in supporting the movement. The KNCU was used by post-colonial 
government during the phase of implementing Africanisation of the country’s 
economy immediately after independence. This was a period when it was appointed 
as the NAPB agent in 1962. It also became important in the phase of implementation 
of socialist policy from 1967. The study has shown that, at this juncture, the KNCU 
was supposedly to function as a socialist organisation. This was a significant step in 
which the post-colonial government was committed to build a socialist state under 
which the co-operative movement in the country was to spearhead the drive towards 




It was obvious that, neither social equality nor socialist expectations were attained. 
As a result, the government introduced a new model, a village as a co-operative 
entity where growers had to work communally so as to stimulate equality and social 
progress that the western model failed to deliver owing to solely its focus to its 
members. All in all, the village co-operative model miserably failed as growers 
resisted.  Consequently, the government was prompted to re-establish the western 
co-operative model as provided under the 1982 co-operative legislation that signified 
a step towards the abolition of a village as a co-operative model.   
 
7.3: THE BUKOBA CO-OPERATIVE UNION 
As pointed out in chapter 6 the historical development of the co-operative movement 
in Kagera region is scanty as far as secondary sources are concerned. Apparently, 
this is due to the fact that, historians have shown no interest in documenting it. This 
has created a critical knowledge gap that, this thesis has built a keen interest in 
exploring and utilising primary evidences that were accessed from the TNA and in 
the UK.  
 
A limited secondary sources are in place that have, nonetheless, failed to trace 
coffee marketing policy historical roots, development and its impact on the co-
operative movement in the region. They also failed to establish why was the co-
operative movement in the region was overdue despite the fact that the British 
colonial administrators encouraged small-scale growers to grow coffee at the same 
time as in Kilimanjaro, but the natives did not manage to have a viable marketing 
organisation. Against the backdrop, this study generates from primary sources a new 
knowledge about the historical trends, power relations involved and interlocking 
policies by highlighting why the growth of co-operative movement was overdue and 
eventual the interventions by the colonial authority that led to the formation of the co-
operatives in the region. 
   
This study has established that Kagera did not attract settler as Kilimanjaro. This 
was so largely because of its remoteness. As a result of lack of competition the 
307 
 
natives were not in need of the organisation to protect themselves from any threat to 
the industry.  An attempt to form coffee marketing organisations, like the NGA in the 
mid-1930s was by and large prompted by individual’s personal entrepreneurial 
interests. As in Kilimanjaro they could be exploited by the colonial authority as a 
platform towards encouragement of the co-operative movement in the region.   
 
The evidence presented in this thesis, unlike any other source shows that, the 
colonial policy neglected the natural growth of co-operatives like the NGA because it 
was viewed to pose a threat to the establishment and likely to disrupt Indian 
businesses. This was a complete degradation of the interest spontaneous co-
operative society growth attempt and discard of the early co-operative impulses. 
None of the literature has shown why the embryonic societies could not be 
transformed but some maintains the colonial description that the Association was 
involved coffee riots in 1937 that warranted the colonial authority to abolish it.    
 
The monopoly that the BNCB had over the handling of the native produced coffee as 
well as the Defence Ordinance and Orders of 1939 and 1940 employed during the 
post-war era reinforced the board’s position that it employed to undermine attempt to 
form co-operatives. The policy and board’s official’s attitude against co-operatives 
had a serious detrimental effect in the development of co-operative movement in 
Kagera.  However, the existing literature has tended to view the BNCB as a 
supportive instrument towards the course. The study has established that the BNCB 
was instrumental towards the course following the repeal of its monopolistic policy in 
1949 that compelled the board to promote the co-operative movement that laid a 
concrete foundation not only to the Registrar but also, the BNCB to promote the co-
operative in Kagera region.  
 
The study has revealed, however, that, the policy implementation has been 
impractical since the colonial authority created legal conditions without the 
growers/local initiatives and preparedness. This emanated from licensing natives to 
purchase coffee. Against the background, there was no struggle and class conflict 
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for the native access in coffee marketing as a result, there was a lack of interest from 
the majority of growers to form co-operative societies as purported by some authors.  
The colonial authority had to take an interest on their behalf by stimulating an 
interest. However, the strategy proved difficult. Hence, the colonial authority took a 
responsibility to form and impose co-operative societies to members who were not 
well prepared. Such intervention approach demonstrates the co-operative societies 
did not organically grow as were not demanded by the growers.  Understandably, the 
BCU emerged through the top-down in which it was imposed by the colonial 
authority to growers. This was also for the managerial positions appointed by the 
Governor to manage the BCU on behalf of the colonial authority. This depicts that, 
the BCU was an extended arm of the government. Such appointments were clearly 
political despite the fact that the appointees were qualified co-operative officers. 
Under such circumstance the BCU did not emerge from the reorganisation of the 
NGA as suggested in some existing literature.   
 
The imposition of the BCU and its affiliated co-operative societies to coffee growers 
manifested in the emergence of the BPCA in Kimwani Chiefdom of Biharamulo 
which was committed to handle coffee grown by natives. Nevertheless, the colonial 
authority declined its registration. As the BCPA emerged as a threat the BCU was 
granted a monopoly on the coffee marketing provided under the compulsion 
legislation. Consequently, a voluntary element was undermined and clearly indicates 
that the colonial authority was not in favour of free coffee trade by providing the BCU 
with monopolistic and protectionist policy. It demonstrates also that, any attempt for 
the spontaneous emergence of coffee marketing organisation was not 
accommodated and tolerated by the colonial authority.  
 
The intolerance of spontaneous emerged organisation which are free from colonial 
authority control in coffee marketing witnessed an escalation in 1950s of coffee 
smuggling in the region. The traders were involved in smuggling. This suggests that 
they were not ready to offer their trading skills and knowledge to co-operatives, but 
to resist that was demonstrated by black marketing. It also illustrates that, the 
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problem was not lack of enthusiasm for co-operatives, but the growers were 
comfortable with the pre-co-operative marketing system.  
  
Interestingly, when Tanzania achieved independence the colonial policies were 
further extended. The BCU was from that effect utilised by the post-colonial 
government to realise the same goals which were extraction of coffee revenue from 
growers. In general terms, the co-operatives were meant to handle crops that were 
exported by government marketing boards. To this effect, the governments 
strengthened the administrative apparatus responsible for co-operation, adjusted the 
co-operative legislation to fit the new era. But the approach employed was the same 
as one used by the colonial authority.  
 
During the post - independence period the colonial model pattern of co-operation 
was adjusted supposedly more appropriate to the specific national context, for 
example, the BCU was forced to amalgamate with all co-operatives in the region and 
were supposed to implement ideological goals provided under the ArD. These were 
macro national and political goals that the co-operative movement was supposed to 
meet. At this stage, the BCU and its affiliated societies ceased to function as 
organisations which were owned by the members. They also supposed to implement 
national policies and party, then TANU ideals. Thus, their functions were step by 
step were being taken over from the members for national and TANU interests.  
 
The takeover of the BCU and its affiliated societies, for example, amalgamation was 
an attempt by both the government and TANU was meant to inflict a sense of 
regional co-operative union unity through the co-operative movement. Such unity, 
which was the regional co-operative union, might have been a stepping stone in 
engaging the members into the socialist oriented organisation. Nevertheless, the 
attempt failed as demonstrated by the abolition of the movement and creation of the 
new model, the village as a co-operative society.  
 
Yet, the village was short of qualification as a co-operative society as it lacked key 
economic and social development drivers embedded under the co-operative values. 
The village lacked policies oriented towards the promotion and expansion of 
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business, but merely to inculcate the socialist ideology on the one hand; and 
hampered the development of a concerted economic strategy which is a core 
tradition of the co-operative movement on the other. Hence, a failure, of an attempt 
to employ as a co-operative movement model that resulted in reinstatement of the 
western co-operative organisation model in 1982. 
  
7.4: THE VICTORIA FEDERATION OF CO-OPERATIVE UNIONS  
This thesis has comprehensively shown the development of the cotton industry in the 
WCGA. It has been illustrated that, when the British took over Tanzania it 
encouraged cotton cultivation among small-scale growers in the WCGA. The 
colonial, BCGA and later ECGC were charged with task cotton development mainly 
on farming practices, policy development and implementation, research and 
expertise; and native authorities were charged with enforcing cultivation of the crop. 
Since the natives proved financially capable; yet, they had not expertise in cotton 
marketing.  The Asian cotton merchants were encouraged by the colonial authority to 
invest in the industry to invest in the industry largely because they had the expertise 
and qualified as were had capital for purchase of cotton, processing (ginning) and 
export; ultimately they had a control and monopoly created through a series of cotton 
marketing legislations and regulations were put in place by the colonial authority in 
an attempt to create viable business monopolistic environment for the merchants. 
The effects of such monopoly contributed to an endless cheating of growers. All this, 
purposefully created a specialised functions envisaged to stimulate and to ensure 
that the cotton industry is successful. The specialisations mentioned have all along 
treated separately in the existing literature that generates difficulty in seeing the 
linkages between one and the other and how the power relations involved in the 
power relations involved led to the emergence of the co-operative movement in the 
WCGA.  
 
The specialisation generated power relations under which the natives were 
recognised natives core cotton producers. The colonial authority was set up and 
enforcing marketing policies and of course prices favourable to investors. The 
marketing policies created a monopolistic business environment for the merchants 
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that resulted in difficulty in the rise or promotion of the co-operatives before and after 
the Second World War. Clearly, under the policies the opportunities for the growers 
to penetrate the marketing and processing became more and more limited. Most of 
the existing literature places more emphasis and capitalises on the colonial 
justification which revolved around lack of capital, experience and illiteracy that the 
growers were side-lined. However, the growers their engagement in production 
warranted them entry in marketing that led to several entry attempts characterised by 
numerous and diversified interest groups into cotton marketing highlighted in the 
thesis; but snubbed and translated by the colonial authority as an attempt to fuel 
troubles.  
 
This thesis has illustrated such attempts in Geita, Ukerewe district were not 
coordinated and each had varied objectives. The earliest attempt to form cotton 
marketing societies in the WCGA was engineered by Chief Mgemela of Bakwimba 
was rejected by the colonial authority. A limited number of authors have pointed out 
such an attempt. However, has not been able to establish why an attempt failed to 
materialise. This thesis has managed to expand the findings further by presenting 
evidence which shows that, the DC who received an application from the Chief 
rejected the idea. The DC discouraged the Chief from pursuing the project further by 
misleading him that a co-operative society plays the same function as the NA thus, 
having it in place was not necessary and would be a duplication of activities and will 
squeeze down the  revenue collection.    
 
Unlike existing literature, this study has established step-by-step and interlocking 
policies regarding the discouragement attempts to form a co-operative society was 
by and large temporary, but was further distracted under the Defence Ordinance and 
Orders of 1939 and 1940. The Defence Ordinance and Orders were brought in place 
following the outbreak of Second World War in 1939 when cotton marketing 
monopoly was placed under the Cotton Exporter Group; thus, the restriction was in 




The thesis has shown also that, the Defence Ordinance and Orders were employed 
along compulsory measure to produce cotton by the colonial authority in the WCGA 
following the outbreak and after the Second World War in which growers positively 
responded. However, these were years when cheating of growers by cotton traders 
was extremely high and widespread by and large owing to the monopoly they had. It 
is obvious that traders took advantage to sabotage the government’s initiatives. The 
growers had to respond to poor response over cheating practices from the colonial 
authority.  The overexploitation of growers intensified hostility against the traders and 
desire to address the problem so as they could benefit from their work that practices 
that gave rise to the mabebete and avapimi va magafu in the 1940s to curb cheating 
practices.   
 
The existing literature simply treated the mabebete and avapimi va magafu as just 
cotton weighing groups. These groups have extensively documented as far as 
control of cotton purchase cheating is concerned. However, most of the researches 
have failed to show their significance as they treat them in isolation as far as the 
cotton industry and growth of the co-operative movement in the WCGA. Some of the 
authors snubbed them and labelled them as illiterate trouble makers who also 
cheated the growers by using defect weighing scales. This study has proven that fills 
the knowledge vacuum. The confidence vested in these groups in arresting cheating 
practices was one of the factors that kept on motivating growers to keep on 
producing cotton because, they managed to minimised and in some areas was put in 
check. Importantly, the vested confidence laid a ground for the rise of interest among 
the growers to embrace the co-operative movement.  
 
The mabebete and avapimi va magafu were not only grassroots groups that 
emerged in the WCGA during post-war years. Numerous and diversified other 
interest groups emerged primarily to protect the interest of cotton growers. The most 
prominent was consumer co-operative society, the MATCS which had members and 
branches across the WCGA. However, there is a tendency in the existing literature to 
down play the MATCS. Most of the research has ignored its role as an organisation 
by placing more emphasis and discussion around MATCS employees or profiling 
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individuals, particularly Paul Bomani in exerting pressure to the colonial authority to 
promote and register co-operative societies in the WCGA. This undermines the 
commitment of the MATCS committee to use the organisation as a stepping stone 
towards transformation of the cotton marketing in the WCGA. 
 
This study has presented a new development regarding the MATCS rejection in its 
attempt to market cotton by the colonial authority because that would be a cultivation 
of chaos policy. It was out of the frustration, it was ultimately transformed into a 
vibrant pressing force in policy changes, by and large that led to the formation of the 
largest co-operative movement in Tanzania. The rejection of the MATCS into cotton 
marketing triggered its transformation into the LPGA.   
 
The formation of the LPGA emerged as galvanising organisation of the cotton 
growers throughout the WCGA. For example, it managed to bring similar groups 
from all districts under its umbrella. The unity created under the LPGA formed a 
formidable force in pressurising the colonial authority to promote the co-operative 
movement in the WCGA. The LPGA managed to defeat the colonial authority 
attempts to frustrate and demoralise them from exerting further pressure for 
registration of co-operatives. Having placed the Registrar of co-operatives under 
constant pressure he deployed the officer who initiated the formation and registration 
of co-operative societies in 1953, then secondary societies and apex organisation, 
the VFCUS in 1955 that successfully managed to shift and wrestle power from Indian 
cotton traders in the favour of growers and the co-operative movement. These 
developments and activism came at a time when growers were readily prepared to 
embrace and exploit a change. The success was generated through their collective 
strength, and co-operative power and relationship which was created by entire 
hierarchy from primary to secondary and apex societies with a foundation that was 
erected by the mabebete and avapimi va magafu. 
 
The explained development in the WCGA was unique as far as the growth of co-
operative movement history in Tanzania is concerned. Nonetheless, most of the 
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authors misleads by asserting that, the process was stimulated by the colonial 
authority. However, this study concurs that, in some respect the colonial authority 
played part, for example, in Geita district, but the LPGA played a key role in the 
whole process. The evidence shows that, the process emerged from the grassroots, 
but faced a number of obstructions from colonial officials who abused their position 
by snubbing and backtracking the initiatives. In this regard, the study has 
demonstrated that, the process was a bottom-up approach in the WCGA.  
 
However, the bottom-up approach growth does not suggest that, the VFCU and its 
affiliated secondary and primary societies evaded the government’s control as they 
were part and parcel of the cotton marketing mechanism in which the LSMB had an 
upper hand whereas the co-operatives were merely the Board’s agents charged with 
cotton collecting from growers. Some literature that has taken an interest in the 
history of the co-operative movement in the WCGA is of the opinion that, the 
appointment of the VFCUS was a reflection of its business success. This study has 
clearly shown that such contention is bias, misleading and failure to understand the 
fact that, under cotton marketing legislation the co-operatives were merely crop 
handling agents as the LSMB had monopoly powers over control and used its 
jurisdiction powers to appoint the co-operatives in the WCGA as its cotton handling 
agencies. This was facilitated both, the colonial and post-colonial government 
access over the control over export earnings. For example, under the policy, the 
post-colonial authority had access to 90 per cent of cotton produced in the country 
and the revenue generation that signified its strategic and economic importance.  
 
The economic significance of the cotton industry prompted a political control of the 
VFCUS. Clearly, the takeover of the VFCUS in 1968 by the post-colonial authority 
was taken seriously under the malpractices allegations by installing its own manager. 
In overview this can be translated as a measure taken when it was felt that the 
practices were jeopardising the economic interest of the country. This might have 
also been a deliberate move to undermine the VFCUS economic power amid 
implementation of the ArD economic nationalisation policy. However, many authors 
became the government’s mouthpiece in defending unfounded corruption practices 
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that prompted the dissolution of the VFCUS and played down a desire and the 
interest to have direct access to revenues generated from the largest cotton 
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Appendix 1a: A list of Interviewees and Group Discussions in Kilimanjaro Region and Dar Es Salaam 
Mzee Phillip Tesha Ex-manager KNCU  Uru Village October 22nd 2012 
Emanuel Kitely 
Mbowe 
Co-operator  Mulama, 
Lyamungo 
October 24th 2012 
Joseph Mchomba Co-operator  Mulama, 
Lyamungo 
October 24th 2012 
John Joseph 
Munishi 
Co-operator  Mulama, 
Lyamungo 
October 24th 2012 
Sam Mshiu Co-operator   
Edwin Mtei Ex-Governor Bank of Tanzania and Minister of 
Finance, currently member of opposition 
political party CHADEMA 
Tengeru, 
Arusha 
March 14th 2014 




27th November 2012 










Appendix 1b: A list of Interviewees and Group Discussions in Kagera Region 
Name Occupation Place Date 
Gabriel Kagaruki  Ex-Moshi co-op college Principal, ex-
commissioner of Co-operative development 
Bukoba 
Municipality 
November 8th, 10th and 
11th 2012 
Pius Ngeze Author, Politician  Bukoba 
Municipality 
November 5th 2012 
Josephat Rwakatare Coffee growers, co-operator Kitendaguro, 
Bukoba 
November 9th 2012 
Godwin Ruguma Coffee growers, co-operator Kitendaguro, 
Bukoba 
November 9th 2012 
Charles Rugachwa Coffee growers, co-operator Kitendaguro, 
Bukoba 
November 9th 2012 
Michael Mwombeki 
Bagyukura 
Coffee growers, co-operator Kitendaguro, 
Bukoba 
November 9th 2012 
Festo Gataya KCU employee KCU, Bukoba 
Municipality 
November 8th 2012 
Edmund Zakayo MA student MUCCoBS  March 10th 2014 
 









Appendix 1c: A list of Interviewees and Group Discussions in WCGA 
Festo Ganzila   Ex-manager Bugerebe Growers Co-operative Union Kirumba, Mwanza 
City 
October 29th 2012 
E.Y. Masele Ex-Manager Nyanza Co-operative Union Nyamagana, Mwanza 
City 
October 30th 2012 
John Richard Madata Ex-Auditor, VFCUS and VUASU Nyamagana, Mwanza 
City 
October 30th 2012 
Kulwa King Nangale Co-operator  Ngulinguli Village, 
Maswa 
November 13th  2012 
Magaka Majingwa Co-operator  Ngulinguli Village, 
Maswa 
November 13th  2012 
Michael Yonga Co-operator  Shinyanga 
Municipality 
November 30th  2012 
Thomas Ntegwa Co-operator  Shinyanga 
Municipality  
November 12th  2012 
John Singu Co-operator  Shinyanga 
Municipality  
November 12th  2012 
Peter Sondo Co-operator  Shinyanga 
Municipality  
November 12th  2012 
John Joseph Kabado Co-operator  Shinyanga 
Municipality  
November 12th  2012 
Jonathan Bomani Ex-VFCUS staff Kirumba, Mwanza 
City 
November 16th  2012 






































































Nassa 5,212 5,755 3,137 1,700 5,717 5,708 4,859 3,253 2,844 2,242 3,814 4,220 
 
Nyambiti 3,078 5,074 2,764 1,429 4,336 4,257 4,235 2,562 2,515 2,121 3,520 3,665 
 
Malampaka 2,507 4,274 3,539 3,905 6,599 6,340 6,969 4,657 1,550 250 3,033 1,067 
 
Ihale 3,870 2,808 1,848 909 2,870 3,349 3,831 2,414 1,751 1,185 1,902 2,830 
 
Bukumbi 2,611 3,836 2,527 2,240 1,924 2,972 2,625 1,560 1,018 405 1,417 1,335 
 
Mwanza 7,373 5,362 4,222 2,073 3,648 4,579 4,139 2,953 2,795 1,404 2,472 2,670 
 
Pambani 4,582 3,743 2,557 2,620 3,448 3,054 3,3446 1,441 1,342 410 3,081 3,385 
 
Usogore 4,620 5,137 4,974 2,943 4,407 4,757 9,046 6,705 4,183 863 4,590 1,235 
 
Murutunguru 3,871 3,997 2,968 1,706 5,021 4,708 5,081 2,171 3,151 4,076 4,035 5,900 
 
Mugango 1,501 2,302 1,580 488 1,703 774 2,002 1,102 590 749 2,063 2,900 
 
Buchenzi      775 3,882 1,932 2,303 2,081 2,983 3,510 
 
Luguru        2,971 761 1,385 2,468 1,100 
 
Total  39,226 42,288 30,116 20,103 39,643 40,273 50,115 33,721 24,713 17,171 35,378 33,817 
 






Appendix 3a: Societies Affiliated to Ngoni- Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd., Reg No 27, 1936 
Number year of registration Name of society 
24 1936 Ndirima  
23                       1936 Liula  
26                        1936 Msindo  
29                        1937 Matogoro  
30                        1937 Namtumbo  
31                        1937  Likuyu(Fusse)  
32                      1937  Litola  
33                         1937  Lipamba  
34                    1937  Mbinga  
35                    1937 Lumecha  
36                      1937 Gumbiro  
40                     1938 Mlali  
49                       1938 Mbangamawo  
50                      1938  Tingi  
53                    1941 Ligera  
66                      1947 Lusewa  
79                              1947 Mbinga coffee Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 









Appendix 3b: Interwar and Post-war Registered Consumer Co-operative Societies 
61 1946 Mwanza African Traders’ Co-operative Society 
59 1946 Dodoma Cooperative Society Ltd. 
52 1941 Chagga Transporters Cooperative Society Ltd. 
Source: Tanganyika Annual report of Co-operative Department, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1947), Appendix. 
 
Appendix 3c: interwar Registered Credit Co-operative Societies 
41 1938 Ismailia Coop Society Limited, Mwanza 
38 1938 Tanganyika Ismailia Coop Society Ltd. 
42 1938 Tanga Ismailia Cooperative Society Ltd.  
42 1938 Tanga Ismailia Cooperative Society Ltd.  













Appendix 3d: Post-war Registered Co-operative Societies  
62                       1946 Moshi Union Growers’ Co-op  Society Limited 
56 1945 Tanganyika Coffee Growers’  Association Ltd. 
60                              1946 Northern Province Farmers’ Cooperative Society Limited. 
67                       1947  Unyiha Coffee Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
68                       1947 Mwakaeli Coffee Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
69                              1947 Suma Coffee Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
70                              1947 Masebe Coffee Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
71                              1947 Katumba Coffee Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
72                              1947 Kiwira Rungwe Coffee 
73 1947  Itete Paddy Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
74                              1947 Kilwa Paddy Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
75                              1947 Mwaya Paddy Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 
76                              1947 Ndamba Paddy Growers’ Coop. Society Ltd. 









Appendix 3e: the War and Post-war Registered Co-operative Societies 
55                              1945 East African Co-operative Trading Co-operative Society 
58                              1946 Tanganyika Co-operative Trading Co-operative Society 
63                              1946 Tanga African Cooperative stores Ltd. 
57                              1946 Chagga Traders’ Cooperative Society Ltd. 
52 1941 Chagga Transporters Cooperative Society Ltd. 
Source: Tanganyika Annual report of Co-operative Department, (Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1947), Appendix. 
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Appendix 4a: KNPA’s Wawakilishi, Members, Number of Coffee Trees and 
Acreage  





Simon Kibong’oto 198 29597 133186.5 27.2283.5 
Ruben Masama 1128 632013 2844056.5 587.4378.5 
Baranabas Machame 1694 746467 3372331.5 696.3891.5 
Alphonce Kindi 111 42255 192847.5 39.4087.5 
Stanslaus Kibosho 1579 2062001 9276018 1917.738 
Bernard Uru 1005 416151 1885179.5 389.4839.5 
Petro Mbokomu 568 78482 104800 21.3210 
Elisa Old Moshi 568 78482 353169 72.4580 
Alphonce Kirua 
Vunjo 
874 237610 1079245 26.3481 
Jacob Kilema 1010 324745 14613352.5 3019.2785.5 
Ndesanjo Mamba 686 182710 821195 169.3235 
Zebedayo Mwika 574 85269 3882110.5 81.1511.5 
Michael Mengwe 53 10413 46858.5 9.6597.5 
J. Maringa Keni R 168 32300 145350 30.150 
Victori Mkuu 260 394225 877413 35.1013 
Masika 
Nganisho and M. 
Ndemasi 
Mrao 27 5402 24309 5.109 
A.Kirita Kirua R  190 2308 58270 12.190 
Karisia Mashati 31 3912 17604 3.3054 
Inyasi Olele 57 2440 10880 2.1300 
Bernard Useri 85 1058 4761 0.4761 
Athumani Usangi p 255 46246 208107 42.4827 
Ahemeleki Ugweno P 85 12840 57780 11.4540 
Simon Gonja S.P 125 25226 113530.5 23.2210.5 
Total   12025 5949902 40482343.5 8064.2590.5 












Appendix 4b: The KNPA’s Committee members 
Committee members Secretaries  
Name Locations Name Locations 
Mohamed Mita Marangu Simon Kibong’oto 
Ndaskoi Matinga Machame Ruben Swai Masama 
Sawaya Mawala Marangu  Barnabas Masama 
Tobia Lema Machame  Aliphonce Kindi 
Johanes Elaika Uru  Stanslaus  Kibosho 
Wihelm Kesi Kirua Vunjo Bernard Uru 
Anton Moshi Old Moshi Petro Mokomu 
Petro Masamu Old Moshi Eliza Old Moshi 
Sefania Mbua Machame Aliphonce Kirua 
Josefu Kendo Masama Anton Masaia Kilema 
Nderingo Ngula Masama  Alois nde Marangu 
Hadji Ahamadi Masama Ngiya Mongi Marangu 
Sebastian  Kisinde Kibosho Ndesanjo Mamba 
Kayus Kiboho Zebedayo  Mwika 
Manase Kawishe Mamba Merinyo  Keni 
Pauli Ngotio Kilema  Pento Nau Mkuu 
Phillip Kibebe Kirua Vunjo Karisia Mashati 
Noe Minja Marangu Bernard Useri 
Josefu Ndekimo Kilema Elmeleki Ugweno (Pare) 
Jacobo Mbokomu Athumani Usangi (Pare) 
Merinyo Shirima Keni and Rombo   























Appendix 4c: The KNPA’s Committee members in attendance to Pennington 
meeting 
Committee members Secretaries  
Name Locations Name Locations 
Bernard Swai Kibong’oto Ruben Swai Kibong’oto 
Barnabas Swai Machame Barnabas Machame 
Stanlaus Madicha Kibosho Stanslaus  Madicha Kibosho 
Bernard Lemunge Uru  Bernard Lemunge Uru 
Petro Mangalili Mbokomu Stanslaus  Madicha Kibosho 
Wihelm Selekio Kirua Vunjo Bernard Lemunge Uru 
Eliza Macha Olutu  Old Moshi Petro Masngalili Mbokomu 
Aliphonce Ndekio Kirua  Eliza Macha Olotu Old Moshi 
Jacobo Ndeiya Kirua Kilema Aliphonce Ndekito Kirua Vunjo 
Ndesayo Shayo Mamba Anton Masaia Kilema 
Alois Ndekiria Masama  Alois Ndekuria Marangu 
Zebedayo Mawase Mwika   
Mohamed Mita Marangu   
Josefu Ndekimo Kilema   
Hadji Ahamadi Masama   
Karugha Kitambachuo  Marangu   
David Moshi Machame   
Shadrak Gidion Machame   
Josefu Kendo Masama   
George Koromia Machame   
Sebastian Kisinde  Kibosho   
Ngoiya Mongi Marangu   
Johanes Ndesika  Uru    
Bonaventura  Kirua Vunjo   
Antoni Masaia Kilema   
Faraji Machame   
Wilheim Salekio Kirua Vunjo   
Wilheim Mrekereke Mkuu Rombo   











Appendix 5: Terms of Reference of the Committee on formation of Co-
operatives in Tanzania (1930) 
1. To consider the kinds of the agricultural produce, both native and non-native, 
including the products of the animal husbandry, which are produced in the 
territory and appear to be such as may advantageous be dealt with by a 
central or local marketing organisation. 
2. To examine the question of inspection before marketing, or other measures 
designed to raise the quality of such produce and to afford to buyers a 
guarantee of quality. 
3. To investigate actual and potential markets for such produce, their present 
consuming capacity and the probability of expansion. 
4. To examine the present system of distribution for local consumption and 
shipment of such produce. 
5. To consider the advisability of establishing a marketing organisation, either on 
a co-operative basis or otherwise for all or any of such produce, and the 
extent, if any, to which such organisation should be under Government 
control. 
6. To advise upon the steps which should be taken to give effect to any 
recommendations which may be made, and particularly to examine the 
method of providing such financial assistance as may be required either from 
public funds, from the producers, or otherwise, and to furnish estimates of the 
revenue which may be expected in each case, and of the total sums involved 
a) For capital expenditure 
b) For annually recurrent expenses, and to make recommendations 
 
Appendix 6: The objects of the societies affiliated to the KNCU 
The objects of the societies affiliated to the KNCU are to promote the economic 
interests of the members in accordance with cooperative principles and are 
particularly;- 
1. To arrange the delivery of the produce of members of the society for 
marketing through the KNCU in such manner as shall be decided by the 
union, and to that end to provide services including factories, storage 
accommodation and transport as may be required 
2. To do all things may be necessary for the care of the plantations of members 
and for the prevention and eradication of pests and diseases of crops and 
animals as required by the KNCU 
3. To receive and bulk the orders of members for seed agricultural and building 
requirements and arrange their purchase through the KNCU 
4. To receive deposits of members on behalf of the KNCU and to repay them 
when ordered by the union 
344 
 
5. To advance loans if necessary to members on the security of their produce 
delivered to the society god owns. 
6. To encourage in the members’ the spirit and practice of thrift mutual help and 
self help 
 
Appendix 6a: The KNCU Membership 
5. The Members Shall Consist Of; 996 
a) Registered Societies Who Join In The Application For Registration; 
b) Registered Societies Affiliated In Accordance With The By-Laws 
 
Appendix 6b: The Objects of the Societies Affiliated to the KNCU 
The objects of the societies affiliated to the KNCU are to promote the economic 
interests of the members in accordance with cooperative principles and are 
particularly;- 
7. To arrange the delivery of the produce of members of the society for 
marketing through the KNCU in such manner as shall be decided by the 
union, and to that end to provide services including factories, storage 
accommodation and transport as may be required 
8. To do all things may be necessary for the care of the plantations of members 
and for the prevention and eradication of pests and diseases of crops and 
animals as required by the KNCU 
9. To receive and bulk the orders of members for seed agricultural and building 
requirements and arrange their purchase through the KNCU 
10. To receive deposits of members on behalf of the KNCU and to repay them 
when ordered by the union 
11. To advance loans if necessary to members on the security of their produce 
delivered to the society god owns. 






                                                          
996 The By-laws of the KNCU and affiliated societies. (Dar Es Salaam: Tanganyika 




Appendix 7: The Native Authority Ordinance (The Chagga Rules) 
 
Coffee (Moshi District) Rules, 1934 
In exercise of the powers conferred upon Native Authporities by Section 15 of the 
Native Authority Ordinance, the following rules are hereby made: 
1. These rules may be cited as the Coffee (Moshi District) Rules, 1934 and shall 
apply to Moshi District. They shall come into force on the first day of ….193… 
2. Every native planter of coffee shall market his crop through the Kilimanjaro 
Co-operative Union and for this purpose deliver his crop at such place as the 
Union require 
3. Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of the rules shall be liable 
to a fine not exceeding one hundred shillings or default of payment to 
imprisonment of either description for a period not exceeding one month for a 
first offence, and for subsequent offences to fine not exceeding shs 200/- or to 
imprisonment of either description for a period not exceeding two months, or 





























Appendix 8a: The Primary Co-operative Societies Affiliated to the KNCU (registered in 
1930s) 
Reg. No Name of a Society Date of registration  
1 Kibong’oto Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 
9 Machame Lyamungo Co-operative 
Society Limited 
1.1.1933 
8 Kibosho West Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.1.1933 
7 Kibosho East Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.1.1933 
19 Uru South Co-operative Society Limited 7.12.1934 
14 Uru East Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 
6 Mbokomu  Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 
5 Old Moshi Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 
4 Kirua Vunjo West Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.1.1933 
434 Kirua Vunjo East Co-operative Society 
Limited 
26.7.1939 
20 Marangu West Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.1.1933 
18 Marangu East Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.1.1933 
2 Mamba Co-operative Society Limited 1.1.1933 
21 Mwika West Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.1.1933 
44 Mkuu Central Co-operative Society 26.7.1939 
48 Useri Co-operative Society Limited 1.7.1939 










Appendix 8b: The Primary Co-operative Societies Affiliated to the KNCU (registered in 
1940s) 
Reg. No Name of a Society Date of registration  
54 Kibosho central Co-operative Society Limited 28.9.1944 
87 Machamne Lemira Co-operative Society Limited 23.12.1948 
88 Masama Mula Co-operative Society Limited 23.12.1948 
64 Machame North Co-operative Society Limited 12.2.1947 
65 Machame South Co-operative Society Limited 12.2.1947 
77 Mraoakairua and Mrere Co-operative Society Limited 1.7.1947 
78 Mashati Olele Co-operative Society Limited 1.7.1947 
Source: KNCU Annual Report 1957 – 1958 and 1958 – 1959 
 
Appendix 8c: The Primary Co-operative Societies Affiliated to the KNCU (registered in 
1950s) 
Reg. No Name of a Society Date of registration  
146 New Mwika East Co-operative Society 
Limited 
2.1.1951 
147 Keni Mamsera Co-operative Society 
Limited 
2.1.1951 
22 Mengwe Co-operative Society Limited 2.1.1951 
151 Kilema North Co-operative Society Limited 15.8.1951 
152 Kirua South Co-operative Society Limited 15.8.1951 
202 Mkuu East Co-operative Society Limited  
219 Machame Narumu Co-operative Society 
Limited 
19.10.1953 
449 Masama Roo Co-operative Society 
Limited 
11.5.1957 
448 Masama Sonu Co-operative Society 
Limited 
11.5.1957 
332 MasamaSawe Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.9.1955 
333 Machame Shari Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.9.1955 
331 MachameUswaa Co-operative Society 
Limited 
1.9.1955 
542 Kibosho Kirima Boro Co-operative Society 
Limited 
25.4.1958 
430 Kibosho Mweka Sungu Co-operative 
Society Limited 
5.7.1956 
191 Uru North  Limited 10.6.1953 
Source: KNCU Annual Report 1957 – 1958 and 1958 – 1959 
 
Appendix 9a: KNCU Membership and Coffee Trees by 1937 
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Society Members            Number of coffee trees 
Kibongoto 441 127,653 
Machame West 2,173 878,472 
Machame East 1,105 647,392 
Machame Central 1,779 904,723 
Kibosh West 920 519,555 
Kibosh East 2,045 787,642 
Uru West 1,299 1,060,110 
Uru East 646 240,953 
Mbokomu 392 147,968 
Old-Moshi 852 206,016 
KiruaVunjo West 569 318,768 
KiruaVunjo East 591 500,858 
Kilema 1,227 478,817 
Marangu West 892 205,429 
Marangu East 900 355,389 
Mamba 1,225 600,862 
Mwika West 460 128,279 
Mwika East 855 395,867 
Mengwe 335 60,738 
Keni – Mriti 623 139,570 
Mkuu 727 140,367 
Mrao 192 46,848 
Kirua Rombo 333 215,306 
Mrere 366 66,588 
Mashati 188 34,907 
Olele 174 15,494 
Usseri 428 46,424 
Total 21,737 9,270,996 
Source: Tanganyika Territory, LEGCO, A report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative 











Appendix 9b: Membership of the KNCU’s Affiliated Societies by June 1947 
Registration Number  Society Members  
1 Kibong’oto 760 
11 Machame West 2,803 
9 Machame East  1,644 
10 Machame Central 1,779 
8 Kibosho West 1,083 
7 Kibosho East 1,168 
16 Uru West 1,726 
12 Uru East 743 
6 Mbokomu 420 
5 Old Moshi 867 
4 Kirua Vunjo West 729 
3 Kilema 1,589 
17 Marangu West 1,213 
15 Marangu East 1,402 
2 Mamba 1,266 
18 Mwika West 595 
14 Mwika East 1,104 
19 Mengwe 632 
13 Keni-Mriti 963 



















Appendix 10: coffee production (in tons) and amount paid to the KNCU growers from 
1932 - 1946 
Season Coffee crop parchment (in 
tons) 
Amount paid in £ to 
growers 
Price per lb paid to 
growers  
1932/33 1,072 35,426 29.55 
1933/34 1,167 35,384 27.03 
1934/35 1,587 35,456 19.85 
1935/36 1,684 33,995 16.94 
1936/37 882 18,707 18.95 
1937/38 1,472 33,336 20.16 
1938/39 1,959 58,747 26.78 
1939/40 2,680 72,275 24.17 
1940/41 4,063 84,798 18.53 
1941/42 1,948 52,184 23.97 
1942/43 3,103 145,399 41.96 
1943/44 2,114 131,012 57.49 
1944/45 3,974 276,380 62.96 
1945/46 3.102 173,032 49.81 
Total 30,807 1,186,131  




















Appendix 11: Deportees from Kilimanjaro following 1937 riots 
s/n Name Place of deportation 
1 Daudi Ngamini Iringa 
2 Asseri Eupraim Shuma Iringa 
3 Tobia Msaki Kahama 
4 N. Gadi Msue Iringa 
5 Toma bin Mafalu Tabora 
6 Joshua Mashuka Tabora 
7 Mose Kirenga Singida 
8 Anderson Anandumi Singida 
9 Samueli Nderingo Tabora 
10 Kimatare Senta Tabora 
11 Israel Mtunga Singida 
12 Anas Masika Iringa 
13 Touder Mchau Iringa 
14 Leonardi Kiwera Iringa 
Source: Edwin Mtei ; TNA 255442 Vol.II MNCB from PC, Northern Province to CS, Re. No. 





























Tonnage Valuein £ £ 
Per ton 
1944/45 29310 16980 3275 343474 105 
1945/46 29600 16830 2512 256449 102 
1946/47 30450 17380 1834 203543 111 
1947/48 31670 22460 3384 439573 130+ 
1948/49 32050 22400 2623 373803 143 
1949/50 31590 23540 3359 954713 284 
1950/51 32030 23010 5049 1214634 241 
1951/52 34390 23620 5670 1596310 246 
1952/53 35280 25100 1949 685680 352 
1953/54 36880 27660 6304 +3724184 591 
Source: KNCU 1944-1954 Annual Reports
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Tonnage Value in £ £ 
Per ton 
1960/61 45000 34000 8739 2499892 286 
1961/62 50000 34000 5853 1676513 287 
1962/63 50000 34000 5182 1306135 252 
1963/64 53000 35000 9600 3105315 323 
1964/65 55000 35500 9046 3039456 336 
1965/66 55000 35500 16831 5159543 308 
1966/67 65000 35500 14486 4043656 279 
1967/68 65000 35500 11526 2862665 248 
1968/69 87000 35500 14665 354611 244 
1969/70 87060 35500 8780 3076352 354 
1970/71 87060 35500 11786 3677121 312 
1971/72 87060 35500 16798 5395419 321 
1972/73 87060 35500 18474 7192500 389 
Source: Source: KNCU 1960-1973 Annual Reports 
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Appendix 14: Summary of conversation with the President of the NGA 
a) Outright purchase from non-members could not be permitted; 
Summary of replies in conversation with Mr Herbet Rugazibwa, the NGA President 
and Mr Klemens Kiiza and two other representatives in the presence of Bukoba 
District DC, Mr W.F Page held in September 23rd 1936. 
The representatives were informed that if a co-operative marketing society were 
registered: 
b) It would not be possible for a society to pay an outright price for coffee 
corresponding to what was paid by the middlemen 
c) An advance of not more than 50% or 60% of the local price at the place of 
payment would be permitted, presuming funds were available for advances; 
d) Registration entailed full compliance with the Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance, the Rules thereunder, and the bylaws of the society; 
e) The society would have to be conducted on a strict business footing; 
f) Outright purchase is usually not permitted, but, if permitted for satisfactory 
reason shown, would only be at a rate appreciably below the, market price; 
g) Outright purchase from non-members could not be permitted; 
h) A society must ordinarily deal only with its members, and strong reasons must 
be adduced for any departure from this principle; 
i) The profoma byelaws given them, were merely to show them what a co-
operative society entitled; 
j) Before a society is registered a full explanation of what society means and 





















Appendix 15a: Licensed Coffee Dealers in some Gombolola in Kianja Bukoba District 
Gombolola European Indian Arab African Total 
Kianja 
Kamachumu  1 18 8 11 38 
Muhutwe - 5 2 15 22 
Kabirizi - - - 4 4 
Rwagati - - - 16 16 
Ibwera - 4 13 5 22 
Kishogo - - 1 3 4 
Mnazi - - - 1 1 
Ibuga - - - 8 9 
Izigo 1 3 2 3 8 
Mikoni - - - 14  
Kaibanya - 8 8 9  
Total 2 50 34 81 147 
Source: Northcote (appendix H)
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Appendix 15b: Licensed Coffee Dealers in some Gombolola in Ihangiro, Kiziba, 




Buleza - 10 2 1 13 
Ilemela - - - 1 1 
Kasasha - 3 1 10 14 
Mbatama - - - 13 13 
Mbunda - - - 1 1 
Mshamba - 2 1 7 10 
Karambi - 1 - - 1 
Birabo - - - 5 5 
Kashanda - 8 16 2 26 
Kahengere - - 3 1 4 
Bumbire 
 
- - - 4 4 
Total  24 23 45 92 
Kiziba 
Gera - - - 7 7 
Bwanjai - 3 - 3 6 
Kitobo - - - 4 4 
Bugundika - 1 - 16 17 
Ishozi - 1 - - 1 
Kanyingo - 5 - 3 8 
Bunyango - 2 - 3 5 
Kibumbiro - 1 7 36 
 
8 
Total   13 7 36 56 
Kiamtwara 
Bukoba town - 24 - 1 56 
Kitendageru - - - 6 25 
Nyakato - - - 4 6 
Katoma - - - 2 4 
Itawa - - - 1 2 
Kitwe - - - 1 1 
Total  24 - 14 38 
Bugabo 
Bwendangabo - - - 5 6 
Kahororo - - - 2 2 
Kaagya - - - 1 1 
Bushasha - 1 - 3 4 
Lubafu - 1 - 4 4 
Total    14 16 
Kanyengereko 
Kanyengereko  2  23 25 
Karagwe 
Karagwe  1 4 7 12 
Misenyi 
Misenyi  2  4 6 
      



















Muhutwe 94 15.8.1950 Kianja Rabafu 97 15.8.1950 Bugabo 
Rwagati 95 15.8.1950 Kianja Kaibinja 100 15.8.1950 Bugabo 
Mikoni 96 15.8.1950 Kianja Buhendagado 145 2.1.1951 Bugabo 
Bushasha 101 15.8.1950 Kianja Buzi 226 8.10.1954 Bugabo 
Minazi 102 15.8.1950 Kianja Kaagya  118 16.9.1950 Bugabo 
Izigo 106 15.8.1950 Kianja Kanyigo 98 15.8.1950 Kiziba 
Kabirizi 120 16.9.1950 Kianja Gera 116 6.9.1950 Kiziba 
Kamachumu 129 1.11.1950 Kianja Kyaka 128 1.11.1950 Kiziba 
Ibuga  130 1.11.1950 Kianja Bugandika 131 1.11.1950 Kiziba 
Ibwera 137 1.11.1950 Kianja Buyango 132 1.11.1950 kiziba 
Nyakibimbiri 174 29.4.1953 Kianja Ishozi 133 1.11.1950 Kiziba 
Ruhanga 175 29.4.1953 Kianja Kitobo 134 1.11.1950 Kiziba 
Bwera 223 8.10.1954 Kianja Bwanjai 135 1.11.1950 Kiziba 
Nyakahanga 224 8.10.1954 Kianja Kyazi 299 23.3.1955 Kiziba 
Lugongo 225 8.10.1954 Kianja Kabumbiro 310 12.4.1955 Kiziba 
Kasheru 300 23.3.1955 Kianja  Ruzinga 365 16.3.1956 Kiziba 
Mbare 301 23.3.1955 Kianja  Ngorongoro  440 6.2.1957 Kiziba 
Rwanda 606 28.3.1959 Kianja  Ishunju 518 12.2.1958 Kiziba 
Kashsha 103 15.8.1950 Ihangiro Nyakato 108 15.8.1950 Kiamtwara  
Biirabo 110 15.8.1950 Ihangiro Kitwe 109 15.8.1950 Kiamtwara  
Bureza 115 6.9.1950 Ihangiro Itahwa 119 16.9.1950 Kiamtwara 
Kahengere 121 16.9.1950 Ihangiro Kitendaguro 123 16.9.1950 Kiamtwara  
Nshamba 124 17.10.1950 Ihangiro Mabira 107 15.8.1950 Karagwe 
Ngote 125 17.10.1950 Ihangiro Bugene 112 25.8.1950 Karagwe 
Kahororo 126 17.10.1950 Ihangiro Nyaishozi 114 25.8.1950 Karagwe  
Kishanda 127 17.10.1950 Ihangiro Kituntu 142 1.12.1950 Karagwe  
Ilemera 136 1.11.1950 Ihangiro Nyabionza 143 1.12.1950 Karagwe  
Mbatama 138 1.11.1950 Ihangiro Ihambe 607 28.3.1959 Karagwe  
Bumbire 140 1.12.1950 Ihangiro Kasambya 105 15.8.1950 Misenyi 
Mubunda 141 1.12.1950 Ihangiro Minziro 111 15.8.1950 Misenyi  
Rulongo 298 23.3.1955 Ihangiro  Nsunga 122 16.9.1950 Misemyi 
Kabalala 540 5.4.1958 Ihangiro Kimwani  28.10.1968  
Rulongo 298 23.3.1965 Ihangiro     
Itongo  757 25.2.1961 Ihangiro     
Makongora 674 1.4.1960 Kianja      
Source: Compiled from the BNCU 1956 Annual Report and 1961/62-1962/63, 1963/64 and 




Appendix 17: The Co-operative Societies affiliated to Ikogelo Cooperative Union 
S/No Registration 
Number 
Name of Societies affiliated Societies  
1 886 Bikaka Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
2 751 Chato Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
3 1199 Bukome Wakulima Co-operative Society 
4 1369 Masasi Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
5 1358 Mkungo Wakulima Co-operative Society 
6 1687 Katendo Wakulima Co-operative Society 
7 1689 Lubambangwe Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
8 1686 Migege Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
9 1507 Nyarumbugu Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
10 1782 Itare  Wakulima Co-operative Society 
11 1819 Ichagulilo Farmers’ Co-operative Society 
12 1834 Muganza Wakulima Co-operative Society 
13 1854 Kachwamba Wakulima Co-operative Society 
14 1855 Ilyamuchele (Kagunga) Wakulima Co-operative Society 





















Appendix 18: The Co-operative Societies affiliated to Bugufi Cooperative Union 
S/No Registration 
Number 
Name of Societies affiliated Societies  
450 Kabanga Coffee Co-operative Society 
451 Mabawe Coffee Co-operative Society 
452 Shanga Coffee Co-operative Society 
453 Muhweza Coffee Co-operative Society 
454 Nyamiaga Coffee Co-operative Society 
Source: Compiled from the BNCU 1968/69 Annual Reports 
 
Appendix 19: MATCS/LPGA affiliated and non-affiliated societies by August 1952 
 District and Society  Membership  
 Mwanza District997  
1 Nassa Growers Co-operative Society  3,000 
2 Mwanza Agricultural Co-operative Society  400 
3 Bukumbi Growers Co-operative Society 78 
4 Massaza II Growers Co-operative Society 600 
5 Sukuma Growers co-operative society 23 
6 Mwanza II Growers co-operative society 203 
 Ukerewe district   
1 Ukerewe Growers Association – affiliated to MATCS 718 
2 Nyanza Growers Co-operative Society n/a 
 Maswa District998 n/a 
1 Unnamed/unspecific society/societies in Itilima Chiefdom 600 
2 Unnamed/unspecific society/societies in Ntuzu Chiefdom 600 
3 Unnamed/unspecific society/societies in Dutwa Chiefdom 600 
 Kwimba district999    
1 Kwimba Produce Marketing Co-operative Society  - affiliated 
to LPGA 
890 
2 Kwimba African Traders n/a 
3 Kwimba Native Traders n/a 
4 The LPGA Kwimba branch  n/a 
Source: TNA 215/1423C, Kwimba,  Maswa and Mwanza Districts Commissioners to 
the PC, Lake Province  
                                                          
997 Mwanza Districts Commissioners to the Lake Province PC (Ref. No. NA/45/18 of 
July 17th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
998 Maswa Districts Commissioner to the Lake Province PC, Confidentila Ref. No. 
C/16/165 of July 22nd 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.  
999 Kwimba Districts Commissioner to PC, Lake Province, Confidentila Ref. No. C/16 
of July 19th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C. 
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Appendix 20: Cotton Production Targets - Lake Province 
Ginnery Average 1960 – 
1961 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Buchosa 10,283 12,500 14,500 15,000 15,500 16,500 
Bukumbi 8,944 11,000 12,000 13,000 14,000 15,000 
Buyagu 7,696 8,200 10,500 13,000 14,000 15,000 
Ihale 2,133 2,500 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 
Kibara 6,388 8,000 10,000 12,500 15,000 16,500 
Kasamwa 9,102 12,000 143,000 15,000 18,000 24,000 
Luguru 7582 10,000 11,000 12,000 14,000 15,000 
Malampaka 9,472 11,000 12,500 14,000 16,000 18,000 
Manawa 9,896 11,500 12,500 14,000 15,000 16,000 
Mugango 7,445 9,000 11,500 13,500 14,500 16,000 
Magu 8,281 8,000 10,000 12,500 14,000 15,000 
Mhunze 10,351 11,000 14,000 17,000 19,000 20,000 
Nassa 8,809 11,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 
Nyambiti 10,705 12,000 15,000 17,000 10,000 20,000 
Sola 8,308 9,000 11,000 13,000 16,000 16,500 
Ukerewe 7,466 7,500 8,000 9,500 11,500 12,000 
Ushashi 8,591 11,000 12,500 13,000 14,000 16,000 
Usogore 12,510 14,000 15,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 
Nyamililo 7,545 8,500 9,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 
Manonga 2,329 5,000 7,000 9,000 11,000 15,000 
Total  161,000 193,000 221,000 258,000 291,000 323,000 
Source: Minister of Agriculture to VFCUS, March 7th 1962, TNA 215/A3/1 Appendix A 
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1 Mwagulanja 15 Nassa 193 Nassa  cotton 
Ginners 2 Nyabihale 18 Nassa 194 
3 Solima 130 Nassa 195 
4 Badugu 158 Nassa 196 
5 Kaloleni 129 Nassa 197 
6 Shigara 239 Nassa 198 
7 Igokelo  Nassa 211 
8 Ipililo  Nassa 212 
9 Yintwimila 9 Nassa 213 
10 Nsayu 16 Nassa 218 
11 Magu 60 Nyambiti 199 
12 Sima 59 Nyambiti 201 
13 Gabu  Luguru 203 
14 Buhamhala  Luguru 204 Luguru 
 
 
15 Somanda  Luguru 205 
16 Nyakabindi 179 Luguru 206 
17 Mwamnuhu  Luguru 207 
18 Zagayu 90 Luguru 208 
19 Luguru 86 Luguru 209 
20 Dasina 127 Luguru 210 Nyambiti 
 21 Bumera 126 Luguru 216 
22 Namasambo 47 Ukerewe 182 Buchosa 
 23 Kibara 48 Ukerewe 183 
24 Muruti 175 Ukerewe 185 
25 Bwiro 49 Ukerewe 186 
26 Omurambo 231 Ukerewe 187 
27 Kibara 56 Ihale/Kibara 181  
28 Rumenya 34 Buchosa 176 Nyakasero 
 29 Kamilo  276 Buchosa 178 
30 Kakoma 35 and 274 Buchosa 188 
31 Bukokwa 234 Buchosa 180 
32 Kishinda 133 Buchosa 189 Bukumbi 
33 Kahunda 268 Buchosa 190 Tcc Ltd 
 34 Nyamililo  Nyamililo 177 
35 Nyamazugo 12 Nyamililo 200 
36 Kasangamire 176 Nyamililo 214 
37 Chifunfu 132 Nyamililo 215 Taitu 
38 Sima 42 Nyamililo 179 Ihale 
Source: Compiled from the Co-operative Office, Mwanza (1953); TNA: 2825/5 
Agriculture Produce Cotton Lint Disposal from PC, Lake Province to members of 
LGA Secretariat, Ref.No. 2416/21, October 19th 1953 
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Appendix 22a: Societies in Buchosa Zone 
S/No Name of society Registration Number 
1 Rumeya Farmers Co-operative Society 176 
2 Kamiloa Farmers Co-operative Society 178 
3 Bukokwa Farmers Co-operative Society 180 
4 Kishinda Farmers Co-operative Society 189 
5 Kahunda Farmers Co-operative Society 190 
6 Ligamba Farmers Co-operative Society 246 
7 Kabarongo Farmers Co-operative Society 295 
8 Kahaganga growers co-operative society 302 
9 Lushamba growers co-operative society 303 
10 Nzera wakulima co-operative society 304 
11 Katema wakulima co-operative society 305 
12 Karebeze wakulima co-operative society 308 
13 Bugoro wakulima co-operative society 336 
14 Kafunzo Farmers’ Co-operative Society 348 
15 Isaka growers Co-operative Society 347 
16 Muharamba Growers Co-operative Society 349 
17 Ruhama wakulima co-operative society 388 
18 Lwenera farmers’ co-operative society 460 
19 Nkome Farmers’ Co-operative Society 647 
20 Muhengele Farmers’ Co-operative Society 643 
21 Katwa Farmers’ Co-Operative Society 690 
22 Kakoma Growers Co-operative Society 188 
23 Nyakasungwa Farmers’ Co-operative Society 296 
24 Nyamazugo Farmers’ Co-operative Society 200 
25 Nyamzenda Wakulima Co-operative Society 297 
26 Nyankongochoro Wakulima Co-operative Society 307 
27 Butoga Farmers’ Co-operative Society 313 
28 Kashinda II Farmers’ Co-operative Society 367 
29 Sango farmers’ Co-operative Society 455 
30 Kongwa farmers’ Co-operative Society 475 
31 Mtakuja farmers’ Co-operative Society 614 
32 Buswedu farmers’ Co-operative Society 617 
33 Igwanzonzu farmers’ Co-operative Society 708 
34 Kakobo wakulima Co-operative Society 788 
35 Mulaga growers Co-operative Society 686 
35 Ibisabageni growers Co-operative Society 1031 
37 Nyahitu wakulima Co-operative Society 1372 
38 Nyamilyango wakulima Co-operative Society 1373 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 




Appendix 22b: Societies in Buyagu Zone 
1 Buyagu Farmers Co-operative Society 306 
2 Nyakukwa Farmers Co-operative Society 362 
3 Nyang’wale Farmers Co-operative Society 382 
4 Butalanda Farmers Co-operative Society 387 
5 Nyijundu Farmers Co-operative Society 407 
6 Nyachenche Farmers Co-operative Society 423 
7 Igalula Farmers Co-operative Society 474 
8 Bitoto Farmers Co-operative Society 477 
9 Ipyagulabuhabi Growers Co-operative Society 486 
10 Kaguga Farmers Co-operative Society 526 
11 Kaboha Farmers Co-operative Society 527 
12 Kakora Farmers Co-operative Society 528 
13 Busisi Growers Co-operative Society 539 
14 Mulaba Farmers Co-operative Society 597 
15 Kabiga Farmers co-operative society 601 
16 Isole Farmers Co-operative Society 691 
17 Busolwa Farmers co-operative society 707 
18 Nyanzumula Farmers Co-operative Society 711 
19 Sota Farmers Co-operative Society 1198 
20 Ng’wabasabi Growers Co-operative Society 1535 
21 Bumanda  Growers Co-operative Society 1677 
22 Ng’wabasabi Growers Co-operative Society 1679 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 









Appendix 22c: Societies in Kasamwa zone  
1 Nyakagomba Wakulima Co-operative Society 400 
2 Bung’wangoko growers Co-operative Society 402 
3 Nyaseke Farmers Co-operative Society 403 
4 Ibanda farmers’ Co-operative Society 404 
5 Kasamwa growers Co-operative Society 405 
6 Muhama Farmers’ Co-operative Society 406 
7 Nyakaduha Growers Co-operative Society 411 
8 Ihega wakulima Co-operative Society 417 
9 Busanda wakulima Co-operative Society 418 
10 Bukondo growers Co-operative Society 419 
11 Lukalanga farmers Co-operative Society 420 
12 Buziransoga growers Co-operative Society 427 
13 Kamhanga growers Co-operative Society 529 
14 Nungwe growers Co-operative Society 530 
15 Kagu farmers Co-operative Society 553 
16 Katoro farmers Co-operative Society 602 
17 Nyamigogo growers Co-operative Society 615 
18 Shinyamwendwa growers Co-operative Society 618 
19 Nyamalimbe farmers Co-operative Society 630 
20 Nyalwanzaga growers Co-operative Society 689 
21 Nyalikoma farmers Co-operative Society 699 
22 Mpomvu growers Co-operative Society 710 
23 Nyakang’waga farmers Co-operative Society 1160 
24 Nyachiluluma farmers Co-operative Society 1197 
25 Nyasalala wakulima Co-operative Society 1498 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 







Appendix 22d: Societies in Nyamililo zone  
1 Nyamililo Farmers Co-operative Society 177 
2 Sima farmers Co-operative Society 179 
3 Kasungamile growers Co-operative Society 214 
4 Chifunfu growers Co-operative Society 215 
5 Igambiro farmers Co-operative Society 232 
6 Rugongo farmers Co-operative Society 247 
7 Kasomeko farmers Co-operative Society 311 
8 Katunguru wakulima Co-operative Society 312 
9 Nyamizeze farmers Co-operative Society 314 
10 Ibondo growers Co-operative Society 323 
11 Nyamatongo growers Co-operative Society 350 
12 Ipandikilo growers Co-operative Society 351 
13 Nyanguganwa farmers Co-operative Society 360 
14 Rubanda wakulima Co-operative Society 361 
15 Kanyang’wanza farmers Co-operative Society 363 
16 Kikoto farmers Co-operative Society 375 
17 Rwenge farmers Co-operative Society 384 
18 Tabaruka wakulima Co-operative Society 248 
19 Mayuya farmers Co-operative Society 479 
20 Ilekemilo farmers Co-operative Society 533 
21 Tunyenye Co-operative Society Co-operative 
Society 
596 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 









Appendix 22e: Societies in Magu zone 
1 Puna growers Co-operative Society 293 
2 Magu growers Co-operative Society 199 
3 Sima (Kwimba) growers Co-operative Society  201 
4 Kahangala growers Co-operative Society 249 
5 Ng’haya growers Co-operative Society 260 
6 Ihale growers Co-operative Society 395 
7 Kisega growers Co-operative Society 397 
8 Kipeja growers Co-operative Society 464 
9 Yichobela growers Co-operative Society 514 
10 Nyang’ahanga growers Co-operative Society 524 
11 Budula growers Co-operative Society 550 
12 Kitongo growers Co-operative Society 613 
13 Ng’wabulenga Co-operative Society 772 
14 Shishani growers Co-operative Society 773 
15 Igombe growers Co-operative Society 941 
16 Mahaha growers Co-operative Society 1207 
17 Nkungulu growers Co-operative Society 1208 
18 Mhobela growers Co-operative Society 1209 
19 Isalo growers Co-operative Society 1580 
20 Masengese growers Co-operative Society 1581 
21 Nyasato growers Co-operative Society 1582 
22 Chandalu growers Co-operative Society 1667 
23 Ibalani growers Co-operative Society 1668 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 









Appendix 22f: Societies in Manawa zone 
1 Igogwa growers Co-operative Society 244 
2 Kijima Co-operative Society 279 
3 Kikubiji Co-operative Society 353 
4 Isesa Co-operative Society 364 
5 Kasololo Co-operative Society 368 
6 Pambani Co-operative Society 369 
7 Nyamanyinza Co-operative Society 380 
8 Lubiri Co-operative Society 381 
9 Mabuki Co-operative Society 383 
10 Bugisha Co-operative Society 386 
11 Chasalawi Co-operative Society 437 
12 Nhunduli Co-operative Society 457 
13 Salawe Co-operative Society 458 
14 Buhingo Co-operative Society 491 
15 Sumbugu Co-operative Society 506 
16 Isungang’holo Co-operative Society 519 
17 Kabala Co-operative Society 520 
18 Buhunda Co-operative Society 641 
19 Mbarika Co-operative Society 871 
20 Kiliwi Co-operative Society 1161 
21 China Co-operative Society 1670 
22 Gulumwa Co-operative Society 1671 
23 Gembe Co-operative Society 1745 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 









Appendix 22g: Societies in Nassa zone 
1 Mwagulanja Growers Co-operative Society 193 
2 Nyabihale Growers Co-operative Society 194 
3 Solima Growers Co-operative Society 195 
4 Badugu Growers Co-operative Society 196 
5 Shigala Growers Co-operative Society 198 
6 Igokelo Growers Co-operative Society 211 
7 Ipililo Co-operative Society 212 
8 Yitwimila Co-operative Society 213 
9 Makoye Co-operative Society 414 
10 Mwamanyili Co-operative Society 436 
11 Ihabuyaga Co-operative Society 505 
12 Ihehenaja Co-operative Society 512 
13 Gasoil Co-operative Society 668 
14 Nyamatembe Co-operative Society 682 
15 Bukabile Co-operative Society 683 
16 Mwasamaba Co-operative Society 695 
17 Ng’waniga Co-operative Society 769 
18 Bugatu Co-operative Society 803 
19 Ng’wagindi Co-operative Society 940 
20 N’wamulila Co-operative Society 1167 
21 Bushigwamhala Co-operative Society 1426 
22 Busani Co-operative Society 1606 
23 Luguga Co-operative Society 1669 
24 Wichamoyo Co-operative Society 1735 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 








Appendix 22h: Societies in Ngasamo zone 
1 Kiloleni Growers Co-operative Society 197 
2 Nsayu Co-operative Society 218 
3 Nyakabindi Co-operative Society 206 
4 Imalakoye Co-operative Society 412 
5 Nyabunsalu Co-operative Society 438 
6 Imalamate Co-operative Society 489 
7 Mukula Co-operative Society 548 
8 Sapiwi Co-operative Society 622 
9 Ihanjo Co-operative Society 676 
10 Sanjo Co-operative Society 677 
11 Lyolasabo Co-operative Society 678 
12 Gininiga Co-operative Society 688 
13 Kuleng’wa Co-operative Society 729 
14 Nguga Co-operative Society 770 
15 Chambutwa Co-operative Society 746 
16 Kijilishi Co-operative Society 771 
17 Ng’wang’wege Co-operative Society 932 
18 Igegu Co-operative Society 933 
19 Isebanda Co-operative Society 1165 
20 Lutubiga Co-operative Society 1166 
21 Isalan’hanya Co-operative Society 1371 
22 Sanga Co-operative Society 1427 
23 Masewa Co-operative Society 1780 
24 Ng’wanhale Co-operative Society 1682 
25 Ditina Co-operative Society 1901 
26 Jisesa Co-operative Society 1902 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 






Appendix 22i: Societies in Sanjo zone 
1 Nyang’homango Growers Co-operative Society 269 
2 Ng’wasongo Co-operative Society 270 
3 Ng’wabagola Co-operative Society 271 
4 Bullae Co-operative Society 272 
5 Nyakato Co-operative Society 277 
6 Bunegeji Co-operative Society 321 
7 Ng’wagala Co-operative Society 337 
8 Misungwi Co-operative Society 261 
9 Kigara (Kwimba) Co-operative Society 385 
10 Kitumba Co-operative Society 415 
11 Ng’wakalima Co-operative Society 470 
12 Kilalo Co-operative Society 490 
13 Ng’wajombo Co-operative Society 532 
14 Bujingwa Co-operative Society 679 
15 Isamilo Co-operative Society 705 
16 Kanyelele Co-operative Society 911 
17 Nguge Co-operative Society 938 
18 Igunamilo Co-operative Society 939 
19 Mwambola Co-operative Society 1240 
20 Iteja Co-operative Society 1672 
21 Ng’walolela Co-operative Society 1674 
22 Mwashilalage Co-operative Society 1626 
23 Bujashi Co-operative Society 319 
24 Nyamguge Co-operative Society 1676 
25 Mwakusekwa Co-operative Society 488 
26 Kongolo Co-operative Society 410 
27 Ilalila Co-operative Society 552 
28 Bugagwa Co-operative Society 274 
29 Mang’welela Co-operative Society 1675 
30 Mwalwingi Co-operative Society 802 
31 Magaka Co-operative Society 258 
32 Kabusungu Co-operative Society 426 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 







Appendix 22j: Societies in Ukerewe zone 
1 Makamwa Growers Co-operative Society 184 
2 Muriti Co-operative Society 185 
3 Bwiro Co-operative Society 186 
4 Omurambo Co-operative Society 187 
5 Masambo Co-operative Society 182 
6 Kigara Co-operative Society 183 
7 Kisorya Co-operative Society 249 
8 Lusozi Co-operative Society 281 
9 Kigaga Co-operative Society 287 
10 Iramba Co-operative Society 290 
11 Mansimo Co-operative Society 282 
12 Buhima Co-operative Society 327 
13 Mkoko Co-operative Society 356 
14 Mgara Co-operative Society 357 
15 Ngoma Co-operative Society 359 
16 Kameya Co-operative Society 485 
17 Hamuhula Co-operative Society 513 
18 Bugolora Co-operative Society 558 
19 Sunsi Co-operative Society 611 
20 Serema Co-operative Society 639 
21 Genge Co-operative Society 669 
22 Rubaga Co-operative Society 737 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 









Appendix 22k: Societies in Ushashi zone 
1 Bunda  Growers Co-operative Society 233 
2 Ichamo Co-operative Society 234 
3 Nyamigunga Co-operative Society 236 
4 Mahunda Co-operative Society 284 
5 Nyakatokabasa Co-operative Society 354 
6 Bitaraguru Co-operative Society 376 
7 Changuge Co-operative Society 377 
8 Hunyari Co-operative Society 378 
9 Kirinero Co-operative Society 399 
10 Nyamadoke Co-operative Society 424 
11 Sazira Co-operative Society 425 
12 Sariku Co-operative Society 502 
13 Lukungu Co-operative Society 546 
14 Bariria Co-operative Society 549 
15 Kizomu Co-operative Society 654 
16 Rwabu Co-operative Society 673 
17 Kalisumba Co-operative Society 693 
18 Nyasana Co-operative Society 694 
19 Nyamasabeta Co-operative Society 703 
20 Nyatwali Co-operative Society 909 
21 Maginameru Co-operative Society 929 
22 Miharo Co-operative Society 1163 
23 Sarama Co-operative Society 1201 
24 Wamuhini Co-operative Society 1200 
25 Masangura Co-operative Society 1202 
26 Nyiberekera Co-operative Society 1203 
27 Buriga Co-operative Society 1567 
28 Gegeya Co-operative Society 1628 
29 Misisi Co-operative Society 642 
30 Kitaramaka Co-operative Society 653 
31 Nyamuswa Co-operative Society 284 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 







Appendix 22l: Societies in Mugango zone 
1 Nyambono Growers Co-operative Society 229 
2 Chumwi Co-operative Society 230 
3 Chirorwe Co-operative Society 231 
4 Musanja Co-operative Society 235 
5 Tegeruka Co-operative Society 245 
6 Busumi Co-operative Society 291 
7 Kurwaki Co-operative Society 370 
8 Suguti Co-operative Society 371 
9 Nyangurukuru Co-operative Society 389 
10 Seka Co-operative Society 499 
11 Mwiringo Co-operative Society 500 
12 Murangi Co-operative Society 543 
13 Wanyere Co-operative Society 544 
14 Ifurifu Co-operative Society 566 
15 Murugongo Co-operative Society 629 
16 Rusoli Co-operative Society 657 
17 Katario Co-operative Society 671 
18 Etaro Co-operative Society 696 
19 Kamugegi Co-operative Society 697 
20 Mwikoro Co-operative Society 702 
21 Nyamwiru Co-operative Society 704 
22 Kyawazaro Co-operative Society 747 
23 Rwanga Co-operative Society 758 
24 Jitirora Co-operative Society 904 
25 Mwibagi Co-operative Society 905 
26 Bukima Co-operative Society 379 
27 Kinesi Co-operative Society 1128 
28 Kisamwene Co-operative Society 1129 
29 Kiriba Co-operative Society 1583 
30 Ngereme Co-operative Society 1920 
31 Kiwasi Co-operative Society 672 
32 Mayani Co-operative Society 1905 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 








Appendix 22m: Societies in Kibara zone 
1 Kibara Growers Co-operative Society 181 
2 Namalebe Co-operative Society 250 
3 Kenkombyo Co-operative Society 278 
4 Mwiseni Co-operative Society 355 
5 Kasuguti Co-operative Society 358 
6 Bugoji Co-operative Society 372 
7 Guta Co-operative Society 501 
8 Saragama Co-operative Society 545 
9 Busambara Co-operative Society 612 
10 Kaburabura Co-operative Society 655 
11 Kabainja Co-operative Society 670 
12 Namibu Co-operative Society 936 
13 Kinabwiga Co-operative Society 935 
14 Namitwebiri Co-operative Society 937 
15 Masinono Co-operative Society 1439 
16 Buzimbwe Co-operative Society 1440 
17 Karukekere Co-operative Society 478 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 













Appendix 22n: Societies in Nyambiti zone 
1 Kishili Growers Co-operative Society 273 
2 Chamva Growers Co-operative Society 275 
3 Bungulwa Co-operative Society 276 
4 Nyamtala Growers Co-operative Society 283 
5 Iseni Co-operative Society 373 
6 Ngwasubi Co-operative Society 374 
7 Ng’waniko Co-operative Society 394 
8 Maligisu Co-operative Society 398 
9 Bunyengeja Co-operative Society 401 
10 Kishosha Co-operative Society 462 
11 Shushi Co-operative Society 471 
12 Igalukila Co-operative Society 495 
13 Manda Co-operative Society 538 
14 Ngudu Co-operative Society 588 
15 Buhumbi Co-operative Society 590 
16 Ng’waginghi Co-operative Society 684 
17 Ibindo Co-operative Society 698 
19 Kadashi Co-operative Society 910 
20 Lifulilo Co-operative Society 912 
21 Bugandando Co-operative Society 1093 
22 Masaladi Co-operative Society 1156 
23 Nyamikoma Co-operative Society 1357 
24 Ng’wamalwilo Co-operative Society 1367 
25 Kihoja Co-operative Society 1415 
26 Shilanona Co-operative Society 1416 
27 Isabilo Co-operative Society 1680 
28 Ng’wahuchuma Co-operative Society 1685 
29 Jinjimili Co-operative Society 1947 
Source: Assistant DA, Lake Province to All DCs in the Lake Province, Ref. No. 
C/COT/BP April 23rd 1957, TNA 215/1423/C; Interview with K.K Nangale (Maswa); 
Kabado (Shinyanga), E.Y. Masele, Festus Ganzila, Mayala and Bomani (Mwanza); 
S.M.L.SEIMU (2014). 
 
 
